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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the emergence, 
nature, and significance of non-state transnational governance. This research 
objective is pursued by examining an aspect of transnational non-state governance 
often neglected, the role of the state in the emergence and operation of non-state 
governance schemes. The role of the state in this context is illuminated by 
identifying and explaining the emergence of a particular type of authority, called 
transnational regulatory authority. Transnational regulatory authority emerges 
when the authority of creating regulation bearing a degree of legal obligation 
about an issue-area or industry at a global level, is delegated to non-state actors. 
This delegation of regulatory authority is puzzling, as it implies a loss of 
regulators’ control over the regulatory governance of their jurisdictions, but also 
raises significant normative concerns, since authority has been entrusted to the 
state under specific procedures which form the very foundation of a democratic 
political association.
An explanation to this puzzle is proposed by a theoretical framework 
created through the synthesis of insights provided by the economic theory of 
international regulation and the political theory of authority. The propositions that 
emerge from this synthesis are tested through the examination of two case-studies, 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International 
Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of 
Pharmaceutical Products (ICH). The principal finding of the thesis is that the 
delegation of rule-making authority to transnational organizations is the result of 
explicit redistributive regulatory strategies, domestic or international, designed to 
satisfy specific domestic constituencies. However, regulators need to allay the 
normative concerns raised by this delegation of authority. To do this, they have to 
justify their decision by persuading the political establishment and the public that 
this delegation is necessary for the provision of adequate regulatory governance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Global governance and non-state actors: a new challenge
In international relations’ literature, the state has traditionally been considered the 
principal entity with the ability and legitimacy to decide both the form and content of 
international institutional and legal arrangements. As a result, non-state actors (NSAs) 
have traditionally been treated as marginal actors with no great bearing on 
developments in the international arena. In recent years however, this academic 
paradigm has been seriously undermined. The varied and multi-layered processes of 
globalization have transformed the role of NSAs in an increasingly inter-connecting 
world. First, a variety of non-state actors are increasingly engaged in a widening array 
of transnational activities which transform all aspects of international economic 
relations (production, trade, finance), but also affect cultural exchanges, migration 
movements, environmental preoccupations and even the way war is conceived and 
conducted (Held et al. 2000).
In this context, the autonomy of states to select and implement unilaterally a 
range of policy options has been seriously constrained (Strange 1996; Reinicke 1998; 
Held 2004). The flurry of transnational activity has meant that increasingly, several 
aspects of everyday life, particularly in the economic realm, are operating in the 
context of a functional geography, which often is at odds with the territorial 
geography of political authority (O’Brien 1991; Neuer 1998; Kobrin 2002). This 
disjuncture between the functional, economic geography of non-state actors and the 
territorial geography of states is threatening the internal operational sovereignty of 
states, that is, their capacity to create and enforce public policy (Reinicke 1998; Held 
2004)1. Meanwhile, international law and the inter-state governance system that 
sustains it, have also eroded, to a degree, the ideal of the “sovereign state” as the
1 Internal sovereignty “involves the belief that a political body established as sovereign rightly 
exercises the ‘supreme command’ over a particular society. Government- how ever defined- must enjoy 
the ‘final and absolute authority’ within that terrain”. External sovereignty on the other hand “involves 
the claim that there is no final and absolute authority above and beyond the sovereign state” (Held 
2004, p. 100).
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supreme authority in the international system, and have therefore contained the 
external sovereignty of states (Held 2004).
Notwithstanding these constraints on states’ authority, this new complex 
transnational reality necessitates regulatory arrangements to guide the widening array 
of participants in their interactions with each other and with the existing national and 
international regulatory frameworks. The international and transnational structures 
and mechanisms that have emerged in recent years in response to this demand for 
governance feature some novel characteristics that have significant consequences for 
both national and world politics. Two significant characteristics of this emerging 
global governance infrastructure, particularly in the realm of political economy, are 
the processes of “pluralization” and “privatization” (Cutler 2003). Pluralization refers 
to the emergence of a variety of rule-making arrangements, which transform the 
traditional conceptualizations of both the subjects and sources of international law, 
associated with states and inter-state legal agreements respectively (Cutler 2003, pp. 
21-23). The proliferation and diversity of subjects and sources lie at the heart of the 
pluralization process. Such alternative legal subjects can be trans-govemmental 
organizations or organizations comprising public national regulators with varying 
degrees of statutory independence from their governments, like the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). The guidelines, standards and 
agreements produced by these organizations have increasingly been used as sources 
of transnational regulation, especially in the area of finance, and have become the 
driving force for the harmonization of national regulatory frameworks2.
Privatization refers to the fact that a significant drive behind pluralization is 
the emergence of a variety of private governance schemes. Civil society movements 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNCs), 
international industry associations and chambers of commerce, transnational groups 
of experts, think tanks and lobbies, engage individually or in cooperation with each 
other, as well as with state agencies and other public entities, in the construction of an
2 For an analysis o f  trans-govemmental governance networks see Slaughter (2000; 2004).
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array of organizations, networks and regimes for the governance of an issue-area or 
an industry. These schemes vary in terms of organizational structure and formality, 
and their work ranges from technical standards,3 to commercial standards,4 to the 
harmonization of diverse national legal frameworks5.
As a result, we now observe an increasing array o f governance functions 
taking place away from the territorial cradle of political authority, the nation-state 
(Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Held 2004; Koenig-Archibugi and Zum 
2006). Indeed, the term “global governance” which “includes formal institutions and 
regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that 
people and institutions have agreed to or perceive to be in their interests”6, implies a 
departure of politics and political analysis from the exclusive preoccupation with 
“government” and the “intergovernmental” institutions that traditionally have been 
the focus of international relations’ analysts. Governance is not the same as 
government (Rosenau 1992). The fact that an amalgam of transnational and 
international regulatory arrangements has an increasingly significant impact on the 
lives and operation o f national societies and economies raises significant issues of 
legitimacy and accountability (Underhill and Zhang 2003; Keohane 2003; Held and 
Koenig-Archibugi 2005; Zum and Koenig-Archibugi 2006; Graz and Nolke 2008). 
This is because this situation undermines one of the central tenets of modem 
democratic theory. According to Held:
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries theorists of democracy have tended 
to assume a ‘symmetrical’ and ‘congruent’ relationship between political decision­
makers and the recipients of political decisions. In fact, symmetry and congruence have 
often been taken for granted at two crucial points: first, between citizen-voters and the 
decision-makers whom they are, in principle, able to hold to account; and secondly, 
between the output (decisions, policies and so on) of decision-makers and their 
constituencies-ultimately, ‘the people’ in a delimited territory.
(2004, p. 16)
3 International Organization for Standardization (ISO); European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI); Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).
4 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN); International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC); International Association o f Classification Societies (IACS).
5 International Accounting Standards Board (IASB); International Conference on Harmonization 
(ICH); Comity Maritime International (CMI).
6 Commission on Global Governance (1995, p.2).
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This symmetrical and congruent relationship however, is increasingly undermined on 
both counts. First, citizen-voters are not able to hold to account many of these 
transnational regulatory arrangements. There are three types o f justification for an 
accountability requirement from the point of view of democratic theory: 
authorization, support and impact (Keohane 2003)7. Obviously, the majority of 
transnational, particularly non-state, arrangements have been neither authorized nor 
supported by voters, who often are not even aware o f them. Nonetheless, such 
governance schemes may exert a considerable impact on the lives of the citizens of 
many countries. This raises a serious deficit o f “external accountability: 
accountability to people outside the acting entity, whose lives are affected by it” 
(Keohane 2003, p. 141). Secondly, the congruence between the output of these 
decision-makers and their constituents is not guaranteed anymore, as the latter are 
organized along the principles of a territorially demarked space while the former 
extend beyond territorial borders along the lines of the functional geography 
described above. A potentially unaccountable and therefore illegitimate global 
governance structure represents a significant risk for democracy. Its operation may 
compromise the principle of autonomy in democratic societies, that is, the ability of 
persons to “enjoy equal rights, and accordingly, equal obligations in the specification 
of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to 
them” (Held 2004, p. 147).
1.2 Coping with the challenge of global governance: what role for the state?
The discussion above, demonstrates the urgent need to improve our understanding of 
the emerging multi-faceted and multi-level global governance structure. The 
examination and analysis of the role of non-state actors is particularly interesting in 
this context. Their participation is increasingly important, so much so, that in recent 
years an entirely new strand of research has emerged in order to examine the role of 
NSAs in the design and creation of the institutional and regulatory framework of 
global governance (Cutler et al. 1999; Higgott et al. 2000; Josselin and Wallace 2001;
7 “An accountability relationship is one in which an individual, group or other entity makes demands 
on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to im pose costs on the agent. W e can 
speak o f  an authorized or institutionalized accountability relationship when the requirement to report, 
and the right to sanction, are mutually understood and accepted” (Keohane 2003 , p .139).
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Hall and Biersteker 2002; Graz and Nolke 2008). The bulk of the first wave of this 
research was primarily concerned with examining a variety of non-state governance 
arrangements in order to reveal their existence and illustrate their significance as new 
transnational regulatory mechanisms. As a result, most of this literature focused on 
the role of NSAs in global governance and tended to neglect the role of the state in 
this process. Analysts tended to treat states as unwilling or unable to provide adequate 
governance structures; in view of this governance deficit, NSAs stepped in and 
increasingly assumed this role. Globalization, and particularly new technological and 
scientific developments and their impact on the operation of global markets, have 
usually been cited as the principal explanatory variables for states’ attitude (Cemy 
1995; Spar 1999; Florini 2000; Kobrin 2002).
The “inability/unwillingness of the state” thesis attributes to state actors a 
passive role. Contrary to this tendency, and without denying the constraints that 
globalization often poses to state action, some analysts have pointed out that states 
and their policies have also been responsible for the emergence of this complex 
transnational governance structure (Josselin and Wallace 2001; Pauly 2002). As the 
global governance literature matures from more general analyses and descriptive 
case-studies to engagement with specific institutional aspects of non-state governance 
arrangements, the relationship between the state and this plethora of transnational 
regulatory mechanisms is being explored in a more systematic way (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002; Sassen 2006; Koenig-Archibugi and Zum 2006; Graz and Nolke 
2008).
This thesis aims to contribute to this emerging literature by exploring the role 
of state actors in the emergence of non-state governance structures. By emphasizing 
the role of state actors, this thesis aims to illuminate an aspect of non-state global 
governance often neglected. This approach reverses the usual course of enquiry, 
which investigates the reasons behind private actors’ coordination to create 
governance mechanisms at the transnational level, and asks instead why and under 
what conditions do states tolerate, endorse or even participate in transnational 
regulatory arrangements?
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1.3 Delineating the puzzle: identifying and explaining transnational regulatory 
authority
In order to provide an answer to these questions, the role of the state in non-state 
governance structures shall be examined in the context of hybrid (public-private) 
global governance schemes. In such cases, the state is not simply tolerating or 
generally endorsing the work of a non-state forum, but it is intentionally and 
explicitly participating in its work. Both the institutional configuration of the hybrid 
forum and its history, and the elimination of alternative courses of action by states 
can provide us with material for analysis. What is more, this thesis will not 
investigate just any type of hybrid governance arrangements, since often the role and 
weight of the participating parties are very different and the resulting governance 
outcomes are characterized by varying levels of regulatory impact and/or legalization. 
In the theoretical and empirical analysis that follows, we shall focus on a specific type 
of hybrid global economic governance, increasingly visible in recent years. This 
specific type o f hybrid governance refers to transnational institutions which involve 
both state and non-state actors and which produce regulatory outcomes that are being 
adopted by states as legally binding.
By focusing on those schemes that produce legally binding results, we hope to 
bring the state’s role in non-state governance much more sharply and clearly into 
focus. This is an extreme paradigm of states’ participation in non-state global 
governance structures; states not only get involved, but intentionally decide to invest 
the regulatory output of such hybrid collaborations with formal legality. In this case, 
it is not necessary to engage in a legal discussion about the actual impact or the 
proper status of soft-law instruments (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Cutler 2003) or to 
articulate a new theory of global law (Teubner 1997), when we want to investigate 
the consequences of states’ participation in multi-level global governance. We can 
instead focus on a very specific question which is why traditional, hard-law, binding 
obligation has been attributed by states to regulation coming out of transnational non­
state institutions.
In addition, the creation by a non-state institution of rules that acquire a 
legally binding force, is by itself, a truly novel and consequential aspect of global
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governance worth investigating. By investing the rules of hybrid, non-state 
institutions with legal force, states are effectively surrendering part o f their control 
over one of the most distinctive powers of the modem nation-state. Legal obligation 
is intertwined with the essence of the nation-state itself, as within the boundaries of 
states it is based on an explicit or implicit threat of physical coercion. The threat of 
physical coercion in turn, stems from what is perhaps considered the core distinctive 
feature of the state as a social institution: “the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory” (Weber in Hall and Biersteker 2002, p.3). 
However, the state is entrusted with this unique monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force on the basis of the democratic guarantees described earlier; when these 
guarantees are weakened at the transnational level, the normative questions raised 
from investing non-state rules with formal legality become even more pronounced.
In order to fully articulate the issues emerging from this kind of hybrid 
process we need a concept able to capture both its political and normative aspects. 
For this reason, the analysis in this thesis will be founded on one of the central 
concepts of political theory, that of authority. The most common and perhaps succinct 
definition of authority is that authority is legitimate power (Friedman 1990). 
Conceived in this way, authority can be an extremely useful concept as it embodies 
both a political dimension, the power of the state to rule within a given territory, and a 
normative dimension, the requirement of consent by the subjects o f state power in 
order for this power to be regarded as legitimate and therefore authoritative. By using 
the concept of authority, we are effectively following the strand of research initiated 
by Cutler, Haufler and Porter (1999), who edited a volume that focused specifically 
on the under-researched role of corporate sector non-state actors in global 
governance. In that volume, the authors introduced an interesting and novel approach 
to examine NSAs’ involvement in global governance, the concept of private 
authority. This approach was further elaborated in Hall and Biersteker (2002) who 
extended the concept o f private authority beyond the economic arena to the private 
moral authority of non-state religious movements and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and to the illicit authority of mercenaries and mafias.
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Despite its positive contribution, it should be said that the literature on private 
authority is still in its initial stages and significant work remains to be done, 
especially when one takes into account the inherent theoretical and normative 
problems associated with the concept of authority. One of the problems with the 
concept of private authority is that it does not address adequately the particular 
characteristics of in authority. In authority “is a property o f rules and offices created 
by rules. Individuals possess it by virtue of holding an office in an organization, such 
as a state, a corporation, a university or a trade union that is (partially) governed by 
more or less formalized or codified rules” (Flathman 1980, p. 16-17). This is different 
from either expertise {an authority) or simply power to change the behaviour of 
others. It is only those in authority that issue and apply rules and commands which 
entail obligations to act. Political authority therefore always refers to in authority 
(Flathman 1980). Many transnational non-state arrangements enjoy an authority 
based on the expertise of the participating parties, or have the power to enforce de 
facto their decisions in a given issue-area or industry. These arrangements should not 
be considered authoritative since they are not, for the most part, viewed as obligatory 
or legitimate by the parties potentially affected by them. This distinction is not 
adequately stressed by the private authority literature and as a result, a variety of non­
state governance arrangements are treated as authoritative even when they lack the 
particular attributes of in authority. This tendency confuses rather than clarifies both 
the institutional and political characteristics of various non-state governance^ 
arrangements and obscures the clarity of the concept of private authority itself.
The purpose here is to use the concept of authority in a way that captures the 
political and normative consequences of attributing legal force to non-state rules, 
while differentiating the resulting governance arrangements from other non-state 
governance structures. For this reason, following an analysis of the concept of 
authority at both the domestic and international level, we introduce in the following 
chapter the concept of transnational regulatory authority which refers to 
transnational, non-state, authoritative rule-making. This concept, used to illustrate the 
delegation of regulatory authority {in authority) to non-state actors, will become the 
focus of the thesis. This delegation of authority is puzzling as it implies costs not only
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in terms of an erosion of the internal sovereignty of states, described earlier, but also 
in terms of legitimacy, since authority has been entrusted to the state under specific 
procedures which form the very foundation of a democratic political association. 
Delegating part of this authority to transnational non-state actors potentially violates 
these procedures and undermines the legitimacy of the state.
Consequently, I believe that in order to provide a comprehensive explanation 
for the puzzle of transnational regulatory authority three fundamental questions need 
to be answered:
• Why do regulators and/or politicians participate in hybrid governance 
schemes or acknowledge the rules produced by non-state governance schemes 
giving rise to transnational regulatory authority?
• Under what conditions do they have an incentive to use or endorse 
transnational regulatory authority, compared to other international and/or 
transnational institutional mechanisms?
• How are they able to reconcile this delegation o f authority to private actors 
with the principles of public in authority?
The answers to these questions are provided through a theoretical framework that 
combines the insights of the economic theory of international regulation (Oatley and 
Nabors 1998; Richards 1999) and the political theory of authority (Friedrich 1958; 
Pennock and Chapman 1987; Flathman 1980; Raz 1983, 1990). The answers to the 
first two questions proposed above, address the functional preoccupations of the 
holders of regulatory authority by focusing on their efforts to ensure their political 
survival though the use of transnational regulatory authority. The basic argument of 
the thesis is that national regulators and/or politicians will use transnational 
regulatory authority to satisfy specific domestic constituencies, in their effort to 
maximize their own political gains. To achieve this, they are likely to use 
transnational regulatory authority in two cases. First, when it allows them to effect 
redistribution among domestic constituencies with lower political costs than through 
other alternatives. This is more likely to happen when, in issue-areas with highly 
complex scientific, technical and/or technological content, the issues being regulated
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have a high potential to mobilize wide public opposition. Secondly, regulators and/or 
politicians may use transnational regulatory authority in order to redistribute wealth 
from foreign to domestic constituencies. This strategy may be employed when, in 
issue-areas or industries characterized by an oligopolistic global market structure, 
there are significant distributional conflicts among the dominant market players, 
which cannot be resolved through international institutions; in this case transnational 
regulatory authority may be used as a forum-shifting strategy.
However, the political equilibrium that regulators and politicians strive to 
achieve is affected not only by interest-driven considerations stemming from their 
substantive goal of being re-elected or re-appointed, but also, as pointed out 
previously, by normative and institutional constraints that stem from their position as 
holders of authority. These constraints are addressed by the third research question. 
Here, apart from procedural criteria that have to be satisfied, we would expect 
regulators and/or politicians to justify the delegation of regulatory authority by 
arguing that it is necessary, because changes in scientific knowledge and/or 
technology have altered the nature of an issue-area or industry, thereby hindering the 
ability of traditional state and/or inter-state mechanisms to provide an adequate 
standard of governance, on their own.
These two sets of constraints are not irreconcilable. Their basic difference is 
that they address different aspects of public in authority. While interest considerations 
refer to the reality of authority as practice, normative considerations relate to the 
concept o f  authority itself. I believe that the key for understanding when states 
delegate their regulatory authority is to be found at the crossroads of the normative 
foundation of public in authority and the functional foundation of its institutional 
manifestation; in other words at the intersection of the interest-based political 
behaviour illustrated by the positive theory of regulation and the normative and 
institutional limits outlined by the political theory of authority.
1.4 Locating the empirical puzzle: introducing the case studies
The propositions developed in the theoretical framework presented above, will be 
tested for their empirical validity through the use of two case studies. The first case 
study will examine the transnational regulatory authority o f the International
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Accounting Standards Board (IASB) while the second case study will focus on the 
International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the 
Registration of Pharmaceutical Products (ICH).
The IASB and its predecessor, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC), have been engaged in the international harmonization of
accounting standards for the past three decades. The IASB is one of the most
successful examples of transnational non-state governance, but more importantly, it is 
embedded in formal institutional structures alongside state and other public actors, 
sharing part of their regulatory authority. Since 2005 the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) produced by the IASB have replaced national
accounting standards for the consolidated accounts of listed companies in the
European Economic Area (EEA), while a similar process has already been adopted or 
is under way in an increasing number of countries.
The history of the IASB has been marked by significant differences among the 
interested parties. Particularly important for its development has been a conflict 
between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the United States’ financial 
markets’ regulator, and the European Commission (EC), about the direction of 
accounting harmonization and consequently about the burden of adjustment for this 
harmonization. As we shall argue, the emergence of the IASB as an authoritative 
global accounting standard-setter is the result of a forum-shifting strategy employed 
by the European Commission when unable to persuade the SEC of a mutually 
acceptable harmonization of accounting standards. While the overall strategy of the 
EC has been successful, since the SEC has come to accept a roadmap for allowing 
IFRSs as a legitimate set of accounting standards that can be used in the US capital 
markets, the content and direction of harmonization have not exactly been what the 
EC had hoped for. This is because the SEC engaged the IASC first, in the context of a 
forum-shifting strategy of its own, albeit in an effort not to establish transnational 
regulatory authority but rather to control and if possible prevent its emergence.
The ICH on the other hand, is a transnational body which brings together 
regulators and industry associations from Europe, Japan and the US. The ICH issues 
Harmonized Tripartite Guidelines which aim to provide common guidance in the
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three states/region on how to conduct the evaluation of applications for new 
medicines for human use. The ICH is one of the most successful examples of 
transnational non-state governance, and is embedded in a formal institutional 
structure where non-state actors and regulators share in equal part the authority to 
regulate the drug approval procedure. So far the ICH has issued more that 50 
guidelines which have been adopted by the three regulators and have been 
incorporated in the national/regional regulatory framework alongside other guidelines 
and regulations, often replacing the latter.
Following sustained pressure from their respective industries, the regulators of 
these three states/region had started looking for alternative harmonization forums 
since the early 1980s, as soon as it became clear that the regulatory direction pursued 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) was linked to demands for a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO)8. While distributional conflicts among the 
major players in the pharmaceutical industry account to some degree for the push for 
international harmonization, they were not a dominant factor, as all three significant 
market players agreed on the need and basic purpose of harmonization. This 
agreement was mainly a result of the coordinated pressure from their domestic 
research-based pharmaceutical industries. The industry was in favour of 
harmonization as regulatory diversity produces significant problems in terms of both 
monetary costs in the research and development process (R&D), and time delays in 
the introduction of new drugs in the market. This agreement was given an additional 
boost in the late 1980s by domestic public and political pressure to make more 
efficient the drug approval process. The coincidence of industry pressure and 
domestic political circumstances favourable to harmonization gave added urgency to 
the regulators’ move towards the harmonization of drug approval and registration 
procedures. Harmonization however did not have to occur in a transnational 
regulatory forum like the ICH. The fact that it did is a testimony to the ability of the
8 The increasing influence of developing countries in the United Nations apparatus, which wanted to 
use the UN as a forum for rebalancing their political and economic relations with the developed 
countries and with multinational corporations, led to the adoption of the Declaration and Programme of 
Action on the Establishment o f a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 (General 
Assembly Resolution 3201, UN). The goal of the NIEO was “to eliminate the widening gap between 
the developed and the developing countries” (UN 1974).
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industry to influence the pharmaceutical regulatory process. The ICH has offered the 
industry a privileged position while excluding other stakeholders, and has followed 
closely the objectives and agenda of the industry. In other words, the ICH represents a 
case of domestic redistribution in all three regions of the ICH, where the interests of 
the pharmaceutical industry have been given priority over the interests of the public.
1.5 Methodology
In this final section an overview of the methodology used in this thesis is presented 
and potential methodological questions and concerns are addressed. First, we need to 
justify the choice of the case study method. The case study method was chosen here 
because it is uniquely suited to the study of a complex social phenomenon such as 
transnational regulatory governance and authority. The case study method is 
particularly relevant when the number of cases is relatively limited and large-n 
studies are not possible, but also when it is difficult to disaggregate the phenomenon 
under study into constituent dimensions that can be examined through the use of 
alternative methods. This is particularly the case when the issues involved are not 
amenable to statistical analysis (King et al. 1994) or when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon under examination and its context are not clearly evident (Yin 2003). 
All of these factors apply to the phenomenon of transnational regulatory authority 
which is an extremely complex phenomenon comprising public and private, national 
and transnational actors, engaging in complex regulatory governance at a 
transnational, and often a global level. Cases of this phenomenon are not yet 
numerous but they exist and their number is likely to increase in the coming years. 
Moreover, the issues that characterize transnational regulatory authority and indeed 
set it apart from other non-state governance schemes are issues such as legitimacy, 
authority and accountability which cannot be quantified, and which are intricately 
linked to a specific political context within the confines of a given political 
community.
The organizations at the centre of the two case studies have been examined 
through the use of both secondary and primary research material. Review and 
analysis of textbooks, research monographs and articles in academic and professional 
journals formed the basis and starting point for their study, which was complemented
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and completed with the analysis of original press articles and news reports, primary 
documentary sources (official documents and reports, press releases, pieces of 
national and international legislation and regulatory codes, standards and guidelines, 
internal guidelines and notifications of national, international and transnational 
organizations) and finally, semi-structured, in-depth interviews with a number of 
active and former representatives of both these two organizations and other 
organizations which are actively involved in their work, some o f whom have played a 
defining role in their evolution and current success.
The choice of these two particular case studies was based on three factors. 
First, they are cases that exhibit clearly the characteristics o f transnational regulatory 
authority. As discussed earlier, this phenomenon has not been discussed as a distinct 
phenomenon in the private authority literature and finding cases that clearly 
demonstrate its difference from other non-state governance schemes is essential in 
order to illustrate the new and unique nature of this phenomenon. Secondly, these two 
organizations are extremely successful and have produced impressive regulatory 
results especially when compared with the results of other non-state governance 
schemes. As such they should provide us with an in-depth understanding o f the 
conditions under which this strategy can be successfully pursued by regulators. 
Thirdly, while both o f these organizations bear the mark of transnational regulatory 
authority, they are different enough to make their comparison a compelling exercise 
and one that would significantly enhance the validity o f the arguments and our ability 
to claim a wider generalization of the conclusions of this thesis. Both the institutional 
characteristics and the historical development of these two organizations differ 
significantly. Thus, while the IASB was established as a pure private sector 
professional organization whose work gradually begun to be adopted by states, the 
ICH was created from the beginning as a public-private hybrid regulatory project with 
well-defined roles for both parties. Moreover, the issue-areas for which these 
organizations provide regulatory governance are considerably different; the policy 
and normative issues that arise are therefore varied enough to provide an additional 
test for the generalization o f our framework’s propositions. Indeed, as we shall see, 
these two cases represent the two different types of redistribution (domestic and
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international) proposed by our theoretical framework, providing thus a stronger test 
for the validity of the thesis’ main redistributive argument.
A final issue which deserves to be addressed in this methodological section is 
whether these two case studies are enough to support the theoretical validity and 
generalization of the argument presented here. I believe that these two case studies 
provide sufficient evidence to establish the theoretical validity of the propositions 
made in this thesis. This belief is grounded on three factors. First, as already 
mentioned, this is a new and emerging phenomenon and there are few cases that 
could be examined. The ability of including a large number of case studies is 
therefore as of yet quite limited. Secondly, the question of the appropriate number of 
case studies is founded on a “sampling logic” which treats multiple cases in the same 
way as multiple respondents in a survey; this procedure is used when we want to 
determine the prevalence or frequency of a particular phenomenon and is ill-suited for 
the case study method (Yin 2003, pp. 47-48). Moreover, a sampling logic necessitates 
random selection of cases (to ensure that selection is not biased) which in small-n 
cases can have the opposite results and lead to significant bias distortions (King et al. 
1994, p. 126). Contrary to sampling rationality, “each individual case study consists 
of a ‘whole’ study, in which convergent evidence is sought regarding the facts and 
conclusions for the case; each case’s conclusions are then considered to be the 
information needing replication by other individual cases” (Yin 2003, p. 50). This is 
why multiple case studies are similar to multiple experiments which are replicated to 
verify the results; in this case what we are after is not statistical generalization but 
analytic generalization, where “a previously developed theory is used as a template 
with which to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin 2003, pp. 32-33). 
Thirdly, the two case studies examined here offer a sufficient number o f observations 
for the examination o f each proposition. It should be remembered that the dependent 
variable of the thesis is the behaviour of regulators and/or politicians. Here we focus 
on a total of five regulators: two for the IASB case and three for the ICH case. Given 
that the thesis examines three different research questions each with one or two 
explanatory variables, which often operate complementary to each other and at
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different levels of analysis, I believe that the observations available are sufficient to 
support the theoretical propositions of the thesis.
Following this introduction, the next chapter develops the conceptual basis 
upon which the rest of the thesis shall be developed. After engaging with an analysis 
of the phenomenon of non-state authority, we introduce the concept of transnational 
in authority and demonstrate its analytical distinction from other forms of 
transnational non-state governance.
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Chapter 2
Conceptualizing Transnational Non-state Authority
2.1 Introduction
The introduction o f the concept of authority in the analysis of non-state governance 
arrangements (Cutler et al. 1999; Hall and Biesteker 2002) has been a positive 
contribution to the global governance literature, since earlier works did not 
discriminate adequately between private power and private authority and often used 
the terms interchangeably9. Despite this positive development, as we have already 
argued, the literature on private authority is still in its initial stages and significant 
work remains to be done. This chapter aims to contribute to our understanding of the 
phenomenon of non-state authority at the domestic and the transnational level. This 
objective is pursued first, by outlining the main characteristics of authority and 
identifying the sometimes loose and inconsistent use of the term in the private 
authority literature. This can hopefully help us distinguish between cases o f authority 
limited to a private setting, of authoritative knowledge and expertise, and of 
authoritative non-state governance of areas of public life and activity. This latter 
phenomenon, which is of interest here, will be defined more narrowly as a type of 
authority which partakes of what is traditionally called political authority. In order to 
understand this new type of authority we shall demonstrate the analytical foundations 
of its constitution and examine the conditions of its emergence.
2.2 Authority
The identification and analysis of instances of non-state authority has to begin with a 
clarification of the concept of private authority, as this has been proposed in the
9 Strange (1996) for example often refers to power and authority interchangeably without making any 
analytical distinction between them. She defines politics as “those processes and structures through 
which the mix o f values in the system as a whole, and their distribution among social groups and 
individuals was determined” (Strange 1996, p.34). According to Strange, her definition is derived from 
Easton’s famous definition o f politics as: “the authoritative allocation o f values in the system” (Easton 
1953, p. 143). Her definition however, departs from Easton’s in one significant point: Easton speaks of 
the authoritative allocation o f values, while Strange is concerned only with the actual distribution of 
values. By omitting the crucial qualification “authoritative”, Strange effectively equates authority with 
power; she defines politics as the effective allocation of values, without examining whether this 
allocation is regarded by its recipients as legitimate and obligatory or not.
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literature. To do this however, it is first necessary to define authority. Authority is a 
very complex concept and different meanings have been ascribed to it from the early 
days of the Roman Republic when the term was first used10. Since then different 
approaches have been competing to establish their own definition of authority11. 
Despite the differences however, there are some characteristics which are commonly 
accepted as essential constitutive features of authority by most scholars.
Perhaps the most significant of these is the acknowledgement that authority is 
not a homogeneous concept. In different contexts, authority can have different 
meanings. Based on this observation, a basic distinction is commonly made between 
“an” and “in” authority (Flathman 1980; Friedman 1990). An authority “is based on, 
is possessed by virtue of, demonstrated knowledge, skill, or expertise concerning a 
subject matter or activity”, while in authority “is a property of rules and offices 
created by rules. Individuals possess it by virtue of holding an office in an 
organization, such as a state, a corporation, a university or a trade union that is 
(partially) governed by more or less formalized or codified rules” (Flathman 1980, p. 
16-17). This distinction is crucial for the purposes of this thesis, because as will be 
shown later in this chapter, it can help us delineate the various aspects of private 
authority and identify those instances that constitute a truly consequential change in 
the structure of global economic governance.
Another significant distinction is that between authority and power. Authority 
is usually called legitimate power to distinguish it from pure power, the main 
difference being that authority has to be viewed as legitimate by the people that are 
subject to it. As Flathman (1980, p. 164) argues, the main analytical difference 
between authority and power is that authority entails the obligation of its subject to 
conform to its rules and commands, while the acceptance of power does not result in 
a comparable obligation to yield to it; indeed it could actually be a reason to resist it. 
Legitimacy, or a sense of obligation, therefore, is a distinct characteristic of authority. 
This sense of obligation also distinguishes authority from persuasion. This is because
10 For a discussion o f what the concept o f authority meant for the Romans see Arendt (1958); also 
Lincoln (1994).
11 For a number o f different approaches to the concept of authority see Friedrich (1958); Pennock and 
Chapman (1987); Flathman (1980) and Raz (1979, 1990).
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authority is not founded on the exercise of rational calculation and the exchange of 
argument, but rests on the fact that the person or organization that issue a 
pronouncement or a command warrant acceptance solely on the basis of their 
authoritative status. Authority is not obeyed because people consider its individual 
commands and pronouncements to be in their individual interest but due to a sense of 
obligation and an acknowledgement of the legitimate right of authority to issue 
commands and pronouncements. The exercise of either coercion or persuasion 
therefore, is not compatible with authority. As Arendt (1958, p. 82) puts it: “where 
force is used, authority itself has failed” and “where arguments are used, authority is 
left in abeyance”.
By differentiating authority from both persuasion and coercion and therefore 
the rational calculation of both interests and threats, we are left with what has been 
characterised as a central element of authority, the “surrender of private judgement”. 
While the surrender of private judgement is considered central to the concept of 
authority, there is no general agreement on exactly how much judgement people are 
supposed to surrender. First of all, it should be made clear that the surrender of 
private judgement is not equally important for both in and an authority. Indeed, in the 
case of an authority often there needs to be no surrender o f individual judgement at 
all. This is ironic given that an authority is founded on the fact that some individuals 
know more about certain issues than others. This inequality is the very source of an 
authority; it is antecedent to the authority relation, since an authority is based on the 
fact that “it is because of the superior insight of some person that he should be 
acknowledged as “an authority” by others: the deference relation is thus supposed to 
reflect the antecedent concrete “personal” differences between the parties” (Friedman 
1990, p.82). Therefore, someone who is an authority can make a statement that 
carries his or her authority as an expert and for that reason people can give such a 
statement added weight compared to other statements or factors in order to make a 
judgement. By doing so however, people do not necessarily surrender their judgement 
for that of the expert (although often they do so) but can actually exercise their 
individual judgement to both weigh the expert view against other views, and after 
considering all views, to reach a judgement of their own. To use Raz’s language, an
32
authority gives another reason to be added in the balance of reasons that one has to 
judge before making a decision (Raz 1979).
Things are quite different with in authority however. This is because in 
authority, contrary to an authority, is based on a premise of equality, not inequality; it 
is a subtle type of equality: “the assumption is not that nobody actually knows more 
than anyone else, that no one is wiser, better or superior; but rather that no one can 
“persuade” the others that his judgement is superior, such as to justify deference” 
(Friedman 1990, p.82). It is because of the difficulty to reach collectively agreed 
decisions therefore that in authority is established as the remedy to collective action 
problems. As Friedman puts it: “the authority relationship will then appear as an 
elaborate contrivance designed to achieve agreement at the procedural level in the 
face of disagreement at the substantive level -  by defining whose judgement is to 
count as “public” and whose judgement is to be deemed “private” (1990, p.78). 
Private in this sense does not refer to judgement pertaining to issues of the private 
sphere or “apolitical” matters, but rather on judgement that is non-authoritative, that 
is, not entitled to prescribe behaviour. Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
individuals do not exercise their judgement. The surrender of private judgement even 
in this extreme sense, does not entail surrendering judgement altogether. Friedman 
acknowledges that people may judge and disagree with the content of a specific 
pronouncement or command but they will obey it nonetheless; in this sense “what is 
suspended is not judgement but choice: the subject desists from acting on his own 
judgement, even though he may “privately” dissent from the authoritative utterance” 
(Friedman 1990, p.72).
In addition to this type of judgement, Flathman (1980) adds another layer of 
private judgement: at the very least subjects of authority must exercise judgement in 
order to decide whether a command is indeed authoritative and therefore warrants 
their obedience as such. To do this, people use certain criteria, usually referred to as 
the “mark of authority”. These criteria can be specific procedures, uniforms, insignia 
or even social attributes such as wealth. They offer a public verification of the 
authoritativeness of the source that makes a pronouncement. Their identification and 
acceptance are dependent on a number of shared beliefs and values that form the basis
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and constitute a precondition for the acknowledgement of authority. Moreover, shared 
beliefs and values are necessary not just for the practical operation and identification 
of authority, but for its very existence. The common acknowledgement of these 
beliefs and values “ ...posits acceptance of some set of propositions according to 
which it is right or proper that there be authority at all and that such authority be 
established, lodged, distributed, exercised and so on in this or that manner” (Flathman 
1980, p.20). However, once people have established that a rule, command or 
pronouncement is authoritative, they surrender their right to make obedience to them 
contingent to their judgement about their substantive merits. As we saw, individuals 
can still judge these statements on grounds of merit (although often they will not) but 
they will not act on them; they surrender their right to act on their substantive 
judgements. Therefore, authority can be thought of as “the ability to change reasons 
for action” (Raz 1979, p. 16). In the case of in authority, commands and orders are not 
only a reason to act by themselves, but they also exclude other reasons for 
consideration before acting. A person can judge the “balance o f reasons” for an action 
but accepting in authority means “giving up one’s right to act on one’s judgement on 
the balance of reasons” (Raz 1979, p.26).
2.3 Private authority in global governance
Having identified the central elements of authority, we can now move on to the 
concept of private authority as used in the literature on global economic governance. 
A straightforward definition of private authority would need to include the above 
features of authority in addition to an acknowledgment that its source can be found in 
the private sector. Indeed, Cutler et al. (1999, p. 5) argue that authority exists when an 
individual or organization has decision-making power over a particular issue-area and 
is regarded as exercising that power legitimately. They also distinguish authority from 
cooperation, and argue that cooperative relations become authoritative when they are 
considered to be binding, when the element of obligation is introduced into them. 
Finally, they make the significant point that such authority need not be associated 
exclusively with government institutions.
While capturing much of the essence of non-state authority, these 
characteristics reveal a significant omission in the conceptualization of private
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authority. They do not distinguish adequately between in and an authority. By failing 
to distinguish analytically between the two aspects of authority, the authors attribute 
to private an authority characteristics that do not belong to it; therefore, such a 
conceptualization confuses rather than clarifies what is exactly meant by private 
authority. Thus while the authors note that obligation is an essential element of 
authority and link this obligation, rightly so, with the “right to rule” (Cutler et al. 
1999, p.363-364), they then go on to ascribe this right to rule to both in and an 
authority. Regulating the behaviour of others in an obligatory way however, is a 
feature associated with in authority not an authority.
To illustrate why this is so and to demonstrate why the consequences of such a 
misconception of private an authority are significant, let us return to the concepts of 
in and an authority. As we saw, in authority requires the surrender of private 
judgement because it is created to design and enforce rules necessary for the 
community that perhaps would not otherwise exist given the problematic nature of 
collective action. If people acted on their own judgements about substantive issues, 
even if that meant disobeying the rules of the established authority, then there would 
be no point in having such an authority. Individuals have to obey the utterances o f in 
authority; it has to be obligatory to be meaningful. This is why in authority is usually 
accompanied by the ability to use sanctions to enforce its rules. This ability to wield 
force is considered legitimate as long as it operates to enforce the rules of the 
authority in a manner consistent with the rules that created authority in the first place. 
On the contrary, as was described above, an authority does not require the surrender 
of private judgement; while people take seriously an expert opinion, its 
pronouncements need not be obligatory. It follows therefore that obligation is a 
feature associated exclusively with in authority: “whereas those in authority issue and 
apply rules and commands which themselves entail obligations to act, an authorities 
make statements, pronouncements, and performances” (Flathman 1980, p. 18).
The omission to adequately distinguish between private an and in authority 
leads to an exaggeration of both its novelty and significance for the global 
governance structure and obscures analytical work. Treating thus the expertise of 
non-state actors as private authority, without any qualification, makes analysis
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difficult; the qualification of such authority as an authority is essential because it 
places it in its proper context and restores it to its proper dimensions. Hall and 
Biersteker for example, argue that the capacity of NGOs to provide expertise grants 
them “regulatory authority” (2002 p.218). The expertise of non-state actors however, 
is not something new. Indeed, when we talk about an expert we usually mean a 
person or perhaps an organization and hardly ever a state. Expertise constitutes an 
essential part of the role often played by non-state actors. Moreover, this has been 
acknowledged by states for a long time. Indeed, the advice o f non-state actors has 
been formally sought since the establishment of the United Nations, as article 71 of 
the UN Charter makes clear: “The Economic and Social Council may make suitable 
arrangements for consultation with non-govemmental organizations which are 
concerned with matters within its competence” (UN 1945). While the involvement of 
both civil society NGOs and private sector actors in the United Nations’ structure and 
agencies and indeed in most international organizations has increased dramatically in 
recent years, this development by itself does not constitute a substantially new 
phenomenon in the area of international governance. These actors still perform, for 
the most part, the traditional consultative and lobbying roles o f non-state actors. The 
increased significance o f technology and functional differentiation is a determining 
factor of the globalizing world economy and it is increasingly making expert 
knowledge a significant asset in the hands of non-state actors. Nonetheless, the 
possession of this knowledge by itself does not provide NSAs with authoritative 
decision-making capacity over an issue-area.
What we are really interested in, and what the definition proposed by the 
authors above implies, are instances of private in authority. The authority to regulate 
in a legitimate and binding way the behaviour and activities o f actors in a sphere of 
activity or an issue-area. This regulatory authority has to be in authority since it has to 
flow and operate according to rules that spell out its purpose, its scope and its mode 
of operation. These specific institutional characteristics of in authority are also 
ignored by Biersteker and Hall (2002) who introduce another type of market 
authority, “normative market authority”, which “refers to the general acceptance of 
the more abstract idea that markets should determine decision-making over important
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issues” (2002, p.214). However, such abstract ideas about the role o f the market in the 
governance of economic activity are not necessarily related to the ability of particular 
actors to govern authoritatively an issue-area or industry. Moreover, state leaders’ 
proclamations that “the forces of the global market give them little room for 
manoeuvre” do not create “the authority of the market” as the authors argue (2002, 
p.6), but constitute admissions of the reduced ability of the state to control 
transnational market forces. These forces, by eroding the ability of the state to 
exercise its authority, do not in any sense become themselves the authoritative 
regulators of the world economy. On the contrary, their actions raise significant 
concerns of legitimacy over their role, concerns entirely inconsistent with notions of 
authority.
Ambiguity is also encountered in other aspects of the analytical work 
underpinning the concept of private authority as well as in the analysis of empirical 
data. In the first case, this leads to a problematic conceptualization of private 
authority and to an analytical treatment of its features that is often inconsistent, while 
in the latter it often results in the erroneous characterization o f non-state governance 
mechanisms as authoritative. Obviously the two are related, since it is the analytical 
and theoretical inconsistencies that lead to incorrect interpretations of empirical cases.
To illustrate the point let us look at the way Cutler et al. (1999, p.365-369)
address the conceptual and theoretical obstacles inherent in the notion of private 
1 ?authority . The authors identify at least two obstacles to theorizing about private 
authority: a) conceptualizing international authority in conditions of anarchy, and b) 
conceptualizing private action as authoritative. In this part of the chapter we will 
concentrate on the second obstacle since it is that which deals directly with the 
concept of private authority, while the first obstacle will be addressed later in the 
chapter. The authors admit that the common understanding of public governance is 
associated with the concept of in authority. This concept is in turn associated with 
hierarchical depictions o f authority relations, which depend on rules and procedures 
according to constitutions that guarantee the representativeness and accountability of
12 The reason for selecting Cutler, Haufler and Porter (1999) as the main target for criticism is that their 
work represents the most comprehensive attempt to conceptualize private authority in global 
governance to date.
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government. Political authority is thus public by definition, because only public 
judgement is regarded as legitimate and authoritative in the sense of being able to 
“prescribe behaviour”. Under this view, private judgement in contrast is non- 
authoritative: it is not accountable to democratic institutions. The legitimacy of 
political authority is inescapably linked with its public nature and inconsistent with 
decentralized, horizontal, self-governance arrangements, as well as with notions of 
private governance and the concept of an authority.
However, they argue that this obstacle of the established conceptualization of 
authority is only convincing if one accepts that the normative argument, that private 
power “ought” not be regarded as legitimate and binding, is enough to validate the 
empirical statement that in fact private power is non-authoritative and legitimate. The 
public dimension of authority is only an obstacle if one accepts that private power 
does not in fact operate in an obligatory an legitimate way. The authors thus argue 
that it is only a normative statement that prevents us from conceptualizing private 
authority. Moreover, the authors also argue that this conceptual obstacle is only 
convincing if one limits rules to commands and directives. They acknowledge that 
private actors lack the authority to enforce and prescribe domestic laws of general 
application unless such authority is delegated to them by governments and that the 
rules most relevant to private authority are those called “soft law”, which is based on 
its mutually consensual nature (Kratochwil 1989). They assert however, that the 
instruments of “soft law”, while not law proper, do in effect govern relations among a 
variety of actors and therefore the obstacle of conceptualizing private authority can be 
overcome.
I would argue that this thesis is untenable. First o f all, it is not only a 
hypothetical normative argument that stands in the way of acknowledging private 
authority. The fact is that in reality, instances of such private regulation are not 
generally regarded as legitimate and binding. The concerns about the legitimacy and 
accountability of such private rules (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Cutler 2003; Keohane 
2003; Held 2004; Held and Archibughi 2005; Ziirn and Archibugi 2006) is a point in 
case; increasing anxiety about the unaccountability of non-state organizations, given 
their influence, points to the fact that such de facto rules represent instances of private
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power and not private authority. Secondly, as we saw above, the authority to regulate 
an issue-area has to be in authority. The fact is that in most, if not all of the cases that 
the authors have in mind, the private organizations that attempt to regulate an issue- 
area do not have an explicit or implicit mandate from all the parties that are affected 
by their rules, that is, there exists no procedural agreement that establishes the 
authority of these organizations. These organizations represent only the parties that 
are involved in their work and not the totality of the people and institutions that 
would be affected by their rules. Therefore, the argument that private rules “ought” 
not to be considered authoritative is not only a normative argument, but derives from 
an empirical fact, their unaccountability, that is, their failure to satisfy the conditions 
o f in authority. Interestingly, many of the analysts of private authority “raise explicit 
concerns about the limited degree (or virtual absence) of accountability of private 
authority” (Biersteker and Hall 2002, p.211). An unaccountable authority however, is 
a contradiction in terms. Thirdly, and following from above, the normative argument 
that private power ought not to be regarded as authoritative would not be possible if 
private power was in fact authoritative. If there were instances of such private 
authority, this argument would not be advocated since private power would already 
be considered legitimate. As we saw previously, the identification and 
acknowledgement of authority is itself a normative process; it depends on the inter- 
subjective values and norms shared among the subjects of authority. The question of 
whether a rule is authoritative or not, cannot be considered apart from the question of 
whether it is legitimate or “ought” to be considered as legitimate. If people see private 
power as unaccountable and undemocratic then by definition they do not consider it 
legitimate and thus authoritative. The very nature of authority, the necessity of a 
sense o f obligation and legitimacy, makes the issue of identifying and acknowledging 
authority an inescapably normative one.
The argument concerning the obligatory nature o f private rules also deserves 
detailed examination. In the first instance, since the authors have defined as a 
constituent feature o f authority the binding nature of rules, the acknowledgment that 
non-state actors lack the capacity to enforce their rules makes their characterization of 
“soft law” as adequate in order to bestow authority on its creators a self-contradictory
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statement. Indeed, their agreement with Kratochwil on the characterization of “soft 
law” as mutually consensual and their acknowledgement o f the uncertainty of the 
exact nature of these instruments which are not “strictly binding norms of law” 
(Akenhurst 1987, p.54), underlines that the essence of these instruments is their 
mutual, voluntary adoption by the participating actors. The voluntary nature of soft 
law instruments is not by itself a reason for disqualifying them as authoritative. 
Indeed, all authority is ultimately voluntary for if it was not, then we would be talking 
about coercion not authority. As we saw however, in authority explicitly involves 
obligation. This obligation can take two forms13: a) legal obligation, defined strictly 
as an obligation to conform to certain rules. Failure to do so can result in the use of 
(legitimate) force to bring about obedience with the rules; b) “moral” obligation, 
defined as the voluntary acceptance of authority as legitimate which produces a 
voluntary decision to consider the commands of authority as binding on one’s self.
Soft law instruments clearly do not have the ability to invoke legal obligation 
as defined above, since no legal sanctions usually emanate from disobeying or 
ignoring them. What is more, I would argue that soft law arrangements in the private 
sector do not exhibit signs of moral obligation either. The reason is that the 
organizations that produce such rules are explicitly instrumental. This means that they 
address specific regulatory needs of the participating parties. In that sense they 
represent one o f the strongest manifestations of what Oakeshott (1991) calls 
“enterprise associations”14. The crucial element that distinguishes such an association 
is its purpose. The members of these associations, which form for the pursuit of a 
common substantive purpose, may have some rules that can be considered 
authoritative and which establish the association and determine its procedural mode 
of operation. However, “these rules are not to be confused with the managerial 
decisions, agreements, etc., which constitute the pursuit of the purpose” (Oakeshott 
1991, p. 116). These managerial decisions are the most important distinctive element
13 Friedman (1990) makes a similar distinction for legitimacy in relation to authority: a) legitimate 
reasons to obey an authority and b) legitimate use of force to exact obedience to authority.
14 Oakeshott defines an enterprise association as a “relationship in terms o f the pursuit o f some 
common purpose, some substantive condition of things to be jointly procured, or some common 
interest to be continuously satisfied” (1991, p. 114); moreover the enterprise association is also a 
relationship “in terms of ...the “management” of its pursuit” (1991, p. 115), where “management” 
signifies the actions or utterances that actors make in the pursuit o f their common purpose.
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of the association not the procedural rules that establish it, because it is the former 
that are decisive for the pursuit of the common objective. For the same reason, the 
desirability of the procedural rules is contingent on their contribution to the 
achievement of the common goal. Therefore, these rules are only considered 
authoritative as long as they contribute towards the achievement of the common 
purpose. It follows then that “even a denial of the authority of these rules would not 
itself be an act of dissociation, as it would be if the terms of association were the rules 
themselves” (Oakeshott 1991, p. 117).
While therefore, the creation of a private “regulatory” organization represents 
to some degree a collective agreement on a procedural level in order to resolve 
differences at a substantial level, very much like the establishment of in authority, this 
procedural agreement does not define the organization but acts only as a facilitating 
factor. The reason behind the creation of such an organization is not to have an 
authority which can then decide which rules are appropriate. In other words such an 
organization does not enjoy self-sufficiency,15 a characteristic that Oakeshott (1991, 
p. 110) describes as “being always self-complete in the sense of having no extrinsic 
substantive purpose”. These organizations have an explicit substantive purpose: to 
produce specific rules that address their particular needs. All else is subordinate to 
this objective. The procedural rules that establish and define the structure and 
operation of the organization do not create an authority that can claim surrender of the 
judgement of the participating actors irrespective of the content of its proposals. 
Therefore, if the organization (authority) proposes a rule that is not desirable to some 
of the members, they may feel entitled not to endorse that particular rule since they 
have not agreed to defer their judgement to the organization; they will only agree with 
its proposals as long as they judge (individually) the substantive merit o f these 
proposals to be satisfactory.
This becomes more evident when we consider that in such organizations the 
parties subject to the “authority” of the organization are not adequately separate from 
it. They are the ones that really create the rules through a continuous process of
15 This characteristic refers to Aristotle’s view that self-sufficiency (autarkeia) is the ultimate goal and 
a basic constitutive element o f a political society (polis). See ApiaTOteXriq (1993).
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bargaining and negotiation that represents their conflicting interests. The operation of 
such organizations does not reflect a mutual deference of authoritative decision 
making over the activities of interested parties to an independent organization. Instead 
such organizations resemble more a meeting place, an agreed procedural and 
institutional context within which the interested parties meet to deliberate and decide 
upon mutually agreed norms, rules and standards, through processes o f negotiation, 
bargaining and power politics. In this context therefore, the differences on the 
substantive merit o f the proposed rules, which is the priority o f the members, become 
an obstacle for the establishment of a true authority over the members of the 
organization. Obviously this is not what happens with in authority where the 
procedural rules which establish it are the very source of authority. It is exactly 
because of the legitimacy of the procedural rules that parties believe the substantive 
rules to be authoritative. It is therefore the legitimacy of the procedure that creates the 
moral obligation on the subjects of authority to abide by its rules even when they 
disagree with it. In this type of voluntary organizations, the participating parties do 
not feel a moral obligation towards the rules that establish the organization and its 
decision-making body16. Thus, they feel free to disobey substantive rules when they 
disagree with their content. In other words they do not surrender their private 
judgement. The enforcement of the rules is dependent upon the continuous rational 
calculation of interests by the participating parties, which may very well decide to 
depart from the informal agreement to uphold these norms and rules if they deem that 
these no longer serve their interests.
It follows therefore, that in authority needs to be able to claim both legal and 
moral obligation (legitimacy) from its subjects. The former cannot exist without the 
latter and even if it did, it would amount to coercion, not authority, since the use of 
force would not be deemed legitimate anymore. Moral obligation is necessary to 
maintain obedience to authority even when the content of its commands is not 
popular. Without it, authority would not be effective. While, initially this would not 
be a problem since efficiency is not a necessary pre-condition for the existence of in
16 This does not mean that moral authority cannot exist in non-state organizations. Religious authority 
for example is founded on moral authority.
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authority, eventually the continuous use of force to impose the rules of authority 
would lead to its discredit and collapse, since people would judge that it has departed 
from the rules that established it and that the use of force has become abusive and 
eventually coercive.
These conceptual and analytical problems can lead to a deceptive diagnosis of 
reality. It is not surprising therefore, that some of the empirical analysis identifies as 
instances o f private authority cases that at best refer only to an authority and at worst 
exhibit no features of authority at all. Thus, when talking about enforcement of 
private authority, the authors rightly argue that this can occur through the presence of 
the state. While enforcement through the state is rightly regarded as a mechanism that 
can be consistent with the idea o f private authority, whether this is actually the case or 
not depends on the mode of this coexistence. It is thus inaccurate to characterize (as 
the authors do) the endorsement and adoption of the TRIPS agreement as an instance 
of private authority because of the influential role o f the Intellectual Property 
Committee (IPC), a private organization representing the interests o f the American 
industry17. The TRIPS agreement was an intergovernmental agreement in the context 
of the WTO, an intergovernmental organization. The significant, even decisive 
influence o f private sector lobbying, is not a case of private authority, it is a case of 
private power and influence that was able to persuade the US government to adopt its 
cause in this international negotiation.
In a similar vein, other examples of non-state governance, like the emerging 
private regime for the operation of the internet (Spar 1999) and global knowledge- 
based network oligopolies (Mytelka and Delapierre 1999; Kobrin 2002) should not be 
treated as examples of private authority without qualifying this characterization. The 
private initiatives on the internet examined by Spar do not form an established regime 
but as she points out, they are the response of individual organizations operating on 
the internet. Such organizations are often forced, in the absence of a central authority 
that can create property rights, exchange rules and enforcement and security 
mechanisms, to proceed and provide these essential institutional arrangements 
individually. They create secure sites over which they have legal ownership and
17 See Sell (1999; 2003).
43
develop software to ensure the security of their clients. This however does not 
constitute private authority. These organizations act on their own behalf, without 
representing other companies or organizations and without exercising authority over 
others; therefore they do not regulate authoritatively the internet. They are trying to 
individually address the problems that anarchy poses for their business, and while 
they may be driving, in an ad hoc fashion, the future governance structure of the 
internet towards a particular direction, they do not constitute in authorities.
Similarly, knowledge-based network oligopolies do not govern authoritatively 
their industries. Such networks may be able to extend beyond territorial boundaries, 
redefine the structure of particular industries, generate new knowledge or even 
control the generation of new knowledge as Kobrin (2002) argues. They may even be 
able to use their control over knowledge to erect barriers to entry (Mytelka and 
Delapierre 1999). These activities however are not a testament to authority but rather 
to private power: the ability to use financial and other corporate assets to gain control 
over valued resources, such as knowledge, in order to manipulate the market structure 
and rip abnormal profits. While limiting the ability of the state to control and regulate 
them effectively, their networked, transnational structure is by no means a mark of 
authority. Changing the way business is done in an industry, may affect the regulatory 
framework that governs that industry, but does not in itself constitute an assumption 
of authoritative regulatory powers. At best it confers competitive advantage to the 
pioneering firms and potentially, a temporary loosening of regulatory control due to 
the emergence o f new, previously unanticipated consequences o f economic activity.
2.4 Non-state in authority
The review o f the use of the concept of private authority in the global governance 
literature made apparent a number of analytical and theoretical problems which as we 
saw, lead unavoidably to misleading interpretations of empirical findings. It follows 
from the above discussion that we need a conceptualization o f private authority that 
addresses these difficulties. Moreover, we need a conceptualization of private 
authority that identifies with clarity what is really new in this concept. If private 
authority is to be proven a useful analytical tool in our examination of the role of non­
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state actors in global economic governance, we need to identify and clearly qualify 
the characteristics and consequences of its different aspects.
From the previous analysis, it appears that most of the case studies identified 
as instances of private authority refer either to private an authority or do not refer to 
private authority at all but rather to private power, influence or cooperation. The 
question then emerges, is private an authority the only type of private authority that 
exists in the context o f global economic governance? I believe that the answer is no: 
private in authority is also possible. To see how this can occur, let us first consider the 
possibility of private in authority at a more abstract level.
Private in authority is really the type of authority that analysts imply when 
they argue that many of the non-state transnational organizations hold private 
authority in the context of global economic governance. For the reasons that we 
described earlier most of the times this assertion is inaccurate. While private in 
authority may not reside in such organizations, it is nonetheless not impossible to 
find. Thus, individuals working in a private organization experience private in 
authority since they acknowledge as legitimate and obligatory the power of their 
supervisor or manager in the context of that organization. Indeed, the manager has the 
right to issue commands that he or she expects to be obeyed by the employees; the 
employees in turn acknowledge the right of the manager to issue these commands18.
Two objections could be levelled against characterizing this type of private 
power as authority. First, the managers or supervisors in a private organization do not 
have an unlimited power and often the employees may disagree with them, refuse to 
obey them and even act against them, through for example legal action or strike. This 
indeed happens, but it does not negate the authority of the management. The 
employees may resort to such actions, but they do so when they believe that the
18 The observation that private in authority is possible does not contradict our previous analysis 
concerning “enterprise associations”. The critique about the lack of moral obligation of such 
organizations, referred to a specific type of non-state organizations which aim to provide governance 
for an issue-area or a type o f economic activity, that is, to provide public governance, and derives from 
the empirical observation o f the mode of operation of such organizations. Moreover, it was offered as a 
critique to the proclaimed authority of this type of organizations found in the literature on private 
authority. On the other hand, the propositions developed in this section refer to the theoretical 
possibility o f in authority existing in the private realm. This discussion is based on a more 
abstract/theoretical argument which examines whether the conditions of in authority can be found and 
satisfied in the private realm.
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content of the commands by their superiors is not in line with the rules and principles 
that give them their authority, that is, the authority of their offices and their positions 
within the organization, not simply when they just do not like or agree with the 
content of these commands. These foundational rules and principles can be found in a 
corporate charter or a constitutional document that sets out the fundamental goals and 
policies of the organization, in specific organizational policies adopted by 
management (for example policies relating to age, sex or race relations within the 
organization), and in the private contracts according to the terms o f which the 
employees have agreed to work for the organization. Moreover, these reactions to the 
substantive commands of management usually take a form that is consistent with 
authority. Strike for example, is a workers’ right that is acknowledged by the 
“authority” of the enterprise as a legitimate way to voice the antithesis of workers to 
its substantive commands. As long as this reaction remains within the limits o f the 
legitimate means available to the employees, it is not authority which is questioned, 
only the behaviour of the people that hold it at a specific point in time19.
The second objection has to do with the fact that this type o f authority is 
limited to private organizations or more generally to private areas of activity. While 
this is true, it does not constitute a significant obstacle for characterizing this private 
power as in authority. As long as employees in an organization regard the power of 
their superiors, as determined from their position in the organization, as legitimate 
and obligatory and defer to them the right to make significant decisions about the 
future of the organization, this power exhibits the basic elements of in authority and 
therefore could be characterized as private in authority. The limits of a private area of 
activity do not preclude the possibility of authority, but they do constrain the area of 
its application, its scope. This authority is limited to the boundaries of the 
organization which are defined by the property rights o f the owners of the 
organization, and by the employment contracts between the organization and its 
employees. Therefore, this authority cannot be characterized as public authority.
19 See Flathman (1980) for a detailed discussion o f how opposition to the commands o f authority can 
be reconciled with the concept o f authority.
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This qualification presents another difficulty with regard to our proposed type 
of authority. While private in authority can exist, it usually is so private in scope that 
it would not fit in the context of the global governance structure that we are interested 
in. This is because the type of private in authority that we seek should not be 
restricted to the boundaries of a social or economic space determined by private 
contracts among the parties that occupy this space. The type o f authority we are 
looking for needs to be able to provide governance at a transnational level for a whole 
industry, issue-area or sphere of economic activity; in other words it needs to be 
public. But as it was just argued, private in authority cannot be public.
Public in authority needs to be based on rules and constitutions that are 
founded on a mandate by society. There is however, no separate public mandate for 
the regulation of the various aspects of public life. The public mandate of in authority 
creates an overarching mechanism of authority that will itself decide on the 
substantive aspects of the regulation of the various issue-areas and activities. Given 
the dominance of the state as the political structure for the organization of human life, 
this overarching authority resides (at least today) with the state. That means that 
private actors cannot just assume the governance of an issue-area on their own 
initiative, at least not in an authoritative way, without the participation or at least 
consent of the state. Moreover, as we have seen, private actors cannot enforce rules 
without the participation of the state. As Anscombe notes for the difference between 
state authority and the authority found in voluntary cooperative associations, the 
authority of the latter doesn’t entail “ ...an unconditional demand for obedience” 
(1990, 144). This unconditional demand for obedience can only come from the state 
which enjoys both a monopoly of “the legitimate use of physical force” and a sense of 
moral obligation from its citizens.
The ability to legitimately enforce the implementation of decisions is crucial 
not only for the distinction between private and state authority, but also for the 
distinction between government and governance. As Rosenau argues, both 
government and governance refer to:
purposive behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule; but government 
suggests activities that are backed by formal authority, by police powers to insure the 
implementation of duly constituted policies whereas governance refers to activities
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backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed 
responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance 
and attain compliance.
(1992, p.4)
Even more relevant for our understanding of non-state governance, is his consequent 
elaboration that governance without government can be conceived as “regulatory 
mechanisms in a sphere of activity which function effectively even though they are 
not endowed with formal authority” (1992, p.5).
The characterization of governance as a regulatory mechanism is important 
because it allows us to link governance to in authority in a more concrete and visible 
way. We can therefore place the abstract identification of public in authority with 
state authority that we described above, in the context o f regulation. Indeed, 
regulation scholars have long acknowledged this dominance of the state; one of the 
most common definitions of regulation is “all state initiatives to intervene in the 
economy” (Baldwin et al. 1998, p. 2-4). However, the centrality of the state for the 
conceptualization of regulation does not mean that the state has to regulate itself all 
aspects of public life. It does not preclude the possibility o f non-state regulation. It 
does mean however that non-state regulation needs the explicit or implicit 
acknowledgement of state authority in order to be considered itself legitimate and 
therefore authoritative.
A good illustration of how this can actually happen is provided by the concept 
of self-regulation. Contrary to the widely-held notion that self-regulation is an 
instance of regulation without the state, the fact is that self-regulatory schemes are 
never entirely independent and free of public scrutiny and state involvement. Indeed, 
regulation analysts see the relation between self-regulation and state regulation as an 
important, mutually constitutive element of both these mechanisms. Thus, Page 
(1986) makes the point that public regulation and self-regulation are interconnected 
and interpenetrated. This view is reinforced by Black (1996) who distinguishes four 
different types of relation between self-regulation and the state: a) mandated self­
regulation; b) sanctioned self-regulation; c) coerced self-regulation and d) voluntary 
self-regulation. It becomes obvious from Black’s typology that the consent of the 
state is needed for the legitimate existence of self-regulatory schemes. The state either
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promotes actively self-regulation (enforced, sanctioned, mandated self-regulation) or 
at least allows it to exist (voluntary), usually under some form of indirect supervision 
or monitoring.
It is in this same sense that private in authority can acquire a public 
dimension. This type o f authority, while consistent with the separation between 
government and governance that Rosenau suggests, goes beyond it by acknowledging 
the possibility of a third type of governance which is neither entirely private nor 
entirely state, but it is backed by formal state authority and therefore is able to govern 
public social and economic space. This is why it would be more appropriate to call it 
non-state in authority rather than private in authority. Therefore, we could define 
non-state in authority as, the type o f in authority that resides with a hybrid20 
governance mechanism in a sphere o f  activity, which functions not only effectively, 
but also authoritatively due to the partial participation o f  the state which lends it 
formal authority, but which due to the partial participation o f  non-state actors cannot 
be considered as part o f  government.
2.5 Transnational in authority
Having shown that non-state in authority is possible at least on a theoretical level, we 
can now address the original question of whether non-state in authority can be 
reproduced at the transnational level21. The task of conceptualizing non-state in 
authority at the transnational level presents even more complications. As we saw 
earlier, Cutler et al. (1999, p.366) identified the lack of international government as 
one of two main obstacles that stand in the way of conceptualizing private authority.
20 The term hybrid is used here to indicate the participation o f two different types o f actors (public and 
private) in the same governance mechanism. This mechanism is termed hybrid because the 
participation o f both types o f actors is an essential constitutive feature o f this mechanism; the 
emergence o f this type o f governance necessitates both the element o f legal obligation and therefore 
the presence o f public actors, and the element of non-state participation in a significant and 
acknowledged role.
21 The use o f the term “transnational” in this thesis is based on the definition o f transnational relations 
put forward by Risse-Kappen which refers to: “regular interactions across national boundaries when at 
least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf o f a national government or 
intergovernmental organization” (1995, p.3). In the context o f our analysis o f transnational 
governance (authoritative or not) the above definition should be extended/modified to refer to 
governance schemes that aim to regulate transnational interactions, and which comprise themselves, at 
least one actor which is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf o f a national government or 
intergovernmental organization. A more comprehensive description o f the different formats that this 
make-up can take is provided in the next section.
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The difficulty here is not limited to the issue of trying to combine private power and 
public authority, but it extends to the difficulty of identifying instances o f any type of 
in authority, in an international system comprised of nominally equal and sovereign 
states.
Obviously this difficulty does not extent to an authority. Both international 
and transnational (non-state) an authority is not difficult to find. As we saw 
previously, an authority does not rest on rules, institutions and procedures, it is not 
defined by the nature o f the association that it affects and therefore it is not subject to 
the strict limitations of the public-private divide. An authority is a feature of 
individuals and organizations. Therefore, we could say that an authority is essentially 
a non-state type o f authority. Hence, there is no a priori reason why international or 
transnational organizations or individuals acting in a transnational or 
transgovemmental capacity should not be able to hold considerable authority as 
experts. Indeed, many international and transnational organizations who aim among 
other things to promote the exchange of information among experts in a specific area 
of activity and collect and store this information, are considered as the foremost 
authorities for that specific field and act as consultants to governments and other 
organizations.
Things are more complicated for in authority however. In the previous section 
we saw that the construction of the concept of non-state in authority presupposes the 
existence o f a state authority (or more precisely a political authority) that would 
merge with non-state actors to produce a hybrid governance mechanism. This 
presents an obstacle for conceptualizing non-state in authority at the transnational 
level because there is no overarching international government that exercises political 
authority at that level.
Part o f the problem lies with the now entrenched notion that political 
authority is synonymous with the state. Although we previously acknowledged the 
primacy o f the state as the dominant political structure today, and accepted that in 
most countries, if  not all, political authority resides with the state, this does not mean 
that political authority and the state are one and the same thing, nor does it mean that 
there can be no political authority without a state. Indeed, as analysts have observed
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(e.g. Ruggie 1993) while the nation-state is currently the dominant form of political 
organization, it is not the only possibility. Monarchy, feudalism, theocracy and 
classical democracy have been some of the dominant forms of political organization 
in different places at different times. A variety of ruling bodies have held political 
authority, often combined with other types of authority, and governed their respective 
societies. While they all had a “stately” mechanism of performing the necessary 
functions o f governing such as issuing directives and commands, ensuring their 
implementation and arbitrating disputes relating to them, their authority did not rest 
with this mechanism but with the king, the feudal lord, the church or the dimos. 
Likewise, state bureaucracy, while governing and regulating most areas o f public life, 
enjoys a delegated authority from the elected government, which in turn derives its 
political authority from the constitution. Furthermore, while this state mechanism is 
organized along the principles of territoriality and hierarchical centralization this is 
not the only way to exercise political authority as is evident from the examples of 
feudalism and classical democracy where personal or lineage allegiance and 
polyarchy replaced territoriality and hierarchy respectively. It follows therefore, that 
the existence of an overarching hierarchical or territorial state is necessary neither for 
the existence nor for the exercise of political authority.
This approach to political authority does not contradict the analysis made 
previously which stressed the requirement of democratic accountability for authority 
and the legitimacy problems that non-state governance encounters because of its lack 
of such accountability. The previous analysis referred to the democratic form of 
political authority dominant today throughout the world and the inherent legitimacy 
problems that non-state governance schemes without a democratic mandate face 
today. This however does not mean that democratic authority is the only possible 
form of authority. The different governance modes presented above were considered 
legitimate and obligatory by their subjects at the time of their prevalence and this is 
what makes them legitimate forms of political authority. What is different among 
these forms of authority and between them and democratic forms of authority, is that 
they had different mechanisms for asserting the legitimacy o f authority. In other 
words, authority still needed to be considered as legitimate to be truly authoritative in
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the cases of monarchy or theocracy as well, but the marks of authority which 
determined its legitimacy were different. So, in a monarchy for example, the evidence 
of blood lineage might be considered the prime criterion for establishing the authority 
of a monarch, while in a theocracy the relevant criterion might be the knowledge and 
stringent observance of divine truths contained in sacred texts. In a democratic polity 
in contrast, the basis of authority is the public mandate, and therefore the legitimacy 
of that authority is judged using a criterion of public accountability and inclusiveness, 
among other things. That is not to say that accountability is entirely absent from 
monarchy or theocracy. In these regimes accountability may also exist, but this is 
owed to a limited body of nobles or the principals of the clergy and not to the people 
at large. So even in these cases we may have some mechanisms of accountability but 
these will be secret and limited and not public and inclusive. Democratic 
accountability in this sense, is not an end to itself but rather a control device designed 
to establish the legitimacy and therefore the authority of democratic government. For 
this reason non-state or private authority may be quite compatible with different 
forms o f authority as has been the case in medieval times with lex mercatoria, a 
private body of laws developed among merchants, which governed maritime trade 
and was considered legitimate, authoritative, and compatible with the feudal model of 
political authority prevalent at the times, which was not based on democratic 
principles. In contrast, today, in the context of democratic liberal states, private 
governance schemes operating without adequate mechanisms o f public accountability 
and inclusiveness, cannot be considered legitimate and therefore authoritative.
There should be no a priori reason therefore, why decentralized loci of 
political authority cannot arise to provide governance for specific issue-areas and 
spheres of activity. After all, as we saw previously, the scope of in authority does not 
affect the prospect of its existence although it can determine its characterization as 
private or public. Therefore, as long as there are institutions that govern an issue-area 
or sphere of activity at the international or transnational level which exhibit the 
features of in authority, there is no reason why such institutions should not be 
characterized as authoritative.
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The question arises then, are any institutions that exhibit the features of in 
authority in the international system? Hurd (1999) demonstrates how the institution of 
sovereignty enjoys almost universal acceptance as an authoritative institution among 
states. Sovereignty is an overarching principle that manifests itself in more concrete 
rules and norms such as non-intervention and mutual recognition among states. 
Sovereignty, and the rules of conduct that follow from it are authoritative because 
they are seen by states as legitimate; states feel obliged to abide by these rules even 
when their interests seem to run against them or rather because “ ...their 
interests,...haws been conditioned by a community standard that delimits the 
acceptable (territorial) reach of state sovereignty” (Hurd 1999, p.397). These rules 
thus, govern the relations of states in a manner that is deemed by them both 
obligatory and legitimate, and which leads states to abandon their own private 
judgement22 on their substantive benefits, and obey them. Such authority is not to be 
found only in fundamental rules and principles like sovereignty that could perhaps be 
dismissed as exceptional since they lay the basic framework for any type of 
communication among states. In December 2003, the United States revoked the tariff 
it had imposed the previous year on all steel imports entering its markets. This policy 
change occurred after the World Trade Organization (WTO) judged that the tariff was 
illegal under its rules and therefore should be scraped immediately. The fact that even 
the United States, the unquestionably dominant force in the world economy, felt 
obliged to abide by the ruling of the WTO, despite its obvious disagreement with this 
decision, is a clear example of the authority of the WTO. Its rules and judgements are 
regarded as legitimate and obligatory by states which surrender their private 
judgement, even when this is at odds with their interests. Indeed, many similar 
examples can be found in other issue-areas, where the rules of international 
organizations are considered authoritative and are obeyed as such by states.
Despite these examples of international authority, skeptics could still dispute 
them as a definite proof of authority. A traditional realist argument could be leveled
22 Private judgement here is meant in the sense that Friedman (1990) uses it to describe the judgement 
that is not entitled to prescribe behaviour, irrespective of what individual or institution holds it. In a 
society o f sovereign states, the judgement of any one is private in relation to the others, that is, it is not 
entitled to prescribe the behaviour o f other states.
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against them: such governance mechanisms are not really authoritative because states 
can ultimately exit agreements and leave international organizations. Consequently, 
they are not obliged to follow the international rules they have adhered to. In 
principle, the argument that states can ultimately exit these organizations and 
agreements is correct, but is this enough to dismiss the authoritative status of these 
institutions? I think that it is inaccurate to characterize such arrangements as non- 
authoritative because of this possibility. As was argued previously, authority is 
voluntary by definition: people choose to consider it obligatory. It follows therefore, 
that just as people are free to choose to acknowledge and obey authority they are 
equally free to abandon it. Indeed, even in a domestic society individuals may place 
themselves outside the rule of authority and refuse to recognize its power over them. 
Such an action however would not be considered as proof that authority does not exist 
in that society. Authority presupposes the existence of inter-subjective values and 
norms that establish, among other things, the necessity of authority itself. Obviously, 
no human society can exhibit a complete consensus of values, norms and principles. 
As long as the authority that stems out of this inter-subjective framework is accepted 
by the majority of the people in a society, then the concept of authority should not be 
rejected when a few individuals choose to place themselves outside of its sphere of 
influence. Indeed these individuals are usually treated as abnormal and potentially 
dangerous by the rest of society. The same applies for the international society of 
states. Hurd makes a similar observation about states that decide to reject the 
institution of sovereignty:
Those states that do question such fundamentals [the institution of sovereignty] are 
regarded with horror by the other actors in the system. The fact that these states are so 
few, and thus so notable, is what allows the rest to define them as ‘rogues’ in contrast 
to the bulk of the population of states, who take the institution for granted.
(1999, p. 397)
As long as a significant number of states consider the power of these institutions 
legitimate and obligatory, and abide by their decisions and rules even when they do 
not agree with them, then these institutions should be considered as authoritative.
The examples that were given above refer only to inter-state and inter­
governmental institutions. Are these the only institutions that can enjoy authority in
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the international system? What about non-state in authority? The question is again 
more complicated than is the case at the domestic level. The problem lies with the 
decentralized nature of international authority described above. Because there is no 
overarching international government to assume or delegate the governance of the 
various aspects o f international and transnational activities, governance often occurs 
in a haphazard and erratic way. One of the consequences of this pattern is that many 
issue-areas, spheres of activity, or industries are not regulated at all or are only 
subject to minimal and usually inadequate governance. The problem is becoming 
more acute as both the number of transnational actors and the intensity of their 
interactions have increased significantly in recent years. Their need for governance 
structures to bring order and predictability to their business is therefore often 
addressed by non-state transnational organizations that aim to provide guidance, to 
educate, even to create transnational standards and rules that will fill the gap of 
international rules. Can such organizations be considered authoritative?
First o f all we should acknowledge that there exists a significant variety of 
non-state governance schemes. Many of them do not aspire to provide governance 
and regulation but rather guidance and assistance. A number of non-state 
organizations act as meeting fora for the exchange of information and ideas; they aim 
to build a sense of community among their members and to provide education for 
members lacking the necessary technical infrastructure or for all members when new 
issues arise in their sphere of activity. Others seek to regulate not behaviour but rather 
technical specifications of particular products that will facilitate their cross-border 
operability, connectivity and compatibility. Even when the aim is to regulate 
behaviour there are often governance schemes that do not address an industry or 
sphere o f activity but rather target specific organizations. Such is the case o f the 
corporate codes o f conduct that are increasingly being adopted by transnational 
companies. Obviously the types of rules and organizations just described cannot be 
considered authoritative in the sense of in authority.
However, there are organizations at the transnational level that explicitly aim 
to provide governance for a whole or issue-area or industry. These organizations 
obviously aspire to achieving authoritative status as regulators. Despite their ambition
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however their governance cannot be considered authoritative. First o f all, these 
organizations are subject to the same criticism that was developed previously with 
regard to the potential for private in authority. Like voluntary associations at the 
domestic level, non-state transnational organizations cannot just assume governance 
of an area of public life even if it is dominated by activities of a transnational nature. 
The reason is that every individual and organization in the private sector that engages 
in transnational activities is legally anchored in one (or many) national, legal 
jurisdictions. Moreover, their overseas activities also have to take place within the 
boundaries of a national legal jurisdiction. Within these jurisdictions, the regulation 
of the issue-areas that these actors engage in, is undertaken by local regulatory 
authorities. As a result, issues pertaining to individuals or private organizations in a 
transnational capacity are addressed by private international law, which treats them as 
issues between different national legal jurisdictions, a conflict of laws approach 
(Cutler 2003). At the international level on the other hand, only states hold the 
legitimate use o f force; under international law only states are considered as subjects 
of rights and obligations23. Therefore, in the absence of transnational legal space, in 
order to characterize any rules as legally binding, they need to be applied in some 
national jurisdiction and be incorporated in its legal or regulatory structure. Non-state 
transnational organizations cannot do that; states are needed for the incorporation of 
transnational non-state rules in the body of domestic regulation.
As was argued previously, members of private voluntary associations also 
lack the sense o f moral obligation that would make them regard the rules of the 
association as obligatory and therefore surrender their private judgement to its 
authority. The argument was that the explicit instrumentality of these organizations is 
an obstacle for the establishment of in authority. Again, this argument applies to 
transnational organizations since their members share little else than the common
23 The state has traditionally been thought as the principal, if not the unique, subject o f international 
law. This absolute domination o f the state in the domain of international law has been undermined to 
some degree in the course of the twentieth century, especially in the area o f human rights, where a 
number o f international court decisions and international agreements have bestowed to individuals 
certain “rights and obligations over and above those set down in their own judicial and authority 
systems” (Held 2004, p. 101). Still, many legal experts seem to consider this an exception and to 
maintain that the state continues to be the predominant, and perhaps, the only true subject of 
international law (see for example Malanczuk 1997, and Brownlie 1998).
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objective to provide a set of rules for addressing a set of specific issues. Their 
objective in other words is not to set up an authority to make decisions about these 
rules, but to set up an organization that will provide a forum for the negotiation of 
these rules. They participate in these organizations to achieve concrete, material 
benefits like reducing costs and increasing information and predictability by 
establishing a common set of rules. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that they will be 
willing to view as obligatory rules that may run contrary to their interests.
One could argue that international organizations could similarly be conceived 
as instrumental organizations, where likewise, negotiation and bargaining are taking 
place and therefore they should not be considered authoritative. I believe that this is 
not the case. I would argue that international organizations are primarily self- 
sufficient associations. That is, like political authority at the domestic arena, they do 
not have an explicit substantive purpose. Obviously they are created to provide 
governance and therefore a set of rules for a sphere of activity. However, they are 
created to provide governance according to some procedural rules that establish the 
authoritative nature of their substantive decisions. When the organization is 
established fierce negotiations and bargaining will ensue, but once an agreement has 
been reached and a decision has been made the authority of the organization will 
make this agreement obligatory on its members and they will see it as such. Indeed, 
the most common criticism of international organizations is that they are not 
productive enough; they do not produce an adequate number of sufficiently detailed 
and up-to-date rules to provide much needed governance at the international and 
transnational levels. This happens because states negotiate fiercely at the preparatory 
stage, exactly because they know that once they have signed an international 
agreement its authority makes it extremely difficult to renege on their obligations.
In addition to the inability to enforce their rules, transnational organizations 
also face a considerable problem of external legitimacy. They often represent only a 
small part o f the actors, national or transnational, that would be affected by their rules 
if these were obligatory. To a greater extent than voluntary domestic associations, 
these organizations cannot be said to be truly representative o f and accountable to the 
actors active in their industries or sphere of activity. This impression is made worse
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by the fact that the power differential among their participants is much greater than in 
the case of domestic organizations. Indeed, the participation in these organizations 
often entails costs that are not affordable by many small actors who could nonetheless 
be affected by their rules.
The rules of transnational non-state organizations cannot therefore be 
considered authoritative in the strict sense of in authority. The lack o f legitimacy, and 
of legal and moral obligation, and the inescapably state-based character o f the 
activities they aim to regulate, make the governance of such organizations non- 
authoritative. Non-state in authority at the transnational level needs political authority 
to infuse it with obligation and legitimacy. However, political authority at the 
international level is fragmented and decentralized. Therefore, this political authority 
can come from two different sources: a) from international organizations that already 
enjoy such authority in an issue-area and b) from the consent o f a sufficient number 
of states, or at least of a number of sufficiently significant states in an issue-area, to 
make the rules of these organizations authoritative at the international level.
2.6 The anatomy of transnational in authority
The next question that we need to answer is how non-state in authority can be 
identified. There can be a variety of ways that non-state actors can come together in 
an authoritative structure with public authorities. To identify these different modes of 
blending private power with state authority we need to take a step back and examine 
the variety o f functions that in authority can undertake in the context of public 
governance. Rosenau’s distinction between government and governance can help us 
here. According to his definition both governance and government refer to “purposive 
behaviour, to goal-oriented activities, to systems of rule”. In other words, both share 
the same underlying purpose of governing behaviour and therefore need to perform a 
similar set o f functions to attain it. Consider Raz’s definition of political authority as 
“a right to make laws and regulations, to judge and to punish for failing to conform to 
certain standards, or to order some redress for the victims of such violations, as well 
as a right to command” (1990, p.2). We can also encounter these functions in the 
context o f the private organizations we examined previously. Management makes 
rules and regulations that determine the operation of the organization; it issues
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directives and commands; it can reward or punish its employees for attaining or 
failing to meet performance or behavioural standards and it can offer compensation to 
the parties that suffered by the violation of the rules by other employees or even the 
organization itself.
The essence of these activities can be captured by three functions that in 
authority performs in any structure of governance and therefore government as well: 
creating rules, implementing them and adjudicating the disputes that arise from them. 
We are now therefore in a position to answer our question, at least on a general and 
abstract level. Non-state in authority emerges when one or more of these functions are 
undertaken by non-state actors while the remaining functions are performed by state 
authorities. Table 2.1 exhibits all the possible modes of combining state and non-state 
actors in the performance of these governance functions24.
Table 2.1 Variations of Non-state in Authority
Type of Actors
Authority Functions
Rule-Making
Implementation
Adjudication
1. State 
State 
State
2. Non-State 
State 
State
Rule-Making
Implementation
Adjudication
3. State
Non-State
State
4. State 
State 
Non-State
Rule-Making
Implementation
Adjudication
5. Non-State 
Non-State 
State
6. State
Non-State
Non-State
Rule-Making
Implementation
Adjudication
7. Non-State 
State 
Non-State
8. Non-State 
Non-State 
Non-State
We see that there are eight possible combinations of non-state and state actors that 
produce different governance structures. Evidently, group one represents pure state 
governance, in other words government at the domestic level, or inter-state
24 A similar type o f categorization o f global governance institutions has been proposed by Abbott et al. 
(2000) with regard to the three aspects o f legalization which is defined as “...a  particular form of  
institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation” (Abbott 
et al. 2000, p. 401), and by Koenig-Archibugi (2006) with regard to the three characteristics o f 
publicness, delegation and inclusiveness. For a detailed definition and analysis o f these institutional 
characteristics see Abbott et al. (2000) and Koenig-Archibugi (2006) respectively.
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governance at the international level. At the opposite end we have group eight, which 
represents what Rosenau calls governance without government. Here we find the 
majority of transnational non-state governance schemes, where various types of 
regulatory mechanisms operate on a voluntary basis among participating parties. 
Between these two extremes we can find a number of possible combinations of state 
and non-state actors’ cooperation which render the resulting governance structure into 
an authoritative mechanism. In these intermediate combinations, one or two of the 
functions can be performed by a state institution and the remaining function(s) by a 
non-state organization. It is in these cases therefore (2-7) that we see the emergence 
of non-state in authority.
To review the simplest cases where non-state actors assume only one of these 
functions, we could have a state agency deciding the rules for an issue-area and 
referring any disputes about them to public courts, while the actual implementation of 
the rules is taking place through the actions and procedures o f a non-state 
organization such as a self-regulatory agency. At the transnational level, a 
comparable situation has been encountered increasingly in recent years, when inter­
state organizations delegate the implementation of policies decided at the 
international level to non-state actors and organizations. This is a very interesting 
development in the context of global governance and undoubtedly this delegation 
confers, to some degree, public in authority to the specified non-state organizations. 
These organizations have the authority to implement on the ground the decisions 
agreed at the international level; they are the embodiment of inter-state authority at 
the local level where the implementation of policies takes place.
Alternatively, we can have a situation where non-state actors have undertaken 
not the implementation but the adjudication of disputes relating to a specific set of 
rules which have been drawn by state authorities or the legislature. This is an 
increasingly recurrent phenomenon in commercial disputes, especially in 
transnational disputes, and it is known as private commercial arbitration. Cutler 
(2003), who studied this phenomenon in her study of the transnational merchant law 
regime, describes how companies may agree to mutually abide by the decisions of 
private arbitration tribunals. The rules to be used however are usually drawn from a
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specific national, legal jurisdiction, commonly agreed by the parties as most relevant 
for the dispute at hand. Likewise, the implementation of the decisions of such 
tribunals takes place through the public courts and authorities o f the jurisdiction in 
question25.
Finally, there can be a situation where the rules regulating an issue-area, 
sphere o f activity or industry are designed by non-state actors but implemented by 
state authorities and adjudicated by public courts. I would argue that this is the most 
consequential manifestation of non-state in authority. This is because, the function of 
rule-making, of designing the rules and determining their content, is arguably the 
most fundamental and most political of the three. Implementation and adjudication 
are to a considerable extent dependent upon the content of the rules they are intended 
to implement and interpret respectively. The content of the rules determines to a large 
degree the distributional outcomes for a variety of actors and structures. These 
outcomes affect not only the present balance of interests and power but also 
determine future governance through the institutionalization and therefore embedding 
of current values, ideas and policy priorities, and through the realignment or 
entrenchment of current power configurations. In this sense, rules are particularly 
important for the distribution and shaping of structural power, that is, “the power to 
shape and determine the structures of the global political economy” (Strange 1994, 
p.24).
However, these are not the only modes of governance that can result from the 
cooperation o f state and non-state actors. Things can be even more complicated. Thus 
it may be the case that state and non-state actors share not only different functions in 
the governance structure of an issue-area but that they also share different parts or 
stages of the same function. Figure 2.1 demonstrates how each function can be jointly 
performed by both state and non-state actors. In such a case, all different modes of 
governance collapse to the same basic format which can exhibit a high degree of
25 The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(New York Convention) obliges the signatory states to acknowledge and enforce such arbitration 
awards. According to Cutler (2003, p.230) 119 countries have now adhered to this convention. 
Moreover UNCITRAL developed in 1976 its Arbitration Rules and in 1985 the Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, which lay down rules to be used in private arbitration 
procedures.
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variation depending on the balance between state and non-state actors within any 
single function. As figure 2.1 demonstrates, the exact configuration of non-state in 
authority becomes a matter of degree, as the balance between state and non-state 
actors often shifts along a continuum rather than taking discrete positions. This 
depends to a large extent on the nature of the issue-area which may allow or even 
require that different parts or stages of the same function are performed by different 
actors.
Figure 2.1 Same Function Variations of Non-State In Authority
Rule-Making
State--------------- .4------------------------------------------------------------------- Non-State
Implementation
State < ► Non-State
Adjudication
State <------------------------------------------------------► Non-State
Therefore, considering again the examples we reviewed above, we may have NGOs 
implementing only part o f a particular project authorized by an inter-state 
organization, while the remainder is carried out by the executive organs o f that inter­
state organization or perhaps by local governmental agencies. Similarly, in the case of 
adjudication private commercial arbitration forms only the initial part of the 
adjudication process, since the decision reached through the arbitration process has to 
be implemented in a specific national, legal jurisdiction and therefore requires 
ratification by the local, public courts (Figure 2.2). Finally, state and non-state actors 
could assume different parts of the legislative process. It is thus common, state 
supervisory agencies or ministries to set the general guidelines or principles that form 
the foundation o f governance in an issue-area, while the day-to-day, detailed 
regulation and governance o f that issue-area is assigned to a non-state organization 
whose rules and decisions, while independent, have to abide by the general principles 
set out by the state.
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Figure 2.2 An Example of Same Function Variation: Fragmented Adjudication 
in Private Transnational Commercial Arbitration
Rule-Making Implementation Adjudication
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
State Law Dispute Dispute Resolved National
Legislates — Implemented — Arises ~ through — Public
Nationally Transnational^ Transnational Courts
Private Ratify
Arbitration Private
Arbitration
Decision
Time Line —>
2.7 Summary and conclusions
The purpose o f this chapter was to delineate the concept of non-state authority in the 
context of global governance. In the course of this process the somewhat loose and 
inconsistent use of the term in the literature on private authority in global governance 
was criticised, and a more thoroughly defined and analytically consistent concept of 
non-state in authority was presented. This concept, which represents a hybrid type of 
governing authority where public and private actors participate in the governance 
functions of an issue-area, activity or industry, satisfies the conditions o f in authority, 
which is the type of authority that a political authority such as the state exercises. This 
concept was then transposed at the transnational level as transnational in authority in 
order to describe the emergence of transnational governance schemes where non-state 
and state actors participate as institutionally defined and acknowledged members with 
distinct and explicit roles. The concept of transnational in authority can hopefully 
help us distinguish between cases of authority limited to the private sector, 
authoritative knowledge and expertise, and authoritative non-state governance of 
areas o f public life and activity. It is the latter case of non-state authority that is the 
most novel and consequential development in the context of global governance 
because it makes non-state actors part of the institutional structure of political
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authority, legitimizing thus their claim to the governance o f public life. It is the 
analysis and explanation of the emergence of this type of non-state authority, and in 
particular, o f transnational authoritative rule-making, that will be the focus of the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 3
Transnational Regulatory Authority and Global Economic 
Governance: A Theoretical Framework
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we identified a hybrid form of regulatory authority labelled 
transnational in authority, illustrated its conceptual and analytical distinction from 
other forms of transnational non-state governance, and argued that this type of 
authority can be found in any one of the three governance functions o f rule-making, 
implementation and adjudication. In this thesis, the focus will be on the rule-making 
function. This is because, as was previously argued, this is the most consequential of 
the governance functions and the one most closely linked to notions of democratic 
accountability and representation. Therefore, the assumption o f such rule-making 
authority by non-state actors represents the greatest and most interesting challenge to 
our understanding of political authority and sovereignty. In this chapter, we will 
develop a theoretical framework and propose conditions for the emergence of 
transnational, authoritative rule-making in global economic governance.
3.2 Transnational Regulatory Authority
In order to proceed with the development of a theoretical framework, it is first 
necessary to define more precisely what is meant by transnational authoritative rule- 
making. Although regulation analysts themselves do not agree about the precise 
definition of regulation and many would include a much wider array of functions and 
actions beyond rule-making, including implementation and adjudication (Baldwin et 
al. 1998; Baldwin and Caves 1999), in this thesis the term will be used in a narrower 
sense to refer mainly to the creation of rules for the governance of an issue-area or 
industry. The ability of certain non-state governance schemes to produce rules that 
are deemed authoritative will hereafter be referred to, as transnational regulatory 
authority.
Transnational regulatory authority emerges when the authority of taking 
decisions about the regulation of a given issue-area is shared between state and non-
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state actors. This does not refer to preparatory work to be discussed or even adopted 
by state actors before producing rules, nor pressure and/or influence on the positions 
adopted by state actors before or during the negotiations of these rules. It means 
specific, institutionally defined and acknowledged voting or veto powers for the non­
state actors participating in a regulatory regime. Moreover, these voting or veto 
powers have to refer to the substance of the rules being created; in other words they 
refer to the ability of non-state actors to decide, alone or in collaboration with state 
actors, the substantive content of the rules and not only procedural or implementation 
issues. These two conditions taken together constitute the first criterion for 
identifying transnational regulatory authority: the existence o f an institutionally 
defined right of non-state actors, acknowledged by states, to decide wholly or partly 
the substantive content o f the rules being created by a non-state forum for the 
governance of an issue-area or industry. However, non-state actors can participate in 
any number of non-state fora without the need to get permission for such activities by 
state authorities. Obviously, what makes the first criterion significant and meaningful 
is the fact that this decision-making power does not refer to just any non-state 
organization. It was previously argued, that transnational in authority differs from 
other non-state governance schemes in that its pronouncements are authoritative, that 
is, they have a binding effect on the behaviour of the regulated parties. Therefore, to 
establish the existence of transnational regulatory authority we also need to establish 
whether the rules of the non-state forum under consideration are backed by the force 
o f law. In practical terms this means that transnational regulatory governance exists 
when the rules being produced by a non-state forum confer some degree of legal 
obligation on the parties that adopt them. Finally, we need to establish the scope of 
the impact of transnational regulatory authority, that is, the degree to which its rules 
govern an industry or issue-area at a global level. This characteristic, while not a 
necessary precondition for the existence of transnational regulatory authority, is 
nonetheless significant because the latter becomes a significant new characteristic of 
global economic governance when it provides governance at a level beyond that of 
the individual state.
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3.3 Trasnational regulatory authority in the world economy
Before proposing a theoretical framework for the explanation of transnational 
regulatory authority, we first need to specify what exactly such a framework aims to 
achieve. Based on the analysis presented in the previous chapter, a comprehensive 
explanation of transnational regulatory authority requires answers to three 
fundamental questions: a) Why do regulators and/or politicians participate in hybrid 
governance schemes or acknowledge the rules produced by non-state governance 
schemes giving rise to transnational regulatory authority? b) Under what conditions 
do they have an incentive to use or endorse transnational regulatory authority, 
compared to other international and/or transnational institutional mechanisms? c) 
How are they able to reconcile this delegation of authority to private actors with the 
principles of public in authority?
All three questions emanate from the nature of public in authority. As argued 
in the previous chapter, today, the authority to regulate public life rests with the state. 
This is why transnational in authority, presupposes a choice made by state authorities 
to delegate their authority to a transnational non-state organization. Without the 
explicit adoption of the state, non-state governance initiatives remain, for the most 
part, voluntary, consultative, non-binding instruments. This thesis does not dispute for 
one moment the importance that such instruments can have for global economic 
governance. I nonetheless aim to distinguish between such mainly market-operated 
standards and guidelines, and instruments that have official and formally 
acknowledged legality and which are a product of an explicit and institutionalized 
collaboration between non-state actors and the state. Given the sovereignty costs 
associated with such a delegation of authority, we need to provide an explanation for 
this decision, which is the aim of the first question. The second question seeks to 
“operationalize” the explanation provided to the first question, by identifying the 
specific framework conditions that will lead to the emergence of transnational 
regulatory authority.
Finally, the third research question addresses the normative aspects of the 
delegation of regulatory authority from state to non-state actors. The focus of our 
attention is a type of transnational governance whose principal innovative and
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consequential element is not the content but the mode o f regulation. What is 
examined here, and what has been the inspiration for this thesis, is the decision to 
delegate the authority to regulate issue-areas and economic activities, previously 
regulated by national public bodies, to transnational non-state actors. The delegation 
of the authority to decide such issues to a non-state organization raises an issue of 
legitimacy, a concern about the conformity of such a decision with the principles 
behind public in authority. This concern becomes even greater when we consider that 
in the case o f transnational regulatory authority the delegation of authority is not 
limited to domestic non-state actors but also to foreign non-state actors. As argued in 
the previous chapter, public in authority rests on a set of inter-subjective values and 
principles that inform its mission and its mode of operation. These values and 
principles translate into specific institutional and normative constraints placed on the 
freedom of the holders of authoritative offices and titles to exercise the authority 
entrusted to them. In modem democratic polities these constraints include high 
standards o f accountability and inclusiveness, usually absent in transnational, non­
state governance schemes. Therefore, in order to have a complete explanation for the 
emergence o f transnational regulatory authority, we not only need to inquire into the 
politics of the decision to employ transnational regulatory authority. We also need to 
describe and follow the process of justifying this decision that seems to run contrary 
to the democratic underpinnings of modem political authorities, and to see how the 
decision to delegate regulatory authority to transnational non-state actors can be 
reconciled with the principles of public in authority. This is necessary, because if the 
regulatory pronouncements of the non-state organization are to be considered 
authoritative and therefore binding, there needs to be a process that reconciles its right 
to regulate with the principles of public in authority. Therefore, the third question is 
complementary to the first two, and all three operate as a whole in order to provide a 
rounded and complete account of a phenomenon with potentially significant 
institutional but also normative implications.
Where can we look for a theoretical framework that provides answers to these 
questions? Can existing theories of international relations and international political 
economy help us understand the phenomenon of transnational regulatory authority?
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The next section of this chapter explores the available theoretical schemata that could 
potentially provide us with answers to our research questions, highlighting their 
positive insights, but also pointing to their limitations in providing a comprehensive 
account of transnational regulatory authority.
3.3.1 Private authority literature
The literature on transnational non-state governance, and particularly on private 
authority, would be an obvious place to look for a theoretical explanation of 
transnational regulatory authority. While this literature has significant insights to 
offer to our analysis of transnational regulatory authority, its contribution is limited 
by its analytical inconsistency in its treatment of the concept o f authority. As was 
argued in the previous chapter, studies of private authority in the context of global 
economic governance do not adequately distinguish between transnational regulatory 
authority and other forms of non-state governance. The resulting analytical ambiguity 
poses an obstacle to the construction of theoretical propositions that could help us 
explain the emergence and the particular features o f transnational regulatory 
authority. Moreover, because hybrid authority is not examined separately from other 
private governance schemes, work on private regimes and transnational governance 
arrangements tends to focus exclusively on private actors, examining the incentives of 
private actors for creating these schemes and the processes through which they 
achieve them. The problem with this approach is that it does not adequately address 
the incentives of states to accept transnational self-regulation. This is a significant 
problem for the purposes of this study, because as we saw above, transnational 
regulatory authority presupposes a choice made by state authorities to collaborate 
with non-state actors to provide governance for the global economy. For these 
reasons, these approaches are ill-suited to answer our first two questions. Moreover, 
by ignoring the analytical difference between in and an authority, private authority 
approaches do not raise adequately the legitimacy issues related with non-state in 
authority. Therefore, these approaches are not in a position to offer an explanation or 
even a description of the process of justification for the delegation o f public in 
authority.
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3.3.2 Efficiency approaches
For answers to these questions it seems that we need to turn to theories that focus on 
state behaviour. Theories that specifically address the state’s decision to delegate 
regulatory authority to non-state actors can be found in the literature on domestic 
regulation and self-regulation. The traditional explanation for economic regulation is 
the public interest theory. The theory argues that regulation is established for the 
pursuit of the interest of the public at large and the protection of the interests of the 
consumers. This is necessary because often the market fails to operate properly, 
resulting either in inadequate provision of services and products or in the provision of 
such services and products in terms economically or socially unacceptable26. If we 
accept the public interest explanation, we would expect states to delegate their 
regulatory authority to non-state actors when this delegation serves the public interest 
better than state regulation; that is, when it results in more efficient or effective 
regulation. Indeed, regulation analysts argue that often self-regulation presents
77several advantages compared to state regulation : i) self-regulatory arrangements are 
usually informed by greater expertise than public law clauses or public agencies, as 
their members are the expert practitioners of the activity being regulated; ii) following 
from the expertise advantage, the information costs will be much lower as 
information will be readily available to the regulators; iii) monitoring and 
enforcement costs will be lower as the regulated parties are themselves part of the 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; iv) rules are more informal and thus 
cheaper and easier to change when circumstances change; v) self-regulation will 
usually produce much more acceptable rules for the industry than public regulation, 
which also raises the probability o f increased compliance with the rules. When these 
positive aspects of self-regulation are combined with the fiscal restraints of the public 
budget which often make monitoring and enforcement inconsistent and sporadic and 
the inflexibility, high cost and poor coverage of public laws, the self-regulation 
alternative becomes all the more attractive. The state therefore could be willing to
26 For a presentation and analysis o f the most commonly cited market imperfections, see Noll (1995) 
and Breyer (1982, 1998).
27 See Baldwin and Cave (1999), Black (1996), Graham (1994) and Ogus (1995).
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delegate its regulatory authority to a non-state organization provided that this move 
would result in improved regulatory efficiency and effectiveness.
The argument of functional efficiency for involving non-state actors in the 
regulatory process is also supported by work on international regulation. Perhaps the 
best example of this type of argument is the work of Reinicke (1998). Reinicke builds 
his approach around the challenges that globalization poses for the formulation and 
implementation of public policy and treats global regulation as the cooperative 
regulatory response of states to these challenges. He believes that globalization is not 
threatening the external sovereignty of states but their internal operational 
sovereignty, that is, their capacity to create and enforce public policy. States therefore 
cooperate in order to get some hold over their internal ability to govern and regulate. 
According to Reinicke, this cooperation should go quite deep in order to counter the 
constraints of globalization resulting in the formulation and implementation of global 
public policy (GPP).
Reinicke argues that if global public policy is going to work as a strategy, the 
principle o f subsidiarity must be embraced. Horizontal subsidiarity, which is more 
relevant for our purposes, refers to the involvement of non-state actors in the process 
of global public policy. Through this concept Reinicke emphasizes an explicit and 
institutionalized role for non-state actors. He values the contribution and importance 
of non-state actors in global governance and doubts its effectiveness without their 
participation:
horizontal subsidiarity seeks the same improvements [improve legitimacy, 
acceptability, efficiency, and effectiveness of public policies] as the vertical variant by 
delegating, or “outsourcing,” part, but not all of public policymaking to non-state 
actors... these actors’ better information, knowledge and understanding of increasingly 
complex, technology-driven, and fast-changing public policy issues will generate 
greater acceptability and legitimacy for global public policy. Such public-private 
partnerships...will also produce a more efficient and effective policy process for the 
design and implementation of public policies for a particular global industry.
(1998, p.89-90)
Is efficiency an adequate explanation for transnational regulatory authority? While 
there is no doubt that often non-state regulation enjoys a comparative advantage in 
terms of efficiency and effectiveness relative to state regulation, this is not enough to
71
provide a comprehensive explanation for transnational regulatory authority. There are 
a number of significant problems with the efficiency hypothesis for our purposes. 
First, we have to assume that the state operates with the sole purpose of satisfying the 
“public interest” in the case of domestic regulation or “national interest” in the case of 
international regulation. This implies first, that it is possible to define such a public or 
national interest and second, that the regulators are impartial and trustworthy and 
operate only with the interest of the public or the nation in mind. Both of these 
propositions are problematic at both a theoretical and an empirical level28. The public 
interest theory has been heavily criticised by the “economic theory o f regulation”, 
which has argued that rational regulators seek a structure of costs and benefits that
90maximise their own political returns . Moreover, the concept of a national interest 
effectively turns the incentives of the various actors at both the sub-national and 
supra-national level to exogenous variables. This makes the explanation of 
transnational regulatory authority very difficult, because a theory based on national 
interest would work well only as an ad hoc theory; it would not allow us to predict 
when and in which issue-areas we are more likely to see hybrid forms of governance.
A second problem with the efficiency hypothesis is that it does not adequately 
address the weaknesses associated with self-regulation. Despite the advantages of 
self-regulatory schemes described earlier, before taking the decision to delegate 
regulatory authority to non-state actors, a regulator needs to also take into account a 
series o f potential problems related to self-regulation. While we argued earlier that 
self-regulatory schemes can potentially produce better compliance with the rules 
being created, this is not always the case; indeed one of the most cited weaknesses of 
self-regulation is poor enforcement and non-compliance with the produced regulation 
(Graham 1994; Baldwin and Caves 1999). Other identified weaknesses of self­
regulation include insufficient coverage of the industry; exploitation of regulatory 
powers to introduce anti-competitive regulation (e.g. erecting barriers to entry); lack 
of transparency and exclusion of third parties (Graham 1994). Finally, the most often
28 For a critique o f the public interest theory see Stigler and Freidland (1962) and Averch and Jonhson 
(1962); for a critique of the normative assumptions assigned to the behaviour o f regulators see Fiorina 
and Noll (1978), Weingast (1981) and Levine and Forrence (1990).
29 See Stigler (1972), Peltzman (1976), and Becker (1983).
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cited criticism of self-regulation concerns the lack of accountability and legitimacy of 
the private sector to produce regulation (Page 1986; Baldwin and Caves 1999).
These problems gain additional weight when delegation of regulatory 
authority takes place at the transnational level. This is because delegating regulatory 
authority to a domestic non-state organization is quite different from doing so in the 
context of a transnational regulatory forum. In part this is due to two significant 
characteristics o f the international system: the lack of authoritative governmental 
institutions and pervasive uncertainty about other actors’ actions and intentions 
(Keohane 1984). These characteristics create in turn significant concerns over the 
effective enforcement and implementation of international agreements. It is for this 
reason that states often look to set their commitments in binding, hard law, 
international agreements. Indeed, recent work on legalization has shown that 
legalization30 “is one of the principal methods by which states can increase the 
credibility o f their commitments...precision of individual commitments, coherence 
between individual commitments and broader legal principles, and accepted modes of 
legal discourse and argument all help limit...opportunistic behavior”; as a result 
“there are few alternatives to legalization when states wish to identify undertakings as 
reliable commitments” (Abbott and Snidal 2000, p.427)31. In addition to making 
commitments more credible, legalization also “facilitates interpretation, application, 
and elaboration by setting relatively clear bounds on dispute resolution and 
negotiation...procedurally, hard law constraints the techniques of dispute settlement 
and negotiation” (Abbott and Snidal 2000, p.429). This makes legalization a more 
cost efficient approach for the enforcement of commitments compared to other 
alternatives such as coercion, persuasion or frequent renegotiation (Abbott and Snidal 
2000, p.430). On the contrary, the main benefits of informal, soft law agreements 
seem to be their flexibility and vagueness which can facilitate compromise
30 Legalization is used here as synonymous to the hard law variety o f legal institutions in contrast to 
soft law arrangements. Hard law in the context of the legalization concept is defined as legal 
arrangements exhibiting a high level in all three constitutive elements of legalization (see footnote 24). 
For a presentation and analysis o f the concept of legalization in international relations see the 
International Organization special issue on legalization (2000).
31 Simmons in her study on the legalization o f international monetary relations supports this finding. 
She shows that harder legal commitments have encouraged greater compliance by increasing the 
reputational costs associated with reneging on a legal obligation (Simmons 2000).
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particularly when agreement is not forthcoming (Lipson 1991; Abbott and Snidal 
2000). This however means that when soft law is used “states face a tradeoff between 
the advantages of flexibility in achieving agreement and its disadvantages in ensuring 
performace” (Abbott and Snidal 2000, p.446). This tradeoff however, creates a 
problem for the efficiency hypothesis in relation to transnational regulatory authority, 
because participation in non-state governance schemes is usually unilateral and even 
when it is the result o f an agreement among states, it does not, by definition, emanate 
from a binding agreement among the participating state authorities, but from some 
more informal agreement or mechanism. This in turn makes the commitment of state 
authorities to the implementation of the produced regulation (and the regulatory 
process more generally) weaker when compared to the obligations assumed under a 
legally binding international agreement or treaty. Therefore, when the interests of the 
participating parties coincide to a considerable degree and there is agreement on the 
way to increase the functional efficiency and/or effectiveness of the existing 
regulatory framework , we would not expect states to use transnational regulatory 
authority from an efficiency/effectiveness point of view, since an international, 
legally binding agreement would be more effective in delivering credible 
commitments, and more efficient in enforcing them than alternative non-state 
governance schemes.
The effect of these factors is augmented by another feature of international 
affairs, which the efficiency hypothesis fails to address adequately: the role of power 
and contrasting interests. The efficiency hypothesis implies not only that there is a 
national interest but that the national interests of different states coincide to a 
considerable degree in order to agree on a common set of rules. Moreover, it 
implicitly assumes that any potential disagreements can be solved in a fashion^ 
satisfactory to all parties involved, without more powerful players taking advantage 
of their capabilities to rip abnormal gains. Reinicke’s work is characteristic of this 
criticism. He seems to assume that in the face of the common challenge posed by 
globalization, states will unite in a common policy front and cooperate efficiently.
32 This assumption o f harmonious cooperation to resolve functional problems is an integral part of the 
efficiency hypothesis as explained in the next paragraph.
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Subsidiarity will ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the system as each part of 
the process will be done by the “best man for the job” 33. He underestimates however 
the role of power and the conflict of interests among both states and private economic 
actors and this problem becomes evident in the analysis o f his case studies. In the 
case of the Basle Accord on capital adequacy, while acknowledging the importance 
of the pressure from the U.S. for achieving the final compromise, he nonetheless 
argues that this case validates his framework because in the end states got together to 
overcome the challenges that financial globalization posed to them. This is a self- 
contradicting assessment, since without the pressure from the U.S. and its bilateral 
agreement with the UK, the Accord may have never been achieved despite the 
common problems facing regulators (Oatley and Nabors 1998; Simmons 2001). 
Similarly, in the case of the anti-money laundering regulation and the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), he admits that progress has not been very satisfactory in 
recent years, the main obstacle being the unwillingness of states to cooperate, despite 
evident efficiency gains from such cooperation.
Also, many of the efficiency gains associated with domestic self-regulation 
will be absent or at least limited in the case of transnational regulatory authority, 
because private sector actors from different countries will have far more varied and 
often contradictory interests than is the case at the domestic level. Therefore, in many 
cases it is likely that achieving agreement will be just as difficult for a non-state 
organization as it would be for an inter-state organization. In fact, given the hybrid 
nature o f transnational regulatory governance where both state and non-state foreign 
actors may participate directly at the negotiating table, we would expect the 
efficiency o f a transnational regulatory organization, as a forum for deliberation and 
agreement, to be less efficient than a comparable international organization. 
Moreover, power differences among non-state actors will be far greater at the 
transnational level. Given the absence of an international authority, there are
33 Reinicke’s argument is reminiscent of the functionalist theory put forward by Mitrani (1948, 1966, 
1975). Like Mitrani, he too, believes that re-organization of economic regulation along functional 
lines, in effect by adjusting political geography to economic geography, will provide a much more 
efficient and durable solution for international cooperation. For a critique o f Mitrani’s work see Haas 
(1968).
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considerable doubts about the ability of powerful non-state actors to put overall 
efficiency first and avoid exploiting their power advantage.
These problems in turn highlight what is the most significant problem of 
transnational regulatory authority: lack of legitimacy. The legitimacy problem is far 
greater at the transnational level because regulators delegate authority not only to 
domestic but also to foreign non-state actors. The inability to resolve this issue based 
only on efficiency grounds is again evident in Reinicke, who admits that there are 
potential democratic accountability issues with subsidiarity. In order to resolve this 
problem he wants to impose on non-state actors the professionalism and ethics of a 
proper regulator. There are three problems with his solution however. First, Reinicke 
uses again the notion of an impartial and trustworthy regulator that we criticized 
above as problematic. Secondly, by attributing such characteristics to non-state 
actors, he is effectively turning them into something they are not. This is neither very 
realistic nor very helpful; a proper examination of private actors should keep in mind 
their private interests. It is these private interests that have led to the concerns 
described earlier over the misuse and abuse of self-regulatory powers. Finally, the 
need to change the morality of non-state actors into that of an impartial and 
trustworthy regulator signifies, by itself, an acknowledgement of the failure of 
efficiency to resolve, on its own, the problem of accountability. In other words, 
efficiency is not enough.
3.3.3 Epistemic communities
Another approach to international regulation, and cooperation more generally, which 
explicitly involves non-state actors, is the “epistemic communities” approach (Haas 
1992; 1994). This approach is of particular interest for our purposes, since it has been 
recently employed to analyze the history of one of the non-state organizations also 
examined in this thesis, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
(Martinez-Diaz 2005). The epistemic communities approach emphasizes the role of 
learning and communication. It is particularly relevant for our analysis, because it is 
based on the significance that expertise, that is, an authority, can have for policy 
coordination: “an epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
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relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992, p.3). The members 
of the community share the same set of normative, principled and causal beliefs, the 
same notions of how knowledge is validated, and participate in a common policy 
enterprise (Haas 1992). These characteristics set them apart from other types of 
interest groups such as general professional or industrial associations.
According to this approach, the growing bureaucratization of the state and its 
increasing involvement in regulation, coupled with the increasingly technical and 
complex nature o f the issues addressed by regulation and public policy, have led to an 
increasing reliance on experts for a widening array of regulatory and policy decisions. 
This process has been reinforced at the international level by the continuously 
widening agenda o f international regulation. This situation has increased the 
uncertainty of state authorities and regulators as to the regulatory decisions they have 
to take. Uncertainty is a significant prerequisite for the growing influence of these 
knowledge-based networks which, using their claim to authoritative knowledge can 
influence, shape and even redefine states’ interests (Haas 1992, 1994).
Despite the centrality of non-state actors and authoritative knowledge in its 
explanatory structure, there are a number of limitations to the usefulness of this 
approach here. First, epistemic communities refer to a specific type of non-state actor, 
which as we saw above is quite different from other more typical and common types 
of non-state groups such as national and international industry or professional 
associations. The concept may therefore cover only part o f the phenomenon of 
transnational regulatory authority, leaving instances of such authority outside its 
explanatory framework. Given that most of the non-state actors encountered today as 
significant players in global economic governance schemes are usually associations 
that do not fall under the rather strict conception of epistemic communities, this 
creates problems for our analysis. Indeed, none of the non-state groups or 
organizations that play an important role in the case studies presented in this thesis 
satisfies the criteria of an epistemic community.
In addition, this approach does not provide us with an adequate justification 
for delegating authority to non-state actors, since experts can still influence and 
inform politicians and regulators without this delegation. Given the fact that this
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approach refers mainly to networks of independent experts and not to non-state 
organizations it would be far more probable to assume that these experts could be 
individually integrated within their corresponding state authorities’ apparatus. Indeed, 
according to empirical findings (Haas 1992; 1994) the influence o f epistemic 
communities grows as their incorporation into national or international bureaucracies 
increases.
These problems can be seen in Martinez-Diaz’s (2005) effort to use the 
concept of epistemic communities to explain the rise o f the IASB to prominence in 
recent years. Martinez-Diaz believes that domestic pressure for harmonization 
increased in the 1990s due to changes in the international system, and that the status 
of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)34 as an epistemic 
community allowed it to legitimately claim technical authority and become a 
compelling solution to the harmonization dilemma. This assertion however is not easy 
to support. Research in international and comparative accounting has demonstrated 
how different economic, social, cultural and legal conditions have created different 
reporting needs and priorities and therefore different conceptions of accounting’s 
predominant role35. As a result, the objectives of accounting systems vary greatly and 
so do the accounting principles and practices that they have developed. This diversity 
is somewhat at odds with the concept of epistemic community, which refers to “a 
specific community of experts sharing a belief in a common set o f cause-and-effect 
relationships as well as common values” (Haas 1994, p. 138). This diversity has been 
evident within the IASC, which for the first fifteen years o f its life dealt with 
disagreements by allowing so many alternatives in its standards that these were not 
taken seriously by most analysts36. It is also worth noting that this difficulty to agree 
on “proper” accounting standards was happening at a time when the IASC was 
comprised solely by accountants and therefore the grounds for an epistemic 
consensus were ideal. In any case, since the early 1980s the IASC has explicitly
34 IASC was the IASB’s predecessor; the IASB emerged from a reconstruction o f  the IASC in 2001.
35 For a review o f the relevant literature see Nobes and Parker (2000); Roberts et al. (2002) and 
Weetman et al. (2003).
36In the view o f some prominent experts of the time: “IASC standards tend to be somewhat bland 
compromises” (Gray et al. 1981, p. 127).
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incorporated other interest constituencies in its structure so that even the appearance 
of an epistemic community seems implausible.
In his effort to “squeeze” the IASC into the profile of an epistemic 
community, Martinez-Diaz has had to change the definition of an epistemic 
community to accommodate the possibility that “communities o f experts strategically 
modify their output of policy relevant knowledge in order to promote its adoption by 
powerful patrons” (2005, p.7). Relaxing the narrow definition o f epistemic 
communities however does not solve the problem. In fact, this would undermine any 
insights that the theory has to offer. This is because this approach is inspired by a 
constructivist view of international relations (Checkel 1998, Ruggie 1998; 
Hasenclever et al. 2000). The core of the theory revolves around the possibility of 
learning. Epistemic communities through their privileged knowledge can persuade 
state authorities and regulators of the correctness of their views and perhaps shape 
and even redefine their interests. This is in line with one of the core tenets of 
constructivist thought, the possibility that actors, including states, can change ; 
interests and even identities; they can leam to see themselves and others in a different 
light (Wendt 1992). This understanding of learning refers to a complex learning 
process “whereby actors alter not only how they deal with particular policy problems 
but also their prevailing concept o f problem solving” (Ruggie 1998, p.868). It is 
obvious thus that manipulating knowledge to fit with regulators’ wishes in order to 
obtain their support, as Martinez-Diaz suggests, defeats the very purpose of the 
concept. If  regulators do not change interests and experts only use knowledge to 
accommodate these predetermined interests and thus advance their own influence in 
the policy-making process, then we are not talking about epistemic communities 
anymore but about traditional interest-group politics.
3.3.4 Power approaches
One of the main explanatory variables of international cooperation has traditionally 
been power. Could power explanations of international regulation fare better than 
efficiency or knowledge approaches? Setting international rules for any issue-area 
unavoidably involves making distributional choices. Even when all parties are better 
off with a set o f rules than without one distributional issues arise, and often they are
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significant enough to create conflicts and stall cooperation. In these cases, power 
approaches would argue that it is the distribution of power capabilities that decides 
the final point of equilibrium: “there are, however, many points along the Pareto 
frontier: the nature of institutional arrangements is better explained by the distribution 
of national power capabilities than by efforts to solve problems of market failure” 
(Krasner 1991, p.337).
Nonetheless, there are limits to the extent to which power can provide, on its 
own, a convincing argument for transnational regulatory authority. First, power 
explanations of international regulation, like approaches based on efficiency, use the 
concept of national interest which as was argued above is difficult to define 
satisfactorily and creates problems for the predictive power of the theory. Secondly, 
power explanations of international regulation seem to be incompatible with 
transnational in authority. Realist and neo-realist explanations based on power 
considerations tend to ignore non-state actors. This is understandable to a degree, in 
the sense that non-state actors lack the power capabilities of states both at the 
domestic and the international level; the state is the basic actor o f the international 
system because it is the most powerful actor and the only one that has the right to use 
force legitimately. Therefore, it would make little sense for states to delegate their 
authority to non-state actors and lose direct control over one of their most important 
resources: legal obligation. Indeed, the dominant power-based explanation of 
international regulation, the hegemonic theory37, seems to deny any role for hybrid 
governance schemes. After all, if one state enjoys a hegemonic status in an issue-area, 
it would have no incentives to pursue hybrid governance schemes, since it can use its 
power advantage to impose a legally binding inter-state agreement that best serves its 
interests.
Simmons’ (2001) work exemplifies these problems. She focuses on the 
international harmonization process that has been taking place in the area of capital 
markets in recent years. In this context, she includes not only cases of inter­
governmental cooperation but also non-state organizations such as the IASC which as 
we have already mentioned is one of the case studies examined in this thesis. Despite
37 See Kranser (1976) and Giplin (1975; 1981).
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the broad array of actors covered by her analysis, Simmons focuses exclusively on 
state power; she believes that state power and particularly the power of a hegemon, or 
a “dominant financial center” in the case of capital markets, is the catalyst that 
explains the variations in international harmonization efforts. This dominant centre is 
a “regulatory innovator” that produces regulation for domestic purposes, which are 
treated as exogenous. The international harmonization process is explained as an 
effort from the dominant centre, to minimize the costs (externalities) that its 
regulation may result in, if other states have incentives to react negatively to it. If 
these costs are significant for the dominant centre, then it will apply international 
political pressure to bring about a change in the policies of the other states and bring 
them in line with its own regulation.
Simmons’ focus on state power leads her to problems which are evident in the 
way she treats the case of the IASC. First, she underestimates the role that non-state 
institutions can play in the global regulatory process. Yet, this attitude towards non­
state actors is often at odds with empirical findings. In her treatment of the IASC she 
dismisses it as providing a mere “cover of multilateral legitimacy to mostly U.S. 
standards” which “does not explain harmonization in this area” (2001, p.611). As we 
shall see in the chapter on international accounting standards, this position is 
empirically weak and represents a gross underestimation of the role o f the IASC and 
its successor the IASB. This organization has been the architect of the international 
accounting standards (IASs)38 around which effectively all harmonization occurs in 
this issue-area. Indeed, developments in the international harmonization process 
shortly after Simmons’ article was published, have demonstrated that she greatly 
underestimated the importance of IASC and overplayed the importance of rival inter­
state forums for harmonization. Secondly, she does not consider the possibility that 
regulatory harmonization may not be initiated by a state but by non-state or hybrid 
organizations, as is the case with international accounting standards as well as in 
other issue-areas, such as the internet39 or the transnational maritime trade regime40. 
Indeed, the application of the “regulatory innovator” concept in the case of
38 IASs are now called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs).
39 See Spar (1999).
40 See Cutler (1999, 2003).
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international accounting standards makes no sense: at the time o f Simmons’ article 
the U.S. had made no new significant domestic regulatory change since the early 
1970s in this area. Moreover, because of Simmons’ exclusive focus on state actors in 
the international arena, non-state actors are only treated as part of the domestic 
political scene usually acting through lobbying to influence their respective 
governments. Simmons effectively treats transnational governance schemes as 
traditional inter-state or trans-govemmental regimes, choosing to ignore their hybrid 
nature. This makes her approach ill-suited for the examination of governance 
structures where non-state actors have significant, explicit and institutionalized roles 
to perform.
Finally, since power explanations seem to deny the possibility of a delegation 
of authority to the private sector, they have nothing to say about the legitimacy issues 
raised by transnational regulatory authority. Private power, while acknowledged and 
playing a significant role as the basis for the power capabilities of the state and 
therefore its negotiating power vis a vis other states, is only manifested through 
lobbying activities at the domestic or international level. Non-state authority never 
emerges.
3.4 Transnational regulatory authority and the politics of delegation
From the previous analysis, it becomes clear that current international regulation 
theories that explicitly aim to incorporate non-state actors in their theoretical 
framework cannot provide us with a single, comprehensive account of transnational 
regulatory authority. Nonetheless, the various approaches examined above hold 
significant insights for understanding the possible motives of, and conditions under 
which, state authorities may decide to delegate their regulatory authority to a 
transnational non-state organization. The theoretical analysis that follows in the next 
sections aims to incorporate some of these insights into a framework designed to 
achieve an eclectic yet, meaningful explanation of transnational regulatory authority.
3.4.1 Explaining the emergence of transnational regulatory authority
To achieve this synthesis, a fundamental ingredient is recognition of the importance 
of domestic politics for international regulation. Emphasis on domestic politics is
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necessary because it is the only way to link the world of international institutions with 
the realm of domestic political community. As was illustrated in the previous chapter, 
political and thus regulatory authority is intricately and essentially linked to domestic 
politics; indeed, domestic politics could be considered as the institutional and 
operational manifestation of the various aspects o f political authority41. In addition, a 
domestic politics approach allows us to identify the interests of domestic groups that 
are affected by international economic regulation and are therefore likely to press 
their governments in specific directions. This enables us to analyze states’ positions 
in international negotiations with reference to these interests, thereby opening up the 
black box of the state as a unitary actor that “defends” the national interest (Putnam 
1988; Milner 1998).
A domestic politics approach that is particularly interesting for our purposes, 
is one which uses the theory of economic regulation as its theoretical foundation 
(Oatley and Nabors 1998; Richards 1999). The economic theory of regulation was 
introduced by Stigler (1971), who advocated not a theory o f regulatory capture but a 
“cartel theory”, where agencies were not captured gradually by the regulated industry, 
but regulation was created from the beginning in order to serve its interests. Stigler 
argued that parties and politicians seek money and votes, and that this is exactly what 
the winning interest groups will offer them. Due to the nature o f the political decision, 
small groups will probably face fewer organizational problems (less free-rider 
problems and less information costs), and at the same time they will enjoy a higher 
per capita interest in specific regulatory issues than large groups (for example 
consumer associations). Such groups are therefore expected to have more incentives 
to “invest” in political procedures, capturing politicians and through them promoting 
the regulation that best serves their interests. Peltzman (1976) formalized and 
generalized the theory of Stigler. A central result o f Peltzman’s model is that the costs 
of using the political process limit not only the size of the winning group but also the 
potential gains it may enjoy. For Peltzman the rational regulator seeks a structure of 
costs and benefits that maximises his political returns. This means that the regulator
41 Oakeshott (1991) argues that the legislative, adjudicatory and executive processes (along with a very 
specific understanding o f the term “politics”) exist to make authority operational in practice, that is, in 
reference to specific problems with distinct circumstances at a given point in time.
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gives attention not only to economic factors but also to political ones and thus 
political criteria will substitute for economic ones to some degree when he makes his 
decisions. This means that even though smaller, and better organized groups will 
probably be on the winning side of the regulators’ auction, as argued by Stigler, their 
victory will not be absolute and some compensation to the losers will be arranged by 
the regulator. Becker (1983) developed this idea further by emphasizing the presence 
of deadweight costs. Deadweight costs are “the distortions in the use of resources 
induced by different taxes and subsidies” (Becker 1983, p.373). Because deadweight 
costs to the groups that are “taxed” rise at an increasing rate as the “subsidies” to the 
winning group increase, the subsidies will tend to be lower than what the winning 
group would like, since higher subsidies will induce stronger opposition from the 
losing groups.
The international strand of the theory expands the model to an open economy. 
The principal insight o f the theory is that international cooperation can be used in an 
open economy context to satisfy domestic constituencies. Given that politicians want 
to win the support of a variety of constituencies, they will use international 
institutions, if they can, to increase the resources available for distribution to these 
constituencies. This in turn will increase the political returns they expect from these 
constituencies: “international institutions will be created only when such institutions 
are utility enhancing for national politicians. In other words, international institutions 
will be created when they are politically efficient (that is, increase electoral support) 
for national politicians” (Richards 1999, p.3).
The economic theory of international regulation is a domestic politics 
approach to international regulation and thus fits exceptionally well with the type of 
theoretical framework we are trying to develop in this thesis. As such, it fulfils the 
two functions we posited as necessary at the beginning of this section: it focuses on 
domestic politics and examines the role of interest constituencies in the regulatory 
process. In addition, the way the theory addresses these issues counters another 
weakness o f the explanations examined earlier. Instead o f relying on normative 
assumptions about the behaviour and motives of the regulator, it assigns the regulator 
rational and self-regarding behaviour, similar to that o f other actors, while
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acknowledging the distinct characteristics of the political process. The combination of 
these two elements provides us with a richer explanation of regulation because, while 
on the one hand it stresses the role of resource capabilities and thus power in 
domestic politics, on the other hand it acknowledges the peculiarities of the “political 
market”, allowing thus for efficiency explanations. Indeed, the characteristic of the 
deadweight costs, implies a “tyranny of the status quo” when a political equilibrium 
exists among pressure groups, which makes it difficult for winning groups to gain 
higher subsidies. The level of subsidies may rise however if new regulation increases 
efficiency, because higher subsidies can be extracted from the same level of taxes; if 
efficiency rises marginally with new regulation, then the winning groups will have an 
incentive to increase their pressure. Because of this effect, “policies that raise 
efficiency are more likely to be adopted than policies that lower efficiency” (Becker 
1983, p.384).
The argument put forward in this thesis is founded on the main insight of the 
economic theory of international regulation: regulators will often use international 
regulation to satisfy domestic constituencies. The aim here however, is to extend this 
basic insight beyond traditional inter-state institutions to the realm of transnational 
regulation by acknowledging that regulators can use not only international institutions 
but also non-state, transnational organizations to satisfy domestic constituencies. 
Given the nature of transnational regulatory authority, which, as was shown earlier, 
hinges on the explicit endorsement of state authorities, the argument put forward here 
can be presented as:
Proposition (1): we expect state authorities to endorse, encourage, or bring about 
themselves the emergence o f  transnational economic governance schemes that enjoy 
regulatory authority, when they want to distribute wealth to specific domestic interest 
constituencies.
Also, in line with the economic theory of regulation:
Condition (la): we expect the winning constituencies to be small, well-organized and 
with a high per capita interest in the regulation being promoted.
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This extension to the transnational level however, raises two significant problems in 
relation to the economic theory of regulation. First, the delegation of authority to the 
private sector runs contrary to the main tenet of the theory, that is, the self-interest of 
the regulator. By delegating their regulatory powers away, politicians and regulators 
give up their leverage over the private sector and thus remove the incentive of the 
private sector to support them financially. Indeed, Peltzman (1989) regards the 
economic theory’s inability to predict the de-regulatory wave of the 1970s and 1980s 
as one o f its most significant failures, since it was obviously not in the regulators’ 
interest. However, this is only true if we adopt a very narrow definition of 
deregulation and self-regulation. By adopting a policy o f hybrid regulation, the 
regulator can retain a significant role in the regulatory process. Deregulation and self­
regulation need not be a complete surrender of power if the state reserves a role in the 
regulatory process, threatening at any time a revocation o f the private sector’s 
regulatory powers and the introduction of state regulation. The experience from the 
deregulatory wave in domestic economies in recent decades seems to verify our 
argument: what has taken place is not deregulation but rather re-regulation. The 
“deregulatory” wave o f recent years has really been a surge in both mandated and 
sanctioned self-regulatory schemes42. What is more, in the case of transnational 
regulatory authority, since the transnational regulatory forum receiving the grant of 
authority also includes foreign non-state actors, with possibly different interests from 
the domestic constituencies that the regulators try to satisfy, retaining a role in the 
regulatory process becomes necessary, in order to influence the produced regulation 
towards the desired direction. The economic theory of regulation therefore sets a limit 
to the degree o f delegation of transnational regulatory authority:
Condition (lb): we expect national regulators/policians to embed their delegation o f  
authority to a transnational regulatory forum with an institutional mechanism or 
procedure which ensures that they retain a significant role in the regulatory process, 
and thus the ability to control the regulatory outcome i f  they so choose.
42 For interesting accounts o f  this process see Harden and Lewis (1986), Cemy (1991), Majone (1994), 
Baldwin et al. (1998). A similar argument has also been made by the literature on private interest 
governments (Streeck and Schmitter 1985).
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There remains however, another even more difficult problem to overcome. The 
economic theory of international regulation, which underpins our argument, is not in 
a position to address our third research question, concerning the justification of the 
delegation o f authority. The economic theory of international regulation refers to 
international institutions. International cooperation however, is quite different from 
transnational regulatory governance because in the latter it is not only the content but 
also the nature of regulation itself that is under consideration. In this context, the 
economic theory o f regulation offers at best a justificatory argument based on the 
efficiency gains offered to the voting public as a counter-balance to the privileged 
role offered to specific interest groups in the regulatory process. As we saw above 
however, efficiency may be adequate for justifying the content of regulation, but it is 
not enough to justify its delegation to transnational non-state actors. The adoption of 
hybrid or even entirely private forms of regulation is inexorably linked with questions 
of legitimacy and authority, which the positive theory o f regulation with its focus on 
interests and rational, egoistic actors is ill-suited to address. Indeed, one of the major 
criticisms o f the economic theory of regulation has been the fact that it ignores almost 
entirely the political and institutional constraints on the ability o f the regulator to use 
regulation to satisfy particular domestic constituencies43.
The solution proposed in this thesis is to relax and widen the rationalist 
assumptions o f the economic theory of regulation by acknowledging the constraints 
outlined by the political theory of authority. Such a synthesis can help us 
contextualize the insights of the economic theory of regulation, by placing regulators 
and private actors within the boundaries o f a political community. As we have seen, 
the normative and institutional limitations grounded on the rules that establish 
authority set the boundaries of legitimacy; they determine whether the actions of 
governments and regulators are legitimate and authoritative and therefore establish 
the boundaries o f the “feasible” in political action, including the delegation of 
regulatory powers to non-state actors. In a liberal, democratic society, where authority 
has been established based on democratic principles, public in authority can only be
43 For reviews o f  the problems identified more generally with the economic theory o f regulation, see 
Peltzman (1989), and Baldwin et al. (1998).
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held by the democratically elected government. Therefore, governments need not 
only compensate the general public for granting self-regulatory powers to the private 
sector, but they also need to justify the transfer of their democratically entrusted right 
to regulate public life to parties without a comparable mandate. While therefore the 
positive theory of regulation can help us understand why regulators may be willing to 
delegate their regulatory powers away, the political theory of authority can help us 
understand when they are able to do so.
The next sections operationalize these arguments. First, we attempt to provide 
an answer to our second research question by identifying the conditions that may 
provide regulators with the incentives to choose transnational regulatory governance, 
over other international and/or transnational institutions, in order to satisfy the 
preffered constituencies. Secondly, we address the problematique raised by our third 
research question by describing the justificatory process regulators have to follow 
when they have an incentive to use transnational regulatory authority.
3.4.2 Using transnational regulatory authority
The economic theory of international regulation proposes two major strategies for 
using international institutions for political gains: a) create institutions that increase 
efficiency and therefore the resources available for distribution to domestic 
constituencies arid b) create institutions that transfer wealth from foreign actors to 
particular domestic constituencies (Oatley and Nabors 1998; Richards 1999). By 
expanding the strategic arsenal of regulators’ economic diplomacy tools to the 
transnational arena however, we give them a choice between international and 
transnational regulatory solutions. Given this option, two questions emerge in relation 
to transnational regulatory governance. First, can the strategies outlined above also 
work with transnational non-state regulatory institutions? Secondly, given the option 
to use international or transnational non-state institutions, when would regulators 
choose to use the latter? We address these questions for each o f the strategies outlined 
above.
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3.4.2.1 Transnational regulatory authority and efficiency gains
The first strategy follows from the discussion on deadweight costs, and its extension 
to the international realm presents no difficulties to the degree that it raises efficiency 
gains for all parties involved and the parties have no dominant strategies44. As we 
argued earlier, regulation that raises efficiency will generally be preferable to the 
regulators than regulation that does not. The same strategy could be used in the case 
of transnational regulatory authority by extending the same line of argument not only 
to the content, but also the method of regulation. We have seen that the typical 
argument in favour of self-regulation is that it is a cost-reducing regulatory method 
for the government (cost of regulatory process passed on, at least partly, to the private 
sector), and that it often leads to more efficient and/or effective regulation. Both 
characteristics translate in increased resources available to the regulator for 
distribution to domestic constituencies. In principle therefore, it seems that the same 
argument could be made for transnational regulatory governance.
However, as we saw earlier, the efficiency and effectiveness gains generated 
by delegating regulatory authority to transnational actors are significantly reduced 
compared to domestic self-regulatory schemes. At the same time, it was previously 
argued that transnational regulatory governance presents many of the problems 
associated with self-regulation, many of which are even more pronounced at the 
transnational level. These problems translate into significant political costs, especially 
when compared to regulation pursued through international institutions, costs, which 
cannot go unnoticed by the politically minded regulator. This is particularly the case, 
if the objective is to increase efficiency gains through international regulation for all 
states involved, when as we saw, we expect binding, hard law, international 
agreements, to be more effective and efficient institutional solutions.
For these reasons, we would not expect regulators to treat transnational 
regulatory authority as their first strategic choice when their objective is to increase 
efficiency gains. Therefore, the use of transnational regulatory authority means that 
enhancing efficiency through international institutions has failed as a regulatory
44 A dominant strategy is a strategy that results always in better outcomes for a player than an 
alternative strategy, irrespective o f their opponents’ strategies.
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strategy. In this case however, it is obvious that international agreement on the 
content of regulation is not forthcoming and therefore efficiency might no longer be 
the criterion for the use of transnational regulatory governance.
3.4.2.2 Redistribution and transnational regulatory authority
It is often the case that a proposed institution or agreement does not increase welfare 
for all parties involved and unsurprisingly, distributional conflicts cause cooperation 
to stall. International cooperation may not be forthcoming even when overall 
efficiency is enhanced because different actors may have different strategies on how 
to achieve the desired efficiency gains, which means that even when all actors gain, 
some actors may gain more than others45. In cases of distributional conflict, the use of 
international or transnational institutions as a redistributive strategy may be quite 
difficult to implement. This is because unlike domestic state regulation, international 
cooperation is by definition voluntary, which makes the possibility of redistributive 
agreements unlikely (Oatley and Nabors 1998; Richards 1999)46.
Nevertheless, as Richards (1999) notes, there are two reasons why 
politicians/regulators might actually accept voluntarily a wealth-reducing agreement. 
First, “wealth-transferring international regulations can benefit national politicians if
45 See Krasner (1991), Stein (1983), and Snidal (1985).
46 The concept o f  redistribution is used here in a similar vein as in the literature o f economic regulation 
which forms the theoretical basis for our argument. Therefore, redistribution refers to the transfer of  
wealth among different interest-constituencies, through the medium o f  regulation. This however, does 
not refer to wide-ranging, systematic schemes that aim to direct the economy and society as a whole 
towards a specific model o f wealth distribution, often driven by transnational elites, along the lines of 
critical theorists (e.g. Gill 1995; Cutler 2003). Rather, it takes place in the context of policy/regulatory 
politics within specific issue-areas or industries, always depending on the institutional characteristics 
and the nature o f the issue-area or industry in question. As it has been made clear earlier, the decision 
to pursue a distributional policy favourable to particular interest constituencies, depends on the rational 
calculation by the regulator and/or politician o f the structure of costs and benefits that maximises his 
political returns in a specific policy area. In this sense redistribution as used in this thesis is closer to 
traditional political science’s interest-group accounts o f public policy and regulation. Still, caution is 
needed not to confuse it with Lowi’s (1964) classic conception of redistribution as a type o f public 
policy. Lowi’s redistribution actually refers to wide-ranging, largely class-based, redistributive policies 
that may have significant impact on the relative distribution o f wealth across society and whose 
importance is determined more by their potential and the expectations they generate rather by the 
actual outcome o f the policy process (Lowi 1964). In this sense Lowi’s conception o f redistribution is 
closer to critical theorists’ views and indeed Lowi admits that in such cases the political process can be 
most closely approximated by an elitist approach, similar to the ones advocated by critical theory. The 
concept o f redistribution used here is more likely to be encountered in Lowi’s regulatory category o f  
public policy which is most often encountered at the level o f specific sectors.
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the domestic actors who actually transfer wealth abroad are not part of the politicians’ 
coalition or if  coalition members stand to gain from an international agreement” 
(1999, p. 12). In other words, international regulation can be used as a means to 
achieve redistribution between domestic constituencies, even at the expense of 
society’s overall well-being. This should come as no surprise since:
international cooperation in this model is attractive due to the private goods it creates, 
not the public goods. Although pubic goods are not irrelevant, they effect political 
choice through their effects on private wealth. Thus international cooperation might be 
politically attractive even if it creates public “bads”.
(Oatley and Nabors 1998, p. 40) 
Why would regulators and/or politicians choose transnational regulatory 
authority over an international agreement as a means to achieve domestic 
redistribution? The use o f international institutions to achieve domestic redistribution 
offers the advantage, compared to voluntary, non-state institutions, that international 
agreements bind national politicians/regulators, but also their successors (who may 
favour different interest constituencies) to specific obligations and policies, especially 
when these agreements are characterized by a high degree o f legalization (Abbott 
and Snidal 2000; Kahler 2000). Transnational regulatory authority however also 
offers this advantage. By leading to binding legal results that transform the domestic 
legal framework, transnational regulatory authority makes the reversal of the 
obligations assumed under its auspices unlikely and thus binds to a considerable 
degree the successor regulators/politicians to its agreements. Even so, the use of 
transnational regulatory authority entails significant sovereignty costs and might raise 
legitimacy concerns regarding the regulators’ choice. An advantage of transnational 
regulatory authority, that could potentially compensate regulators/politicians for the 
sovereignty costs they would incur and the legitimacy concerns they would raise by 
using it, could be its less formal set-up, which might result in less public attention and 
scrutiny for the regulator (Lipson 1991). This presents a considerable advantage, 
when the objective is domestic redistribution. Less public awareness could reduce 
significantly the legitimacy concerns and the corresponding political costs making 
this option particularly attractive for the regulator.
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Whether this is enough of an incentive for the use of transnational regulatory 
authority will depend on the nature of the regulatory dilemma that 
regulators/politicians face. For example, when regulators want to bypass strong 
domestic opposition of well-organized constituencies, which have sufficient interest 
and resources to identify and denounce publicly this strategy, the less formal set-up of 
transnational regulatory governance could become a disadvantage. 
Regulators/politicians would be pressed to withdraw from the transnational 
governance scheme and they would not be able to invoke any binding international 
agreement allowing them to resist such calls. On the other hand, if opposition comes 
from large, poorly organized constituencies with low awareness o f the issues at hand, 
which usually means the general public or some large subgroup thereof (e.g. 
consumers) we would expect regulators/politicians to bind this weak opposition to a 
formal international agreement, since it is very likely that the redistributive agreement 
would not be detected or understood from the opposition. However, when the nature 
of the issue-area in question is such, that increased public awareness associated with 
negotiations in an international forum has the potential to mobilize significant 
opposition from the public, including civil society movements/organizations, then 
regulators and/or politicians might have enough of an incentive to resort to 
transnational regulatory authority. Hightened risk of public reaction in turn, is more 
likely, the more politically sensitive is the issue-area where domestic redistribution is 
sought. Using transnational regulatory governance in this case, allows 
regulators/politicians to lower the visibility of the issues addressed, by locating the 
negotiations in a technical, expert-dominated forum. The potential benefits from such 
a move in turn, are more likely to be available in issue-areas with highly complex 
scientific, technical and/or technological content. It is in such issue-areas or industries 
that the public will probably be less organized, and more likely to be either unaware 
or less capable o f understanding the issues being regulated. Also, in such issue-areas 
it would be easier for the regulators and/or politicians to shift the regulatory forum to 
a transnational non-state organization without drawing significant public attention. 
Summarizing the previous discussion, we have:
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Proposition (2): when their objective is domestic redistribution, we would expect 
regulators and/or politicians to choose transnational regulatory authority: (a) in 
issue-areas with highly complex scientific, technical and/or technological content, 
and (b) when the issues regulated have a high potential to mobilize wide public 
opposition.
A second reason why regulators/politicians may accept a wealth-reducing 
agreement or institution is that they are forced into it. This can happen in two cases: 
when unanimity is not the choice rule and when there is an actor that has the ability to 
manipulate the choice set, that is, the set of alternatives from which the outcome will 
be selected. If unanimity is not the choice rule, the majority can extract wealth from 
the minority. However, when unanimity is the rule of choice, as is often the case in 
international politics47, convincing voting parties to a redistributive agreement is very 
difficult. Oatley and Nabors suggest that this difficulty can be overcome when a 
player has the ability to propose alternatives that are costly to other parties, forcing 
them to choose the less costly, but still wealth-reducing choice. In this case even if 
unanimity is required the dominant actor can still get their desired outcome. This is 
usually the case when a state enjoys a significant advantage of structural power in the 
issue-area, which allows it to shape the possible outcomes:
the...reason national politicians might voluntarily accept wealth-reducing international 
regulations stems from the potential for states with market power to unilaterally define 
the reversion point of international negotiations. The reversion point is the set of 
marketplace rules that will result if there is no new international agreement.
(Richards 1999, pp. 12-13)
In other words, redistributive cooperation can occur, even when unanimity is 
required, provided there is a hegemon. However, there are two problems with the 
hegemonic argument in terms of international redistribution. First, few global 
industries display so asymmetrical a distribution of power that one state can 
determine on its own the reversion point. Most industries that exhibit high levels of 
concentration at a global level could be better characterized as oligopolies rather than 
monopolies, and the companies that make up these oligopolies usually come from
47 Oatley and Nabors themselves admit that, “majority rule is not the dominant decision rule in 
international politics” (1998, p.41).
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more than one country. There is therefore a significant problem for the hegemonic 
argument when the other important players are not in agreement with the “dominant” 
centre. In the case o f the banking industry for example, the US and the UK acted in 
coordination, in effect creating a powerful front that threatened the other players 
because o f the combined structural power of these two countries in the area of 
banking (Simmons 2001). In other instances however, this has not been the case. 
Underhill (1995) describes how the UK did not agree with the US approach on a 
similar capital adequacy standard, this time for securities firms. UK views were in 
line with the EU Directive on the issue which was also in line with an IOSCO/Basle 
Committee Accord. As a result there is still no comparable capital adequacy 
agreement for securities firms today.
Secondly, even in cases where a hegemon exists, the nature of the 
international political process may attach costs to an international agreement that the 
hegemon may consider unacceptably high. First, the one-state, one-vote system 
reduces significantly the impact of the underlying power asymmetries among states, 
since all states in international negotiations are statutorily equal. Secondly, the 
“noise” in the process of voting in international negotiations cancels out, to some 
degree, the power advantage of the hegemon. Stigler describes the voting process in 
domestic political systems as gross or noisy: “the expressions of preferences in voting 
will be less precise than the expressions of preferences in the marketplace because 
many uninformed people will be voting and affecting the decision” (1971, p. 11-12). 
The uninformed people are voters that have no incentive to get informed because the 
costs they have to incur in order to acquire information are disproportionate to their 
gains, especially when the issue under consideration does not directly affect them. 
Moreover, they cannot trade their voting power for favours, unless they first 
coordinate into blocks of votes, because the large number o f domestic voters 
precludes any one o f them having an impact on the voting outcome. Voting in 
international organizations is like domestic voting in the sense that there may be 
many voters (states) that are not directly interested in a particular issue; in other 
words there is noise in international voting as well. Unlike domestic voting however, 
due to the small numbers involved in international negotiations, states that do not
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have a direct (or significant) stake in an issue, know that they can nonetheless affect 
the final outcome. Therefore, they often have an incentive to exploit their influence 
over the voting outcome in order to bargain for concessions in other issues. Because 
these states do not have a direct interest in the issues that the hegemon is trying to 
pursue, they are not considerably affected by the manipulation of the choice set by the 
hegemon; preserving the status quo entails no costs for them and therefore the 
reversion point threat is not an effective tool against them. If the deal these countries 
offer to the hegemon affects negatively some of its domestic constituencies, the 
hegemon’s regulator may face a backlash at home from the reaction of the adversely 
affected constituencies. Therefore, depending on the relative wealth and electoral 
importance of these constituencies, the costs associated with the deal, which we shall 
hereafter call compensatory costs, may be considered too high and international 
negotiations may stall48.
Because of the difficulty of international negotiations in certain issues, states 
(even those considered as hegemonic) may prefer to either forgo an international 
agreement altogether or to pursue alternative strategies such as bilateral agreements, 
or agreements in alternative international fora, where membership will be limited to 
states with more compatible interests. When states are selecting such alternative 
solutions, they are in effect pursuing a strategy of forum-shifting. Forum-shifting is 
not a new strategy. As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) argue, forum-shifting has been 
used in international regulation since the Second World War in a number of issue- 
areas49, its use made easier by the growth in the number of international institutions. 
There is no reason however why forum-shifting could not be extended to non-state or 
hybrid organizations. Indeed, what is argued here is that when regulators seek but are 
unable to achieve redistribution through international institutions, they may resort to 
the solution o f transnational regulatory authority as a forum-shifting strategy.
48 The negotiations currently under way at the WTO in the context o f the Doha Round are a case in 
point: developed states push for concessions in issues of investment, technology and services, while 
developing countries press for concessions mainly in agriculture. Because farmers are a well-organized 
and politically significant group in both the European Union and the United States, the latter find it 
difficult to agree to the concessions demanded by the developing countries.
49 For example in financial regulation, intellectual property rights, telecommunications, labour 
standards, competition policy, air and sea transport, nuclear safeguards, privacy standards, food 
standards and drugs’ regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 564-571).
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3.4.2.2.1 Transnational forum-shifting
To understand in which issue-areas or industries regulators will have an incentive to 
use transnational regulatory authority as a forum-shifting strategy, we need to look at 
the different strategic configurations that they may face following the failure of 
international agreement, in line with the discussion in the previous section. Table 3.1 
outlines the different possible combinations of simple or distributional coordination50 
and different levels o f compensatory costs in the context o f a hegemonic power 
structure. We see that when there are low compensatory costs the presence of a 
hegemon facilitates international cooperation and there is no need for employing 
forum-shifting strategies on the part of the hegemon. Other market players have no 
incentive to engage in forum-shifting either, since they can either free-ride on the 
hegemon (benign hegemony), or if the content of rules is important for them and they 
disagree with the hegemon on this issue, they are likely to be coerced into a set of 
rules favourable to the hegemon (coercive hegemony).
Table 3.1 Forum-Shifting in a Hegemonic Power Structure
Type o f cooperation problem
Simple Coordination Distributional Coordination
Compensatory
Costs
Low
International Agreement 
(Benign Hegemony)
International Agreement 
(Coercive Hegemony)
High
International
Forum-Shifting
International
Forum-Shifting
50 This category refers to the type o f problem for the resolution o f which international cooperation is 
sought after. Simple coordination refers here to problems where there are no significant conflicts of 
interest among the interested parties. They usually concern “common aversion dilemmas”. In such 
cases actors have a common interest in avoiding a particular outcome whose resolution requires mainly 
coordination among the affected parties, and thus it does not affect significantly their patterns of 
behaviour. Nonetheless, significant distributional differences can emerge even in common aversion 
dilemmas. These cases along with problems usually characterized as “dilemmas of common interests” 
are included in the distributional coordination category. In common interests’ dilemmas agreement is 
much more difficult and actors must collaborate, establishing strict patterns o f behaviour and ensuring 
that no one cheats. For a detailed discussion of different cooperation problems see Stein (1983), Snidal 
(1985) and Martin (1992).
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When compensatory costs are high, the hegemon may decide that it prefers to use an 
alternative forum. In cases of simple coordination, states with regulatory concerns 
similar to those of the hegemon have an incentive to join the new forum and free-ride 
on the hegemon. In cases of distributional conflict, the hegemon can again try to 
overcome both the high compensatory costs and the distributional conflicts through 
bilateral agreements where it enjoys a negotiating advantage. Alternatively, it can 
form an alternative forum and again press other market players into compliance 
through its market power. From this overview, it is obvious that there is ultimately, 
no compelling reason for the hegemon’s regulators to use hybrid forms of 
governance, thereby delegating part of their regulatory control to the private sector, 
incurring thus significant sovereignty costs, and potentially raising sensitive 
legitimacy questions over their choice. The hegemon’s asymmetrical power 
advantage ensures binding international agreements either through principal or 
alternative international fora, or through bilateral agreements.
Table 3.2 outlines the possible combinations of simple or distributional 
coordination among market players and different levels of compensatory costs in an 
environment characterized by an oligopolistic distribution of market power. When 
compensatory costs are low and the objective of the group of strong market players is 
a common set of rules, an international agreement is feasible and forum-shifting will 
not be used as a strategy. In the case o f high compensatory costs and agreement 
among the significant market players, the latter can form an alternative forum and 
cooperate to provide a common set of rules while other small players can free-ride on 
them51. It should be noted here, that it is only states that enjoy considerable structural 
or market power in the issue-area in question that are able to employ successfully a
51 According to collective action theory, no individual has an economic rational incentive to contribute 
to the provision o f collective goods, since everyone would be better o ff by free-riding on the 
contributions o f others (Olson 1965). A group can enjoy a collective good however when there is one 
or more members of the group for which the net benefit o f providing the good is larger than its cost 
even if  everybody else free-rides on them. Hardin (1982) has showed that, what is important for 
collective action is the factor k, rather than the number of group members n; k being the “the size of 
the smallest subgroup that could benefit more than the total cost o f the whole group’s good” (Hardin 
1982, p. 46). In an “oligopolistic” industry where a small number o f states enjoy significant market 
power, they may have the incentive and the capabilities to provide a collective good because their 
benefits from collectively doing so are likely to be greater than the cost o f providing it.
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forum-shifting strategy, inter-state or hybrid. There are two reasons for this. First, it is 
only the departure of a state that is a significant player in an issue-area that can 
weaken the abandoned forum and thus have any impact on its international standing. 
It is only in such a case therefore, that the other states participating in the forum may 
be willing to change their position. Secondly, only a state with significant market 
power in an issue-area will be able to endow a non-state organization with enough 
influence to be considered a significant forum for global economic regulation.
When distributional conflicts emerge among the dominant market players and 
international agreement is not likely, then one or more of these states might have an 
incentive to form an alternative forum to pursue international regulation. But would 
the states that form these alternative fora have an incentive to use transnational 
regulatory governance? Having one or more inter-state fora would only repeat the 
impasse of international negotiations at different fora, unless a “critical mass” of the 
dominant players, either in numbers or in market weight, can create a common front, 
which would make opposition from the other significant players unsustainable (e.g. 
the case o f the bilateral capital adequacy standard between the US and the UK).
Table 3.2 Forum-Shifting in an Oligopolistic Power Structure
Type o f cooperation problem
Simple Coordination
Distributional
Coordination
Compensatory
Costs
Low International Agreement Forum-Shifting
High Forum-Shifting Forum-Shifting
If  this is not possible, then transnational regulatory governance may be chosen 
in the context o f a forum-shifting strategy. The states that opt for transnational 
regulatory governance are bound to exert significant influence over the work of the 
transnational regulatory forum. As we have seen, regulators will embed their
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cooperation with a transnational organization, with an institutional mechanism that 
provides them with a measure of control over the regulatory outcome. After all, that is 
the reason for deciding to engage with the organization in the first place: to overcome 
the resistance o f opposing states and promote their own version of international 
regulation. At the same time, the participation of the private sector in the new forum, 
which is considered “an authority” and can contribute to more efficient and effective 
regulation, allows the initiating states to advertise the new transnational forum as an 
“experts” forum promoting efficient, market-based regulation. This claim may attract 
a number o f smaller market players, which could raise the status of the new 
organization and therefore the probalities that it will become the new dominant forum 
for the particular issue-area.
Moreover, the claim of an authority that the private sector can bring to such a 
hybrid forum makes a compromise between the opposing states more feasible. First, 
while undoubtedly favourable to the initiating states’ position, the rules produced by 
such a forum may be moderate enough to provide a reasonable basis for a future 
compromise with the opposing states. Secondly, a transnational regulatory forum may 
provide a face-saving solution for regulators/politicians locked in a regulatory 
stalemate. Thus, when regulators/politicians are under pressure from domestic interest 
constituencies to reach an international agreement, they may be willing to 
compromise their initial negotiating position to overcome the negotiating deadlock. 
However, doing so in the context of an international forum, would be a clear 
admission of defeat and put regulators/politicians in difficult position vis a vis their 
domestic constituents and the political establishment. On the other hand, 
compromising their earlier position in the context of a new transnational forum, either 
by participating in a forum first engaged by the opposing states, or by initiating first 
such a move, allows them to present the agreed regulation as efficient, market-based 
regulation developed by the experts, avoiding the impression of a forced and perhaps 
damaging compromise.
However, the most significant advantage of transnational regulatory authority, 
is the fact that the initiating states effectively change the reversion point, a 
considerable advantage, especially when compared to other non-state governance
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schemes. This is because unlike other non-state governance schemes, transnational 
regulatory authority has concrete legal effects. Once a state has adopted the hybrid 
organization’s rules, the costs of not complying with them will be high for foreign 
competitors, since they won’t be able to conduct business in its jurisdiction. The more 
economically significant that state’s market is for them, the higher will these costs be. 
Further, if foreign competitors adopt the new rules for this jurisdiction (and perhaps a 
number of other important jurisdictions participating in the scheme), they will then 
have an incentive to either adopt this set of rules globally, or compromise their earlier 
position in order to achieve one set of rules for their global operations and avoid the 
costs and uncertainty of having to comply with multiple sets of rules. In this way, 
dominant market players can achieve many of the benefits o f hard international 
legalization, that is, to bind their competitors into concrete legal obligations.
The same arguments can be made in the case of a distributional conflict with 
high compensatory costs. The crucial factor that impedes agreement is not so much 
the opposition of weaker states, not directly involved in the particular issue-area, but 
the conflict among the dominant markets players. Still, the existence of high 
compensatory costs adds another reason for pursuing a forum-shifting strategy. 
Opting for transnational regulatory authority has the added advantage o f preventing 
states without a significant presence in the industry, and therefore expertise, from 
participating in the regime. In other words, transnational regulatory governance acts 
as a barrier to regulatory entry for these states and deprives them of the opportunity 
to demand compensatory costs in return for granting their consent to an agreement. 
Summarizing the previous discussion, we have:
Proposition (3): when their objective is international redistribution, we would expect 
regulators and/or politicians to use transnational regulatory authority: (a) in issue- 
areas or industries characterized by an oligopolistic global market structure, and (b) 
when there are significant distributional conflicts among the dominant market 
players, which cannot be resolved through international institutions; in this case 
transnational regulatory governance may be used as a forum-shifting strategy.
With proposition (3), we conclude the discussion of section 3.4.2, which examined 
the conditions under which transnational regulatory authority may be used in order to
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satisfy domestic interest constituencies. The discussion showed that we would expect 
regulators and/or politicians to use transnational regulatory authority only in the 
context of a redistributive strategy and not in order to achieve an international 
agreement aiming primarily to enhance efficiency for all parties involved. Therefore, 
we are now in a position to restate proposition (1) in more precise terms:
Proposition (1): we expect state authorities to endorse, encourage, or bring about 
themselves the emergence o f  transnational economic governance schemes that enjoy 
regulatory authority, when they want to redistribute wealth to specific domestic 
interest constituencies. Transnational regulatory authority may be used to 
redistribute wealth either from other domestic constituencies (domestic 
redistribution), or from  foreign constituencies (international redistribution).
3.4.3 Justifying transnational regulatory authority
As we have seen, the political theory of authority can helps us contextualize the 
insights of the economic theory of international regulation, by placing politicians and 
private actors within the boundaries of a political community. In this political 
community, governments need to satisfy the political establishment and the public 
that the delegation of regulatory authority does not violate the rules and principles of 
their own authority, and that it is legitimate and therefore authoritative. The 
authoritativeness o f the decision to delegate authority, like that o f any governmental 
action, is determined by a two-stage assessment process. First, an institutional- 
procedural assessment, where both the office making an authoritative pronouncement 
and the pronouncement itself are assessed in order to verify their authoritative status 
according to the appropriate and acknowledged rules and procedures that establish 
authority. Thus for example, a law will not be considered authoritative if it has not 
passed through parliament according to the appropriate procedures; likewise a 
ministerial executive decision will not be considered authoritative if it violates 
existing law. The second type o f assessment we shall call a substantive-normative 
assessment because it does not assess the actions and pronouncements of authority 
according to the procedures of their appearance but according to their substance. This 
assessment does not negate the characteristics of authority described in the previous
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chapter. What is judged here is not the personal appeal of the actions and 
pronouncements of authority. Rather, what is judged is the conformity of the content 
of these actions and pronouncements to the principles and beliefs according to which 
authority itself is established. This type of assessment therefore, operates as a second 
order mark o f authority in the process of evaluation, whereby the subjects of authority 
determine whether a command or pronouncement is indeed authoritative and 
therefore warrants their acceptance as such52. For example, we often see, courts 
cancelling governmental actions or rules not because the government did not follow 
the appropriate procedures but because such actions and rules are judged 
“unconstitutional” in the sense that they violate the principles embodied in the 
constitution, which is the source of governmental authority and from which all 
decisions taken by this authority should flow.
For the institutional-procedural assessment of the delegation of regulatory 
authority, the traditional model of administrative authority suggests that the 
delegation o f authority operates in principle in a hierarchical fashion (Bayles 1987). 
This means that “delegated authority is justified if the authority of the delegator is 
justified” (Bayles 1987, p. 290). For the case of regulatory in authority therefore, this 
delegation o f authority must come from the state. Moreover, the procedural 
conditionality o f the delegation process means that it must conform to certain 
procedures, and that the organizations receiving the grant of authority must operate 
according to the standards and principles of the organization that delegates it. This 
usually translates into a set of formal attributes such as adequate standards of 
transparency, openness, interest representation and due process; in other words the 
attributes that an institution entrusted with public authority would be expected to 
possess. Finally, the state cannot delegate all its regulatory authority away because 
that would mean that the people entrusted with the authority to regulate public life 
have neither the power to exercise this authority nor the responsibility for the 
consequences o f its exercise. The state therefore must retain a role, often a 
supervisory one, in order to establish an institutional, formal procedure that ensures
52 See pp.33-34 for Flathman’s point that people have to judge whether a pronouncement is 
authoritative before accepting it as such.
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that the government retains the ultimate authority for the regulation of public life and 
that the regulatory process does truly satisfy the formal procedural attributes 
described above. The institutional-procedural constraints of authority therefore, 
provide us with another, more rigorous reason, for the adoption of hybrid forms of 
regulatory authority than the success of regulators’ redistributive strategies. Even if 
the configuration of voting and financial power was such that it gave politicians 
and/or regulators an incentive to allow an entirely self-regulatory regime in a 
particular industry, they would still not be able to do so because such an action would 
violate the institutional-procedural conditions of authority and would be judged not 
only illegitimate but also illegal.
However, the procedures and limitations associated with the delegation of 
authority do not help us justify , and therefore legitimize, the delegation o f authority. 
They only refer to the process of delegation not to its justification. As argued above, 
the ability to delegate authority also rests on a substantive-normative assessment 
regarding the validity of the regulator’s claim. The justification for delegating in 
authority needs to emanate from the purpose and principles underlying in authority as 
these are outlined in the constitutional rules of authority. This helps us qualify the 
justifiability of delegating authority “to the extent that it helps the holder o f authority 
to achieve the ends towards which his authority is geared” (De George 1985, p. 106).
What can non-state actors contribute to the achievement of public policy 
objectives? As we have seen, non-state actors are considered “authorities”. Most 
people would agree that a person, that is considered an authority in some issue-area 
or activity, would be best placed to provide guidance to others for issues relating to 
their area o f expertise. Indeed, that is the essence and pre-condition of being an 
authority; it is not only the superior knowledge that one has, but also the 
acknowledgment by others that such a person has superior knowledge. From this 
follows that in issue-areas where non-state actors can be considered authorities, they 
would also be considered as well placed actors to provide guidance to others relating 
to this issue-area. Lacking a democratic mandate therefore being “an authority” is a 
prerequisite for the assumption of in authority by the private sector.
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Still, as we have argued before, expertise, while able to contribute towards 
achieving better regulation, is not an adequate justification for the delegation of 
authority to transnational non-state actors. The justification based on the contribution 
to policy objectives should therefore be further qualified; the regulator needs to be 
able to argue not only that the expertise of the private sector is necessary for 
regulation, but that the delegation of authority to the private sector is necessary for 
regulation53. This can only be claimed when the delegation of authority contributes 
towards the regulation o f an issue-area, which the state cannot satisfactorily provide 
on its own, that is, when there are evident and generally acknowledged limitations on 
the functional ability o f the state to provide an adequate standard o f governance. This 
argument in turn, could be convincingly made, when changes in the nature of an 
issue-area or an industry occur, which hinder the ability of the state to regulate 
domestically or internationally certain issue-areas or industries. Changes like this can 
usually emanate from changes in scientific knowledge and/or technology.
The increasing rate of technological innovation in recent years has created 
entirely new industries and fundamentally transformed existing ones. These changes 
have had significant consequences for their regulation. First, the increasing rate of 
technological innovation changes the operational reality of many industries with an 
increasing frequency, rendering rules obsolete within a short period of time of being 
introduced. State authorities are usually hampered by bureaucratic procedures and red 
tape which makes their response to new technological and scientific developments 
too slow and inadequate. Private sector actors are often the only parties with adequate 
knowledge and understanding of the rapid changes taking place in such industries or 
issue-areas. Secondly, the importance of the technological and scientific knowledge 
for the everyday operation o f many industries is now such that any attempt to regulate 
such industries must be founded on a deep understanding of the role of technology 
and science in their operation. In many industries the level o f expertise that is
53 The fact that the regulator needs to persuade the political establishment and the public that the 
delegation to non-state actors is necessary does not negate the authority of the regulator. It should be 
reminded that this justification takes place in the context of the substantial-normative assessment 
described above, which does not evaluate the personal appeal of regulatory pronouncements; what is 
judged is not authority itself but whether the holder of public authority exercises it according to its 
underlying principles and purpose.
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required is only or mainly available in the private sector, because it is the private 
sector that is responsible for many of the technological and scientific breakthroughs 
and innovations. This is especially true for the so-called high-tech industries as well 
as for areas that combine a high technological component with advanced scientific 
knowledge, such as biotechnology, biochemistry, aeronautics, etc.
However, it is not only technological and scientific sectors that governments 
have a difficult time regulating. Technically complex professions such as accounting, 
law and banking are also undergoing changes as the underlying transactions have 
become increasingly complex. Moreover, technology has allowed the proliferation 
and distribution of vast amounts of information and has contributed to an increasingly 
complex division of labour (Clarke 2000). The regulatory work becomes increasingly 
complex and resource-consumptive as vast and specialized amounts o f information 
are increasingly available and needed for the efficient regulation of many industries. 
In such cases, the task of regulators unavoidably becomes extremely difficult, costly 
and time-consuming, to such a degree that often their ability to provide an adequate 
level o f governance is questioned. This difficulty becomes even greater when these 
changes affect issue-areas with a significant transnational aspect or industries 
operating at a global level, since the amount of information that needs to be collected 
and assessed and the complexity of the issues involved increase significantly.
All these changes have deeply affected the way companies to do business 
across borders. Kobrin (2002) for example argues that the scale of technology in 
many strategic industries (its cost, risk and complexity) renders the minimum 
efficient market size larger than that o f the largest national markets, while the 
migration o f markets to cyberspace renders geographic space problematic as a basis 
for effective economic governance. As a result, the structure o f industries themselves 
changes and networks are replacing hierarchies and markets as a basic form of 
economic organization (Mytelka and Delapierre 1999; Kobrin 2002). These new 
organizational forms are not consistent with authority exercised through bounded and 
discrete geographic territory and therefore affect the ability of states to regulate them 
effectively (Reinicke 1998; Kobrin 2002). In such cases, regulators can claim the 
necessity o f hybrid regulation. Highly complex technical and technological problems
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and developments, continuous change in business practices and new organizational 
forms which transcend the traditional boundaries of time and space, may be used to 
illustrate the inability of state regulation to achieve an adequate provision of 
regulatory governance and the potential risks and dangers if cooperation with the 
private sector is not pursued. In this situation, opposing constituencies and/or part of 
the public may accept the necessity of transnational regulatory authority. In sum:
Proposition (4): we would expect regulators and/or politicians to justify the 
delegation o f  regulatory authority to a transnational regulatory forum by arguing 
that it is necessary, because traditional state and/or inter-state mechanisms are 
unable to provide an adequate standard o f  governance on their own.
Proposition (5): the inability o f  traditional state and/or inter-state mechanisms to 
provide an adequate standard o f  governance, is likely to be justified on grounds o f  
fundamental transformations in the nature o f  an issue-area or industry, due to 
significant changes in scientific knowledge and/or technology.
3.5 Summary and conclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to construct a theoretical framework that will allow 
us to explain the phenomenon of transnational regulatory authority. To achieve this 
objective we put forward three research questions. We have tried to answer these 
questions by combining the insights of the economic theory of international 
regulation and the political theory of authority. A summary of the resulting 
propositions and their accompanying scope conditions is provided in table 3.3. The 
three research questions and their suggested answers address two basic theoretical 
dimensions o f transnational regulatory authority. First, a political/functional 
dimension that seeks to understand the political reasons behind the emergence of 
transnational regulatory authority, and to identify the winners and losers of the 
decision to delegate authority to a transnational non-state organization. Secondly, a 
normative dimension that seeks to understand the process through which this 
delegation o f authority to transnational non-state actors is reconciled with the 
principles of public in authority.
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Table 3.3 Summary of the Theoretical Framework
Research Question 1: Why do regulators and/or politicians participate in hybrid governance 
schemes or acknowledge the rules produced by non-state governance schemes giving rise to 
transnational regulatory authority?
Proposition (1): we expect state authorities 
to endorse, encourage, or bring about 
themselves the emergence of transnational 
economic governance schemes that enjoy 
regulatory authority, when they want to 
redistribute wealth to specific domestic 
interest constituencies. Transnational 
regulatory authority may be used to 
redistribute wealth either from other 
domestic constituencies (domestic 
redistribution), or from foreign constituencies 
(international redistribution).
Condition (la): we expect the winning 
constituencies to be small, well-organized 
and with a high per capita interest in the 
regulation being promoted.
Condition (lb): we expect national 
regulators/policians to embed their 
delegation of authority to a transnational 
regulatory forum with an institutional 
mechanism or procedure which ensures that 
they retain a significant role in the regulatory 
process, and thus the ability to control the 
regulatory outcome if they so choose.
Research Question 2: Under what conditions do regulators and/or politicians have an 
incentive to use or endorse transnational regulatory authority, compared to other international 
and/or transnational institutional mechanisms?
Proposition (2): when their objective is 
domestic redistribution, we would expect 
regulators and/or politicians to choose 
transnational regulatory authority: (a) in 
issue-areas with highly complex scientific, 
technical and/or technological content, and 
(b) when the issues regulated have a high 
potential to mobilize wide public opposition.
Proposition (3): when their objective is 
international redistribution, we would expect 
regulators and/or politicians to use 
transnational regulatory authority: (a) in 
issue-areas or industries characterized by an 
oligopolistic global market structure, and (b) 
when there are significant distributional 
conflicts among the dominant market 
players, which cannot be resolved through 
international institutions; in this case 
transnational regulatory governance may be 
used as a forum-shifting strategy.
Research Question 3: How are regulators and /or politicians able to reconcile this delegation 
of authority to private actors with the principles of public in authority?
Proposition (4): we would expect regulators 
and/or politicians to justify the delegation of 
regulatory authority to a transnational 
regulatory forum by arguing that it is 
necessary, because traditional state and/or 
inter-state mechanisms are unable to provide 
an adequate standard of governance on their 
own.
Proposition (5): the inability of traditional 
state and/or inter-state mechanisms to 
provide an adequate standard of governance, 
is likely to be justified on grounds of 
fundamental transformations in the nature of 
an issue-area or industry, due to significant 
changes in scientific knowledge and/or 
technology.
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These two dimensions are not irreconcilable. While interest considerations refer to the 
reality of authority as practice, normative considerations relate to the concept o f  
authority itself. I believe that the interplay of these two different sets o f constraints 
lies at the heart o f the decision to use transnational regulatory authority. In order to 
test empirically these propositions, the next chapter offers an introduction to the first 
case study of this thesis, the IASB.
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Chapter 4
Transnational Regulatory Authority in Practice (1): International 
Accounting Harmonization and the International Accounting
Standards Board
4.1 Introduction
The first o f the two case studies examined in this thesis, concerns the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and its predecessor, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which during the past three decades have 
been engaged in the international harmonization of accounting standards. This 
chapter will serve as an introduction to the issue of international accounting diversity, 
and provide a brief history of both the wider harmonization initiatives in this issue- 
area and the efforts undertaken in the context of the IASB and its predecessor the 
IASC. Following this introduction, the aim of this chapter is to establish, based on the 
three criteria set out in the theoretical framework, our claim that the IASB is indeed a 
case of transnational regulatory authority.
4.2 International accounting diversity: causes and consequences
Until recently, accounting was considered a craft valued for its ability to perform a 
number o f functions deemed necessary for the operation of the economy (Hopwood 
1987; Beaver 1998; Scott 2003). Accounting methods were not considered part of the 
process of deciding what is economically or socially desirable and accounting debates 
were limited to purely technical issues. This view of accounting however has been 
seriously questioned in recent decades; accounting is increasingly seen not only as 
reflective of its surroundings, but also as a force that shapes its environment 
(Hopwood 1987; Burchell et al. 1980; Burchell et al. 1985). New research has 
demonstrated how accounting information exerts significant influence on almost all 
aspects o f economic and social activity54. In view of these findings a debate has
54 Accounting information can affect agency relations in the context of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986), the internal organizational structure and operation of a firm 
(Burchell et al. 1980; Hopwood 1985), the efficient operation of financial markets (Ball and Brown
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begun in both academic and policy circles about the economic consequences of 
accounting information and therefore the unavoidably political nature of accounting 
standard setting (Rappaport 1977; Zeff 1978; Solomons 1978; Brown 1990; Biener 
1994; Leuz, Pfaff and Hopwood 2004). As a result, it is now widely acknowledged 
that “the selection among financial reporting systems can be viewed essentially as an 
issue of social choice involving trade-offs among constituencies. Under this view, 
standard-setting is the outcome of a political process” (Beaver 1998, p. 16).
Figure 4.1 Explaining International Accounting Diversity
Accounting Differences
Different accounting 
principles
Different objectives of 
financial reporting
In presentation, 
recognition and 
measurement
Country-specific social, economic and 
cultural environment
Source: Haller and Walton 2003, p.2.
The political nature of accounting standard-setting becomes even more apparent at 
the international level. Research in international and comparative accounting has
1968; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Botosan 1997; Beaver 1998), economic development (Mckee and 
Ganer 1992), the design and implementation of state policies (Briston 1981; Burchell et al. 1985) and 
even wider social issues and policies (Glautier and Underdown 2001).
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demonstrated how different economic, social, cultural and legal conditions will 
unavoidably lead to different accounting systems as they create different reporting 
needs and priorities, and therefore different conceptions o f accounting’s predominant 
role55 As a result, the objectives of accounting systems will vary, and so will the 
accounting principles and practices that will be developed. This process is displayed 
in figure 4.1. Given the significant influence of local factors on accounting standards’ 
development, it is not surprising that there exists a high degree of international 
accounting diversity. Despite three decades of international efforts to harmonize 
accounting standards, a recent survey concluded that approximately half of the more 
than sixty countries surveyed displayed significant differences and showed no 
inclination for convergence56.
This diversity can have significant economic consequences, especially for 
actors that operate or have interests in more than one accounting jurisdiction. The 
most obvious consequence of having different national accounting standards is the 
cost that multinational companies (MNCs) have to incur in order to comply with 
different accounting requirements. MNCs are forced to reproduce their reporting 
procedures as their foreign subsidiaries have to prepare their accounts according to 
their own national accounting standards, and then produce a second set o f accounts 
for the consolidated accounts of the parent company. The complexity and costs o f this 
process are even greater for companies that want to have a presence in foreign capital 
markets. Companies have to comply with the accounting requirements of the foreign 
stock exchange and its national regulator. Regulators may require that foreign 
companies prepare a second set of accounts using the host country’s standards; 
alternatively, companies may be allowed to use their home-country standards but be 
required to provide a reconciliation to host country standards, which means that they 
must explain the main differences between the two sets of accounting principles and 
rules, and also quantify their effects so that key figures like net income, equity and
55 For a review o f the relevant literature see Nobes and Parker (2000), Roberts et al. (2002) and Walton 
et al. (2003).
56 “GAAP 2001: A Survey o f National Accounting Rules Benchmarked against International 
Accounting Standards”, Andersen, BDO, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, Grant Thornton, 
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001.
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earnings per share can be presented as if the statements were prepared according to 
the host country standards.
Apart from the significant translation and extra legal and auditing costs that 
this process entails, significant costs may also arise from internal changes in the 
company structure as more and perhaps new types of information may need to be 
collected for the preparation of the new set of accounts (Roberts et al. 2002). 
Moreover, new types o f information sought by a foreign regulator can also create 
problems when this information was not previously disclosed. Disclosing such 
proprietary information is often seen by companies as putting them at a competitive 
disadvantage (Roberts et al. 2002). Finally, using a second set of accounting 
principles and standards, or even a reconciliation, may affect the image and the 
financial standing o f the company in ways not previously anticipated. Different 
accounting treatments can lead to significant differences in the reported information 
between the two sets of figures. Empirical studies consistently show that accounting 
diversity can lead to significantly different figures depending on the rules applied 
(e.g. Gray 1980; Wygal et al. 1987; Simmonds and Azieres 1989; Weetman and Gray 
1991; Walton 1992; Weetman et al. 1998). Moreover, differences in interpretations 
and practices can lead to significant differences in accountants’ judgements even 
when the facts and rules are the same (Schultz and Lopez 2001).
These differences create uncertainty and confusion for investors who have to 
deal with two sets of figures for the same company and are not entirely sure which the 
correct one is and why these differences exist in the first place (Gemon et al. 1990). 
This confusion can lead investors to invest in a company that they would not invest in 
had they properly understood its performance, to avoid investing in foreign 
companies altogether, or to demand a higher price (higher cost o f capital) for 
accepting the increased uncertainty and perceived risk. Obviously, this has adverse 
effects for the efficiency o f capital markets, and could undermine confidence in them. 
Empirical studies have confirmed that different accounting requirements create 
significant problems for participants in capital markets (Choi and Levich 1991; Joos 
and Lang 1994; Miles and Nobes 1998).
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The costs of diverse accounting rules and requirements would suggest that 
companies decide, at least partly, where to list their shares according to the 
accounting and disclosure requirements of foreign jurisdictions and the perceived 
effects these would have on their accounts, and consequently their image. Studies by 
Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) and Saudagaran and Biddle (1992; 1995) confirm that 
differences in disclosure requirements are a significant factor in companies’ decision 
on where to list their shares. This suggests that excessive accounting and disclosure 
requirements may adversely affect the international competitiveness of a stock 
exchange if companies decide that the cost for listing there is higher than the expected 
benefits. This pressure in turn, could create incentives for a regulatory “race to the 
bottom” with significant consequences for the security and efficiency of capital 
markets worldwide (Haller and Walton 2003; Roberts et al. 2002).
Finally, accounting diversity may hinder the ability o f states (particularly 
developing states with limited capacity to collect and assess accounting information), 
labour unions and other social actors to observe and compare the performance and 
activities o f multinational companies.
4.3 Early international harmonization efforts
Given the costs associated with accounting diversity, it is not surprising that the 
debate on accounting differences and their consequences, as well as initiatives 
towards reducing these differences date back to the early International Congresses of 
Accountants at the beginning of the twentieth century (Samuels and Piper 1985). 
Following the Second World War, interest in the subject of international accounting 
harmonization grew and a number of regional professional associations and 
conferences appeared in the early post-war period aiming to promote mutual 
understanding and cooperation. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the first concrete 
initiatives for the harmonization o f accounting regulation appeared.
The first non-regional international organization to initiate efforts for the 
harmonization o f accounting standards was the United Nations. In the context of its 
mandate to understand and regulate the operation and effects of transnational 
corporations (TNCs), the Commission on Transnational Corporations of the 
Economic and Social Council established an Expert Group on International Standards
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of Accounting and Reporting in 1975. The creation of this group was proposed by the 
Group of Eminent Persons, formed in 1973 to examine the effects of the activities of 
transnational corporations on development and international relations in the aftermath 
o f a number o f scandals involving TNCs (Kline 1985). The work of the Group of 
Experts was directed towards the identification of differences across accounting 
systems and the formulation of lists of common minimum requirements for 
disclosure. These lists could then be used “...for the purpose of working out, within 
the framework o f the United Nations, an internationally accepted set o f reporting 
standards” (United Nations 1977, p.28). For this purpose an Ad Hoc 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting was created in 1979 with a mandate “to work towards the 
long-term objective of formulating an international, comparable system of 
standardized accounting and reporting”; in doing so it would take into account “the 
needs o f home and host countries particularly those of developing countries” (Ziind 
1983,p. 111).
The work of the Group had limited success. The participants could not reach 
agreement on fundamental questions such as the overriding aim o f multinational 
companies’ financial statements, or the nature of the information that should be 
disclosed by individual enterprises (Choi and Mueller 1984, p.485). The difficulties 
that the Group faced in reaching any substantial agreement were due to its mandate 
and the type o f harmonization it promoted. The emphasis of the work of the Group 
was directed towards disclosure rules, and particularly extended disclosure 
requirements for MNCs. The information needs sought to be satisfied at the UN 
Group were the “needs o f individual national governments, particularly in developing 
countries, for information about the economic, social and political impact of MNCs” 
(Gray et al. p. 121). As expected, developed countries, from which the majority of 
MNCs originate, were not very sympathetic towards this type of harmonization. 
Consequently, work in the Group was stalled by continuous conflicts during the 
negotiating process: “the performance of the Working Group so far is notable largely 
for its political rhetoric and the serious basic conflict o f views between 
representatives of the developed nations and the Group o f 77. The latter group seems
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determined to use the UN effort for purposes of demanding detailed disclosures by 
transnational enterprises” (Fitzgerald 1981, p.29). This description is verified by 
Ziind, an insider57 in these negotiations, who testifies to an almost belligerent 
atmosphere: “in addition to conceptual [accounting] differences, there are 
considerations relating to national prestige and the North-South conflict. There are 
two established blocks: the OECD countries and Group 77. Both groups meet 
separately at first, and only then in plenary” (1983, p. 117).
By the time the UN Group released its interim report in 1981, it was evident 
that agreement was lacking on many of issues. In 1982 the Commission on TNCs 
recommended that an experts’ group would be established to review developments in 
the field but not to set standards (Choi and Mueller 1984, p.486). Following this 
recommendation, the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International 
Standards of Accounting (ISAR) was established the same year. It abandoned the 
previous objective o f becoming an international standard-setter for a much broader 
mandate which envisaged that the Group would serve as a general forum for 
discussion on harmonization (UN 1988). In 1993, the Group was transferred under 
the auspices o f the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). In parallel and as a reflection of this change, a shift in the focus of the 
Group also came about. Since the early 1990s it has focused more on helping 
developing and transition countries with accounting standards and in promoting 
accounting education and a global accounting qualification.
Shortly after the UN, the OECD also became involved in the harmonization of 
accounting standards through its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976), and 
in particular through a chapter on the disclosure o f information by MNCs. The 
OECD’s Working Group on Accounting Standards, set up in 1979, was never meant 
to be a standard-setting body. Its mission was to engage with other actors interested in 
the harmonization o f accounting standards, with a general task “...to encourage 
exchange of views on matters relating to accounting and reporting standards with the 
objective o f supporting efforts... toward increased international comparability of these
57 Ziind represented the Swiss government in both the UN and the OECD international accounting 
groups.
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standards” (Denman 1980). This however does not mean that the OECD did not have 
a significant impact on the harmonization process.
The “battle” between developed and developing nations was not played out 
only in the context o f the United Nations. Arguably, the OECD initiative was a 
strategic move to set up a competing forum to the UN where the interests of the 
developed countries (contrary to the UN context) would be dominant. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were 
themselves a pre-emptive initiative to set limits to the requirements proposed in the 
U.N. Code of Conduct for TNCs developed during the same period at the instigation 
of developing countries (Flower 2002; Nobes and Parker 2000). The same rationale 
seems to be behind OECD’s initiative in the area of accounting standards; as Haller 
and Walton put it when reviewing the success of the UN recommendations “their 
main effect was to trigger the OECD into producing its own recommendations on the 
subject” (2003, p. 18). This proposition has been given further support by Ziind, who 
admits that the motivation for creating the OECD Group was “the desire for the 
formation o f a group of specialists from the industrial nations in view of the 
formation of a UN Working Group” (1983, p.l 16).
Following the “decommissioning” of the UN group in the early 1980s, the 
OECD Working Group continued its work by providing information and research 
towards the harmonization of accounting standards. The Group has published a series 
of reports investigating international accounting differences, and has organized 
conferences, like the 1985 forum on International Harmonization of Accounting 
Standards, bringing together representatives of governments, standard-setters, 
business organizations, trade unions and other interested parties.
4.4 Transnational harmonization: from the IASC to the IASB
At the same time that international organizations engaged the issue o f accounting 
harmonization, the accounting profession established its own organization to address 
the problem of accounting diversity. The International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) was set up in 1973 as a private transnational organization of 
professional accounting bodies from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan,
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Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. The IASC’s 
objectives were:
(a) To formulate and publish in the public interest accounting standards to be observed 
in the presentation of financial statements and to promote their worldwide acceptance 
and observance.
(b) To work for the improvement and harmonization of regulations, accounting 
standards and procedures relating to the presentation of financial statements.
(IASC Constitution, 2, 1982)
In 1982 after long negotiations with the recently established International Federation 
of Accountants (IFAC), the IASC became the designated, global standard-setting 
professional body:
IFAC recognizes IASC as the sole body having responsibility and authority to issue, in 
its own name, pronouncements on international accounting standards with full 
authority in so doing to negotiate and associate with outside bodies and to promote the 
world-wide acceptance and observance of those standards.
(IASC/IFAC Mutual Commitments, 6, 1982)
The IASC proved productive from early on; during the first ten years of its life it was 
able to issue twenty-five International Accounting Standards (IASs), covering a range 
of issues. This productivity (at a time when the UN was facing serious problems) and 
the fact that these standards were produced by the “experts”, enhanced the profile of 
the IASC, which by the early 1980s was widely considered the “premier international 
body and the most productive issuer of international accounting standards” (Evans 
and Taylor 1982, p. 117). As a result, the IASC was invited in an observer capacity to 
the plenary sessions of the United Nations Intergovernmental Group of Experts, while 
the OECD invited the IASC to be a permanent participant in the work of its Working 
Group on Accounting Standards (Denman 1980).
The status of the IASC was given a further boost in 1987, when the newly 
established International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) accepted 
IASC’s invitation to join its consultative group and indicated that it would be 
interested in using the IASs as a benchmark standard for listings in international stock 
exchanges, provided that the options allowed under the IASs were reduced (Cairns
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2003)58. The IASC agreed to begin its Comparability Project with the aim of 
eliminating the alternatives allowed in IASs and proposing instead a benchmark 
treatment. The Statement of Intent on the Comparability o f Financial Statements 
(1990) identified the issues for change and resulted in the revision of a number of 
IASs through the Improvements Project. The cooperation of IASC and IOSCO on 
these projects, eventually led to the landmark 1995 “core standards” agreement. The 
agreement was that the IASC would develop a comprehensive set of core accounting 
standards used in cross-border offerings and other foreign listings. Provided that these 
were acceptable to IOSCO, the latter would then “recommend endorsement of IAS 
for cross-border capital raising and listing purposes in all global markets” (IASC 
Insight, July 1995). This agreement was crucial for IASC since it “projected IASC 
into a new situation, where it moves from being a self-appointed body with no 
political power base or formal constituency, to being the world’s leading standard- 
setter with a mandate to set standards for listings on the world’s stock exchanges 
(Raffoumier and Walton 2003, p. 40).
The increasing involvement of IOSCO and the 1995 core standards agreement 
raised the status of the IASs. The prospect of using the IASs in most o f the major 
stock exchanges proved to be a significant incentive for their adoption by standard- 
setters, companies and stock exchanges. The rise of the IASs’ status was confirmed in
1999 when they were included in the Compendium of Standards, a list of standards 
considered key for the stability and efficiency of financial systems, drawn up by the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
During the same period the IASC completed the core standards project and in May
2000 the IOSCO’s Technical Committee issued a report which recommended to 
IOSCO’s members the “use of 30 selected IASC standards for cross-border listings 
and offerings by multinational enterprises, as supplemented in the manner described 
in this report (i.e., reconciliation, supplemental disclosure and interpretation)” 
(IOSCO 2000, p .l). Shortly after the IOSCO’s decision to endorse IASC’s core 
standards, the European Commission announced a new financial reporting strategy
58 See also the comments o f the Chairman o f IOSCO during the proceedings o f the International 
Financial Reporting Forum on IASC’s Comparability Project (Gemon et al. 1990).
118
for the European Union, which would transform the role and status of the IASC: the 
European Commission proposed that all EU listed companies should be legally 
required to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with IASs from 2005 
onwards, in effect replacing national accounting standards. This proposal, which was 
endorsed and has become a reality for all European listed companies since 2005, 
transformed the IASC from a private transnational body into the designated 
accounting standards-setter for twenty-eight countries, including several of the 
world’s most developed economies59.
In view of the increasing influence of its work, the IASC appointed a strategy 
working party in 1996 to review the IASC’s overall strategy following the completion 
of the IOSCO’s core standards project. Following long negotiations, in 2001 the 
IASC was finally restructured into the IASC Foundation which is a private, non-profit 
entity. The objectives of the IASC Foundation are:
(a) to develop, in the public interest, a single set of high quality, understandable and 
enforceable global accounting standards that require high quality, transparent and 
comparable information in financial statements and other financial reporting to help 
participants in the world's capital markets and other users make economic decisions;
(b) to promote the use and rigorous application of those standards; and
(c) in fulfilling the objectives associated with (a) and (b), to take account of, as 
appropriate, the special needs of small and medium-sized entities and emerging 
economies;
(d) to bring about convergence of national accounting standards and International 
Accounting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards to high quality 
solutions.
(IASC Foundation Constitution, Part A, 2, July 2005)
The restructuring that took place in 2001 transformed the IASC and created the IASB, 
which effectively replaced the IASC’s Board, as well as three new bodies: the 
Trustees, the Standards Advisory Council (SAC) and the International Financial 
Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC):
59 The new reporting framework also applies to the countries o f the European Economic Area (EEA).
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International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
Within the institutional context of the IASC Foundation the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) is the body responsible for issuing the accounting standards, 
which are now called International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). The IASB 
is also responsible for amending and withdrawing older IASs. It comprises fourteen 
members selected on the basis of their expertise and professional experience in the 
area o f financial reporting and accounting standard setting.
Trustees
There are twenty-two Trustees, all outstanding individuals with a good understanding 
of the importance of the task and of the challenges related to the creation of a single 
set of global accounting standards. Their selection is based on both geographical and 
professional criteria. The Trustees are responsible for the strategic, financial, 
operational and legal governance of the IASC Foundation. They also have the power 
to appoint the members of the IASB, the SAC and the IFRIC.
Standards Advisory Council (SAC)
The SAC aims to bring in the working process of the IASB the opinions and views of 
a number of interested organizations, with diverse geographical and functional 
backgrounds.
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC)
The IFRIC comprises twelve members whose main mission is to interpret the 
application of IASs and IFRSs and provide timely guidance on financial reporting 
issues not specifically addressed in the standards. The members of the Committee are 
selected on the basis o f their technical expertise and their ability to maintain 
awareness of current issues in accounting. Its composition also reflects geographical 
and functional diversity. Figure 4.2 presents a graphic representation of IASC 
Foundation’s new structure.
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Figure 4.2 The Structure of the IASC Foundation
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Source: IASB website, http://www.iasb.org/about/structure.asp. accessed 10/04/2006.
Following the restructuring, a significant step, which greatly enhanced the IASB’s 
global status, was taken in 2002 with the signature of the Norwalk Agreement 
between the IASB and the United States’ accounting standard-setter, the Financial
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Accounting Standards Board (FASB). In October 2002 the two boards issued a 
Memorandum of Understanding stating their commitment to develop “high-quality, 
compatible accounting standards”60. To achieve this compatibility the two boards 
agreed to:
a) undertake a short-term project aimed at removing a variety of individual differences 
between U.S. GAAP and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs, which 
include International Accounting Standards, IASs);
b) remove other differences between IFRSs and U.S. GAAP that will remain at January 
1, 2005, through coordination of their future work programs; that is, through the 
mutual undertaking of discrete, substantial projects which both Boards would address 
concurrently;
c) continue progress on the joint projects that they are currently undertaking; and,
d) encourage their respective interpretive bodies to coordinate their activities
(Memorandum of Understanding, FASB and IASB, October 2002)
The United States’ securities markets regulator, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), responded positively to the Norwalk agreement, and in April 
2005 a “roadmap” towards equivalence between the IFRSs and the U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) was agreed between the SEC Chairman and 
the EU Internal Market Commissioner. The roadmap foresees the elimination of the 
requirement to provide a quantified reconciliation to the US standards for foreign 
companies that want to list in the United States’ capital markets and use IFRSs, by 
2009 at the latest61. In view of the roadmap provisions and following consultations 
with the SEC and the European Commission, the FASB and the IASB renewed their 
commitment to harmonize their standards in a new Memorandum of Understanding in 
February 2006, and provided a more concrete schedule for the process they anticipate 
in the years to the 2009 deadline.
4.5 IASB’s transnational regulatory authority
From the previous discussion, it is evident that accounting diversity is not a simple 
problem and that the effort to harmonize diverse accounting systems can lead to
60 IASC Insight, October 2002, p.l.
61 IASB Insight, April/May 2005.
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significant distributional conflicts. Given this situation, the puzzle of IASB’s 
emergence as the premium forum for accounting harmonization becomes even 
greater, particularly as IASB’s standards have taken on a legally binding nature. In 
order to explain this puzzle, the first step is to show that the IASB and the standards 
that it produces are indeed instances of transnational regulatory authority. In the 
second chapter of this thesis three criteria were spelled out for identifying 
transnational regulatory authority. The first criterion refers to the ability of non-state 
actors to decide wholly or partly the substantive content o f regulation for an issue- 
area or industry. The second criterion requires that these rules confer some degree of 
legal obligation on the parties that adopt them. Finally, the third criterion addresses 
the scope of the impact of transnational regulatory authority, that is, the degree to 
which its rules govern an industry or issue-area at a global level.
4.5.1 The decision-making power o f non-state actors
As we saw earlier, the IASC was initially set up by private sector, professional 
accounting bodies. For the first years of its life the IASC worked much like an 
international professional association and, as we saw, its standard-setting function 
was officially endorsed in the early 1980s by the newly founded IFAC. This 
composition however did not last long. By the late 1970s, the IASC had already 
realized that in order to achieve the widest possible support for its standards, it had to 
involve in its work non-accountant constituencies that were affected by accounting 
standards, as well as national accounting standard-setters and regulators. To this end 
the IASC tried to upgrade its engagement with non-accountant constituencies 
interested in international financial reporting. The first initiative towards this goal was 
the creation of a consultative group in 1981 which included representatives of 
financial executives and analysts, stock exchanges, trade and business unions, and 
international organizations such as the World Bank, the OECD, and the Centre for 
Transnational Corporations of the United Nations. Also in 1981 the IASC set up the 
first joint working party with national accounting standard-setters to seek a common 
solution for the accounting treatment of deferred taxes. The involvement o f standard- 
setters in IASC’s work became gradually deeper as more joint projects were initiated 
and standard-setters played a significant role in the Comparability and Improvements
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Projects and the development of IASC’s Conceptual Framework in 198962. Since 
1991 the IASC has been holding conferences of standard-setters to encourage the 
convergence of national accounting standards with IASs, while between 1993 -2001 
the IASC also participated in the meetings of the G4+1 group63, a group of standard 
setters working on harmonization in a variety of accounting issues.
In 1995, following an effort to re-organize the IASC, the Advisory Board was 
created comprising outstanding individuals from a variety o f backgrounds, aiming to 
advise IASC’s Board on its strategy, raise awareness and acceptance of the IASs and 
ensure the funds necessary for IASC’s operation. Moreover, in 1996 the Standing 
Interpretations Committee (SIC) was established to offer advice on the different 
interpretations in the implementation of IASs in different national accounting 
frameworks. These institutional channels provided various actors and constituencies 
interested in the work of the IASC with an opportunity to contribute to, and influence, 
the international accounting harmonization process. Indeed, many o f these and other 
actors not represented in one of these bodies participated actively in the consultations 
and preparatory work that took place in the context of the steering committees. The 
steering committees were appointed by the Board to examine each new project and to 
submit draft statements of principles and exposure drafts to the Board (Cairns 2003).
Despite the openness o f the IASC’s process to many different constituencies 
throughout this period, the body responsible for carrying out the work of the IASC 
was its Board, later re-constituted as IASB. The Board had the power to issue the 
IASs, as well as exposure drafts and all documents relating to IASC’s work. The 
Board also appointed the twelve members of the SIC. Initially representatives from 
accounting associations occupied all the seats on the Board, but this changed when in 
1982, in line with the strategy of engaging with non-accounting constituencies 
outlined above, the IASC added four places to its Board which were to be filled by 
organizations interested in the harmonization of accounting standards. The additional
62 See Caims (2001b and 2003) and Gemon et al. (1990).
63 In the second conference for standard-setters in 1992, hosted by the FASB, the Canadian, UK and 
US standard setting bodies invited other national standard-setters to join them in a work group 
interested in international harmonization; their call was answered by Australia and later New Zealand. 
The IASC accepted an invitation to participate in the group. In 2001 the G4+1 was disbanded because 
it was decided that its activities could divert valuable resources from the work o f the newly formed 
IASB. See IASB Insight, March 2001, p. 18.
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places were gradually filled by the representatives of financial analysts (1986), the 
Federation of Swiss Industrial Holding Companies (1995), and the representatives of 
financial executives (1996). The fourth place remained empty after IOSCO and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) declined the offer of a seat in the Board. 
This composition of the Board remained in place until the 2001 restructuring.
While the new seats affected the Board’s functional composition, they did not 
alter the fact that the membership of the Board remained entirely in the hands of the 
private sector. This was not the result of a conscious effort to exclude public actors; 
IASC’s Constitution generally invited “up to four organizations having an interest in 
financial reporting to be represented on the Board” (IASC Constitution, 12 (a), 1982). 
Indeed, as was mentioned above, the IASC invited IOSCO, an organization o f public 
regulators to take up the fourth seat. The result was that while much of the research 
and preparatory work that went into the IASs was undertaken jointly with a number 
of actors representing a variety of constituencies, including public agencies and 
regulators, the decision-making power over the final form and content of the 
standards remained exclusively with the Board, that is, with private sector actors.
The 2001 restructuring strengthened and extended the institutional channels of 
communication and cooperation among the various constituencies interested in 
international accounting harmonization and the bodies of the IASC Foundation. The 
relation with national standard-setters in particular was significantly strengthened 
with the establishment of official liaisons between seven o f the IASB members and 
significant national standard-setters. The Norwalk Memorandum of 2002 reinforced 
this close cooperation, with the FASB and the IASB now working together both on 
short-term convergence and in longer-term projects. Finally, the SEC, the Financial 
Services Agency of Japan and the European Commission (EC) participate as 
observers in the proceedings of the SAC while the EC and IOSCO also participate as 
observers in the proceedings of the IFRIC. In addition, the working procedures of the 
IASB have been broadened to facilitate participation and consultation with as many 
interested parties as possible. Ensuring a broad synthesis o f working groups 
established to examine new projects, providing for extensive public comment periods 
and seeking continuous consultation with the Trustees, the SAC, and the IFRIC are
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part and parcel of a new extensive due process which now pervades the IASB’s 
work64.
However, these new institutional links with national-standard setters, 
regulators and other actors have not altered fundamentally the character of the 
decision-making process. As was the case with the IASC Board, the IASB has:
complete responsibility for all IASB technical matters including the preparation and 
issuing of International Accounting Standards, International Financial Reporting 
Standards and Exposure Drafts, each of which shall include any dissenting opinions, 
and final approval of Interpretations by the International Financial Reporting 
Interpretations Committee.
(IASC Foundation Constitution, Part B, 31(a), July 2005)
The Board comprises fourteen members, twelve full-time and two part-time. The 
members serve in their individual capacity as experts in international accounting. The 
Constitution of the IASC Foundation states clearly that “the main qualifications for 
membership of the IASB shall be professional competence and practical experience” 
(IASC Foundation Constitution, Part B, 19, July 2005). No geographical criterion 
applies to the selection of the Board members although the Board has to exhibit, 
professional, that is, functional background diversity, including auditors, users and 
preparers of financial statements and academics65. Each member has one vote, and for 
the publication of an Exposure Draft, International Accounting Standard, 
International Financial Reporting Standard, or final Interpretation of the IFRIC, 
approval by nine of the fourteen members of the IASB is required. Other decisions of 
the IASB, including the publication of a discussion paper, require a simple majority 
of the members of the IASB present at a meeting that is attended by at least 60% of 
the members of the Board.
From the above, it becomes apparent that throughout its history, the Board has 
wielded the authority to release, amend, reject and withdraw IASs, IFRSs and 
Interpretations. Despite changes in its composition, the Board has always been 
comprised solely by private sector actors, either representing their private 
constituencies or in their capacity as individual experts. A variety of public actors
64 “Due Process Handbook for the IASB”, IASC Foundation, March 2006.
65 See Appendix 6 for a list o f the criteria for Board membership as described in the Annex o f the 
IASC Foundation’s Constitution.
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have been invited to participate from the early stages o f the IASC’s work, but while 
they have contributed to the preparatory work and consultations o f the IASC/IASB, 
they have never had the institutional authority to either vote in the Board or veto its 
decisions. On the contrary, the recent practice (and constitutional provision)66 which 
encourages the outsourcing of much of the IASB’s research work to national 
standard-setters, illustrates particularly vividly a reversal o f the traditional roles of the 
expert/consultant and regulator/decision-maker. It is worth noting that these “research 
projects are normally carried out by other standard-setters under the supervision of, 
and in collaboration with, the IASB”67. When national standard-setters and regulators 
engage in the preparatory work for the standards being produced, while the 
supervision for this work and the ultimate decision-making power rests with the 
private sector experts, then it is obvious that the first criterion of transnational 
regulatory authority has been satisfied.
4.5.2 The legal status of the IFRSs
The previous section established that the IASC/IASB satisfies the first criterion of 
transnational regulatory authority, but as we have argued previously, this is not 
enough. While having the authority to devise international accounting standards, the 
IASB has no authority to enforce these standards in national jurisdictions. In order to 
determine whether the IASB wields transnational regulatory authority we need to 
show that the IFRSs have been adopted by states in a way which confers at least some 
degree o f legal obligation to the parties that use them.
The adoption of international accounting standards has been neither swift nor 
trouble-free. From the very beginning “the IASC recognized that no country could or 
would yield its sovereignty in setting standards” (Cummings 1975, p.358). Indeed, 
despite the rise of the IASC’s profile that we described earlier, early empirical 
research on the actual impact of the IASC on national accounting standards and 
practices suggested that this was quite limited at least until the mid-1980s (Lafferty et 
al. 1979; Nair and Frank 1981; Evans and Taylor 1982; McKinnon and Jannell 1984;
66 See the IASC Foundation Constitution, Part B, 31c, July 2005.
67 “Due Process Handbook for the IASB”, 26, 2006.
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Nobes 1990). The IASC understood that compliance was crucial if its standards were 
to become true international benchmarks (Benson 1976). It is at this time that the 
IASC began the process of opening up to other actors and interest constituencies that 
was described above.
In 1986, the IASC’s Board decided to undertake a survey of the use and 
application of the IASs. The survey was based on responses from seventy countries 
and its results were published in 1988. A first reading of the findings suggests that 
contrary to the empirical evidence mentioned above, the majority o f companies (both 
private and public), conformed in all material aspects with IASs and that in the 
majority of countries national requirements or practice conformed with 23 of the 25 
IASs existing at the time68. However, as the IASC secretary-general himself admitted 
in the preface of the survey, the IASC was aware that conformity in some cases was 
the result of the alternative treatments allowed under IASs69. Indeed, as Gemon et al. 
(1990) note, the degree of conformity was higher for the early standards which were 
more generic. As we saw above, in the early years the IASC was comprised solely by 
accounting associations. This meant that it depended on the lobbying and support of 
its member organizations to convince national standard setters and regulators to 
comply with IASs and if possible to adopt them. Because o f this dependency the 
IASC standards for the most part did not break any new ground, and basically 
represented a compromise; in essence a classification of current accounting practices. 
As a consequence, early IASs repeatedly received criticism for allowing a 
considerable range of alternative treatments, reflecting the various approaches in use 
by different jurisdictions at the time (De Bruyne 1980; Fitzgerald 1981; Gemon et al. 
1990). Some put it bluntly: “IASC standards tend to be somewhat bland compromises 
which are generally either ignored because they are easily accommodated or cannot 
be enforced” (Gray et al. 1981, p. 127). This in turn meant that most countries could 
exhibit conformity with the IASs without actually having done anything towards 
greater harmonization. Nevertheless IASs did score some success, as they were used
68 “Survey of the use and application o f International Accounting Standards”, IASC, 1988.
69 Ibid, p.l.
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as national standards or as a basis for developing national standards in a number of 
developing countries.
During the 1990s, the situation gradually changed. The Comparability and 
Improvements projects reduced the alterative treatments and improved the quality of 
many standards. Moreover, the increasing involvement of IOSCO and the 1995 core 
standards agreement seemed to change the status of IASs. While fears that fewer 
alternative treatments could lead to reduced adoption rates were to some extent 
realized (Gemon et al. 1990; Caims 200la)70, the improved quality of the standards 
following the revision process, and more importantly the prospect of the use of IASs 
in most of the major stock exchanges, proved to be significant incentives for the 
adoption of the IASs71. As a result, in the mid-1990s the first signs of endorsement 
appeared, particularly from a number of big German multinationals such as Bayer, 
Heidelberger Zement, Schering, Hoescht and Deutsche Bank, which started 
publishing their consolidated financial statements in conformity with IASs, either 
partially, or as a complete second set of accounts. As voluntary adoption by 
companies started gathering pace, the European Commission published in 1995 its 
new strategy for international accounting harmonization, which proposed working 
with and through the IASC since it was the only body with “results which have a 
clear prospect of recognition in the international capital markets” (EC 1995). This 
move boosted further the status of the IASs and an increasing number of countries 
and stock exchanges begun allowing their use or even requiring it. In 1998 a number 
of European countries (Italy, Germany, France and Belgium) passed legislation that 
allowed the use o f IASs by companies under certain conditions (usually for the 
consolidated accounts of listed companies). New exchanges like the European 
Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System (EASDAQ), a pan- 
European exchange for growth companies, and the Neue Markt, created in 1997 in 
Germany for young and innovative firms, required that listed companies publish
70 The Canadian case is the most striking; in the 1980s over one hundred Canadian companies referred 
to IASs in their statements; by 1998 only five companies referred to IASs in their statements as a result 
of the elimination o f alternatives under the Comparability project (Caims 2001a).
71 IASC Insight, March 1996, p. 14.
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consolidated accounts in accordance with the IASs72. A survey conducted in 1998, 
revealed that most stock exchanges in the world allowed the use of IASs with or 
without conditions73.
The great change in IASB’s status however came in 2000 when the European 
Commission proposed that all EU listed companies should be legally required to 
prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with IASs from 2005 onwards. With EC 
Regulation 1606/2002, this proposal became a binding legal requirement for all 
European listed companies. This decision has had far-reaching consequences as it 
replaced, literally overnight, national standards with the IASs in twenty-eight 
countries. The new strategy has affected more than 7000 companies, compared to the 
275 companies that used IASs voluntarily before their mandatory adoption. This is 
even more extraordinary when we consider that most continental countries, contrary 
to many Anglo-Saxon countries, are characterized by Code legal systems74 where 
accounting regulations have traditionally been part of Commercial Codes or 
Accounting Plans produced by government and approved by parliament. This bold 
move was followed by Russia, Australia and New Zealand which also replaced 
national accounting standards with IFRSs in 2004, 2005 and 2007 respectively, while 
more countries are endorsing IFRSs every year. A recent survey from 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers75 reveals that of the 110 countries listed in the survey, 
seventy countries require use of IFRSs for listed companies, i.e. the use of IFRSs is 
legally mandatory, and another eleven countries allow its use, that is, IFRSs are one 
of the legally accepted alternatives. Finally, in a number of countries that prohibit 
IFRSs for domestic companies, this is allowed for foreign companies listing in their
jurisdictions (usually under certain conditions; examples include the U.S.A, Canada
<
and Japan). From the evidence presented above therefore, it is evident that the IFRSs 
have clear and binding legal force in an increasing number o f countries. As a result, it 
is obvious that the IASB satisfies the second criterion of transnational regulatory 
authority.
72 The Neue Markt also allowed the use of US GAAP.
73 IASC Insight, October 1998.
74 For a classification o f legal systems see David and Brierley (1985).
75 World Watch, Issue 2, 2005.
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4.5.3 The scope of IASB’s authority
The fact that IFRSs have been adopted as legally mandatory standards in an 
increasing number of national jurisdictions around the world provides concrete 
evidence for IASB’s regulatory authority. Obviously, the fact that seventy countries 
currently require the use of IASB’s standards verifies, by itself, that IFRSs are now a 
global set of accounting standards. Their use is not anymore limited to a small 
number of developing or underdeveloped states free-riding on the expertise of the 
IASB. This is not only because of the decision of the European Commission to 
replace national accounting standards with IFRSs. Beyond Europe, and even before 
the European Commission’s strategy was put forward, an increasing number of 
countries had been adopting IASs and IFRSs. Between 1997 and 2000 many 
countries (including Kazakhstan, Peru, Kenya, Armenia, Jordan, the United Arab 
Emirates and Panama) adopted IASs as a requirement for some (e.g. listed) or all of 
their companies. At the same time the Eastern, Central and Southern African 
Federation of Accountants (ECSAFA) initiated a project to reduce differences 
between national standards and the IASs76, while the Arab Society of Certified 
Accountants (ASCA) called on its members to adopt IASs as their national 
standards77. Meanwhile, China had been using IASs for certain types of shares78since 
the early 1990s.
Following its re-structuring the IASB has gone from strength to strength 
towards becoming the global accounting standard-setter. We have already seen that 
since 2002 the FASB and the IASB have been working closely on the convergence 
project that will render IFRSs one of the legally permitted options for foreign 
companies wishing to list in the United States. Also as we saw, following the decision 
of the EU to adopt the IASs, Russia, Australia and New Zealand have followed suit. 
Moreover, in January 2005 the IASB and the Accounting Standards Board of Japan 
agreed to launch a joint project to reduce the differences between IFRSs and the
76 IASC Insight, March 1997.
77 IASC Insight, June 1997.
78 These are B-shares traded on the stock exchanges o f Shanghai and Shenzhen; B-shares are shares 
sold to foreign individuals or enterprises. IASs are also used for H-shares; these are shares listed on the 
Hong Kong stock exchange.
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Japanese accounting standards79, while in November 2005 the IASB and the China 
Accounting Standards Committee issued a joint statement where they agree to 
coordinate closer their future work80. Finally, Canada’s Accounting Standards Board 
has also proposed a convergence project with the aim to replace Canadian standards 
with IFRSs by the end of a five-year period81.
Beyond endorsement by national standard-setters and regulators the scope of 
IASB’s influence can also be demonstrated by its status and direct role in global 
economic governance mechanisms. Developments between 1998 and 2000 in 
particular, embedded the IASC in the global economic governance infrastructure and 
gave it the authority of the global accounting standard-setter. The first step in this 
new role for the IASC was taken, as we have seen, with IOSCO’s endorsement of 
IASC’s set of core standards. It is worth noting that IOSCO makes it clear in its 
report that the work on the harmonization of accounting standards, especially in 
regard to cross-border capital raising, is an on-going process and that it will continue 
to work closely with, and be part of IASC’s work program and operations. The IASB 
therefore, has become part of the global governance mechanism dealing with the 
issue of capital market access in a globalizing economy. The endorsement of IASs by 
the Basle Committee o f Banking Supervisors following their review in April 2000, 
only reaffirms this observation82.
A second step was taken in the context of the international debate on what has 
come to be called the international financial architecture. In the aftermath o f the East- 
Asian crisis of 1997, the quality of accounting information was portrayed as one of 
the most important aspects of the crisis and also a crucial component of any solution. 
In October 1998, the G-22 Working Party on Transparency and Accountability 
reported that “weaknesses in the provision and use of information played a major part 
in the development and spread of recent international financial crises”; the report 
moreover argued that “firms should publish a comprehensive set of financial 
statements on a periodic and timely basis...using a set o f  high quality, internationally
79 IASB Insight, January 2005.
80 IASB Insight, October/November 2005.
81 IASB Insight, April/May 2005.
82 “Report to G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on International Accounting 
Standards”, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, April 2000.
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acceptable accounting standards”83. This point was echoed at the highest political 
level. President Clinton applauded the Working Party’s recommendations for strong 
international standards including accounting and loan standards for private 
institutions, while Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair informed the NYSE in a 
speech that in the 1998 summit, G8 leaders had agreed “that we must press ahead 
with the development of international accounting standards”84. These calls for 
international accounting standards were given concrete substance with the 
Declaration of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in October 1998 
which called specifically upon “the IASC to finalise by early 1999 a proposal for a 
full range of internationally agreed accounting standards”. Part o f this multilateral 
effort to reshape the international financial architecture was the establishment of the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in 1999, which issued the Compendium of 
Standards: a list of the various economic and financial standards that are 
internationally accepted as important or sound in stable and well functioning financial 
systems85. The Compendium highlights 12 key standards which the FSF has 
designated as deserving priority implementation, after taking account o f country 
circumstances. The Compendium of Standards established the IASC standards as the 
internationally acknowledged set of accounting standards, becoming an integral part 
of the global financial governance structure. It is worth noting that IASC and IFAC 
are the only private organizations in the Compendium.
4.6 Summary and conclusions
International accounting diversity has been a pervasive characteristic of the global 
economy until very recently. Despite its significant negative consequences 
international harmonization has not been an easy task, notwithstanding more than 
thirty years of harmonization efforts. This is because the causes of accounting 
diversity are rooted deeply in the idiosyncratic nature o f national economic and 
financial systems. As a result, accounting standards’ harmonization has stumbled on 
fierce conflicts of interests and ideology concerning its direction and consequently the
83 IASC Insight, October 1998.
84 Ibid.
85 See Appendix 7.
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share of the adjustment burden among the interested parties. Given these difficulties, 
it is surprising to see that the IASB, a private sector organization, has become the 
dominant forum for the global harmonization of accounting standards. More than 
that, in recent years the IASB has been elevated to the position of the transnational 
regulatory authority in the area of global financial reporting standards. Our overview 
of IASC/IASB’s history and of the legal status and influence of their standards both 
in the context o f national jurisdictions and international regulatory and governance 
fora, has demonstrated beyond any doubt that the IASB satisfies the three criteria we 
set out at the beginning of the theoretical framework. Private sector actors have 
always held the reigns o f the Board in both the IASC and IASB eras, and with it the 
exclusive authority to approve, modify and cancel international accounting standards. 
These standards have progressively been adopted by almost one hundred countries 
either as legally required standards or as one of the explicitly legally allowed options 
for participants in capital markets. Moreover, the standards have also acquired an 
independent, institutionally acknowledged standing in global public economic 
governance fora such as the IOSCO and the FSF. There is no doubt that the IASB 
exhibits all the characteristics of transnational regulatory authority and that it is truly 
on its way to becoming the world’s designated accounting standard-setter.
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Chapter 5
Explaining IASB’s Transnational Regulatory Authority
5.1 Introduction
Having demonstrated that the IASB represents a case of transnational regulatory 
authority, we can now examine why and how the IASB has become the global 
accounting standard-setter. In accordance with propositions (3a) and (3b), we shall 
argue that, in the context of an oligopolistic global market for capital, the emergence 
of the IASB as an authoritative global accounting standard-setter is the result of a 
forum-shifting strategy employed by the European Commission when faced with the 
resistance of the SEC to agree on a mutually acceptable harmonization of accounting 
standards. While the overall strategy of the EC has been successful in that it has 
forced the SEC to accept the IFRSs as a set of accounting standards that can be used 
in US capital markets without reconciliation, the content and direction of 
harmonization have been mainly influenced by the American view o f accounting. 
This is because the SEC engaged the IASC first, in the context of a forum-shifting 
strategy of its own, albeit in an effort not to establish transnational regulatory 
authority but rather to control and if possible prevent its emergence.
5.2 Regulators’ dilemmas
The theoretical framework developed in this thesis locates the reasons for the 
emergence o f transnational regulatory authority in domestic politics. Therefore, our 
effort to account for the emergence of the IASB as the global accounting standard- 
setter, needs to begin with an overview of the dilemmas facing the regulators of the 
United States and the European Union, as these will provide the basis for 
understanding their consequent moves and initiatives at the international and 
transnational level.
5.2.1 SEC and international accounting harmonization
The politics of accounting harmonization in the United States have been heavily 
influenced by the SEC’s view of accounting’s role in the economy. This view reflects
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the structural characteristics of the US financial system. Traditionally, the main 
source of finance for US companies has been the capital market. Capital markets are 
characterized by large numbers of external investors with no access to privileged 
information. The information that these investors use to make their investment 
decisions, is the information that companies make public through their financial 
statements. In the US therefore, accounting standards for financial statements have 
always been linked to the operation of capital markets. This link has been reinforced 
by the fact that the SEC was set up following the Great Crash of 1929. Not 
surprisingly, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
which established the SEC, focus on the protection of investors and their ability to 
make sound investment decisions. The SEC’s accounting philosophy has 
consequently been informed by this mission:
The SEC requires public companies to disclose to the public meaningful financial and 
other information so that investors may judge for themselves if a company’s securities 
are a sound investment. Only through the steady flow of accurate, comprehensive, and 
timely information can the public make informed investment decisions.
(SEC 2004, p.6)
Accounting standards in the US have been developed since 1973 by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), an independent private sector organization. 
However, the FASB operates under the supervision of the SEC, which is ultimately 
responsible for accounting regulation and has the authority to reject FASB proposals 
as well as make proposals o f its own. Unsurprisingly, the SEC’s view o f accounting is 
echoed by the FASB:
The objectives [of general purpose external financial reporting by business enterprises] 
stem primarily from the informational needs of external users who lack the authority to 
prescribe the financial information they want from an enterprise and therefore must use 
the information that management communicates to them.
(FASB 2002, No. 1, par. 28)
Investor protection being the overriding priority, US authorities traditionally did not 
afford any significant exceptions for foreign issuers wanting to list in the US markets:
The legislative history of the Securities Act indicates an intent to treat foreign private 
issuers...the same as domestic issuers. The Commission’s rulemaking authority in this
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area is conditioned upon findings that the relevant rule or form is necessary for the 
protection of investors and in the public interest.
(Nikolaisen 2005)
If high quality foreign issuers wanted to list in the US, they were expected to 
welcome the high regulatory standards o f the US markets which protected them and 
ensured a fair price for their securities (Schuetze 1994). Relying on the supremacy of 
the US capital markets and the fact that capital markets around the world remained 
largely national and isolated, the SEC could afford to follow this policy untroubled 
until the late 1970s, since multinational companies wanting to raise money invariably 
listed their shares there. In their empirical study, Lafferty et al. (1979) indicate that 
one o f the most important factors o f the moderate harmonization taking place in the 
1970s were the SEC rules, particularly for companies listed or aiming to list in the 
US. Things however were about to change. The internationalization o f national 
economies and financial markets started being increasingly felt by the SEC as the 
number o f foreign companies wanting to list in the US started to rise (graph 5.1), and 
as the amount o f  foreign and US equities traded by foreign investors on US markets 
increased rapidly (graph 5.2).
Graph 5.1 Number and Capitalization of Foreign Stocks Listed on the NYSE
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Graph 5.2 Stock Transactions in U.S. Equity Markets by Foreign Investors
1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1987 1989
Volume of trading in US stock s — ♦—  Volume of trading in foreign stock s
— * —  Total Volume of Trading
Source: New York Stock Exchange Fact Book, issues 1965-1990
This trend was also facilitated by the growing influence o f  institutional investors who 
played an increasingly important role in the US capital markets (table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Holdings of NYSE Listed Stocks by Institutional Investors
(USD Billions)
U.S. Institutions Foreign Institutions Total
Percentage o f  NYSE 
market value held by 
institutional 
investors
1960 52.9 - 52.9 17.2
1965 114.4 - 114.4 21.3
1970 166.4 - 166.4 26.1
1975 216.7 25.1 241.8 35.3
1980 382.7 57.5 440.2 35.4
Source: New York Stock Exchange Fact Book 1985
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For all these companies and investors, the array of accounting and disclosure 
regulations burdening foreign companies started becoming a significant issue. The 
SEC acknowledged that changes were necessary. These changes came in 1982, in the 
form of the Integrated Disclosure System (IDS). The IDS reduced and simplified, to 
some degree, the previous burdensome and complicated registration and 
documentation procedures for foreign issuers in the US, and allowed them to prepare 
their statements according to foreign GAAP provided that it was “a comprehensive 
body of accounting principles”86. However, companies that made use of this 
exemption had to provide a quantified reconciliation between those principles and the 
figures that would result had they used the US GAAP87.
While the SEC felt that the IDS changes constituted major concessions to 
foreign issuers (Saudagaran and Biddle 1995), critics were not very impressed, as 
foreign companies still had to produce a significant amount of new information and to 
provide a reconciliation using different accounting standards. The principal concern 
of the critics was that this regulatory burden was undermining the competitiveness of 
the US stock exchanges (Baumol and Malkiel 1993; Edwards 1993). Their case was 
given the evidence they needed when in 1983 the SEC extended the new 
requirements o f the IDS to the securities traded on the NASDAQ (National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations system). Until that time, 
companies that were traded over-the-counter on the NASDAQ did not need to be 
registered and therefore needed to provide much less information than the official 
registration procedure required. Between 1977 and 1983 the number of foreign 
securities on the NASDAQ increased from 85 to 294. When the new regulations came 
into force things changed dramatically. As SEC Commissioner Lochner later 
admitted, “new foreign participation in NASDAQ was halted when the Commission 
imposed new reporting requirements” (Baumol and Malkiel 1993, p. 21). Between 
1983 and 1991 foreign firm listings on the NASDAQ fell from 294 to a low of 213 
Edwards (1993).
86 See 47 Fed. Reg. 54, 787 (1982).
87 It should be noted here that in most other developed markets US companies could list their shares 
using their home-country accounting standards (US GAAP) without being required to provide a 
reconciliation to host-country standards.
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At the same time that the attraction of US stock markets was diminishing, 
foreign capital markets were undertaking regulatory initiatives to increase their 
international competitiveness. In 1983, the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) amended its 
own regulations, by reducing the documentation required to be filed by foreign 
companies, and by simplifying and reducing the frequency o f several reports 
submitted by foreign issuers. Moreover, after pressure from the TSE, the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) also amended existing regulations to relax certain disclosure 
requirements for foreign listings (Saudagaran and Biddle 1995). Meanwhile, in 1983 
the Paris Stock Exchange and in 1986 the London Stock Exchange, also underwent 
significant organizational changes to boost their international competitiveness. 
Although these changes were not related to accounting and disclosure issues 
(Saudagaran and Biddle 1995), they nonetheless added to the anxiety over the 
competitiveness of American capital markets.
Concern over the future o f American capital markets reached its peak in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. At the time, the TSE contested closely the NYSE for the 
position of the world’s largest stock exchange by market capitalization, and American 
exchanges lagged far behind foreign capital markets in terms o f international listings 
(table 5.2). It was in this context that an open, public confrontation erupted between 
the newly appointed Chairman of the NYSE William Donaldson, and the SEC 
Chairman Richard Breeden (Jarrell 1992). Donaldson warned that the NYSE was in 
danger of becoming a “regional exchange” (Jarrell 1992), and demanded the relaxing 
of SEC requirements for large foreign companies, putting forward a proposal 
concerning 200 “world class issuers” which would satisfy specific requirements in 
terms of size, market capitalization, and trading volume, and provide a written 
explanation o f material accounting differences (Freund 1993; Cochrane 1994). 
Moreover, the NYSE proposed a number of investor safeguards for the listing of 
foreign companies if these were allowed to list without the full disclosure 
requirements of the SEC (Jarrell 1992). These proposals were rejected by the SEC.
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Table 5.2 Foreign Firm  Listings on M ajor Exchanges by Domicile in 1992
Stock Exchange
Domicile NYSE/AMEX TOR LDN AMS PAR TKY FRA ZUR
USA - 66 159 I l l 49 67 134 109
Canada 77 - 30 9 9 7 10 9
UK 35 11 - 18 19 19 33 14
Netherlands 7 0 37 - 11 2 27 21
France 5 0 55 9 - 2 31 9
Japan 9 1 108 26 38 - 61 16
Germany 0 0 32 16 14 8 - 41
Switzerland 0 0 15 2 2 4 17 -
Other 65 13 520 64 51 11 155 33
Total 198 91 956 255 193 120 468 252
Percentage
Foreign 4% 8% 39% 51% 19% 7% 37% 54%
Source: Saudagaran and Biddle 1995, p.323.
There were two major arguments that the SEC employed to justify its reluctance to 
accommodate foreign issuers (Edwards 1993). The first was that foreign accounting 
rules were not good enough to ensure the protection of the US investors. This view 
was rejected by the SEC’s critics, who argued that foreign rules were not inferior, 
only different, and that by discouraging foreign firms from listing in the US, the SEC 
was actually undermining the protection of US investors (Baumol and Malkiel 1993; 
Edwards 1993; Freund 1993; Longstreth 1994). This happened because investors 
were already buying foreign shares and bonds either through the over-the-counter 
market where foreign companies did not have to register with the SEC and where the 
information available for the companies and their trading was minimal (Edwards 
1993; Cochrane 1994), or directly in foreign markets where the SEC rules did not 
apply anyway and the transaction costs for US investors were much higher (Baumol 
and Malkiel 1993; Edwards 1993; Freund 1993). The second argument of the SEC 
was that allowing foreign issuers to list with less disclosure requirements would 
discriminate against the US firms and create a competitive disadvantage for them. 
Again, this argument was rejected by the critics who argued that allowing firms to list
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without reconciliation did not put American firms at a disadvantage because, if 
investors thought that foreign firms did not provide adequate information their cost of 
capital would reflect this and if not, then that would be a clear signal that the SEC 
rules were redundant and imposed unnecessary costs on American firms (Edwards 
1993). Despite the critique by prominent academics and policy experts88 however, the 
SEC did not change its position.
The SEC’s reluctance to accommodate foreign issuers was due to the fact that 
it was caught in the midst of a difficult regulatory dilemma that pitted domestic 
interest constituencies against each other (Jarrell 1992). On the one hand, there was 
SEC’s main regulatory “clients”, the stock exchanges, which were opposed to the 
imposition of burdensome and costly accounting and disclosure requirements that 
were driving away foreign issuers and putting them at a competitive disadvantage 
compared to foreign capital markets. On the other hand, the SEC had to consider the 
interests of investors the protection of whom is its primary mission. Irrespective of 
whether one accepted the arguments of the critics about investors’ protection, the 
SEC was not willing to risk a scandal involving a foreign company’s less strict home- 
country disclosure requirements, which would be blamed entirely on the SEC (Jarrell 
1992). Moreover, in such a case, the entire stock market, including US issuers, would 
be adversely affected as investors withdrew from the market (Jarell 1992). In 
addition, US business was not willing to surrender its significant comparative 
advantage of being able to draw significant funds at low cost from both the US and 
international capital markets using their home-country accounting standards, 
something their competitors could not do. Obviously, US issuers resisted even more 
the idea that foreign issuers could be allowed to follow less costly accounting and 
disclosure requirements. The pressure from American firms would be significant in 
such a case and could take the form of lawsuits against the SEC (Zeff 1998). 
Moreover, allowing foreign issuers to follow less demanding accounting and 
disclosure requirements, could encourage US issuers to press for a loosening of the 
accounting and disclosure requirements applicable to them, leading thus to a potential
88 Among the critics were William Baumol an Economics’ Nobel Prize winner, William Freund a 
former NYSE Chief Economist, and Bevis Longstreth a former SEC Commissioner.
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regulatory “race to the bottom” (Dye and Sunder 2001). Indeed, the answers of 
respondents representing US issuers, such as the Financial Executives Institute, or the 
US Business Round Table, to the 2000 SEC Concept Release89, indicated that 
endorsement o f IASs by the SEC could be acceptable only as long as the choice to 
use IASs in financial statements was not limited to foreign issuers but was also 
extended to US issuers. In such a situation, the SEC would find itself in an extremely 
difficult position since refusal to accommodate the demands for a looser regulatory 
framework could lead to a relocation of a number of US companies to less demanding 
jurisdictions (Jarell 1992; Zeff 1998).
The risk associated with these scenarios was too high for the SEC to accept 
since they threatened another powerful constituency: the SEC establishment itself. 
The SEC administration did not see favourably the idea of reducing its complex 
regulatory requirements, because that could undermine its own status as a regulatory 
agency. As Jarrell, a former SEC chief economist commented at the time: “the U.S. 
has an army o f accountants, lawyers and government bureaucrats who are well- 
employed as a direct result o f the SEC’s strict financial disclosure rules. Any threat to 
them is a serious threat to an enormously influential set of SEC constituents. The 
prospect of the SEC allowing foreign firms to be traded on the Big Board without 
adhering to U.S. GAAP should bother them greatly” (1992, p. A10).
5.2.2 EC and international accounting harmonization
European accounting has always been characterized by considerable diversity. As the 
President of the Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE)90 once noted: 
“It must be recognised that the major divergences between financial reporting 
standards are within Europe, not between Europe and the rest o f the world” 
(Nordemann in Caims 1997, p. 311). Europe sought to remedy this divergence and 
the problems it created for intra-European business in the context of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty of Rome (1957) which established the EEC 
called for the freedom of movement of labour, capital, goods and services. In line
89 In 2000 the SEC issued a Concept Release asking for the first time the views o f interested parties on 
whether the reconciliation requirement should be abolished.
90 The FEE is the European association o f accounting professionals.
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with this requirement, the Common Industrial Policy (1970) called for the creation of 
a unified business environment, including the harmonization of company law and 
taxation. Accounting and financial reporting harmonization initiatives are part of the 
company law harmonization programme.
The two most important instruments produced by the European harmonization 
programme were the Fourth (1978) and the Seventh (1983) Directives which deal 
with the financial statements of all limited liability companies and with consolidated 
statements respectively. The initial drafts of both instruments were heavily influenced 
by the German Aktiengesetz (the German company law) which was enacted in 1965 
and was considered at the time the most advanced company law, at least compared to 
the legal frameworks in force in the other members o f the EEC. The German 
approach however was at odds with the British accounting tradition, which presented 
a problem in view of UK’s entrance in the EEC in 1973. According to some experts, 
the vision of a potential harmonization of accounting standards along the lines of 
Continental accounting was terrifying to the British accounting profession: “The 
imminence of this [entrance in the EC] had brought fear to the British accountancy 
bodies who were worried by the potential consequences o f what they saw as the 
imposition of continental European statutory and state control on the much more 
discretionary relationship between corporate management and the auditor in the UK” 
(Hopwood 1994, p.243) 91. In order to safeguard its discretion in the establishment 
and interpretation of accounting standards, the British accounting profession sought 
to introduce “what they saw as the strategic ambiguities of the British notion of “true 
and fair” into the draft of the Fourth Directive” (Hopwood 1994, p.243). Indeed, the 
secretary of the Elmendorff Committee (the committee responsible for drafting the 
Fourth Directive), and officials o f the European Commission, have confirmed that the
91 Traditionally, accounting systems have been classified into two main categories: the Anglo-Saxon 
and the Continental tradition. One of their basic differences is the reliance on the concept o f  fairness in 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition which refers to the view that financial accounts should present as accurate a 
picture o f a company’s operations as possible, even at the cost o f formal legality, correctness or 
cohesiveness o f accounts. The Continental tradition on the other hand relies mostly on conservatism 
which refers to the notion that figures should be reported in a conservative manner in order to avoid 
unfounded optimism that could lead in misleading economic decisions, even if  this leads to a not 
entirely accurate picture o f the company’s operations and potential. This classification however is not 
absolute and its validity has been questioned in accounting circles (e.g. Caims (1997) and Alexander 
and Archer (2000).
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changes in the second draft of the Fourth Directive were introduced as a result of 
UK’s accession to the EEC (Nobes 1993). Subsequently, the British were also able to 
introduce changes in 14 out of 19 main features of the final draft of the Seventh 
Directive, either by substituting UK rules for German ones, or by adding a UK option 
to a German rule (Diggle and Nobes 1994).
The Directives had significant effects for many European countries in a 
number of accounting areas: they introduced specific formats for the presentation of 
accounting information, increased the level of disclosure required by companies, 
increased and extended the publication and audit requirements for many companies, 
made consolidated accounts a legal requirement,92 and introduced world-wide 
consolidations and segmental disclosure by type and geographical area of activity. As 
we saw however, they were the result of a long and arduous negotiating process and 
effectively represented a compromise between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental 
traditions of accounting (Gray et al. 1981; Nobes 1993; Nobes and Parker 2000). This 
has meant that often, when agreement was not possible, alternative options were 
introduced, thereby limiting the restrictiveness of the clauses o f the Directives and 
thus their contribution to the harmonization of European accounting. This made 
compliance with the Directives a relatively effortless affair with limited effect on the 
actual practices of European companies. Empirical studies (Simmonds and Azieres 
1989; Walton 1992; Archer et al. 1995; Emenyonu and Gray 1996) have shown that 
the harmonization o f European accounting systems remained rather limited, even 
many years after the adoption of the Directives.
Following the approval of the first two accounting Directives, the EEC 
continued to address accounting-related issues. However, while new Directives 
addressed specific areas of concern (e.g. reporting for banks and insurance companies 
or audit regulations), the feeling in the Community during this period was that the 
progress o f accounting harmonization in Europe had stalled. No significant new 
regulatory initiative was undertaken despite the agreement o f member states that 
further harmonization was needed (EC 1990; Hulle 1993). This was largely because
92 In a number o f countries such as Austria, Italy, Spain and France there was no legal requirement for 
consolidated accounts prior to the Seventh Directive.
145
of the problems inherent to the Directives’ process. Apart from the deep-seated 
disagreements described earlier, there were also significant implementation problems 
associated with the Directives. First, while adopted at a European level, Directives 
were not actually implemented in national jurisdictions for many years. In some 
countries it took more than ten years to fully implement them. This situation was 
further exaggerated by the entrance of new members in the EU. The lengthy process 
of negotiating and implementing the Directives meant first, that for long periods of 
time while the Directives were at different stages of implementation in different 
countries, there remained significant differences in accounting requirements among 
member states, and second, that by the time they were implemented, they were 
largely outdated, and thus often stood in the way of the modernization of European 
accounting systems (Haller and Walton 2003).
These problems became increasingly important. One reason for this was the 
urgency that the 1992 project gave to the EC’s efforts to reduce the obstacles that 
accounting diversity created for a common European market. The answer to this 
problem was an increasing reliance on the mutual recognition policy, which signalled 
a break from the previous policy o f harmonization of accounting rules and principles 
through the Directives’ process. However, this did not eliminate differences, only 
made them mutually acceptable. This created problems not only for the internal 
market project, but also for Europe’s role in international harmonization. The slow, 
ambivalent pace of European accounting harmonization meant that there was no 
European accounting model to be proposed for use in foreign jurisdictions (e.g. the 
US) or to be used as a negotiating tool in a wider harmonization process. One 
possible solution was the creation of a European Accounting Standard Setting Body 
which given the familiar disagreements and a number o f legal obstacles did not seem 
plausible; discussions during the 1980s on the issue had led to an impasse (Hulle
1992).
These problems became increasingly significant for the European Union, as 
structural changes in the wider international and European economic environment 
created new accounting needs for a number of accounting constituencies. Economic 
liberalization and de-regulation combined with technological changes that reduced
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costs to transportation and communication, increased capital mobility and allowed 
both direct and portfolio investment to grow at a gathering pace. In Europe, the 
completion o f  the internal market and the forthcoming adoption o f  the Euro made 
some o f  these changes even more pronounced. European companies expanded their 
operations globally, and in Europe, engaging heavily in mergers and acquisitions 
(Graph 5.3).
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Traditionally, European multinationals had not considered accounting diversity a 
major issue. Until the late 1970s capital markets were for the most part isolated and, 
outside the US and the UK, underdeveloped. Continental companies relied mostly on 
credit-based sources o f  finance in their home countries. However, the expansion o f 
European com panies m eant that they could no longer rely solely on their traditional 
sources o f  finance, and raising money in capital markets became increasingly 
necessary93. Given the urgency for fresh capital, it was inevitable that European 
companies would want to list their securities in the US markets, the largest and most 
liquid markets in the world. Listing in the US capital markets would also provide 
them with added public relations’ and marketing benefits (Saudagaran and Biddle
1995), particularly important for those companies wanting to expand in the large US
93 See tables in Appendix 2.
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market. This trend was reinforced by other structural changes, most notably the rise 
of institutional investors. Increasingly, European shares were held not only by “sister” 
banks and corporations, but by institutional investors, both domestic and international 
(Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Bank and Institutional Intermediation Ratios (Proportion of
Intermediated Claims Held by Banks and Institutional Investors)
1970 1980 1990 1995 1998
Change
1970-1998
United
Kingdom
Bank 0.58 0.64 0.55 0.47 0.46 -0.12
Institutional 0.28 0.26 0.32 0.38 0.40 0.12
Germany Bank 0.84 0.86 0.83 0.78 0.74 -0.10
Institutional 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.13
France Bank 0.94 0.68 0.82 0.74 0.66 -0.28
Institutional 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.24 0.29 0.24
Italy Bank 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.91 0.92 -0.06
Institutional 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.04
Source: Adapted from Davis and Steil 2001, p. 7.
At the same time, governments themselves were increasingly under pressure from the 
competition rules for the internal market and the provisions regarding the adoption of 
the Euro, which demanded deregulation and privatization of the previously protected 
state monopolies. These changes led to an unprecedented wave of privatizations 
during the 1990s94. However, this meant that governments were also in need of liquid 
and developed capital markets to sell the shares of these companies. Some of these 
privatizations were so large in terms of market value that the US capital markets were 
needed to complete successfully their floating, as domestic markets did not have the 
required liquidity (Raghavan and Sesit 1993). Yet, listing European shares in the 
United States was not so easy. The problem was that European companies had to 
provide, among other things, a quantitative reconciliation o f their financial statements 
according to the US GAAP. As we have seen, this is a costly exercise with
94 See Appendix 3.
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unpredictable results, which can create confusion and undermine the image of the 
listed companies, with adverse consequences for their cost o f capital95.
Therefore, much like the SEC, the European Commission was facing a 
regulatory dilemma. The problem here however was not one of opposing domestic 
interest constituencies. The issue of diverse national accounting requirements at a 
European level had been temporarily resolved, albeit unsatisfactorily, with the mutual 
recognition policy. On the contrary, all interested European constituencies (European 
issuers and investors) seemed to share the same objective: they wanted European 
companies to be able to list their stocks abroad (and particularly in US markets) 
without the obligation of reconciliation and the costs that went with it. The changing 
economic and regulatory European environment made the need to provide big, global 
European issuers, both public and private, with the ability to list their shares in the US 
capital markets without having to incur the multiple costs of the reconciliation 
requirement, an increasingly important regulatory issue, which effectively dominated 
the dicscussions and efforts of European regulators and the EC in relation to 
international accounting harmonization (Hulle 1993; Biener 1994). These 
constituencies put pressure on national regulators and the EC to come up with a 
solution. The German side in particular had been raising the issue repeatedly and was 
pressing in both bilateral negotiations with the SEC and through the EC, for some 
kind of solution to the problem that did not require European companies to either 
adopt US standards or adjust their statements to accommodate the reconciliation 
requirement96. Several German MNCs had tried to get a listing based only on their 
German statements. They claimed that since US firms could have their shares listed in 
Frankfurt with US GAAP, they should have the same right in New York. The SEC 
would not accept this argument and as a result, no German company was listed on the 
NYSE before 1993.
For the EC this problem was fast becoming a significant cause for concern. 
The inability to resolve this issue could have dire repercussions for European 
harmonization and consequently for the EC’s position as European accounting
95 See Appendix 4.
96 Interview with former EC official, 08/06/2007.
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regulator. This is because it could potentially lead global European issuers to seek a 
solution outside the European harmonization framework. Indeed, in the early 1990s 
senior executives of major European companies started suggesting publicly that they 
should be allowed to use only US GAAP, which was the dominant set of standards 
used internationally, or that the biggest stock exchanges (specifically the NYSE and 
the LSE) should develop jointly a set of standards and others should follow (Hulle
1993). The pressure from the industry was growing towards the national regulators, 
who were often dissatisfied with the Directives and did not pay the required attention 
to their proper implementation, which only slowed European harmonization further, 
and made the absence o f a European set of standards comparable to the US GAAP 
even more apparent (Hulle 1993). The situation was made worse by the fact that 
many European companies were already using US GAAP since they had their shares 
listed on American capital markets. Under these circumstances, it seemed that some 
regulators were considering whether large companies should be allowed to use US 
GAAP for listing purposes (Hulle 1993).
The decision of Daimler-Benz to list its shares on the NYSE made matters 
worse. In 1993, Daimler-Benz decided to accept SEC’s rules and provide 
reconciliation to US standards in order to get a listing. In Germany, Daimler-Benz’s 
decision was seen by many as a betrayal that undermined the standing of German 
accounting (Haller 1995; Glaum 2000). The SEC would have no incentive to give in 
to European pressure since a company as prestigious as Daimler-Benz had already 
accepted its terms (Flower 1997). The problem was bound to get worse and put more 
pressure on regulators and politicians, given the need to privatize an increasing 
number o f public companies. This was forcefully illustrated with the privatization of 
Deutsche Telekom which, given the company’s size, also required flotation in the US 
markets. Deutsche Telekom lobbied the government to amend the law so that it could 
use US GAAP as its only set of standards (replacing German standards), and it seems 
that the government was prepared to accede to this demand (Flower 1997).
Such a decision however, was not an acceptable option for the European 
Commission. A unilateral compromise like this would mean that the EC would have 
failed to protect the interests of European companies, as European issuers would have
150
to bear the cost for using US GAAP for listing purposes, probably in combination 
with domestic accounting rules, necessary for taxation purposes, putting them at a 
significant competitive disadvantage vis a vis their American competitors. In 
addition, such initiatives from national regulators would breach the Seventh Directive 
and undermine the whole European harmonization edifice, threatening to undermine 
the accomplishments of thirty years of European accounting harmonization and of 
course the EC’s role in European accounting regulation. Obviously this was not 
something the EC could accept (Hulle 1993). The EC’s mission was to find a way 
around the SEC’s resistance.
5.3 Resolving the dilemmas: regulatory strategies and the politics of 
transnational regulatory authority
As we saw above, the EC and the SEC faced significant but quite different regulatory 
pressures from their regulatory constituencies. The SEC’s dilemma was to find a way 
to resolve a conflict of interests among domestic constituencies in the most politically 
efficient way, while the EC’s problem referred to its inability to satisfy its European 
constituencies because of foreign (US) resistance to harmonization. The two 
regulators devised two quite different regulatory and negotiating strategies, which 
they hoped could help them overcome these problems and satisfy their constituencies.
5.3.1 Resisting harmonization: SEC, forum-shifting, and international redistribution
As we saw previously, the SEC was determined not to back down from its position 
regarding the necessity o f the reconciliation requirements for foreign issuers. Still, the 
SEC’s position was difficult, as the opposing constituencies comprised powerful, well 
organized, and extremely knowledgeable constituents. As per our discussion in 
chapter 3, in this case, we would expect the SEC to resolve its dilemma by pursuing 
an international agreement that would harmonize foreign accounting standards to US 
GAAP. This way, the SEC could keep its regulatory framework intact and facilitate 
access to US markets, while the costs of the harmonization adjustment would burden 
foreign regulators, issuers and investors. Indeed, beyond the initial domestic reaction 
o f the SEC with the IDS, which did not solve the problem, the SEC soon realized that
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it also needed to plan an international response to meet the challenge of economic 
globalization, which was not going to go away:
a more unified effort by all countries will be necessary to respond fully to the 
business realities of the modem multinational corporation...the SEC and other 
securities regulators around the world will have to work together to develop a 
common framework of international accounting principles, disclosure standards, and 
trading market mechanisms.
(Thomas 1983, p. 134)97
Achieving an international agreement that would fit the SEC’s strategy however did 
not seem plausible. One the one hand, the SEC considered most foreign accounting 
standards as inadequate and was particularly critical of some o f the practices of the 
principal European accounting traditions such as the German discretionary reporting 
of earnings (Breeden in Jarrell 1992). Moreover, the multiple alternative treatments 
allowed under the European Directives, was not acceptable to the SEC. Given the 
overriding objective of investors’ protection, FASB’s accounting standard-setting was 
characterized by a detailed rules-based approach, where ambiguity had to be avoided 
at all costs by explicitly spelling out what was permitted and under what 
circumstances. In view of these problems, as well as the difficulties associated with 
the Directives, and the past negotiating experience in international organizations98, it 
did not seem likely that the SEC could achieve a satisfactory international agreement 
that would include the Europeans. The adoption of the mutual recognition policy by 
the EC made the possibility of reaching an international agreement with the 
Europeans even less likely.
On the other hand, while the US markets held undoubtedly the dominant 
position in terms of market weight, liquidity and sophistication, the SEC was not in a 
position to force an international agreement on others. First, both Japan and Europe 
(which numbered several significant stock exchanges) were important players and 
grew rapidly, particularly during the 1980s (Table 5.4).
97 Thomas was at the time the SEC Delegate to the United States Inter-Departmental Committee on 
Foreign Investment.
98 Zttnd (1983) describes how disagreements were common in the context o f the OECD Working 
Group among developed countries, and in particular between EEC countries and the US.
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Table 5.4 Global Shares of Domestic Market Capitalization!
1980*** 1990 1995 2000
US 41% 38% 42% 52%
Europe* 12% 21% 18% 23%
Japan** 14% 33% 21% 10%
Combined Total 67% 92% 81% 85%
t  Excludes foreign listings.
* Includes the combined domestic market capitalizations of the six biggest European stock exchanges 
(LSE, Deutsche Borse, Amsterdam, Borsa Italiana, Paris and Spanish Exchanges). The share of 
Europe is underestimated because it does not include all European markets, and because the shares 
exclude foreign listings, an area where, as we have seen, Europe led the other regions.
** Japan’s share is also slightly underestimated because it includes only TSE’s capitalization.
*** The US share includes only data from NYSE while the Europe share excludes the Spanish Stock
Exchanges and includes Lisbon._____________________________________________________________
Source: Calculated from NYSE’s international statistics, available on www.nvse.com. and 
World Federation of Exchanges’ time series statistics, available on www.world- 
exchanges.org.
Moreover, particularly in Europe, the harmonization programme touched all 
aspects of financial reporting and all limited liability companies", which made the 
prospect of forcing the Europeans into an agreement with legal consequences for all 
European companies less likely. In other words, the global market for capital could be 
best described as oligopolistic, and the SEC did not have enough structural power to 
force a redistributive international agreement on the other significant players, 
particularly in the 1980s.
As we have argued in chapter 3, when international agreement is not 
forthcoming, a state may seek to employ an international forum-shifting strategy. We 
also argued, that such a strategy would be successful when the dominant players are 
able to mobilize other significant players to their side, effectively creating a powerful 
front that could potentially press the remaining players into agreement. Failing this, 
the impasse of international negotiations would only be repeated in different fora. 
Indeed, the SEC’s first move was an international forum-shifting strategy. In 1985, 
the SEC published a discussion paper, which sought a tripartite solution by promoting 
the harmonization of cross-border listings’ requirements between the US, the UK and 
Canada. This move bears remarkable resemblance to the Federal Reserve Board’s
99 In the US, the stringent SEC regulations apply only to listed companies.
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bilateral agreement with the Bank of England on the issue of banking capital 
adequacy standards, which took place around the same time. The SEC sought to 
harmonize the listing disclosure requirements with the two most significant 
jurisdictions of the Anglo-Saxon camp, which shared to a considerable degree the US 
view of accounting. Should these three jurisdictions reach an agreement, the new 
disclosure requirements would apply to all North-American capital markets and the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). Given the importance of the LSE, where a large 
number of European and Japanese companies listed their shares100, and the market 
weight of the American stock exchanges, it is very likely that other states would be 
willing to accept an agreement that converged significantly to US accounting 
standards, at least for the consolidated accounts of listed companies. The tripartite 
initiative however, did not have the successful conclusion of the banking capital 
adequacy bilateral initiative. Such a plan could not succeed, as the UK was already 
bound by the European Accounting Directives and the mutual recognition policy. The 
US did go ahead to complete a bilateral agreement with Canada, the 
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS), in 1991, but the absence of the UK 
from this agreement meant that it did not have the critical mass it needed to start a 
move towards an international agreement.
As per proposition (3), it is in cases like this, when, in an oligopolistic market 
structure we have a distributional coordination problem, which cannot be resolved 
through international institutions, that we would expect to see states opting for a 
transnational forum-shifting solution. Therefore, following the failure of the tripartite 
agreement, we would expect the SEC to use transnational regulatory authority as a 
forum-shifting strategy. Indeed, representatives from the SEC and the IASC had 
already met in 1984 and discussed the possibility of a common disclosure document 
for cross-border listings. The SEC however did not take the IASs very seriously at the 
time, as it considered their quality poor and wholly inadequate for the US markets 
given the variety o f options they allowed (Gemon et al. 1990). When it became 
obvious that a tripartite solution was not possible, the SEC went back to the IASC in
100 During the 1980s the LSE averaged 474 foreign companies listed on its table. Calculated from LSE’ 
historic statistics, available from www.lse.co.uk.
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1987 to discuss the use o f the IASs as possible benchmark standards in cross-border 
offerings. The SEC however was not satisfied with the number of options contained 
in the IASs and wanted the IASC to identify for each issue only one treatment as the 
benchmark or the “reconciling standard”. If this approach was endorsed, SEC 
representatives indicated that there was a possibility that the SEC might accept 
reconciliation to these benchmark standards instead of the US standards (Caims 
2003). In other words, provided that sufficient progress along the lines advocated by 
the SEC was made, a promise of regulatory authority was given to the IASC, that is, a 
promise to legally adopt the IASC standards for listing purposes.
According to condition (lb), regulators will always try to embed their relation 
with a transnational forum with some mechanism or procedure, which will allow 
them to exercise at least some degree of control over the regulatory process. The need 
for such a control mechanism was even greater for the SEC, since the IASC was 
already active for many years, and the SEC had to make sure that the existing 
standards would be revised in a way consistent with the philosophy of the US GAAP. 
For this reason, the SEC advanced its proposal through the newly founded 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)101. In 1987, the 
IOSCO, having accepted IASC’s invitation to join its consultative group, echoed 
SEC’s proposal, indicating that it would be interested in using IASs as a benchmark 
standard for listings in international stock exchanges, provided that the options 
allowed were reduced (Caims 2003)102. Not surprisingly, the IASC decided in 1987 to 
begin its Comparability Project with the aim of eliminating the various alternatives 
allowed in IASs and proposing instead a benchmark treatment. As we have seen, the 
Statement of Intent on the Comparability of Financial Statements (1990) identified 
the issues for change and resulted in the revision o f a number of IASs through the 
Improvements Project, while the cooperation of IASC and IOSCO on these projects 
eventually led to the landmark 1995 core standards agreement.
101 The IOSCO was founded in 1983, emerging as an international forum from its regional predecessor, 
the Inter-American Association o f Securities Commissions. The IOSCO brought together national 
securities regulators in an attempt to deal with the growing internationalisation o f securities markets 
(Underhill 1995).
102 See also the comments o f the Chairman o f IOSCO during the proceedings o f the International 
Financial Reporting Forum on IASC’s Comparability Project (Gemon et al. 1990).
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IOSCO had a significant impact on IASC’s work: “many of the changes made 
to IASs during the improvements project reflected the wishes of the IOSCO 
representatives” (Caims 2003, p.44)103. However, the input o f IOSCO was largely 
determined by the SEC. The SEC was the most important member of the IOSCO in 
relation to accounting standards, due to the attraction of the US capital markets, the 
SEC’s tough line with foreign issuers, and its rigorous enforcement policy (Caims 
2003, p.57). SEC staff was present in almost all occasions of cooperation between the 
IASC and the IOSCO. It held posts with significant influence over the future of this 
cooperation, such as the chairmanship of working group 1, responsible for evaluating 
the revised IASs and recommending their endorsement or rejection by IOSCO 
(Caims 1997), and “played a critical role in the comparability and improvements 
project, the IASC-CICA104 financial instruments project, the determination of 
IOSCO’s list o f core standards and the subsequent evaluation o f IASs” (Caims 2003, 
p.58).
Beyond providing the SEC with a mechanism that allowed it to influence 
heavily the direction and content of the Improvements Project, the control that this 
setting offered the SEC, gave it the ability to pursue what seems to have been another 
objective of its forum-shifting strategy. The tactics of the SEC in the context of the 
IOSCO-IASC cooperation seemed to be part of a strategy designed to delay IASC’s 
progress towards becoming the forum for international accounting harmonization. In 
this way, the SEC could retain the status quo, that is, the use of US GAAP by a 
considerable number of foreign multinationals, effectively hoping to bring about a de 
facto harmonization based on American accounting standards105.
Indeed, former IASC and SEC officials have acknowledged in interviews with 
the author that at least until the mid-1990s the SEC and the FASB still believed that 
the US accounting standards could become de facto global accounting standards. A
103 David Caims was IASC Secretary General for the period 1985-1995.
104 CICA is the Canadian Institute o f Chartered Accountants.
105 At the beginning o f this chapter, we saw that until the 1980s the only harmonization that was taking 
place was that which was dictated by the need of MNCs to list their shares on American capital makets 
and were therefore obliged to adopt US GAAP as a secondary or reconciliation set o f standards. The 
growth of financial markets since the 1980s had raised further the status of the US GAAP. By the early 
1990s, the US GAAP was already considered an international set o f accounting standards (Hulle 1993; 
Caims 1994).
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strategy to turn this belief into reality is the only way to explain SEC’s behaviour in 
the context of the IOSCO-IASC cooperation, which could, at best, be characterized as 
ambivalent. This is obvious for example with the timetable for the adoption of the 
core standards; many regulators including Paul Guy, secretary-general o f IOSCO, 
Jean Saint Geours, president of the French regulator and chairman of the technical 
committee of IOSCO, and Edward Waitzer, chairman o f the Ontario Securities 
Commission, were in favour of an immediate, step-by-step endorsement process 
whereby the revised standards could be endorsed as they were completed. The SEC 
however thought otherwise and objected to this approach (Caims 1997). The 1994 
recommendation of working party 1 (whose chair was held by the SEC) reflected 
SEC’s view and suggested that the core standards (including some which had been 
revised during the improvements project and had already been found to be acceptable 
to the IOSCO) should not be endorsed until the whole set of standards was 
completed. This decision produced acrimony and some tough words between the 
IASC and IOSCO (Caims 1997), but eventually the SEC prevailed as this view was 
endorsed in the final core standards agreement in 1995. Following this, the SEC 
announced in April 1996 that, irrespective of IOSCO’s verdict, it would conduct its 
own evaluation o f the core standards, which would be based on whether they satisfied 
three key elements: a comprehensive set of accounting pronouncements, high quality 
standards and most importantly, their rigorous interpretation and application (SEC 
1996). It is obvious, that the third criterion could never be satisfied by the IASC 
which did not have the authority to enforce the IASs in national jurisdictions. In other 
words, the SEC signalled that it was not going to accept use of the IASs without 
reconciliation. When asked by the author about these obstacles that the SEC seemed 
to keep putting in the way of IASC’s progress, Sir Brian Carsberg, IASC Secretary- 
General for the period 1995-2001, suggested that indeed,
there were some in America who thought that their standards were the highest quality 
standards in the world and because they had such a strong position in the capital 
markets they had only to, sort of delay things, as far as international accounting 
standards were concerned, and more and more companies would adopt US standards
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and so US standards would become the international standards almost by a process of 
default106.
The engagement with the IASC therefore constituted a two-pronged forum-shifting 
strategy. Either the US could stop from within the progress of the IASC, in effect 
employing a forum-blocking strategy107, hoping to bring about a de facto 
globalization of US standards, or failing this, it would influence the development of 
the next possible candidate, the IASs, so that they would resemble the US GAAP as 
close as possible. This meant that most of the adjustment costs of harmonization 
would be bom by foreign companies, investors and regulators. The IOSCO provided 
the SEC with the necessary control device to pursue both ends. The IOSCO however 
was not the only way the SEC could influence the future o f the IASC.
SEC’s influence in IOSCO was complemented by an effort to influence the 
work of the IASC at the preliminary stages, that is, before and during the drafting 
stage of the standards. This was achieved to a large degree through the influence of 
the G4 group, which effectively represented another forum-shifting move similar to 
the tripartite harmonization proposal, but this time at a transnational level and within 
the wider strategy o f engagement with the IASC. As we have seen, the G4 group 
comprised the standard-setters of the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. The IASC also accepted an invitation to participate in the group, and 
between 1993 and 2001 the G4+1 group issued a number of position papers on a 
variety o f accounting issues. The formation of the G4 raised significant concerns 
among the other members of the IASC and was viewed as a threat to the IASC itself 
(Street and Shaughnessy 1998). Critics did not see this joint effort sympathetically 
and saw the G4 as an attempt to maintain Anglo-American dominance in the 
organization (Flower 1997; Nobes 2003). Indeed, the G4 played a very influential 
role: the G4 set and dominated to a large degree the agenda of the IASC (Nobes 
2003), while the IASC steering committees relied heavily on the joint publication
106 Interview with author, 15/03/2007.
107 According to Drahos and Braithwaite, forum-blocking is a variation o f the forum-shifting strategy 
and occurs when a state prevents an organization from becoming the international forum for an issue- 
area (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p.564).
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papers produced by the G4+1 during the time that it was active (Street and 
Shaughnessy 1998).
However, the greatest opportunity to control IASC’s destiny came with the 
restructuring project. The Strategy Working Party that was established in 1996 to lead 
and coordinate the restructuring process initially proposed that an enlarged IASC 
board with twenty-five members representing professional accounting associations 
from more countries, and other organizations interested in harmonization of 
accounting standards, should have the final say in the approval o f the standards. The 
standards themselves would be developed by a Standards Development Committee 
(SDC) comprising eleven members, most of whom would have to be voting members 
in their national standard-setting bodies108.
These proposals met with fierce resistance from the US. In reply to these 
proposals, the FASB published in 1999 its vision o f international accounting 
standard-setting109. According to the FASB, “the ultimate objective of the 
international accounting system is simultaneously optimizing capital market 
efficiency and ensuring investor protection” (1999, p. 10). This would be achieved by 
developing a single set of high-quality accounting standards with minimum 
alternative treatments which would be capable of rigorous interpretation and 
application. In turn, this set of standards would be developed by a mechanism that 
incorporates a standard-setting body, an interpretations committee and a consultative 
professional body. In other words, the FASB envisioned an international standard- 
setter after its own image. To secure this image, the FASB argued strongly for the 
independence o f the decision-making body, which should be comprised of “standard 
setters with sound technical expertise”110. To ensure that its vision was dully noticed, 
the FASB did not hesitate to resort to threats. The FASB noted the importance of US 
markets and the American standard-setters, and warned that “worldwide acceptance 
of internationally recognized standards and a global standard-setting process is 
impossible without U.S. acceptance and participation...U.S. support is necessary to
108 These recommendations are included in “Shaping IASC for the Future”, IASC Strategy Working 
Party, IASC Insight Supplement, December 1998.
109 “International Accounting Standard Setting: A Vision for the Future”, FASB, 1999.
110 E.L. Jenkins, FASB chairman, IASC Insight, June 1999, p. 12.
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the legitimacy of any set of international standards” (1999, p .l). The FASB suggested 
that if the current process failed there were other possible solutions: “the objectives 
and vision presented are also consistent with other possible alternatives, including the 
possibility that the FASB might reorganize itself to become an international standard 
setter or that an alternative international structure and process could be established 
that meets the FASB’s fundamental objectives” (1999, p. viii); this could be “a 
successor international organization..., perhaps based on the G4+1” (1999, p. 7). 
Echoing the views of the FASB, the SEC also argued for independence and technical 
skills.
Despite the fact that most other interested parties, including the European 
Union, the Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and even IOSCO itself 
(with the explicitly noted the disagreement of the SEC) were in favour of an enlarged 
Board and geographical representation111, the SEC had a major influence on the final 
report of the Strategy Working Party and in the end the American view prevailed 
(Caims 2003). The decision was taken to have an independent board whose members 
would be chosen solely on the basis of their technical expertise and experience. The 
members of the new Board would be experts in all aspects of accounting and financial 
reporting, with significant professional experience. It should be noted that such 
experts could only be found in developed economies with developed capital markets, 
particularly since the reporting philosophy of the new organization was explicitly 
geared primarily towards the satisfaction of the reporting needs of capital market 
participants112. As a result of this decision, the resulting synthesis o f the Board has 
played out to the advantage of the SEC and the FASB as most o f the Board members 
fall within the Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition, sharing thus similar views on 
financial reporting, as well as a significant experience of close cooperation through 
the G4+1. Of the fourteen members of the first IASB, ten came from the US (5), UK 
(2), Canada, Australia and South Africa, effectively all the major countries in the
111 See IASC Insight, June 1999, pp. 15-16.
112 See the IASC Foundation Constitution, Part A, 2, July 2005, for the objectives o f the IASC 
Foundation.
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Anglo-Saxon tradition, while the remaining four came from Germany, France, 
Switzerland and Japan113.
5.3.2 Europe’s response: transnational regulatory authority as a forum-shifting 
strategy
We saw previously that the EC’s regulatory dilemma was quite different from the 
SEC’s problems. The EC was put under pressure from its constituents who wanted to 
be able to list their shares in the US capital markets without having to reconcile their 
accounts to US GAAP. As we have seen, the SEC was not willing to grant this 
request. As we would expect, the first attempt of the EC to solve the problem was to 
seek an international agreement that would eliminate the costs for European issuers 
and balance the costs of analyzing foreign financial statements to European and 
American investors. Following its decision to adopt a mutual recognition policy in the 
context of European harmonization, which also meant that there was no single 
European accounting model to be used in negotiations with the Americans, the EC 
proposed to the SEC a mutual recognition agreement (Caims 1994). Unfortunately, as 
the Commission later admitted: “the Commission has attempted to initiate such 
discussions, but has found little interest on the American side” (COM 1995, p.5). The 
SEC’s refusal was hardly surprising. First, as it was just mentioned there was no 
European set of accounting principles for the SEC to recognize. As described above, 
the Directives were incomplete, often outdated and in many cases not yet adopted by 
all member states. Moreover, being a compromise between different accounting 
traditions, they allowed many options, a flexibility, which as we already have seen, 
was entirely inconsistent with the prescriptive standard-setting philosophy o f the 
FASB and the SEC. Finally, the Commission had very little to negotiate with, since 
accounts prepared by US companies under US GAAP were already accepted in most
113Although we cannot accept this view without reservations given the absence o f direct evidence, it is 
worth mentioning that accounting scholars have often suggested that the synthesis o f the Board has 
given a significant advantage to Anglo-Saxon countries when acting as a voting block. This has been 
achieved either by being able to block the approval of new standards in the old IASC, where they held 
five out of the sixteen seats, that is, more than the 25% of the votes needed to block a new standard 
(Flower 1997), or by being able to pass new standards in the new IASB, given that the required 
majority for the approval o f a new IFRS is nine out of fourteen members (Nobes 2003). It is obvious 
that the new synthesis has greatly increased the representation o f the Anglo-Saxon camp in the Board, 
and thus their ability to control the voting if they so chose.
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Member States, and therefore the EC had nothing to offer the American side in 
exchange for the recognition of European accounting standards.
As was the case with the SEC, following the failure of international agreement 
in an oligopolistic global market for capital, we would expect the EC to try to resolve 
the international conflict of interest in favour of European issuers, using an 
international forum-shifting strategy. However, given, the weight o f the US capital 
markets, the MJDS agreed betweem the US and Canada, and the difficulties of 
Europeans in agreeing amongst themselves, achieving a sufficiently powerful 
international front with other market players (e.g. Japan) to force the SEC to come to 
the negotiating table seemed unlikely. Therefore, in accordance with proposition (3b), 
we would expect the EC to pursue a transnational forum-shifting strategy. Given that 
there was already a prestigious transnational organization active in accounting 
standards setting, the IASC, it would seem reasonable for the EC to try to use the 
IASC in the context of a forum-shifting strategy. The prestige and highly regarded 
expert profile of the IASC provided an ideal forum for reaching a compromise with 
SEC along the lines of our argument.
Indeed, in view of the regulatory stalemate, the EC embarked on a strategy of 
gradual engangement with the IASC. In 1990, the European Commission organized a 
conference on the future of European accounting harmonization. The conference was 
meant as a way forward but produced very little concrete results and made apparent 
the disagreements about the direction of European accounting harmonization (EC 
1990). However, despite these disagreements, and given the increasing pressure to 
facilitate European business’ access to American capital markets, there was 
agreement on the increasing importance of international harmonization, especially in 
the IASC, and on the fact that it was absolutely necessary for Europe to be more 
involved in international accounting harmonization developments. It was thus decided 
that the EC should be proactive and participate in the IASC114. The Commission 
would take up the IASC’s invitation to join the consultative group and take an 
observer position on the Board.
114 This does not mean that everyone approved of IASC’s work. German and French officials in 
particular were explicitly opposed, at the time, to any potential delegation o f accounting standard- 
setting authority to a non-state organization (EC 1990).
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This initial decision to engage with the IASC, proved to be the prologue to a 
significant new strategy that was announced by the European Commission in 1995115. 
The EC acknowledged the fact that the difficulty o f European issuers to list in foreign 
markets, and particularly the US capital markets, was a major problem for European 
business, which was only going to get worse:
Accounts prepared in accordance with the Directives and the national laws which 
implement them do not meet the more demanding standards required elsewhere in the 
world, notably by the Securities Exchange Commission in the United States. The result 
of this last problem is that large European companies seeking capital on the 
international capital markets, most often on the New York Stock Exchange, are obliged 
to prepare a second set of accounts for that purpose. This is burdensome and costly and 
constitutes a clear competitive disadvantage. Producing more than one set of accounts 
also causes confusion. Moreover, it involves companies in conforming with standards 
(US Generally Accepted Accounting Practices or GAAP) which are developed without 
any European input. As more and more Member States are implementing important 
privatisation programmes and as the capital needs of the companies concerned are 
increasing, the number of companies facing this problem is growing.
COM 1995, 1.2,1.3
Moreover, the EC stressed the dangers that this situation posed for the European 
harmonization programme, should the problem remain unreslolved:
The most urgent problem is that concerning European companies with an international 
vocation. The accounts prepared by those companies in accordance with their national 
legislation, based on the Accounting Directives, are no longer acceptable for 
international capital market purposes. These companies are therefore obliged to prepare 
two sets of accounts, one set which is in conformity with the Accounting Directives 
and another set which is required by the international capital markets. This situation is 
not satisfactory...there is a risk that large companies will be increasingly drawn 
towards US GAAP. They and the Member States are looking to the Union for a 
solution that can be implemented rapidly.
COM 1995, 3.3
Given this situation, the pressure was on the EC to come up with a solution promptly:
The Union needs to move promptly to offer the users and preparers of accounts a clear 
prospect that companies seeking listings on the US and other world markets will be 
able to remain within the EU accounting framework and that US GAAP, over which 
they and their governments can exercise no influence, is not the only option.
COM 1995,6
115 “Accounting Harmonization: A new Strategy vis-i-vis International Harmonization”, Commission 
of the European Communities, (COM 95) 508, 14.11.95.
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The EC proposed the aligning of European Union’s work with the 
harmonization efforts being undertaken by the IASC. In the context of this new 
cooperation with the IASC, Member States could allow companies to report under the 
IASs as long as these were not incompatible with the European Directives. The 
Commission proposed as a first step, to make a survey of the differences between the 
IASs and the Directives. For the first time, the Commission accepted that in case of 
incongruity it would be ready to review the Directives. A Contact Committee was 
established in 1996, comprising government experts, and was charged with 
undertaking an examination of the conformity between the European Directives and 
the IASs. Also, for the first time, the Commission made a distinction between 
consolidated accounts and annual accounts and proposed that the Contact Committee 
should focus on consolidated accounts since these would be less controversial (no tax 
implications) and more relevant for companies affected by the lack of harmonization. 
The conclusion o f the Contact Committee’s survey was that there were only two 
minor issues o f incompatibility, if the options allowed in the European Directives 
were chosen by individual states, in such a way, as to comply with the IASs (EC
1996).
The change of approach by the EC while being quite dramatic, given the 
divergence of European views, was not surprising in view of the increasing pressure 
that European “global issuers” started putting on European regulators116. As we saw 
previously, faced with increasing pressure from big European TNCs, regulators 
started contemplating solutions outside the context of the European harmonization 
programme. Even in Germany, where both regulators and companies had opposed the 
SEC’s insistence on reconciliation to such a degree that no German companies were 
listed on the NYSE until 1993, pressure eventually drove regulators to comtemplate 
allowing big public companies to adopt the US GAAP. Moreover, as we saw above, 
and in the previous chapter, voluntary adoption by big European TNCs of both US 
GAAP and IASs started gaining ground at a gathering pace in the early 1990s, 
leading to a gradual de facto harmonization based on US GAAP and the IASs 
(Canibano and Mora 2000; Haller 2002). Given the inability of Europeans to find
116 Interview with Karel Van Hulle, 08/06/2007.
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common ground amongst themselves, which was reaffirmed at the 1990 conference, 
and the growing significance and urgency o f the problem, many regulators, in line 
with condition (la), seemed less interested in the continuation of the extensive, all- 
pervasive European harmonization programme, and became more concerned with 
finding a solution for a specific regulatory clientele, the big global European issuers, 
a solution limited to consolidate accounts for listing purposes (Hoarau 1995; 
Canibano and Mora 2000). Indeed, it seems that a number o f European regulators had 
endorsed this new direction for harmonization even before the announcement of the 
new European strategy, and their views informed its development. Already from the 
early 1990s, certain jurisdictions had begun the alignment of their national standards 
to IASs and incorporated IASs to domestic accounting or stock exchange listing 
regulations where possible (Haller 2002). This change o f direction has been 
confirmed by Karel Van Hulle117, who prior to the adoption of the new strategy, 
embarked on a European tour trying to find a solution to the problem. After 
describing the unwillingness of European regulators to engage in the development of 
a European Standards Board or in a new process of revising the Accounting 
Directives, he explained that:
The majority of people [regulators] were saying why don’t we try IASs? Let’s open up 
the European area and allow the possibility for companies to use IASs in consolidated 
accounts, only consolidated accounts, because then we don’t have the tax problem.
Given the difficulties of European harmonization, this approach presented a 
favourable alternative for both European regulators and the EC. First, it offered 
European “global issuers” the possibility to gain access to international capital 
markets based only on one international set of accounts. Secondly, it allowed 
European regulators to keep intact their domestic accounting regulatory frameworks 
for the individual accounts of limited liability companies, which ensured that there 
would be no tax implications (Hoarau 1995), and on the other hand, given the 
favourable report of the Contact Committee, it ensured the preservation of the 
European accounting framework. Therefore, this new approach seemed to offer a 
potential way out o f the reconciliation problem without undermining the authority of
1,7 Ibid.
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either the national regulators or the EC. As a result, it was not surprising to see that 
shortly after the announcement of the new European reporting strategy, a number of 
European countries (Austria, Italy, Germany, France and Belgium) passed legislation 
that allowed the use o f IASs for consolidated accounts by listed companies, while 
new exchanges (EASDAQ, Neue Markt), required that listed companies publish 
consolidated accounts in accordance with the IASs.
The IASC was chosen, because it had already achieved global recognition as 
the prominent, independent, expert-driven forum for international accounting 
harmonization, a reputation institutionally established and recognized with the 
IOSCO core-standards agreement. The EC was obviously hoping that this move 
would force the SEC, in line with the IOSCO agreement, to acknowledge the IASs as 
an internationally accepted set o f standards, which could be used for listing in the US 
without reconciliation:
The International Organization of Securities Commisssions (IOSCO) has recently 
reached an agreement with IASC on a joint work programme, which aims to produce in 
the medium-term a core set of international accounting standards to be applied by 
companies seeking a multinational listing of their securities. The realisation of this 
objective would make it easier for European companies which apply International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) to have access to international capital markets and 
especially to the US capital market.
COM 1995, 2.8
Moreover, because of the IOSCO agreement, the EC did not have to move 
completely to transnational regulatory authority, but could only allow the voluntary 
incorporation of IASs in the European accounting framework and wait for the IOSCO 
endorsement of the core standards agreement to put in place the final legal 
component, which would allow European issures to list their shares in the US using 
the IASs. Finally, as we have argued, transnational regulatory authority offers 
regulators the ability to exert influence on the operation of a transnational regulatory 
forum, while taking advantage o f the prestige and proclaimed neutrality o f experts, 
which can be used to facilitate compromise. Indeed, engaging with the IASC, the EC 
hoped to achieve agreement on an international set of standards that would not 
constitute a wholesale adoption of US GAAP and would be closer to a compromise 
between the Anglo-Saxon and Continental approaches to accounting. This would be
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achieved by the active engangement of the EC in the IASC standard setting process 
which would allow it to exert influence on IASC’s work so that the EC would not just 
accept the standards of the IASC which “should not be an American or Anglo-Saxon 
dominated body” (EC 1990, p. 113). The Contact Committee would establish a 
common European position in future Exposure Drafts (EDs) and convey this unified 
position to the IASC, a process which would “allow the Union progressively to gain a 
position of greater influence on the IASC’s work, including the determination of its 
agenda, so that its output will increasingly reflect the EU viewpoint” (COM 1995, 
5.4).
However, while the 1995 strategy seemed a promising way out of the impasse, 
things in the next few years did not go exactly the way the EC had hoped for. First, as 
we saw, the IOSCO endorsement, while positive, was not automatic or mandatory 
and allowed national regulators various adjustments, including a reconciliation 
requirement. Moreover, irrespective of IOSCO’s decision, the SEC signalled in 1996 
that it would decide on its own and with rather stringent criteria whether to allow the 
IASs in US capital markets without reconciliation. Finally, FASB’s influence through 
the work of the G4 had actually grown and dominated to a large degree the IASC 
agenda.
In view of this situation, the EC had to take its strategy to the next level. 
Following our theoretical discussion, we would expect the EC to move fully towards 
transnational regulatory authority, that is, to decide to adopt legally the IASs for use 
in European capital markets. This is not only because the EC had no other option, 
given that the only other available international set o f standards was the US GAAP. It 
is true that following the failure of the IOSCO’s core standards endorsement to 
deliver the desired outcome, the EC found itself in a difficult position. Obviously, the 
EC could never accept US GAAP in the development o f which it had no input. 
Moving to the IASs therefore provided a way out of the impasse and allowed the EC 
to save face by claiming that it chose an international set of standards renown for 
their comprehensiveness and quality (COM 1995). While a certain degree of path 
dependency is evident in this decision, this is in line with our argument about 
international redistribution. As was argued in chapter 3, the use of transnational
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regulatory authority in the context of a forum-shifting strategy, is not a pure forward- 
looking strategy, since it is employed as a second-best strategy, following the failure 
of international agreement. Moreover, it provides a number of advantages that 
facilitate compromise, including the opportunity given to regulators to save face when 
reaching difficult compromises. However, this is not the only advantage. Moving 
fully to transnational regulatory authority, would change the reversion point in a way 
that the inconclusive IOSCO endorsement could not. Such a decision would create a 
set of international standards with more market weight than the US GAAP; the SEC 
could not ignore a set of standards used by most of the developed economies in the 
world. SEC’s objections about the multiple choices allowed by the Directives and the 
lack of a common European set of standards would not be valid anymore. Moreover, 
this move would satisfy the third and most troubling of the criteria that the SEC itself 
had set out for the adoption o f the IASs: their rigorous interpretation and application. 
This criterion could be satisfied if IASs were a legal requirement in European 
jurisdictions. In addition, the decision to adopt the IASs would give the Europeans an 
even greater opportunity to influence the work of the IASC. By becoming the largest 
constituency actually implementing the IASs, the EU was bound to have more say 
and influence in IASC’s work. Finally, we should remember that such a move would 
only be the continuation of a strategy which begun in the early 1990s. In its 
communication of the new financial reporting strategy in 1995, the Commission 
examined a number o f possible alternatives to the strategy finally adopted, but 
decided that this suited European interests best at the time (COM 1995, 4). Moving 
fully to transnational regulatory authority would only be the reasonable continuation 
of the strategy of gradual engagement with the IASC.
•  •  118 Indeed, in 2000 the Commission issued a new financial reporting strategy
where it took an unprecedented step and proposed that all EU listed companies should
be required to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with IASs from 2005
onwards. This proposal was accepted by the European Council and the European
Parliament without significant objections and consequently with EC Regulation
1,8 “EU Financial Reporting Strategy: the way forward”, Commission of the European Communities, 
(COM 2000) 359,13.06.00.
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1606/2002, this proposal became a binding legal requirement for all European listed 
companies, and an option for single company accounts or the consolidated accounts 
of non-listed companies (the option is open to Member States). This deadline was 
extended to 2007 for companies that were using U.S. GAAP prior to 2005 and 
companies that have only debt securities listed in European markets.
The new strategy was a significant turning point as it effectively endowed the 
IASC with the regulatory authority to develop accounting standards that would be 
legally adopted by the European Union. The move to transnational regulatory autority 
represented a complete break from the previous policy of retaining national options. 
To attempt such a dramatic move, the European Commission took advantage of the 
new European Strategy for a single internal market in financial services. The Lisbon 
European Council of 2000 underlined the importance of a single financial market in 
the EU, and set as one of its priority objectives the comparability o f companies’ 
financial statements. The EC presented its new strategy as the best way to achieve 
this objective, arguing that to achieve comparability it was necessary to have common 
financial reporting standards (COM 2000, 2). However, the adoption o f IASs as 
national accounting standards was really the EC’s ultimate effort to gain a degree of 
control over international accounting harmonization. While the proposal to adopt the 
IASs for the consolidated accounts of listed companies served the purposes of the 
internal financial market project, this proposal did not emerge suddently, following 
the new impetus for a single European financial market propagated at the Lisbon 
European Council. As noted above, and as the description of the new strategy by the 
EC itself makes clear:
A central objective -  and one against which success can be measured -  is that the 
policy should ensure that securities can be traded on EU and international financial 
markets on the basis of a single set of financial reporting standards.
COM 2000, 7
The issue therefore, was not simply to have comparability between European 
capital markets, which had operated on the basis of mutual recognition for many 
years without significant problems, but to have European issuers being able to use 
one set of standards in all international capital markets, which as we have seen really
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meant the US capital markets119. The 2000 strategy was the culmination of the 1995 
strategy, as Karel Van Hulle himself has admitted120.
Finally, in line with our previous discussion and condition (lb), an 
endorsement mechanism has also been created. It comprises an Accounting 
Regulatory Committee (ARC), a political body representing Member States, which 
gives its opinion on whether or not to adopt an IAS after having consulted the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), a private sector 
organization, which includes all interested parties (including standard-setters) and 
provides the technical assessment of the proposed IASs. The EFRAG also participates 
in the consultative stages for the preparation of new IASs at the IASC. According to 
the Commission’s communication, the endorsement mechanism’s central task 
“should be to confirm that IAS are in full conformity with the Union’s overall 
approach -  more specifically, if there is conformity with the EU’s Accounting 
Directives and that a suitable basis for financial reporting by listed EU companies is 
provided” (COM 2000, 21). In other words, the decision to adopt IASs was not a 
cheque en Blanc; the EU’s endorsement apparatus was supposed to act as an approval 
mechanism hopefully giving leverage to the EU in the IASC process. The 
endorsement mechanism would help coordinate the views in the European Union “at 
all stages of the IAS standard setting process not least to influence the debate” (COM 
2000,25).
5.3.3 Struggling for influence: IASB and the politics of transnational regulatory 
authority
The success of the EC’s forum-shifting strategy soon became evident. As we have 
seen, in October 2002 the FASB and the IASB came to an agreement to jointly 
develop high-quality, compatible accounting standards. The SEC responded 
positively to the Norwalk agreement and indicated for the first time, that it would be 
willing to abandon the reconciliation requirement: “the announcement was a major 
step towards a global system of accounting standards and would in particular help the
1,9 Financial statements of European companies prepared according to the European Directives have 
usually been accepted in all other jurisdictions except the United States (Biener 1994).
120 Interview with the author, 08/06/2007.
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SEC to accept financial statements prepared by EU companies in accordance with 
IASs, without reconciliation to US GAAP, for the purposes of listing on US 
markets”121. The turnaround in the SEC’s and the FASB’s attitude was dramatic. It 
should be remembered that as recently as 1999, the FASB in its proposals for the 
restructuring process had explicitly expressed misgivings about the quality of the 
IASC’s work and doubted the possibility of its use in the US without reconciliation:
The FASB is not convinced that their use [core standards] in their present form 
would improve financial reporting in the United States....At least within the FASB’s 
current planning horizon, it seems unlikely that the IASC’s core standards ...will be 
accepted in the United States without requiring reconciliation of some of those 
standards.
(FASB 1999, p.4)
These views were repeated in 2000 in FASB’s reply to a Concept Release by the 
SEC, seeking comments on whether the SEC should accept IASs statements of 
foreign issuers without reconciliation. Had the quality of the standards change so 
dramatically within two years, that the IFRSs were now of high enough quality to 
become the basis of a joint standard-setting process? Obviously not, particularly in a 
period when the IASC was absorbed by its restructuring process and actual standard- 
setting work had stalled. The EC’s strategy had been successful in forcing the SEC 
and the FASB to acknowledge the IASC as the forum for international accounting 
harmonization: in 2005 the SEC and the EC agreed on a roadmap towards 
eliminating the reconciliation requirement by 2009. At last, the EC had found a way 
out of the impasse.
Despite the undoubted success of the EC strategy, not everything worked out 
according to plan. Perhaps, the most important setback was its failure to push its own 
vision about the new structure o f the IASC Foundation. This failure was made all the 
more costly by the SEC’s success in imposing a model entirely consistent with its 
own views. This gave the opportunity to the SEC and the FASB to influence to a 
considerable degree the agenda of the new organization. This was crucial in view of 
the 2005 deadline because, while the EC managed to get the SEC to retreat from its 
previous position, this success also meant that the SEC and the FASB would try to
121 IASC Insight, October 2002, p. 2.
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influence the work of the IASC so that the standards that would be adopted in the EU 
would be as close as possible to the US GAAP. This is evident from the work plan 
agreed in the Norwalk agreement, which sets out both a short-term convergence 
project and a longer-term coordination schedule. The short-term project was meant to 
address major differences before 2005, while the long-term coordination project 
refers to other differences between IFRSs and U.S. GAAP that remain after January 
1, 2005122. The whole agenda of the IASB was determined by the 2005 deadline. In 
2002, a new Improvements Project was initiated. The IASB decided in view of the 
EU’s and other countries’ decision to adopt IASs by 2005, that it had to “examine as 
a matter of urgency the standards that it had inherited from its predecessor”; 
moreover in order “to avoid the prospect of companies having to change their 
accounting twice, first on applying international standards in 2005 and then as the 
standards were amended shortly afterwards, the Board decided to speed up this 
project” (Tweedie 2004, p.5). By the end of March 2004, a stable platform of 
standards had been created which would not change before the 2005 deadline to give 
time to adopting authorities to familiarize themselves with them. All in all, the new 
Improvements Project resulted in the revision of fifteen IASs, while five new IFRSs 
were also issued by the first quarter of 2004. During the same time, work begun on a 
common Conceptual Framework. The urgency and scope o f these changes suggest an 
effort to create a core set of standards that would be quite similar to the US GAAP, 
and therefore acceptable to the SEC, and to get under way a number of other projects 
before the EU begun enforcing the IASs and the new IFRSs. This is obvious for 
example in the case of the revised standards on financial instruments, IAS 32 and IAS 
39, which as we shall see proved extremely controversial. Despite the fact that the 
standards were heavily influenced by the US GAAP to begin with, through the 
improvements project “further convergence with US GAAP was achieved by 
eliminating ten differences between the two sets of standards”123. Indeed, it seems 
that officials of the European Commission were disappointed by the urgency and
122 See the “Memorandum of Understanding”, FASB and IASB, October 2002.
123 IASC Insight, January 2004, p. 2.
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direction of the improvements project, seriously questioned its necessity, and 
expressed reservations about the true intentions behind the project124.
The urgency of these changes was given added impetus due to developments 
in the EU: in the context of the wider process of creating a single European capital 
market, and in the course of setting up its endorsement mechanism for the IASs and 
IFRSs, the EC started to exert pressure to the IASB and the SEC. The leverage of the 
EU endorsement mechanism was tested with the revised IAS 39 on financial 
instruments. According to David Caims125, despite many years o f preliminary work, 
IAS 39 was basically the result o f a “quick fix” by the SEC which, due to the lack of 
an US standard explicitly dealing with derivative instruments, produced a summary 
standard incorporating most of US relevant regulation on the issue ahead of IOSCO’s 
endorsement o f the core standards. Indeed, the IASB itself admits that the 
requirements in IAS 32 and IAS 39 are very similar to those in equivalent US 
standards; as we saw the improvements project brought the IASs even closer to the 
US GAAP126. The revised IAS 39 met with significant resistance as European 
banking supervisors and the European Central Bank were concerned that the 
recognition of derivatives at “fair” or market value, which the standard required with 
some limitations, could be used as a precedent for a move to a complete adoption of 
“fair” value accounting in financial instruments, which is not allowed under European 
Company Law. Moreover, regulators were concerned that fair value accounting could 
be used to inflate earnings and could result in a misleading image o f the financial 
situation of the reporting companies127. Also there was significant resistance from 
European Banks especially on the issue of hedge accounting for banks128. Opposition 
came mainly from banks in France, Spain, Italy and Belgium129, which argued that 
IAS 39 would inject excessive volatility into balance sheets and income statements. 
As a result the European Commission endorsed IAS 39 in November 2004 with the
124 Interview with author, 08/06/2007.
125 Interview with the author, 11/05/2006.
126 IAS 32 deals with disclosure and presentation of financial instruments while IAS 39 deals with their 
measurement and recognition.
127 Tweedie, in IASC Insight, October-November 2004, p. 6.
128 Hedging refers to the use o f financial instruments to mitigate against risk and volatility in 
international markets, for example from fluctuations in interest or exchanges rates.
129 Financial Times, July 7, 2004, p. 19.
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exception of two “carve outs” one relating to the fair value option and the other to the
hedge accounting for banks. While this provoked reactions from both the IASC
Foundation and the SEC, whose chief accountant warned that the SEC's offer to
consider dropping the reconciliation requirement would not apply if European
companies could not abide by all aspects of IFRSs130, a number of amendments were
made to the standard. Eventually, The Fair Value Option amendment was issued in
June 2005, which addressed the concerns of European regulators, and on the 8th of
July 2005 the ARC approved an EC draft Regulation for the endorsement of the
amendment. However, the second carve out for hedge accounting for banks remains
an issue o f dispute. What is more, this has not been the only disagreement to emerge.
In June 2005, IFRS 3, a proposed standard on mergers and acquisitions, the result of
the cooperation between the IASB and the FASB was issued, attracting criticism
1^1
literally from all European constituencies and the European Commission , which 
led to the revision of the standard finally adopted in January 2008. Meanwhile, the 
proposed IFRS 8 on segmental reporting received heavy criticism from the European
Parliament, which instructed the European Commission to conduct an impact
1 ^assessment before deciding on the adoption of the IFRS . Although, following the
study conducted by the EC, the European Parliament approved the adoption of IFRS
8, its decision was accompanied by a number of reservations and regrets about what it
effectively considered the incorporation of the US standard SFAS 131, upon which
IFRS 8 is based, into European law without due notice of the interests of European 
1constituents . Indeed, the European Parliament has recently issued a report where it 
points to a number of standards, which it believes merit further attention134.
Beyond disagreements on individual standards, confrontation has emerged in 
the wider issue o f convergence. The creation of a pan-European securities regulator, 
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), seen by many as a type of 
“European SEC”, created anxiety in the SEC side: “creation of a coordinated 
European securities regulatory structure raises the possibility of real conflicts between
131 Financial Times, December 8, 2005, p. 15.
132 PE 387.132v01-00, 18.04.2007.
133 PE 396.09 lvO 1-00,07.11.2007.
134 PE 392.258v03-00, 05.02.2008.
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regulatory requirements” (Campos 2004). This anxiety was further fuelled by the fact 
that with Regulation 809/2004, the EC decided to allow non-European issuers to list 
their shares in Europe using either IFRSs or the national accounting standards of a 
third country, which are considered equivalent to IFRSs. Following a mandate by the 
European Commission, the CESR recommended that differences between IFRSs and 
other equivalent standards should be disclosed and in some cases the quantitative 
impact of a transaction reported135. Reactions from Japan and the US were immediate 
and concerns were expressed that this would effectively lead to a European 
requirement for reconciliation and would work against the convergence objective136. 
It is obvious that the adoption of IFRSs changed significantly the reversion point, 
giving the EC the power to yield the equivalence requirement in a stick and carrot 
fashion, similarly to the SEC’s use of the reconciliation requirement. Indeed, 
following consultations with the CESR, a mechanism for assessing the equivalence to 
IFRSs was established by the Commission with Regulation 1569/2007, which was 
issued on the 21st of December 2007, the same day that the SEC announced its 
decision to allow foreign issuers to list in the US capital markets using IFRS without 
reconciliation137. Still, this decision referred to the IASB version of the IFRS and not 
the EU version, which includes the hedge accounting carve out. Companies using the 
European version o f the IFRSs have been allowed its use for another two years as 
long as they provide a reconciliation to the IASB version o f IFRSs. After this time, 
they will have to adopt either the IASB’s version or the US GAAP. Following the 
SEC’s decision to abolish the reconciliation requirement, the CESR proposed in 
March 2008, that US and Japanese accounting standards should be considered 
equivalent for listing purposes in the EU138. Still, in view o f the SEC’s requirement 
for the ultimate adoption of IASB’s version of IFRSs, it will be interesting to see how 
and when the EC decides to endorse the CESR’s proposal.
135 The Review o f Securities and Commodities Regulation, Standard and Poor’s, Vol. 38, No 20, p. 251.
136 Ibid.
137 SEC Release No. 33-8879, December 21,2007.
138 “CESR’s advice on the equivalence of Chinese, Japanese and US GAAPs”, CSER/08-179, March 
2008. It should be noted here that with the Tokyo Agreement of August 2007, Japan and the IASB 
agreed to converge their standards by eliminating major differences by 2008 and the remaining by 
2011.
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From the above, it is obvious that the redistributive strategies o f the two 
regulators continue in the context of the IASB. Americans and European regulators 
use strategically their national and regional regulatory mechanisms, in a stick and 
carrot fashion to ensure influence over the IASB’s work. What is more, the closer 
cooperation of the IASB with national and regional regulators has led to the 
involvement of other institutional components of the national and regional regulatory 
frameworks in the engangement with the IASB. Thus, the incorporation of the IFRSs 
in the European regulatory framework has led to frequent inteventions by the 
European Parliament, which was also able to press the EC into an agreement to have 
“effect studies” conducted for new accounting standards and intepretations intended 
for endorsement in the European Union. Also, since 2006, following a request by the 
European Union’s Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), the EC has 
been monitoring the governance of the IASCF and the IASB and conducting an 
annual report o f governance developments. This request has been driven by the 
ECOFIN’s concern over the legitimacy, transparency and accountability o f the 
IASCF/IASB governance structure, aspects, which the Council believes should be 
improved by increasing for example, the public oversight of the IASCF, and the 
geographical representation of the Board’s membership139. On the other hand, it is 
worth noting that the FASB’s reccomendation to the SEC in relation to the abolition 
o f the reconciliation requirement, in November 2007, was not to proceed with it, until 
key international parties had commited to strengthen and sustain the IASB role as an 
independent standard setting body, and to abolish their separate review and 
endorsement procedures140, a condition obviously meant for EC’s endorsement 
mechanism and the other EU institutions’ interventions described above.
5.4 Justifying IASB’s transnational regulatory authority
The decision to replace national accounting standards with the IASs in the EU was a 
remarkable decision. It was an unprecedented move, which has had far-reaching 
consequences as it essentially replaced, literally overnight, national standards with the
139 “Council Conclusions on IASB Governance”, ECOFIN meeting, Brussels, 8 July, 2008.
140 See FASB’s reply to the SEC’s Concept Release on June 2007 concerning the ability o f foreign 
issuers to use accounts based only on IFRSs. FASB, November 7,2007.
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IASs in twenty-eight countries. The new strategy has affected more than 7000 
companies compared to the 275 companies that adopted IASs voluntarily at the time 
that the new strategy was announced. Apart from the sheer scope and finality o f this 
decision (making IASs mandatory), what makes this move even more extraordinary, 
but also more contestable in terms of legitimacy, are two additional factors.
First, most continental countries, unlike most Anglo-Saxon countries, are 
characterized by Code Law legal systems. In these countries, accounting has usually 
been regulated by the government and is part of the wider system of economic and 
business regulation where emphasis is usually given to the protection of various 
stakeholders. Also, the tax implications of accounting rules weigh heavily in the 
consideration of regulatory authorities. Usually there exists an accounting code, 
which is prescriptive detailed and procedural, and often industry-specific plans or 
codes exist as well (Salter and Doupnik 1992). Given this context, the decision to 
delegate the accounting standard-setting function to a private transnational 
organization marks a dramatic change in the regulatory tradition of these states. 
Indeed, only one year before announcing its new strategy, and in the context of the 
IASC’s restructuring debate, the EC’s Head of Accounting and Auditing Unit Karel 
Van Hulle had argued that the LASC needed:
greater credibility and acceptance of its work. That credibility has to be based on 
political legitimacy in how it sets its standards. The IASC needs to make a step change 
from being a body that is dominated by the accounting profession in a small number of 
countries to being a truly representative and publicly accountable international body141.
How were the EC and national regulators able to justify the decision to 
delegate the regulatory authority to set accounting standards for EU listed companies 
to the IASB? It is evident from the above that the Commission realized and probably 
shared the legitimacy concerns raised by its decision. In the presentation of its new 
strategy the Commission explicitly acknowledged them but sought to allay them by 
declaring that “the European Union cannot delegate responsibility for setting financial 
reporting requirements for listed EU companies to a non-governmental third party” 
(COM 2000, 19). To reconcile this strong statement with the actual reality of 
endorsing the standards that the IASB had produced and would produce in the future,
141 IASC Insight, June 1999, p. 16
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the EC made sure, in line with our argument in chapter 3, that an institutional 
structure, the endorsement mechanism, was in place, which gave it the power to 
control to some degree the regulatory outcome. This gave it the ability to claim that 
the EC and the national regulators retained the ultimate authority over accounting 
standard-setting. It is not surprising therefore that in its proposal the EC links this 
mechanism explicitly with issues of legitimacy and accountability and presents it as 
the means “to exercise the necessary regulatory oversight” (COM 2000, 19, 20). In 
this context, it is explicitly stated that the endorsement mechanism must have a 
political component and that “the technical level will need to be under the control set 
at a political level” (COM 2000, 22). The regulators and government agencies that 
comprise the political level, the ARC, have to approve the recommendation of the 
technical private-sector body, the EFRAG, and only following ARC’s endorsement 
does the EC proceed with the adoption of new LASs/IFRSs. The mechanism, as we 
saw, has been used to demonstrate the ultimate authority of the EC and national 
regulators in the case of IAS 39 when the EC decided that two carve outs should 
accompany the adoption of the standard.
A second factor that makes EC’s proposal truly remarkable is that it applies to 
twenty-eight countries, some among the world’s most developed economies that have 
both the means and the expertise to provide their own, highly efficient, accounting 
framework. In our theoretical framework, it was argued that justification of the 
decision to delegate regulatory authority has to be based on an acknowledged 
functional inability o f the state to regulate on its own an issue-area or industry. How 
can this argument be sustained when some of the most developed states in the world 
decide to replace their accounting standard-setting frameworks with that of the IASB? 
As we have seen, the IASs started being used by a number of countries as national 
accounting standards wholly or partly already from the mid-1980s. However, the 
countries that used them in this way were as recently as 1996, only developing and 
least developed countries (LCDs)142. These countries lack the necessary expertise and
142 See “Survey on the status o f IASs”, IASC Insight, October 1997.
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resources to set up sophisticated national accounting systems (Wallace 1993). 
Clearly, in these countries, the state can convincingly make this argument when 
opting for the adoption of IASs. Indeed, in many cases these countries did not have 
the resources to participate in the IASC process, even when invited to do so (Cairns 
1997). Obviously, the same kind of argument cannot be made in Europe’s case.
As suggested by our framework, the justification put forward by the 
Commission was based on an argument of necessity created by changes in both the 
global and European economic environment and in accounting itself. It is worth 
bearing in mind that in all previous attempts to harmonize European accounting 
standards, the preference for national options was defended very strongly by national 
regulators and acknowledged by the EC, whose first strategic choice had been mutual 
recognition with the US. This was not the case anymore. In line with proposition (5), 
it was agured that the structure of the international and European economic system 
had changed: “Member States’ securities markets are in a period of dramatic change 
and increasing consolidation, driven by new technologies, globalization and the effect 
of the Euro” (COM 2000, 3). In this context, national options could not be tolerated 
anymore:
Adaptation of financial statements to take account o f local legal and tax conventions 
was justifiable when investors and other stakeholders were generally o f the same 
nationality as the company. But today the securities o f any one company tend to 
increasingly be held by an internationally diverse group of investors. The interests of 
investors from another Member State are not served by having to interpret, or 
decipher, financial statements prepared in accordance with the local conventions of 
the country where the company is incorporated.
(COM 2000, 10)
In addition, technological change was transforming accounting itself:
“The rapid development o f information and communication technologies and, in 
particular, electronic trading platforms, are changing how transactions take place and 
the way financial information is disseminated. Financial reporting itself is also 
changing”.
(COM 2000,3)
In line with proposition (4), EC’s rhetoric suggested that the situation could no longer 
be dealt within the context of existing regulatory frameworks, which fostered
179
diversity; the existing accounting framework was simply not good enough for a 
global marketplace:
Our existing directives do not meet the needs of companies that wish to raise capital on 
pan-European or international securities markets. This is because transparency, 
comparable financial reporting and more demanding disclosure requirements for listed 
companies are being sought by both investors and supervisors.
(COM 2000, 9)
In view of this situation, the Commission argued that the currect regulatory 
framework needed to be changed in order to catch up with global developments. First, 
traditional, national regulatory mechanisms needed to be replaced by an 
internationally recognized financial reporting framework:
Standard setting itself is evolving rapidly. There is a strong pressure towards the 
convergence of accounting standards, raising the importance of international standard 
setting and thereby encouraging national standard setters to cooperate more closely.
(COM 2000, 5)
This framework should also be more efficient in providing the relevant information 
to the international business community:
With the accelerating pace of business the need for a more dynamic and responsive 
legislative framework for financial reporting increases. The Union’s lengthy 
legislative processes need close examination to ensure they meet the challenges of 
the market. Ways to move from the rigid, sometimes overly-prescriptive nature of 
EU directives to a more efficient and responsive system for financial reporting best 
suited to the needs of the securities markets have to be considered.
(COM 2000,12)
There were only two available options: the IASs and the US GAAP. The IASC met 
both challenges and it did so better that the US GAAP. First, it was an internationally 
recognized set of high quality accounting standards, particularly suited to the needs of 
international companies and investors:
Already IAS provides a comprehensive and conceptually robust set of standards for 
financial reporting that should serve the needs of the international business community. 
IAS also has the distinct advantage of being drawn up with an international 
perspective, rather than being tailored to the US environment. US GAAP on the other 
hand, is voluminous and is based on very detailed rules and interpretations. 
Considarable education and training is necessary in order to use its standards.
(COM 2000,15)
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Moreover, the IASC provided a more efficient regulatory forum, one ideal for the 
purposes sought by the European Commission:
Recently, major developments have also taken place within the IASC itself Its new 
organisational structure should become effective next year driven by a clear 
determination to make IAS the highest quality, comprehensive accounting standards 
for use in capital markets throughout the world.
(COM 2000, 6).
A similar line of reasoning was followed by the SEC, although the 2005 roadmap 
agreement is in no way as consequential for the domestic capital market participants 
as the 2000 reporting strategy is for Europe. In 2004, in a speech at IOSCO, SEC 
Chairman William Donaldson talked at length about the dramatic changes taking 
place in today’s global economy which have resulted in an increasing integration of 
financial markets and the gradual development of a global “shareholder society” 
(Donaldson 2004). Similar remarks about the tremendous changes taking place 
around the world and the emergence of a new global marketplace with new regulatory 
needs were made at various occasions by SEC Commissioners and other SEC 
officials following the Norwalk agreement (e.g. Herdman 2002; Campos 2004; 
Nicolaisen 2004, 2005). According to the SEC Chairman, high standards are vital for 
this new global world market, and the essential method of building support for high 
standards, is cross-border cooperation:
cooperation, for instance, is vital to the important project on converging our 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles with the IASB's International Financial 
Reporting Standards. The ongoing convergence project holds out tremendous 
potential for investors and companies seeking to allocate or raise capital on a global 
basis.
(Donaldson 2004)
For the first time SEC officials acknowledged the quality o f the IASs. In setting out 
his proposed “roadmap” for the elimination of the reconciliation requirement in April 
2005, the SEC’s Chief Accountant expressed his belief that “the IASB has 
demonstrated an ability to set high quality standards that provide needed and useful 
information to investors” (Nicolaisen 2005). IASB standards’ quality was now 
considered high enough to allow both the SEC Commissioner and the SEC’s Chief 
Accountant to talk about how the convergence-process is a “two-way street” and
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improvements can be made by both sides through their cooperation (Donaldson 2004; 
Nicolaisen 2004, 2005). The FASB could actually learn on occasion from the IASB. 
The US investors were not endangered anymore by the possibility of using IFRSs in 
US capital markets but could actually benefit from it: “the inclusion in SEC filings of 
financial statements prepared under IFRSs should significantly benefit U.S. investors 
and others who rely on such financial information” (Nicolaisen 2005).
5.5 Summary and conclusions
Proposition (1), suggested that transnational regulatory authority could be used in the 
context of a redistributive regulatory strategy devised by national regulators, in order 
to transfer wealth from foreign constituencies to specific domestic interest 
constituencies. As we saw in this chapter, the IASB’s transnational regulatory 
authority is the result o f the interplay of two such international redistributive 
regulatory strategies by two of the dominant global financial players.
Both the SEC and the EC faced internal regulatory pressures vis a vis the issue 
of accounting harmonization. In the United States, there was a conflict of interests 
between those domestic constituencies that were in favour of abolishing the 
reconciliation requirement for foreign issuers (mainly stock exchanges), and those 
which opposed such a move (mostly US issuers but also the bureaucratic 
establishment built around the SEC itself). The situation was quite difficult for the 
SEC because the opposing interests were both well-organized and powerful. In line 
with both proposition (1) and condition (la), the SEC sought to satisfy the demands 
of both these constituencies through a process of international harmonization based 
on US GAAP which would facilitate access to US capital markets while burdening 
with the costs of adjustment foreign issuers, investors and regulators. Following its 
failure to attain a satisfactory international agreement, the SEC, along the lines of 
propositions (3a) and (3b), sought to use the IASC in the context of a forum-shifting 
strategy by promising the endorsement of IASs without reconciliation, should the 
IASs be reviewed in a manner satisfactory to the SEC. Moreover, the ambivalent and 
contradictory attitude of the SEC towards the IASC in the context of their 
cooperation, has shown that the SEC tried to bring about a de facto globalization of 
US GAAP, by delaying the progress of the IASs. In this way, all domestic interest
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constituencies could be satisfied and the SEC and its regulatory establishment retain 
and even increase their standing. As suggested by condition (lb), the SEC sought to 
effect its strategy through the means of an institutional mechanism that could provide 
it with a measure of control over the regulatory outcome. IOSCO proved to be an 
ideal setting because on the one hand it allowed the SEC, through its leadership in 
IOSCO, to control IASC’s work effectively, while on the other hand the attraction of 
IOSCO’s endorsement forced the IASC to follow its lead.
On the other hand, the European Commission managed to overcome the 
conflicts among different accounting traditions at the European level through the 
mutual recognition policy, but this policy did not help, and actually inhibited progress 
at the international level. Faced with the completion of the internal market and the 
creation of the Eurozone, significant changes in technology which changed the mode 
of operation of financial markets, and an increasingly globalizing economy, European 
“global issuers”(both public and private), needed access to international, and 
particularly American, capital markets. However, the SEC’s resistance to a mutually 
agreed harmonization of accounting standards could not be overcome; the absence of 
a European accounting model, and the acceptance of US GAAP in most European 
jurisdictions left the Commission in an inferior negotiating position. As per 
proposition (3b) therefore, the EC decided to use the IASC/IASB in the context of a 
forum-shifting strategy. This strategy was developed and employed gradually, first 
through an increasing engangement with the work of the IASC, and then with the 
1995 strategy which allowed the voluntary use of IASs for consolidated accounts of 
listed companies. As per proposition (la), this solution was designed in order to 
address the concerns of the major European issuers. At the same time, it did not 
distrurb the accounting framework applicable to the vast majority o f European 
companies not listed in capital markets, and avoided creating problems for taxation. 
The choice o f the IASC was made because of its prestigious global profile in 
accounting standard setting, recognized by IOSCO’s decision to proceed to an 
agreement with the IASC for the preparation of an international set of standards for 
use in international capital markets. Still, this strategy was based on the assumption of 
the acceptance by the SEC of the set o f core standards. When it became obvious that
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the SEC was not willing to endorse without a reconciliation requirement the core 
standards, the EC took its strategy to the next level by proposing the replacement of 
national accounting standards with the IASs for the consolidated accounts of listed 
companies. By legally adopting the IASs the EC changed the reversion point, while it 
saved face vis a vis its domestic regulatory clientele and the European political 
establishment. The IASs were internationally acknowledged, high quality standards 
developed by experts. They did not allow many options, and were up-to-date, in some 
areas even ahead of the US accounting standards. Moreover, by being legally 
endorsed, the IFRSs were now a set of standards enforced and implemented 
rigorously across the EU, a criterion that the SEC had set unilaterally in anticipation 
o f the completion of the IASC-IOSCO core standards. Finally, in line with condition 
(lb), the EC sought to embed its engagement with the IASB in an institutional 
mechanism, which would provide some degree of control over the produced 
standards. As we saw, the endorsement mechanism has already been used in this way. 
The EC’s strategy proved successful as it resulted in the immediate engagement of 
the SEC and the FASB with the IASB to produce a set o f standards that could be 
acceptable in US capital markets without reconciliation by 2009. However, while 
forced to acknowledge the new status quo, the FASB and the SEC moved fast and 
through their already established influence in the IASB process have able to control 
the agenda of the organization in a way favourable to their own view o f accounting.
Finally, in accordance with propositions (4) and (5), the EC justified its new 
financial reporting strategy by putting forward an argument based on swiping 
technological changes, globalization and the European integration process, which 
created a new pressing need for increased comparability and flexibility of financial 
information. This need could no longer be provided by the traditional European 
regulatory mechanisms. A more efficient and internationally acknowledged set of 
standards suitable for the needs of a globalizing economy was required and the best 
available was the IASs/IFRSs. Following the Norwalk agreement and the SEC’s 
decision to accept the IFRSs in US capital markets without reconciliation by 2009, a 
similar rhetoric was adopted by the SEC.
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Chapter 6
Transnational Regulatory Authority in Practice (2): The 
International Conference on Harmonization of Technical 
Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceutical Products
6.1 Introduction
The second case study of this thesis examines the International Conference on 
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration of Pharmaceutical 
Products (ICH). ICH is a transnational body comprising government and private 
sector actors. Its objective is to harmonize the technical requirements for the approval 
and market authorization of new medicines. In this first chapter, we shall introduce 
the concepts and issues related to the procedures for introducing a new drug for 
human use in the pharmaceutical market. Next, as was the case with the IASB, we 
shall examine the problems arising from the differences of the various national 
registration procedures and the principal efforts that have been made in international 
fora to address these problems, including a brief history and overview of the ICH and 
its work. We will then proceed to establish, using the three criteria outlined in the 
theoretical framework, the transnational regulatory authority of the ICH.
6.2 The causes and consequences of international drug registration regulations
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most heavily regulated industries (McIntyre 
1999). A new medicine for human use enters the market after a long cycle of research 
and development (R&D) which, including the marketing authorization procedures, 
lasts approximately thirteen years (EFPIA 2006)143. A large part of this long R&D 
process is devoted to an array of regulatory requirements regarding the safety, quality 
and efficacy of the new drug. This regulatory burden is one o f the most important 
factors in the operation of a research-based pharmaceutical company144. The cause for
143 EFPIA is the European Federation o f Pharmaceutical Industries’ Associations.
144 Not all pharmaceutical companies conduct original research and discover new drugs; many firms 
for example belong to the generics industry. Generics are usually produced by a manufacturer who is 
not the inventor o f the original product and are marketed when intellectual property protection rights of 
the original product are exhausted (EFPIA 2006).
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this heavy regulatory intervention is primarily the need to protect public health, which 
due to considerable negative externalities (e.g. time lag which can lead to loss of 
human life before a bad drug is identified by the market or lack of drugs for rare 
diseases) cannot be safeguarded by market mechanisms alone.
The pervasive regulatory intervention in the research and development 
process of a new drug has emerged mainly as a result of public health crises due to 
unsafe drugs, which spurred governments to prevent their reoccurrence through pre­
marketing regulation. The first regulatory measures responding to such crises 
occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Jordan 1992; Schweitzer 1997). 
Nonetheless, undoubtedly the most significant crisis for today’s pre-marketing 
regulatory landscape has been the 1961-1962 Thalidomide incident. Thalidomide was 
a drug used to treat nausea during pregnancy. Its use resulted in at least 8,000 
deformed children being bom in 46 countries, with an equal number estimated to 
have died at birth (McIntyre 1999). The most consequential regulatory response to the 
crisis came from the United States in the form of the 1962 Harris-Kefauver 
Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act in force since 1938. The drug was 
never approved in the US but a company had distributed 2.5 million tablets to doctors 
for a test run. The 1938 Act did not require approval before clinical trials. The 
Amendments introduced the need for an Investigational New Drug (IND) application 
which requires approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before 
proceeding to clinical trials. In order to apply for an IND the manufacturer has to 
check for toxicity and pharmacological activity first in the laboratory and then in 
animals. Moreover, the Amendments extended previous controls by the FDA to 
clinical trials and to the development process and required manufacturers to show that 
their drugs are not only safe but also effective. Following approval of the IND the 
clinical trials, which are conducted in three phases, can begin. The first phase is 
concerned mostly with toxicity and tolerable dosage in humans; the second phase 
aims to establish the first evidence of efficacy while continuing to look at the safety 
of the drug; in the third phase the efficacy claims of the manufacturer have to be 
established while also looking for adverse and long-term effects (Getzen 1997). The 
Amendments also required pharmaceutical firms to comply with “good
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manufacturing and laboratory practices” as defined by the FDA, and gave the FDA 
the authority to inspect plants in order to confirm this compliance. Finally, the new 
legislation extended these requirements to “generic” and “me-too” drugs145. These 
requirements remain the fundamental regulatory framework o f the United States until 
today.
Regulation in Europe and Japan was encouraged and heavily influenced by 
the basic framework of the US regulation (McIntyre 1999; Braithwaite and Drahos 
2000; Ess et al. 2003). In the UK, the 1968 Medicines Act made statutory the 
voluntary arrangements that were adopted in the early 1960s following the 
thalidomide crisis. The Act created the Medicines Committee on Safety of Medicines 
and the Committee on the Review of Medicines. The Act also introduced an efficacy 
requirement which was implemented in 1971. Currently, all medicinal products are 
subject to a registration procedure under the authority o f the Medicines Control 
Agency (MCA) and require similar data as those described for the US. In Germany, 
the 1976 Medicines Reform Act brought similar controls in the drug registration 
process while in Japan, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) 
supervises approval and registration procedures very similar to that o f the US and the 
UK, with the Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Agency (PDMA) being in charge 
of the drug approval process. At the European level, the first pharmaceuticals 
directive adopted in January 1965146, identified the criteria of safety, efficacy and 
quality as pre-conditions for marketing authorizations, and introduced some of the 
requirements needed to ensure the appropriate evaluation of these criteria. More 
specific requirements for scientific and technical data and procedures were introduced 
in subsequent legislation147. The new European Medicines Agency (EMEA), 
responsible for evaluating and recommending market authorizations to the European 
Commission, also makes use of a long list of technical and scientific requirements for 
the examination of a new medicine application, enshrined in EU legislation148.
145 The term ‘me-too’ “historically has most often referred to a new drug entity with a similar chemical 
structure or the same mechanism o f action as that o f a drug already on the market” (Di Masi and 
Paquette 2004, p. 2).
146 Directive 65/65/EEC.
147 Directives 75/318/EEC, 75/319/EEC and subsequent amendments.
148 Directive 2001/83/EC, 6 November 2001.
187
The introduction of new regulatory measures in the US and other countries 
following the Thalidomide crisis created for the first time a nexus of different 
national regulations for producing and marketing a new medicine. This array of 
regulatory measures has increased significantly in recent decades (Schweitzer 1997; 
McIntyre 1999) and has resulted in a multitude of different national regulations 
dictating the specific safety, quality and efficacy characteristics of new drugs that 
each national regulator deems necessary. This diversity creates significant problems 
for the industry. National variations in these strict and lengthy testing requirements 
force companies to duplicate tests they have already conducted in one jurisdiction to 
gain access to another. Often tests conducted in one country are not accepted in 
another, although they do not present any problems from a scientific point of view. 
Several countries for example have had regulations stipulating that certain tests 
should be conducted in their own soil using patients or volunteers from their own 
population (Wall 1984; Jack 2005). The need to comply with many different national 
standards prolongs the R&D process, thus increasing its costs and reducing the 
effective patent period, making investment in R&D economically less attractive149. 
According to the European Commission (1991), eliminating double testing would 
reduce tests by 30%, while limiting the repeated dose toxicity studies to six rather 
than 12 months would result in substantial savings per new substance and spare the 
lives of thousands of laboratory animals. Moreover, diversity of regulatory 
requirements increases significantly the funds needed to achieve compliance with 
them, leaving less funds available for investment in research (Wall 1984). The 
resources needed to satisfy regulatory requirements can reach as much as 60% of the 
R&D budget (Abrahams 1991).
Another significant consequence of diverse regulatory requirements is the 
phenomenon of “drug lag”. Drug lag is the additional time it takes for a country to
149 Patent protection is a crucial factor for the research-based pharmaceutical industry. The discoveries 
made during the R&D process have to be legally protected in order to ensure that the industry 
continues to invest in R&D. Under the WTO TRIPS agreement patent protection is granted for a 
period of 20 years. Firms however usually seek patent protection when a new chemical compound has 
been identified; between that time and the introduction o f a new drug to the market, intervenes a period 
of several years devoted to further research and development needed to transform the compound into a 
drug and to satisfy all the pre-clinical and clinical testing required to ensure the safety and efficacy of  
the new rug. As a result, the effective life o f a patent is usually much shorter than 20 years.
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approve a drug relative to another country, or its failure to ever approve a drug 
approved in another country (Schweitzer 1997). The issue was first raised in the 
United States by Wardell (1973; 1978) who compared approvals of new drugs in the 
US and the UK between 1960 and 1976, and concluded that US approvals lagged 
behind those in the UK and that the situation had become worse in the latter period. 
Other studies (Grabowski and Vernon 1977; Grabowski 1980) verified this drug lag 
in the United States. Moreover, more recent studies (Andersson 1992; Schweitzer 
1997) have shown that drug lags exist in all countries, although variations exist 
depending on the exact nature of the regulatory framework o f each country. The 
phenomenon of drug lag has important implications for public health because it 
means that new and potentially life-saving drugs are being introduced late in the 
market and some times perhaps not introduced at all (Katz 1993). Indeed, it is not 
unusual for patients to travel abroad to obtain these drugs or even smuggle them 
illegally (Jordan 1992). Of course, in these cases, patients acquire the drugs without 
adequate physician guidance, and often from countries with inadequate safety 
standards, risking side-effects or other complications. The problem of drug lag is 
particularly acute for people suffering from terminal and life-threatening diseases 
who do not have the luxury to wait for the entire drug approval process to be 
completed before they can have access to new, potentially life-saving drugs for their 
condition. The problem became particularly acute in the United States with AIDS 
patients, who in the 1980s conducted a concerted campaign to secure accelerated 
access to experimental drugs. In order to accommodate the particular medicinal needs 
of such patients, the FDA has made it possible to approve the use of drugs even 
before all phases o f the clinical trials are completed. Recently the EU adopted similar 
legislation.
Apart from the potentially negative effects on innovation and the availability 
and quality of drugs, complicated and diverse national authorization regulations also 
affect public health by indirectly affecting the structure of the industry. At the 
domestic level Grabowski (1976) and Grabowski and Vernon (1977) have shown that 
innovation in the US following the 1962 regulation not only declined but also became 
concentrated in fewer firms. At the international level, increased R&D costs and
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competitive pressures have led to a wave of M&A activity since the late 1980s which 
has led to higher concentration of the global pharmaceutical market, with the top ten 
firms now accounting for almost half of the world market (ABPI 2004)150. By 
increasing the cost of R&D and reducing the effective patent period, the diversity of 
national approval regulations reinforces the trend towards bigger and more 
international companies, as these alone are able to bear the costs of developing new 
drugs and launching them in multiple markets. A more concentrated market may lead 
to higher prices and less innovation as the top firms focus on more lucrative 
therapeutic markets with higher profit margins (Sarett 1974; Wall 1984). This leads to 
whole categories of diseases being neglected, leaving parts o f the population in 
developed countries and entire populations in developing countries without adequate 
medicinal coverage, creating the phenomenon of “orphan drugs”.
Finally, regulatory diversity entails significant costs not only for companies 
and patients but for state agencies as well. Having a national regulatory agency 
requires significant resources. As Vogel (1998) reports, in 1993, before the creation 
of EMEA, EC’s twelve members employed between 2,000 and 2,500 full-time drug 
evaluation staff, in addition to approximately 1,000 expert consultants, at an annual 
cost of approximately $300 million. This cost is borne by consumers through taxation 
and to some degree by the industry which pays licensing and registration fees. Apart 
from the obvious inefficiency in the use of public resources, the result has been to 
raise further the cost for companies, which have often avoided some smaller markets 
altogether (Orzack et al. 1992). Moreover, the higher prices that may result from 
increased R&D costs and reduced effective patent lives lead to increased costs for 
national welfare and health care budgets, as in most countries, at least a part of 
pharmaceutical expenses is covered by the national health care system.
6.3 Early international harmonization efforts
Given the costs of national regulatory diversity and the consequent implications for 
public health it is not surprising that there have been various efforts at harmonizing 
pharmaceutical regulations and particularly drug approval regulations. The first
150 ABPI is the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industries.
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international efforts at harmonization of pharmaceutical regulations took place in the 
context of the World Health Organization (WHO), a United Nations specialized 
agency set up in 1948 to address health issues. Within its broad mandate, the WHO 
has the institutional competence to deal with pharmaceutical issues and to “develop, 
establish and promote international standards with respect to food, biological, 
pharmaceutical and similar products”151. The rapid expansion of the industry in the 
post-war period and the resulting availability of a significant number o f new 
medicines, coupled with the growing medicinal needs o f an increasing number of 
developing countries following the decolonization process, led to an increasing 
interest in the international regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, particularly 
through the WHO apparatus (Cone 1983). Early proposals tended to emphasize the 
need for developing national laboratories to control pharmaceutical products. 
However, the lack of financial and technical resources in developing countries soon 
made the practical impossibility of implementing such measures apparent, and 
showed that international cooperation or regulation was a more promising avenue for 
action (Cone 1983). In 1975 the first concrete results occurred in the form of the 
“Certification Scheme on the Quality of Pharmaceutical products Moving in 
International Commerce” and the “Good Practices in the Manufacture and Quality 
Control of Drugs Act”. The Certification Scheme aimed at preventing the dumping of 
banned or flawed products in developing countries. This was achieved through a 
Certificate from the exporting country, at the request of the importing country, 
assuring that the medicines under consideration had been granted authorization for 
domestic sale in the exporting country and that they were manufactured in plants 
subject to regular inspections and in conformity with the WHO Good Manufacturing 
Practices Act.
The same year the World Health Assembly (WHO’s ruling body) requested 
the WHO to develop means of assisting Member States in formulating and 
implementing national drug policies for the selection of essential drugs, the 
appropriate procurement of quality drugs based on health needs, and the provision of 
education and training. In 1977 the WHO issued the first list o f essential drugs
151 WHO Constitution article 2 (u).
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(EDL), and in 1981, following intense lobbying from consumer groups (Chetley 
1990; Abel-Smith 1994), formally established the Action Programme on Essential 
Drugs (APED). This more comprehensive approach to drugs’ issues has become the 
dominant WHO strategy since the early 1980s, resulting in projects like the 
Guidelines for developing national drug policies. More specific proposals for an 
explicit system of international registration of drugs by an international inter­
governmental evaluation agency were made in WHO meetings but never progressed 
(Cone 1983). Since the late 1980s the WHO’s role in this issue area has diminished 
significantly, and international harmonization of technical requirements for the 
registration of pharmaceuticals has taken place in the context of the ICH. The WHO’s 
work in the area o f medicines today focuses on expanding access to essential 
medicines, particularly for low-income and disadvantaged populations and for the 
priority diseases o f HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. In this context, the WHO provides 
expertise and technical assistance through various activities such as a system for 
regular exchange o f information between Member States on the safety and efficacy of 
pharmaceutical products, or the Prequalification Programme set up in 2001, aiming to 
facilitate access to medicines that meet unified standards of quality, safety and 
efficacy for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis152 .
6.4 International Conference on Harmonization
In the late 1980s the dominant forum for the harmonization of drug approval 
procedures became the ICH. The ICH comprises the pharmaceutical regulatory 
authorities of the EU, US and Japan: the EC, the FDA and the Japanese ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare (MLHW), and the respective industry associations: the 
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries’ Association (EFPIA), the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) and the Japan 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (JPMA). The WHO, EFTA and Canada 
have observer status. The idea for the ICH originated in a 1988 meeting between 
Japan and the EU aiming to discuss ways to resolve differences in safety and efficacy 
requirements (Kidd 1997, p. 185). This was one in a series of bilateral meetings on
152 See the WHO website, http://www.who.int/medicines/en/. accessed 16,01, 2007.
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harmonization between Europe, US and Japan that took place in the 1980s 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Abraham and Reed 2001). At the WHO International 
Conference of Drug Regulatory Authorities (ICDRA) in Paris in 1989, specific plans 
for action were decided, and soon afterwards the regulatory authorities proposed to 
the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) 
a joint harmonization initiative153. At a 1990 meeting hosted by EFPIA, the ICH 
started taking shape as plans for the first Conference were made, and the ICH 
Steering Committee (SC) was established. At the first SC meeting the terms of 
reference were agreed, and it was decided that the topics selected for harmonization 
would be divided into Safety, Quality and Efficacy to reflect the three criteria needed 
for approval and market authorization for new drugs154. It was also agreed that six- 
party Expert Working Groups (EWGs) should be established to discuss the scientific 
and technical aspects of harmonization topics155. The first ICH conference was held 
in Brussels in 1991 and over 1,000 participants attended. At this conference the first 
concrete harmonization results occurred, such as a “minimum data blueprint” 
guideline which defined control conditions for testing, a reduction of long-term 
toxicity tests to six months, and the abolition of the “Lethal Dose 50” toxicity test156 
(D’Arcy and Harron 1992). Perhaps the most important accomplishment of the 
meeting however, was the public demonstration from the three regulatory authorities 
that they were committed to the principle of harmonization and that this was just the 
beginning of an ongoing process (Jordan 1992). ICH2 took place in October 1993 in 
Orlando, Florida, with over 1,600 attendants. Progress was again made in the area of 
safety, and agreement was reached for issuing draft guidelines covering various 
aspects of Good Clinical Practices (D’Arcy and Harron 1994). In November 1995 a 
third conference attended by 2,400 delegates took place in Japan, where once again 
significant progress was made (Vogel 1998). The success o f the conferences turned 
the ICH into a continuing harmonization process despite the fact that it was originally 
designed to be a six-year project (D’Arcy and Harron 1992, 1994; Vogel 1998). The
153 See the ICH website, http://www.ich.org/cache/html/355-272-1 .html. accessed 17/01/2007.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 This was a very costly and ethically questionable toxicity test as it entailed increasing doses to 
laboratory animals until 50% of the animals died.
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process has therefore continued to work and further conferences were held in Brussels 
in 1997, in San Diego in 2000 and in Osaka in 2003. The ICH has been very
1 r< 7
productive and by the end of 2006 it had completed over 50 guidelines, while a 
number of new guidelines are at a development stage. A particularly important 
achievement of the ICH process has been the Common Technical Document (CDT) 
which provides a harmonized structure and format for new product applications. In 
2000, during the San Diego conference, the Steering Committee issued a statement 
about the future o f the ICH:
the ICH Steering Committee and other interested parties have agreed to continue in 
their commitment to pursue future harmonization activities. ICH has been successful 
in achieving harmonization, initially o f technical guidelines and more recently on the 
format and content o f registration applications. All parties agree that there is a need 
to maintain this harmonization.
(ICH Steering Committee 2000)158
6.5 ICH as a forum of transnational regulatory authority
As was the case with the IASB, the first step in the analysis of ICH is to show that the 
ICH and the guidelines that it produces are indeed instances of transnational 
regulatory authority. For this purpose we shall use the three criteria outlined in 
chapter 3.
6.5.1 The decision-making power of non-state actors
“ICH is a joint initiative involving both regulators and industry as equal partners in 
the scientific and technical discussions of the testing procedures which are required to 
ensure and assess the safety, quality and efficacy of medicines”159. This statement, 
taken from ICH’s own website, clearly demonstrates the relationship between state 
and non-state actors in the context of the ICH process: regulators (state authorities), 
view the industry (non-state participants), as partners with equal rights in the decision 
making process governing the procedures for the registration o f medicines for human
157 Available from the ICH website, http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-l.html. accessed 
18/01/2007.
158 “Statement by the ICH Steering Committee on the Occasion of the Fifth International Conference 
on Harmonisation”, 9-11 November 2000, San Diego, available from the ICH website, 
http://www.ich.org/cache/html/355-272-1 .html. accessed 18/01/2007.
159 Available from the ICH website, http://www.ich.Org/cache/html/510-272-1 .html. accessed 
17/01/2007.
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use. The validity of this statement is confirmed by an examination of ICH’s structure 
and mode of operation. The ICH comprises six parties, which were also its founding 
members: the three regulatory authorities and the three industry associations (national 
or regional) from the EU, Japan and the US respectively. This composition is 
reflected in the ICH Steering Committee, which is the organ that determines the 
policies and procedures o f the ICH, selects topics for harmonization and monitors the 
progress of harmonization initiatives160. Each of the six parties holds two seats on the 
SC and their votes carry equal weight. The IFPMA which provides the Secretariat, 
also participates as a non-voting member as do the ICH Observers (WHO, Canada 
and EFTA).
The procedure towards adopting a new guideline involves five steps. The first 
step begins with the adoption of a Concept Paper for a new topic by the SC. The 
Concept Paper may be submitted by any one of the six SC members. A new or 
extended Expert Working Group comprising experts from the six parties is 
established and a Rapporteur prepares an initial draft of the guideline, based on the 
objectives of the Concept Paper and in consultation with the EWG. When, usually 
after a number of revisions of the draft guideline, the EWG reaches a consensus 
among all six parties, it signs the Experts Document which is submitted to the SC to 
request adoption under step 2 of the ICH process. Step 2 is reached when the SC 
agrees, based on the report o f the EWG, that there is sufficient scientific consensus 
for the draft guideline to proceed to the next stage of regulatory consultation. All six 
parties need to give their consent for this decision (Step 2 adoption). In the third step 
the draft guideline becomes the subject of the normal regulatory consultation 
procedure of each of the three regulatory jurisdictions. After obtaining all 
consultation results, the original EWG is resumed, comprising representatives from 
the six parties and often from the Observers. If the previous Rapporteur came from 
the industry a new regulatory Rapporteur takes over, and the consultation process 
with the EWG resumes, resulting once consensus is reached, in what is called the step 
4 Experts Document. Step 4 is reached when the SC members agree, based on the 
report of the Rapporteur, that there is sufficient scientific consensus in the EWG; its
160 Ibid.
195
endorsement is based on the signature of the three regulators, who affirm that the 
Guideline is recommended for adoption by the regulatory bodies of the three 
states/region. In the event that one or more parties from the industry have strong 
objections to the adoption of the guideline, the regulatory parties may agree that 
further consultation is needed and the EWG discussion may be resumed. The Step 4 
Final Document is signed off by the SC regulatory parties as an ICH Harmonized 
Tripartite Guideline. The final step is regulatory implementation. This is carried out 
according to the national/regional procedures that apply to other regulatory guidelines 
and requirements in the three states/region161. Information on this regulatory action 
and the implementation dates are reported back to the SC and published on the ICH 
website.
As is evident from the above description, the first criterion of transnational 
regulatory authority is fully satisfied. First, the institutionally defined and 
acknowledged decision-making power of the non-state participants materializes in the 
distribution and weighting of votes in the SC, the decision-making organ o f the ICH; 
in the SC both state and non-state participants share an equal number o f votes with 
equal weight. This is particularly important because, while industry representatives 
also participate in equal terms in the EWGs, it is voting in the SC which is required 
for the adoption of any new guideline (Step 2 adoption). It is thus evident that non­
states actors participate equally in the decision-making process over the substantive 
content o f new rules, that is, the ICH guidelines. This institutional role is reinforced 
by the mode of operation o f the organization, which requires consensus throughout 
the process of developing a new guideline, both in the EWGs and in the SC. Indeed, 
during both step 1 and step 3, if consensus among the EWG has not been reached, the 
SC does not proceed to the next step but may allow for an extension of the 
discussions in the EWG (provided there are assurances that consensus may be 
reached within a short time); alternatively it suspends or abandons the harmonization 
project, either entirely or in its current form and restarts the procedure from step 1 
(this last option only in case of failure to agree during step 3)162. It is also worth
161 See the ICH website, http://www.ich.org/cache/html/2830-272-l.html. accessed 17/01/2007.
162 Ibid.
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noting that the same procedure is required for any revision of an existing guideline163, 
and that when update of an existing guideline is required, the approval o f the SC, by 
consensus, is again required164.
6.5.2 The legal Status of the ICH Guidelines
The product of the ICH harmonization process are guidelines “aimed at eliminating 
duplication in the development and registration process so that a single set o f studies 
can be generated to demonstrate the quality, safety and efficacy of a new medicinal 
product”165. In accordance with this goal, the guidelines fall into four topics; the first 
three follow the legal requirements for the registration of new medicinal products in 
the ICH region, that is, safety, quality and efficacy, while a fourth topic has been 
added for multidisciplinary issues that do not fit exclusively into one of the other 
categories. These guidelines “represent agreed-upon scientific guidance for meeting 
technical requirements for registration”166. Each of the regulatory authorities 
implements the guidelines according to the national or regional procedures that apply 
for other similar regulatory guidelines. The exact legal nature of the guidelines, 
therefore, depends on the legal and regulatory framework of each region and/or state.
6.5.2.I  The Legal status o f  the ICH guidelines in the European Union
In Europe, the guidelines are submitted for endorsement to the Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) once they have reached Step 2 of the 
ICH process167. The CHMP decides on the duration of the consultation period and the 
EMEA distributes the guidelines for comments. Following their endorsement at step 4 
by the CHMP, the guidelines are published by the European Commission in Volume 
III o f the Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Union. “Once adopted 
by the CHMP, ICH guidelines have the same status as other European scientific
163 See the ICH website, http://www.ich.org/cache/html/2832-272-1 .html. accessed 20/01/2007.
164 See the ICH website, http://www.ich.org/cache/html/2833-272-l.html. accessed 20/01/2007.
165 Available from the ICH website, http://www.ich.org/cache/html/2834-272-l.html. accessed 
17/01/2007.
166 Ibid.
167 The CHMP replaced the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP) in 2004. Much like 
the CPMP it comprises members from the regulatory authorities of the member states. The CHMP is 
the technical body responsible for evaluating new drug applications under EMEA’s marketing 
authorization procedure.
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guidelines and replace existing guidelines on the subjects covered” (EMEA 2005,
168 • •p.8) . The Scientific Guidelines contained in Volume III, are part o f a series of
guidelines that support the basic legislation for pharmaceuticals and are published in 
different volumes of the Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Union 
(EMEA 2005). Under European law:
a guideline is a Community document, which is either referred to in the legislative 
framework as intended to fulfil a legal obligation laid down in the Community 
pharmaceutical legislation or considered to provide advice ... on the best or most 
appropriate way to fulfil an obligation laid down in the community pharmaceutical 
legislation.
(EMEA 2005, p.3)
The legal status o f different guidelines may vary, but generally “guidelines do not 
have legal force and the definitive legal requirements are those outlined in the 
relevant Community legislative framework (Directives, Regulations, Decisions, etc.) 
as well as appropriate national rules. However, guidelines are to be considered as a 
harmonised Community position” (EMEA 2005, p.3).
From the above, it becomes evident that the legal status of the guidelines is 
somewhat unclear: on the one hand it is explicitly stated that guidelines have no legal 
force in terms of constituting legal requirements; on the other hand however, they 
clearly constitute part of European regulation and are therefore included in the 
European medicines rulebook. Moreover, as stated above, they are often referred to in 
legislation with the intent that these guidelines fulfil the legal obligations laid down in 
such legislation. Indeed, for the Scientific Guidelines, it is expressly stated in Annex I 
of Directive 2001/83/EC, which outlines all the technical requirements for 
registration of new medicinal products for human use, that “in assembling the dossier 
for application for marketing authorization, applicants shall take into account the 
Community guidelines relating to the quality, safety and efficacy o f medicinal 
products published by the Commission”169. Directive 2005/28/EC on Clinical Trials, 
states in even stronger terms that “it is necessary that sponsors, investigators and 
other participants take into account the scientific guidelines relating to the quality,
168 “Procedure for European Union Guidelines and Related Documents within the Pharmaceutical 
Legislative Framework”, EMEA 2005.
169 Directive 2001/83/EC, Official Journal o f the European Union, Annex I, Introduction, L.311/101.
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safety and efficacy of medicinal products for human use, as agreed upon by the 
CHMP and published by the Agency”170. Moreover, according to EMEA, when 
applicants cannot comply with the requirements of a new guideline within the given 
timeframe, they have to justify their departure from the guideline: “the applicant's 
justification will then be considered on a case-by-case basis by the relevant competent 
regulatory authorities” (EMEA 2005, p. 12). This means that while applicants are not 
legally obliged to follow the guidelines, they are legally obliged to take them into 
account to such a degree that deviations from the guidelines have to be justified to the 
regulatory authorities which will evaluate them. So in practical terms the guidelines 
do confer obligations on the applicants.
In addition, several ICH guidelines, have assumed a formal legal binding 
status, for instance the MedDRA, the Medical Dictionary for Regulatory Activities 
Terminology, an international medical dictionary for the various phases of drug 
development, developed by the ICH. The use of MedDRA is mandatory in the EU 
since January 2002 for single case reports of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) after 
market authorization, and since January 2003 for regulatory reporting o f all ADRs171. 
Moreover, the CDT, a uniform format of application for registration o f new drugs 
which achieved ICH step 4 approval in 2000, has also become mandatory for all 
applications of new medicinal products for human use with Directive 2003/63/EC. 
Finally, the ICH Good Clinical Practice guideline (E6), was agreed in 1996 and in 
1997 became mandatory in the EU for registration studies on unlicensed medicinal 
products. The more recent Directives on Clinical Trials 2001/20/EC and 2005/28/EC 
explicitly refer to this guideline and state that it should be taken into account when 
conducting clinical trials.
6.5.2.2 The legal status o f  the ICH guidelines in the United States
In the United States, the ICH guidelines are adopted as Guidance documents. Once 
step 2 has been reached, the FDA publishes a notice with the full text o f the guidance
170 Directive 2005/28/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L. 91/14, (9).
171 Volume 9 -  “Pharmacovigilance, Medicinal Products For Human Use And Veterinary Medicinal 
Products”, The Rules Governing Medicinal Products in the European Union, available from the EC 
website.http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pharmaceuticals/eudralex/vol-9/pdf7vol9 10-2004.pdf. accessed, 
22/01/2007.
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in the Federal Register with a date for receipt of written comment. Following step 4 
approval, the guidances are available for use on the date they are published on the 
Federal Register172. According to the FDA,
Guidance documents represent the Agency’s current thinking on a particular subject. 
These documents are prepared for FDA review staff and applicants/sponsors to 
provide guidelines to the processing, content, and evaluation/approval of applications 
and also to the design, production, manufacturing, and testing of regulated products. 
They also establish policies intended to achieve consistency in the Agency’s 
regulatory approach and establish inspection and enforcement procedures. Because 
guidances are not regulations or laws, they are not enforceable, either through 
administrative actions or through the courts173.
From the last statement in FDA’s comment, it seems that in the United States the ICH 
guidelines do not have formal legal status. However, things as was the case in the EU, 
are more complex than that. First, the characterization of the legal status of its own 
guidances by the FDA is not by itself adequate: “courts have held consistently that the 
label applied by an agency to a given rule is not dispositive of whether that rule is 
legislative ... or merely interpretive ..., accordingly, FDA’s characterization of ICH 
Guidelines is not dispositive of their legal status” (Booth 1997, pp. 241-215). 
Moreover, as was briefly mentioned previously, a guidance although entailing no 
formal legal obligations, may create obligations as a practical matter:
a court might conclude, therefore, that the Guidelines were legislative after all. This 
is particularly true with regards to applications for approval, especially when the 
affected parties reasonably believe that failure to comply will produce denial of an 
application. Because it would be reasonable to believe that failure to meet an ICH 
Guideline’s voluntary standard would result in failure to win approval for a new 
drug, it could be concluded that the ICH Guidelines are legislative rules subject to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.
(Booth 1997, p.52)
Such a view is reinforced when we take into account instances o f particularly strong 
FDA endorsement of ICH guidelines, as is the case with the use o f the CTD format 
which the FDA strongly recommends to potential applicants (Cone 2003)174, or the
172 See the ICH website, http://www.ich.org/cache/htmal/250-272-1 .html. accessed 22/01/2007.
173Available from the FDA website, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatorv/applications/ind page l.htm. 
accessed 22/01/2007.
174 “Summary Report, Sixth International Conference on Harmonisation, New Horizons and Future 
Challenges”, 13-15 November 2003, Osaka, Japan.
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design of the Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS), aiming to support FDA’s 
post-marketing safety surveillance program, according to the safety reporting 
guidance (ICH E2B) and its codification based on the MedDRA175. This also seems to 
apply to FDA employees who although not legally bound by the guidances, “may 
depart from guidance documents only with appropriate justification and supervisory 
concurrence”176. This binding nature of the guidelines, as an issue o f actual practice, 
is reinforced by the fact that the consultation process does not afford an adequate 
opportunity for comment given the technical nature of the issues, the brief comment 
period, and the advanced state of the draft guidelines (Goldman 1994), all o f which 
serve to practically bind interested parties such as consumers and manufacturers not 
participating in the ICH process to the guidelines. These considerations have led 
some legal experts to argue that “the ICH Guidelines should be treated as legislative 
rules” (Booth 1997 p.217).
6.5.2.3 The legal status o f  the ICH guidelines in Japan
In Japan, when step 2 consensus has been reached, the ICH text is translated into 
Japanese. Subsequently the Pharmaceutical and Medical Safety Bureau (PMSB) 
issues a Notification for consultation with a deadline for comments. When step 4 is
1 *77reached, the notification is issued with an implementation date . Notifications can 
be issued by the Director General of the Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau 
(PFSB) or by the directors of the Divisions in the Ministry o f Health, Labor, and 
Welfare, and together with ministerial ordinances and notices are prepared in order to
17ftenforce and manage the basic laws that govern the pharmaceutical industry . 
Generally, ordinances are statutory orders which relate to civic duties and rights, 
while notifications and circulars are part of administrative regulation not concerning 
civil rights and duties (Slingsby et al. 2004, p.246). All these instruments together 
form the body o f administrative legislation, which has relatively less legal binding
175 Available from the FDA website, http://www.fda.gov/cder/aers/default.htm. accessed 22/012007.
176 Code o f Federal Regulations, 21, Section 10.115, Good Guidance Practices, FDA, Federal Register: 
September 19,2000 (Volume 65, Number 182).
177 See the ICH website, http://www.ich.org/cache/htmal/250-272-l.html. accessed 22/01/2007.
178 “Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan”, JPMA 2006, available from the JPMA 
website, http://www.ipma.or.ip/english/pari/0607.html. accessed 23/01/2007.
201
power than laws but “significantly more binding power than guidelines published by 
academic societies or professional organizations such as the Japan Medical 
Association” (Slingsby et al. 2004, p.249).
In addition to these administrative guidelines, as was the case in Europe, many 
guidelines have acquired formal legal binding force. Following the adoption of the 
ICH guideline on GCP in 1996, the MHLW issued an Ordinance on Standards for 
Implementation of Clinical Studies on Drugs (GCP) based on the ICH guideline179. 
Moreover, a MHLW notification issued in August 1998, also based on ICH 
guidelines, expanded the acceptance of foreign clinical test data for the approval of 
new pharmaceuticals . Further, on the basis of agreements at the ICH concerning 
periodic safety update report (PSUR) systems, a new "periodic safety report system" 
was enacted into law at the time of the revision of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law in 
April 1997181. Moreover, since March 2000, it has been possible to use MedDRA for 
clinical trial data, re-examination and re-evaluation data and package inserts, while 
from October 27, 2003, it became obligatory to use MedDRA in individual case 
safety reports182. Two notifications in 2001 (No. 899 and No. 663) introduced the 
CTD format for applications, which became obligatory for new products in 
applications filed on or after July 1, 2003.
6.5.2.4 The legal authority o f  the ICH guidelines
Given the evidence presented above, it is clear that the ICH guidelines do have an 
authoritative status in the sense described in chapter 3, and therefore satisfy the 
second criterion we set at the beginning of this chapter for transnational regulatory 
authority. First, as was described above, several o f the ICH guidelines have become 
legally binding in EU and in Japan. As far as these guidelines are concerned, the 
regulatory authority of the ICH is clearly established. This however does not mean 
that the remainder of the guidelines are not authoritative. As we saw above, the 
guidelines are adopted by the regulatory authorities of EU, US and Japan. This means
179 MHW Ordinance No. 28 dated March 27,1997.
180 “Second Joint Status Report on the U.S.-Japan enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition 
Policy”, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 1999.
181 “Pharmaceutical Administration and Regulations in Japan”, JPMA 2006.
182 Ibid.
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that these guidelines have become part of the regulatory infrastructure of these 
states/region and are therefore part of the body of their administrative and/or 
regulatory law. Indeed, in all three jurisdictions these guidelines have been added to 
the government rulebook for medicinal product registration and approval. They enjoy 
the same status as other guidelines adopted through the respective national regulatory 
procedures and have often replaced such national regulations. Moreover, often these 
guidelines enjoy a more binding status than is the case with usual guidelines (for 
example CDT in the US where the FDA “strongly recommends” its use, or the 
ordnances used for the adoption of CGP in Japan). In addition, their legal status is not 
uniform in all three areas; guidelines in Japan for example, can take a variety of 
formats, some more authoritative than others, and all “significantly more 
authoritative” than professional or academic guidelines. Finally, as was argued above, 
the explicit references to these guidelines in various pieces o f basic legislation and the 
necessity to justify and receive judgment for deviating from these guidelines, point to 
a clear legal obligation on the private sector. Even if not obliged to adopt the ICH 
guidelines, companies are nonetheless legally obliged to take them into account and 
justify their decision when deviating from them. All these characteristics clearly 
demonstrate the authoritativeness of the ICH guidelines; indeed, it is these 
characteristics which, as we saw, have led legal experts to argue that they should be 
treated as legislative rules. This is not intended to be a legal treatise on the binding 
nature of governmental soft law instruments such as regulatory guidelines and 
standards. The fact is however, that the ICH guidelines have become 
national/regional regulations, and that they enjoy public regulatory authority of the 
nature that no other voluntary, non-state governance instrument can enjoy.
6.5.3 The global authority o f the ICH Guidelines
As we saw above, the three jurisdictions participating in the ICH have adopted over 
50 ICH guidelines harmonizing a substantial part of their pharmaceutical regulatory 
framework. Relying solely on this fact it is beyond doubt that the ICH has a truly 
global scope given the dominant position of these three states/region in the global 
pharmaceutical industry. Between them these three players account for more than 
85% of world pharmaceuticals’ production (graph 6.1).
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M oreover, the average per capita spending on pharmaceuticals in high-income 
countries is 100 times higher than in low-income countries: about US$ 400 compared 
with US$ 4 (WHO 2004, p. 3). As a result, according to WHO (2004), 15% o f the 
world’s population consumes over 90% o f  the w orld’s production o f  pharmaceuticals 
by value. It is no surprise therefore that the “triad” accounts for 88% o f  global sales 
(graph 6.2).
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Concentration o f R&D activity in these regions is equally high. Over 90% o f new 
chemical and biological substances are currently introduced in these markets.
Graph 6.3 New Chemical or Biological Entities 1986-2005
110 T— 104-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005
El Europe ■  US Q Japan m O thers
Source: EFPIA 2006
Given the progress o f harmonization among these dominant players it is not 
surprising that several o f  the ICH guidelines have also been adopted by Canada and 
the EFTA countries which are observers in the ICH process (Abraham and Reed 
2001). The adoption o f ICH guidelines is also creating a de facto harmonization in 
many developing and less developed countries, whose markets are dominated by the 
major transnational pharmaceutical companies. As Vogel has noted “in light o f the 
fact that virtually all nations have pharmaceutical industries dominated by American, 
European or Japanese firms, ICH guidelines are likely to become de facto 
international standards” (Vogel 1998, p. 13). This de facto harmonization in 
developing countries is emerging not only due to the practices o f transnational 
pharmaceutical companies, but increasingly also due to the practices o f  new 
pharmaceutical companies from large emerging markets (e.g. India) trying to 
establish themselves in the international pharmaceutical market. The appeal o f 
gaining access to the large pharmaceutical markets o f Europe, US and Japan often
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prompts these companies to adopt the ICH guidelines as a matter of strategy (WHO 
2002).
6.6 Summary and conclusions
Differences in the national registration requirements for new drugs for human use 
create significant costs and delays to the introduction of new medicines in the market. 
Apart from the negative economic consequences for companies and governments, this 
situation also raises a public health issue, when new and potentially life-saving 
medicines cannot reach the market promptly and at a reasonable price. This 
dimension of public health risk makes it all the more surprising to discover that a 
transnational non-state organization is responsible for the harmonization of these 
divergent national registration requirements. From the discussion above, it is clear 
that the ICH satisfies the three criteria of transnational regulatory authority. Private 
sector actors share the same number of votes, with equal weight, at the decision­
making organ of the ICH, and their consensus is required before any new guideline is 
adopted or any old guideline is amended or abandoned. The guidelines produced by 
the ICH are formally incorporated in the regulatory infrastructure o f the three 
jurisdictions participating in the ICH, and enjoy a legal status equal with other similar 
national regulatory instruments. Some of the guidelines have become legally 
mandatory, while even when this is not the case, the guidelines have beyond any 
doubt a binding effect on the behaviour of pharmaceutical companies which are 
legally obliged to take them into account and justify any deviations from them. 
Finally, the fact that they have been adopted by the three states/region participating in 
the ICH is enough to establish their global scope, although this claim has been further 
strengthened by the adoption of some of the guidelines by most o f the remaining 
developed markets (Canada, EFTA), and by a growing voluntary adoption in 
developing countries. The ICH clearly enjoys transnational regulatory authority and 
has already become the global forum for setting guidelines regarding the technical 
requirements for marketing approval of new medicines for human use.
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Chapter 7
Explaining ICH’s transnational regulatory authority
7.1 Introduction
Having established ICH’s claim to transnational regulatory authority, we are now able 
to use the propositions o f our theoretical framework to provide an explanation for 
ICH’s emergence as the forum for harmonizing technical guidelines for the approval 
and registration of new medicines. Based on the available material, our analysis will 
demonstrate that in accordance with proposition (1) the creation o f the ICH is the 
result of a regulatory strategy agreed by the three national/regional regulators, which 
aimed to satisfy the interests of their domestic research-based pharmaceutical 
industry. In line with propositions (2a) and (2b), the regulators o f all three 
jurisdictions decided to address the regulatory diversity issue in a transnational 
organization that satisfied both institutionally and in the way o f its agenda the 
industry’s needs, while reducing with its exclusive and technically-based structure, 
the social visibility of the harmonization process thereby, minimizing the risk of 
incurring potentially significant political costs.
7.2 Regulators’ dilemmas
As was the case with the IASB, the analysis of this case study has to begin with an 
examination of domestic regulatory politics. We first need to comprehend the 
regulators’ dilemmas before we are able to understand why they opted to resolve 
them through the means of transnational regulatory authority.
7.2.1 European pharmaceutical harmonization: integration vs. national control
European states have traditionally had distinct regulatory frameworks concerning the 
pharmaceutical sector (Spivey et al. 1992). In terms of drug approval procedures, this 
is due to cultural factors and different medicinal, healing and even religious traditions 
(Burstall 1991). These factors have affected the assessment of regulators about the 
acceptable balance between the potential risks and benefits of approving a new 
medicine, and have therefore often dictated divergent regulatory requirements.
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Consequently, in their mission to protect public health, European regulators have 
been unwilling to surrender control over their national regulatory policies. Beyond 
public health considerations, tight national control over pharmaceutical regulation is 
also due to a large extent, to the fact that drug approval regulation is part of a wider 
pharmaceutical regulatory mechanism, which also governs medicines’ prices, 
pharmaceutical industries’ profits and R&D subsidies and thus affects significantly 
governments’ health care budgets (Vogel 1998). This intensive regulatory 
intervention in turn, is because regulation of the pharmaceutical sector is closely 
related to wider national health care and welfare policies. This has been particularly 
important for European states, which boast the most extensive social welfare systems 
(Mossialos and Le Grand 1999).
European efforts to reduce regulatory diversity began as early as 1963 when 
the European Commission (EC) called a meeting of all interested parties to discuss 
the standardization of pharmaceutical laws (Orzack et al. 1992). Despite evident 
disagreements among different interest groups in this first meeting, the EC went on in 
1964 to propose the standardization of methods for carrying out tests on drugs and in 
January 1965 Directive 65/65/EEC was adopted. This first pharmaceutical directive 
spelled out the criteria of safety, quality and efficacy as preconditions for authorizing 
new drugs. Moreover, it required that submissions of medicinal products to national 
authorities were prepared and signed by experts and required member states to 
approve standards for marketing applications. In 1975, the EEC adopted two 
directives183 that identified the types of data that governments should receive from 
manufacturers before issuing a license for a drug’s sale and distribution, such as 
chemical, pharmaceutical, toxicological and clinical data (Orzack et al. 1992).
A major change in the European regulatory framework also came about in 
1975 when the EC established the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products 
(CPMP) with members from the regulatory authorities of the member states and set 
up a multi-state procedure for the approval of new drugs. The role o f the CPMP was 
advisory, giving its opinion on approval of marketing applications to national 
agencies, which however, the latter could disregard (Orzack et al. 1992). Following
183 Directive 75/318/EEC and Directive 75/319/EEC.
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authorization by a national authority, the multi-state procedure allowed, the sending 
of concurrent applications to at least five other members, which would have to take 
into account the initial authorization by the first member state. They could only reject 
the application by submitting a “reasoned objection” to the CPMP, which would then 
issue its opinion, which was again not binding. The next significant step in the 
European harmonization programme came in 1987 with the “concertation procedure”, 
which concerned applications for biotechnology and high-technology products for 
which the EC thought it would be easier to achieve harmonization, given that member 
states did not yet have standards for such products (Vogel 1998). Under this 
centralized procedure, the initial evaluation of the application would be undertaken by 
the CPMP, which would then issue a non-binding opinion.
The concertation procedure was an ultimate effort to increase the efficiency of 
the European regulatory mechanism, a need that became increasingly pressing in 
view of the 1992 deadline. One of the objectives of the 1992 project was “to improve 
the welfare of European consumers by eliminating duplicative and unnecessarily 
restrictive national rules and regulations”, while at the same time “lowering the costs 
o f national regulatory administration occasioned by the need to maintain fifteen 
regulatory bureaucracies” (Vogel 1998, p. 18). These considerations had become 
particularly important in the late 1980s, as there was widespread frustration and 
disappointment with the Community regulatory interventions aimed at harmonizing 
the different national registration procedures (Orzack et al. 1992). The mutual 
recognition procedure set up by the European Commission had not achieved the 
desired results (Burstall 1991). Allowing national authorities to retain final control 
over the approval process, proved to be the weak spot of the mechanism. The process 
did not work as envisioned, as each state effectively conducted its own assessment 
and raised its own objections; according to the CPMP Chair: “in practice...there have 
been objections with regard to every case dealt with under the Multi-State 
procedure...on the whole Member States do not yet accept each other’s assessments” 
(Teijgeler in Orzack et al. 1992, p. 856).
This situation had negative consequences for European companies, regulators 
and patients. First, it meant that it took a long time to introduce new drugs in
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European markets. The multi-state procedure set time limits: a state authority had 
four months to evaluate a dossier already approved by another state. However, given 
the insistence of national regulators on examining each application without 
consideration of the other states’ approval, these limits were regularly violated. In 
many countries, the process lasted two or three years, sometimes even more (Vogel 
1998). This delay resulted in significant costs for the companies, which in turn 
contributed to higher prices for medicines, an issue increasingly important for 
European governments. Public expenditure accounted for approximately 58% of all 
pharmaceutical expenditure in 1990184, while total per capita expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals more than doubled between 1980 and 1990 and continued to increase 
significantly throughout the 1990s (table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Total per Capita Expenditure on Pharmaceuticals ($ PPPs*)
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000**
Belgium 100 139 193 309 328c
Denmark 50 77 109 171 223
Finland 54 82 122 199 259
France - - 254 346 473
Germany 110 172 228 269 312b
Greece 65 83 104 195 258
Ireland 50 58 88 126 187
Italy - - 280 311 459d
Luxembourg 88 132 223 255 307a
Netherlands 53 83 128 196 264
Portugal 53 97 152 266 316b
Spain 69 93 145 210 246c
Sweden 55 82 120 202 227c
United
Kingdom 57 94 131 201 236c
Source: Mossialos et al. 2004, p.4 
*Purchasing Power Parities
** Or latest available data: al999, bl998, c l997, d2001.
Most European governments had to support extensive welfare and health care 
programmes, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s many European countries 
underwent significant health care reforms, focusing mainly on the overall efficiency
184 Calculated from data in Mossialos et al. (2004, p.4).
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of the system and the containment of costs “because of concerns about whether 
sufficient funds can be allocated to meet the demand for health care” (Wendt and 
Abel-Smith 1995, p.l). In many countries this meant new controls on pharmaceutical 
prices; Germany introduced price controls for pharmaceuticals in 1989 for the first 
time, while in France a new mechanism whereby prices were determined by the 
Ministry of Health was also put in place in the late 1980s (Le pen 1995). In this 
context, many governments started complaining about the effectiveness of the CPMP 
mechanism, while both the industry and consumers’ associations also lamented the 
existing situation (Orzack et al. 1992).
In addition, the regulatory diversity within Europe created problems for the 
competitiveness of the European pharmaceutical industry. The pharmaceutical 
industry has traditionally been one of the most successful European industries. In 
1990 it contributed, at a European level, a trade surplus of over € 7 billion (EFPIA 
2006). Traditionally, European companies invested heavily in R&D and held the 
leading position in the discovery of new chemical substances (NCEs). Since the 
1970s however a relative decline has been increasingly observed compared to both 
the US and Japan (Poggiolini in D’Arcy and Harron 1992). During the 1980s, this 
decline became more obvious as Japan emerged as a significant global competitor, 
while in the 1990s US companies started to take the lead in R&D expenditure (graph 
7.1). The European industry began complaining about the difficulty o f competing 
with the US and Japanese pharmaceutical companies which had large domestic 
markets and did not have to make new drug applications to twelve regulatory 
authorities (Marsh 1990). The Cecchini Report on the single market, published by the 
European Commission in 1988, acknowledged the difficulties that the different 
national regulatory requirements presented for the industry. It was estimated that lost 
revenues for companies that had to wait beyond the 4-month period ranged between 
100-175 million Ecus, while multiple registration requirements meant additional staff 
for companies at a cost of between 40 and 55 million Ecus (Cecchini Report 1988, p. 
67).
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Graph 7.1 Pharmaceutical R&D Expenditure in Europe, US and Japan 
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The European regulators faced a significant dilemma. On the one hand, they had to 
handle the politically sensitive issue o f drug approval regulations and therefore 
jealously guarded their ability to control nationally the approval and registration 
procedures for new drugs, as a potential approval o f a harmful substance could have 
dire political consequences. On the other hand, in the long term, their insistence on 
national control potentially undermined the quality o f  health care as it deprived 
European consumers and patients o f potentially health improving and life-saving 
drugs for many years. Moreover, this attitude undermined governm ents’ budgets by 
contributing to higher prices for pharmaceuticals. This was particularly important for 
European regulators who were operating in the context o f extensive public welfare 
and health care systems. Finally, the situation create significant problems for the 
industry in terms o f  competitiveness and profitability.
7.2.2 The FD A ’s dilemma: safety vs. innovation
The introduction o f  the 1962 Amendments in the United States had a significant 
impact on the US pharmaceutical sector. The 1962 Am endments increased
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significantly the amount o f testing that manufacturers had to conduct in order to 
accumulate “substantive evidence” to satisfy the safety and efficacy requirements of 
the FDA. These requirements increased substantially both the amount o f time and the 
costs required for the development o f new drugs (graph 7.2). Grabowski et al. (1976) 
estimated that the 1962 amendments roughly doubled the cost per NCE in the US. 
This increase in R&D time and costs proved to have significant consequences for the 
industry and consequently for the public and the FDA itself.
Graph 7.2 Average Development Period for NCE Drugs Introduced Annually in 
the US M arket and R&D Expenditures per Drug Unit (1951-1978)
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The new regulatory environment, while undoubtedly contributing towards the 
protection o f public health by establishing tougher drug safety standards, seemed to 
undermine public health in other ways. A significant consequence o f  the new 
regulations was the slowdown o f  pharmaceutical innovation, as R&D costs increased 
significantly and investment in new drugs became less economically attractive. As is
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evident from graph 7.3 the number o f NCE drugs introduced in the US market fell 
markedly after 1962. The average annual number o f new drug introductions in the 12 
years before 1962 was 45.6, while for the years from 1962 to 1979 this number fell to 
16.8. According to Peltzman (1974), this slowdown o f  innovation was the direct and 
exclusive result o f  the 1962 Amendments. This assertion was contested by the FDA, 
whose Commissioner argued in the early 1970s, that this slowdown was mainly due 
to two other factors: the decrease in new drugs with little or no therapeutic gain and 
the fact that scientific knowledge had reached a “plateau” which made new 
breakthroughs increasingly difficult (Schmidt 1974).
Graph 7.3 Number of NCE Drugs Introduced Annually in the US (1950-1979)
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As far as the first point is concerned, significant disagreements existed among experts 
over the validity o f  this claim (Peltzman 1974), as well as over the ranking used by 
the FDA to characterize effective and ineffective drugs (Grabowski 1976). The FDA 
argued the second point based on the fact that innovation seemed to have declined at 
the time in other developed countries as well. However, this was not an entirely 
convincing argument because prior to the 1960s other countries had little or no 
regulation at all (Grabowski 1976). The introduction o f new regulatory measures in 
these countries, although less stringent than the US regulations, had consequences for
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their rate of innovation as well. Studies have found that the regulations introduced in 
the UK in the early 1970s added an extra two years or more to development time and 
significant costs, leading to a reduction in innovation (Hartley and Maynard 1982).
The reduced number of new drugs introduced in the United States was not 
only due to a slowdown of domestic innovation. The regulatory stance o f the FDA 
raised costs not only for American companies, but also for foreign multinationals, 
which had to incur higher costs and longer approval periods for the drugs they wanted 
to either export to, or manufacture in the US market. The FDA traditionally did not 
accept foreign clinical data and required drugs developed abroad, even by American 
companies, to undergo substantial duplicative testing in the United States before 
granting them a marketing approval. This was justified on the grounds of FDA’s 
inability to monitor data collected by foreign regulators in the same way that it 
monitored tests conducted in the United States (Jordan 1992). This resulted in 
significant delays in the introduction of foreign-discovered drugs into the United 
States, even when these represented significant therapeutic advances (Jordan 1992). 
This “drug-lag” problem came to be one of the most significant problems and a 
source of continued criticism for the FDA (Grabowski 1976).
Critique over the issue of drug-lag increased during the 1980s and the FDA 
came increasingly under pressure from patients, the Congress, and the government to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its regulations. FDA approval times were 
becoming increasingly longer, from an average of two years in the 1970s to an 
average of three years in the 1980s, far above the statutory limit o f 180 days 
(Gladwell 1991). Comparative studies revealed that the FDA approved drugs that 
were considered “therapeutically important”, as much as five years after these drugs 
had been approved in the UK, while the NDA process was found to be approximately 
one year longer than comparable processes in Europe and Japan (Jordan 1992). As a 
result of this lag, most US companies were introducing their new drugs first into 
foreign markets. Of the 135 new drugs approved by the FDA during the period 1984 
to 1989, 106 were first approved abroad (OTA 1991).
Under pressure, the FDA, much like the SEC in the case of accounting 
diversity, first sought to address the problem through unilateral action. In 1982, the
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FDA Commissioner announced that in certain circumstances the FDA would approve 
new drugs solely on the basis of foreign data (Wall 1984). A new regulation 
promulgated in 1985 embedded this promise into the FDA’s drug approval 
procedures and following this change, the FDA approved drugs based on a mix of 
both foreign and domestic data, and occasionally solely on foreign data (Kanusky 
1994). Things did not change significantly however as the acceptance of foreign data 
occurred on a case-by-case basis which diminished the value o f the new policy 
(Jordan 1992). Consequently, instead of abating, the drug-lag issue reached high 
levels of publicity when AIDS patients organized a concerted campaign, publicly 
criticizing the FDA’s procedures and requesting shorter approval times for AIDS 
treatments. The public confrontation reached a climax when, in October 1988, AIDS 
protesters shut down the FDA headquarters (Jordan 1992). Under pressure, the FDA 
was forced to change part of its regulatory framework to accommodate the needs of 
these patients (Dillman 1991; Lindemann 1994). By that time however, concern over 
the drug-lag issue had reached the higher echelons of the administration. In 
November 1991, only a week after the first ICH conference, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services Dr. Sullivan, announced a comprehensive reform of the FDA 
procedures in order to achieve shorter approval times for new drugs (Leary 1991).
This reform aimed at changing the way the FDA operated, since there was a 
belief that the drug-lag issue was at least partly the result o f systemic institutional 
factors embodied in FDA’s mission and structure. According to the critics, legislation 
was designed with a negative image of the industry in mind, and the FDA personnel 
perceived themselves as the protectors of the public against the malevolent firms that 
wanted to defraud it (Brozen in Grabowski 1976). This negative legislative mission of 
the FDA, was reinforced by the fact that FDA personnel faced adverse motives to 
release new drugs, as successful drugs’ approval does not draw headlines whereas 
failure of a drug becomes a major theme; external signals such as congressional 
hearings for issues regarding approved drugs’ safety reinforced this view (Grabowski 
1976; Jordan 1992). As a result, FDA personnel were characterized by a bias towards 
withholding new, potentially valuable drugs from the market (Jordan 1992). This
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however can be as detrimental to public health as the release of an unsafe drug 
(Jordan 1992; Katz 1993).
In addition to public health considerations, pharmaceutical regulation seemed 
to create problems for the American pharmaceutical industry as well. The significant 
increase in R&D time and costs put the US industry at a competitive disadvantage, 
particularly as the same requirements applied for approving new drugs for exports. 
Confronted with higher costs and longer delays in both introducing new drugs in the 
American market and exporting to other markets, US multinationals changed their 
corporate strategies and expanded in foreign markets both in terms of R&D and in 
terms of manufacturing. A survey by Lasagna and Wardell (1975) reviewing fifteen 
large US companies (accounting for 80% of R&D in the US) showed that, while 
traditionally testing of NCEs was almost entirely conducted in the US, in the 1960s 
the situation began to change. Between 1966 and 1974, the percentage of NCEs first 
studied abroad grew from almost zero to roughly 50%. Other studies (Reis-Amdt and 
Elvers 1972; Reis-Amdt 1975) also found that after 1962 the majority o f new NCE 
discoveries by US firms were first introduced abroad. Not surprisingly, international 
sales of US firms also grew rapidly (graph 7.4).
As is evident from above, the FDA had to tackle a similar dilemma to the one 
confronting European regulators. On the one hand, the mission of the FDA dictated a 
firm and thorough pre-marketing regulatory process, in order to safeguard public 
health. This view of FDA’s mission was reinforced by the fact that all significant 
regulatory and legislative interventions in the US since the beginning of the twentieth 
century had occurred in the aftermath of a public health crisis. This as we saw 
promoted a conservative view of FDA’s role, which preferred to forego the 
possibility of approving faster a potentially valuable new drug than risking a potential 
public health crisis. On the other hand, as was the case in Europe, this attitude 
undermined public health in other ways in the long term, and also undercut the 
competitiveness of the US pharmaceutical industry which had to turn to other 
jurisdictions to conduct much of its pre-marketing R&D. This situation had negative 
long-term effects for the FDA itself. If most multinational companies applied for new 
drugs first in European or Japanese markets, the FDA would lose its position as the
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world’s leading pharmaceutical regulatory agency (Katz 1993). This would 
undermine both the FD A’s body o f scientific expertise and its regulatory know-how, 
and thus undermine its ability to pursue its mission and protect effectively public 
health.
Graph 7.4 Ratios of International to Domestic Sales and R&D of US companies
(1970-2005*)
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7.2.3 Japanese industrial policy in the pharmaceutical sector
Unlike their American and European counter parts, the Japanese regulators did not 
face a regulatory dilemma pitting valid regulatory objectives against each other. 
Nonetheless, the Japanese also had to face significant challenges in the 
pharmaceutical sector. The first was to build up a domestic research-based industry. 
This goal was grounded first on an industrial policy rationale since Japan was the 
second largest national pharmaceutical market but relied almost entirely on foreign 
imports for new drugs. The Japanese industry was traditionally internally oriented and
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comprised many small and medium-sized companies focusing mainly on generic 
copies of Western drugs (McIntyre 1999). This was largely due to the lack of 
investment incentives in R&D as under Japanese law, patent protection only applied 
to development processes and not products. A change in patent law in 1976 extended 
patent protection to products and Japanese R&D investment began to grow 
substantially. It has been estimated that from 1975 to 1985, R&D expenditure grew at 
an annual rate of 13% (McIntyre 1999). This was only the first o f a number of 
measures taken in the context of a new industrial policy aiming to turn the Japanese 
industry into a global pharmaceutical power. Another particularly important 
legislative intervention in this direction was the 1987 Patent Bill that allowed for the 
possibility of extended patent protection for up to five years in order to compensate 
companies for the loss of effective patent protection due to regulatory requirements 
during the R&D process. As a result, Japanese companies began investing heavily in 
R&D, and were able to establish an international presence by the late 1980s. At that 
time, their expansion strategies, domestic pressures from increased foreign 
competition, and new price controls imposed by the government, drove them to 
expand their operations in foreign markets, entering into joint ventures with foreign 
companies, investing in US biotechnology companies and sponsoring research in 
American universities (OTA 1991, p.86).
At the same time, the Japanese government was under increasing pressure to 
contain health care costs. Health care costs were a major problem for the public 
budget, as public expenditure on health per capita, more than doubled between 1980 
and 1990 (EFPIA 2006). A major component of this problem is the unusually high 
drug consumption of the Japanese population: in 1990, expenditure on drugs in Japan 
as a percentage of total health spending was 21.4% compared to 14% in Europe and 
only 9.2% in the US (EFPIA 2006), while in 1993, per capita drug spending in Japan 
was $254 per year compared with $179 for the US (Maurer 1994). Among other 
factors, this is due to a dramatic trend in Japanese demographics, whose population is 
aging at a pace unprecedented among developed countries. It is estimated that by 
2020, 28.1% of Japan’s population will be over the age o f 65 (EFPIA 2006). 
Confronted with this situation, throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Japanese
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government introduced a variety of regulatory and legislative changes to curb the cost 
of pharmaceuticals (JPMA 2006). According to experts, a basic paradigm shift started 
taking place in Japan in the early 1990s affecting regulators, payers, providers and the 
public; the focus on equality and guaranteed access to health care, which were 
traditionally the basic health care policy objectives, began to be circumscribed by 
financial strain, and new measures such as flat sum reimbursement tariffs for several 
categories o f patients were introduced (Maurer 1994).
7.3 Resolving the dilemmas: ICH as a redistributive regulatory strategy
In chapter 3, it was argued that transnational regulatory authority may be used when 
the objective of the regulators is redistribution, either domestic or international. In 
this part of the chapter, it will be shown first, that the ICH was not a case of 
international redistribution and therefore it was not forced by one or more of the 
regulators on their counterparts; rather it was a mutually acceptable and jointly agreed 
solution. Secondly, it will be demonstrated that this jointly agreed institutional 
solution, was part o f a strategy to effect domestic redistribution.
7.4.1 Pharmaceutical harmonization and international redistribution
The previous discussion showed that, with the exception o f Japan, national regulators 
found themselves in a dilemma which pitted valid public policy objectives against 
each other. On the one hand, the protection of public health dictated strict regulations 
and tight control of the regulatory process to avoid public health crises that could 
have dire political consequences. On the other hand, extreme focus on safety and 
national control could undermine public health in the long-term, by preventing the 
timely introduction o f new drugs, raise the cost of health care by contributing to 
higher drug prices, and of course, it created significant problems for the industry. 
While it is obvious that the problems faced by the three regulators were quite distinct 
in their particular details, it is also obvious that reducing the diversity o f regulatory 
requirements could contribute, by reducing the time and costs o f the drug approval 
process, to the solution of their regulatory dilemmas. Indeed, the regulators in all 
three states/region begun considering international harmonization as a way out of
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their problems. As was the case with accounting harmonization however, they 
initially pursued harmonization in different ways.
In Europe, the emphasis was on completing the internal market. Taking 
advantage of the looming 1992 deadline the European Commission put forward its 
ambitious plans for a central approval mechanism which could hopefully end the 
predominance of national control that had haunted its previous harmonization efforts. 
In 1990, it released four drafts of directives for the free movement o f medicinal 
products in the European Community, which included a proposition for a single 
European Medicines Agency. After long negotiations this vision became reality, and 
in 1995 the overriding prevalence of national regulatory authorities came to an end 
with the creation of the European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA)185. The 
EMEA brought a revolution in European pharmaceutical regulation (Garatinni and 
Bertele 2004). For the first time, the approval of a pharmaceutical product authorized 
centrally through the “centralized” procedure, would be binding for all EU member- 
states.
At the same time, the FDA, which as we saw was under increasing pressure in 
the 1980s, had already partially revised its policy on foreign data, adopted a policy of 
“on-going information sharing” with other regulatory authorities, and initiated a 
series of bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) concerning mainly good 
laboratory practices and pre-clinical testing (Wall 1984). In the late 1980s, caught in 
the midst of the AIDS crisis, the FDA also turned to increased cooperation with 
foreign regulators, completing among other things a MOU for good manufacturing 
and laboratory practices with the EC in 1990, and co-sponsoring a trilateral 
conference with Canada and the EC on the harmonization o f health care product 
names the next year (Vogel 1998).
At the same time, throughout the 1980s bilateral negotiations to reduce 
regulatory diversity were undertaken between the US and the European Community 
with Japan. These were motivated mainly by commercial considerations, and 
particularly the eagerness of the US and Europe to open up the large Japanese market.
183 In 2004, new legislation reinforced and streamlined the EMEA and its operations. The name of the 
agency has been changed to European Medicines Agency, but the acronym EMEA has been kept.
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Japan, which is home to the second largest national pharmaceuticals market, is the 
only developed country who has been accused of using drug approval regulation as a 
non-tariff barrier to entry (Wall 1984; OTA 1991; Vogel 1998). Until 1975, a ban on 
foreign direct investment in pharmaceuticals in Japan helped to develop the local 
industry. Following the lift o f the ban in 1975, foreigners could sell and manufacture 
their own drugs in Japan, but this required a complex approval procedure (Edelman 
1988). Japanese authorities had developed a system of regulatory requirements that 
effectively resulted in total non-acceptance of foreign test data. This was justified on 
the grounds of racial differences, which was supported by evidence from an incident 
in the 1970s when a serious neurological side-effect’s incidence had been much 
higher among the Japanese than any other national or racial group (Wall 1984). The 
complexity of the Japanese pharmaceutical regulatory system and its bias against 
foreign companies were specifically targeted during the Market-Oriented-Sector- 
Selected (MOSS) talks in 1985 with the US, which produced the first concrete results 
towards deregulation and national treatment of foreign companies, as the Japanese 
agreed to simplify the procedure for the transfer of licenses to foreign companies, and 
accept some foreign clinical data (Edelman 1988; OTA 1991). Europeans had already 
approached the Japanese regulators in 1984 in an effort to reduce the diversity of 
regulatory requirements and continued to have meetings with them throughout the 
1980s (Griffith in D’Arcy and Harron 1992).
Given the momentum towards harmonization that was starting to build up at 
the time both in the European Community and in the United States, it was not 
surprising to see an effort going beyond regional, bilateral or unilateral initiatives 
towards a process of truly international harmonization. Indeed, the timing presented 
an opportunity for all three states/region to address many o f their problems through 
international harmonization. In the EC the momentum towards European 
harmonization and the 1992 deadline gave the European Commission a unique 
opportunity both to take a lead in the international harmonization process and to use 
the latter to consolidate and complement the former. Indeed, regulation experts agree 
that the European Commission played a leading role in the inception and 
establishment of the ICH, taking advantage of its experience with the European
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project (Vogel 1998; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). At the same time, the completion 
o f European harmonization was a prerequisite for negotiating global harmonization 
(Vogel 1998). This argument was used by the European Commission in its effort to 
push through European harmonization, as is evident from the fact that “the first three 
meetings of the ICH paralleled the EU’s progress in creating a single market for drugs 
in Europe” (Vogel 1998, p. 14).
In the United States, the climate was also ripe for a move towards 
international harmonization. As we saw above, during the 1980s, under growing 
domestic pressure, the FDA began cooperating closer with foreign regulators. 
However, this was not enough. The public confrontation with the AIDS patients in 
the late 1980s, the growing complaints about the drug lag, and perhaps most 
importantly, the deregulatory agenda of the Conservative Administration singaled the 
beginning of a more coordinated and comprehensive turn to harmonization in the 
context of an extensive FDA reform under the Bush Administration. As already 
mentioned, in November 1991, only a week after the first ICH conference, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services Dr. Sullivan, announced a comprehensive 
reform o f the FDA procedures in order to achieve shorter approval times for new 
drugs (Leary 1991). FDA’s reform had become a significant political issue (Jordan 
1992; Vogel 1998). The reform was spearheaded by Vice-President Quayle, president 
of the White House’s Council on Competitiveness. A package o f 11 major reforms of 
the FDA’s drug approval process were announced aiming to cut down drug review 
times by encouraging, among other things, greater use of external experts by the 
FDA, as well as greater cooperation between the FDA and the industry. Many of 
these reforms which were business friendly and aimed at reducing the regulatory 
burden on the companies, found their way in to new significant legislation passed in
1 8Athe early 1990s , and changed the traditionally adversarial relationship between the 
FDA and the industry towards a more cooperative one (Wiktorowicz 2003). One of 
these 11 reforms was international harmonization, particularly in the context of the 
ICH (Jordan 1992; Contrera 1995). Vice-President Quayle confirmed the
186 A more detailed account about this new legislation will be presented in the next section o f this 
chapter.
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commitment of the Bush Administration to international harmonization at the highest 
political level, stating that one of the most important changes would be closer 
cooperation with the drug approval authorities of other countries, which would allow 
“quicker introduction o f new therapies to other markets of the world”, while 
Secretary Sullivan stressed that “the development of common procedures would 
reduce ...duplication and speed the approval of drugs worldwide” (Leary 1991). To 
support this new direction, significant changes were made to the structures of the 
FDA, including the establishement in the early 1990s, o f an Office for International 
Policy and an Office of International Affairs.
The Japanese regulators were also keen to progress to an international forum 
for harmonization. This was because first, for the Japanese, harmonization was 
viewed as a unique opportunity to continue the effort they had begun in the late 1970s 
to become a global pharmaceutical power. Harmonization would enable Japanese 
firms to use the results of tests conducted in Japan on their foreign applications, and 
thus enhance their ability to enter the US and European markets (Vogel 1998; 
Abraham and Reed 2001). As the Japanese Minister and Charge d’Affaires of the 
Japanese mission to the European Community noted in his opening remarks in the 
first ICH Conference, “in the field of pharmaceuticals, maintenance and development 
o f a free trade system is even more essential than in any other industry” (D’Arcy and 
Harron 1992, p. 7). Secondly, by helping to bring down R&D costs, harmonization 
could potentially contribute to a reduction of pharmaceuticals’ prices, which, as we 
have seen, was a major concern of the Japanese government.
This turn towards harmonization was also supported by the industry in all three 
jurisdictions. In the run up to the 1992 project, the EFPIA consistently argued for 
mutual recognition of regulatory bodies within Europe, and proposed “a single 
dossier for each product and a single assessment following a hearing open to the 
manufacturer of the medicine in consideration” (Orzack et al. 1992, pp.859-860). 
This idea also appealed to US and Japanese companies which had to file applications 
in fifteen different European jurisdictions, incurring considerable costs and regulatory 
uncertainty given the mistrustful and uncooperative attitude among European 
regulators (Orzack et al. 1992). At the same time European and Japanese companies
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wanted to see American standards harmonized; the FDA traditionally required 
clinical studies to be performed in the US and generally considered foreign clinical 
data as cumulative or supportive if at all (Wall 1984). Finally, as we have already 
seen, European and American companies wanted to access the lucrative Japanese 
market, something the Japanese industry did not object, as long as harmonization 
reduced the regulatory burden for accesing the European and US markets as well.
Therefore, it is obvious that both public interest considerations and the private 
interests of the research-based pharmaceutical industry coincided in this case to a 
considerable degree, and drove regulators to international harmonization. It is also 
evident that, unlike the accounting harmonization case, harmonization in the 
pharmaceutical sector did not produce significant conflicts o f interest among the 
dominant players. Therefore, the regulators’ choice to set up the ICH as the forum for 
international pharmaceutical harmonization could not have been a forum-shifting 
strategy on the part of any of the three regulators. The only case that could be 
considered a case o f redistributive cooperation, were the bilateral negotiations 
between the US and the EC with Japan. While the intention to pressure Japan into 
opening its market to foreign companies may have been part o f the motivation behind 
international harmonization, it cannot explain on its own why harmonization 
initiatives could not continue on a bilateral basis, as had been the case throughout the 
1980s, or why a hybrid forum was chosen over an international forum. Surely, the US 
and the EC would prefer either bilateral negotiations where they would enjoy a 
superior negotiating position, or an international forum, where Japan’s negotiated 
commitments could potentially be stronger and have a higher degree of legal 
obligation. Moreover, the Japanese regulators surely prefered the ICH, where the 
same requirements would apply to all participating parties, to the bilateral 
negotiations with either the US and the EC, where the latter could negotiate from a 
position o f superior market power. Indeed, the Japanese government, was quite 
supportive o f the ICH initiative (D’Arcy and Harron 1992; 1994) and in 1992, the 
MHLW created “Pharma Dream 21”, a $10 million scheme to promote harmonization 
of drug regulation and fund joint international studies on racial differences’ impact on 
clinical trials (Kanusky 1994).
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Moreover, unlike the IASB, the ICH was created from the beginning with the 
participation and input of all three jurisdictions following a common decision taken at 
the 1989 WHO ICDRA in Paris. Domestic regulatory dilemmas and pressure from 
the industry in all jurisdictions created incentives for all three regulators to pursue 
harmonization. Even the unwillingness of the FDA to accept foreign clinical data and 
its long held attitude, expressed by an FDA Commissioner, as “harmonization is fine 
so long as the world harmonizes to us” (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 372), begun 
to change. Despite the fact that of the three founder members of the ICH the FDA 
was initially the most reluctant participant, often causing the irritation and discontent 
o f the other participants in the early ICH stages (Abrahams 1991; D’Arcy and Harron 
1994, Drahos and Braithwaite 2000), when confronted with the determination of the 
Conservative Administration to reform the FDA’s operation along the lines of 
market-friendly re-regulation, and the public outcry for its deteriorating drug approval 
record, the FDA’s resistance, dissipated. Any last hesitations it may have had were 
dissolved when pressed by the American industry to go ahead with the ICH 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).
However, the absence of significant distributional conflicts and the fact that 
regulators had an incentive to pursue harmonization, do not explain their choice to do 
so in the context o f the ICH. During the first ICH conference, the regulators of all 
three jurisdictions repeatedly argued that the ICH initiative was undertaken 
principally in the name of public health (D’Arcy and Harron 1992). However, as 
argued in chapter 3, when efficiency and/or effectiveness gains are the principal 
objective of international harmonization we would expect regulators to use 
international institutions and not a transnational regulatory forum. This would signal 
the strong commitment o f the participating parties, would result in more binding legal 
agreements, which are likely to be more efficient and effective, and through the 
institutional safeguards of an international organization, would ensure transparency 
and easier access o f the various stakeholders to the regulatory process, leading thus to 
a more comprehensive, inclusive and therefore readily accepted regulation, 
characteristics also associated with significant efficiency and effectiveness gains. The 
puzzle over the regulators’ choice becomes even greater in the case of pharmaceutical
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harmonization, because there is already an international organization in the issue-area 
of health care with a clear mandate to pursue international regulation for 
pharmaceuticals, the WHO.
During the 1960s and early 1970s the WHO was quite active in the area of 
pharmaceutical regulation. The early WHO agreements were possible to a large 
degree due to the leadership o f the United States (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
During this period, the US sponsored International Conferences of Drug Regulatory 
Agencies and it was actively promoting harmonization through initiatives like the 
Good Manufacturing Practices agreement, which was in essence the globalization of 
US good manufacturing practices through the WHO (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). 
However, following the adoption of the NIEO in 1974, things started to change. 
Given the importance of drugs for many developing countries facing acute public 
health problems, and the structure of the industry which was dominated by large 
MNCs, the pharmaceutical industry was a prime target for pressure by the developing 
countries. According to one commentator of the time “the pharmaceutical industry is 
destined to be a testing ground on which the future of this U.N. program [NIEO] will 
be decided” (Phelps 1982, p. 200). The tendency to focus on the pharmaceutical 
industry was reinforced by a number of unethical law evasion tactics by 
pharmaceutical MNCs, which often exported to developing countries products that 
were unlicensed or banned in the developed world or conducted high-risk 
experimental research in developing countries eschewing the safety testing standards 
of developed countries (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). Consequently, the 
pharmaceutical industry became a target for analysis and action by many U.N. bodies 
and agencies (Cone 1983).
The US became worried over this new direction o f WHO’s work and 
“carefully emphasized that... it opposes the kind of redistribution the NIEO invites” 
(Phelps 1982, p. 202). This concern marked a shift in the attitude o f the US towards 
the WHO in the early 1980s. Two events were particularly important for this 
development. First, the coming to power of a conservative administration in the US 
which followed an anti-UN policy, limiting the interest, involvement and therefore 
influence of the US in the WHO (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). The second was the
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adoption by the WHO, of the International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk 
Substitutes in 1981 (Chetley 1990; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). This Code came 
after many years o f consumer campaigns following the well-supported documentation 
of health problems facing children in the developing world making use o f breast-milk 
substitutes instead of breast-feeding (Cone 1983; Chetley 1990). As expected, this 
“interference with the operation of the free market was opposed by the Reagan 
administration in the US” (Abel-Smith 1994, p. 128). The United States was the only 
country to cast a negative vote in the World Health Assembly that approved the Code. 
Significant resistance also came from the industry, which argued that the WHO 
“should not be involved in efforts to regulate or control the commercial practices of 
private industry” (Silverman et al. in Abel-Smith 1994, p. 128). According to an 
information paper from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), the 
breast-milk substitutes code “represents an unprecedented intrusion into corporate 
commercial operations...should this prove to be a precedent for pharmaceuticals, the 
impact on functioning, efficient private-sector drug distribution systems in many 
developing countries could be most harmful” (Cone 1983, p.335).
The confrontation between the developed states and the industry on the one 
hand, and the WHO on the other, soon intensified further. The success o f the breast- 
milk substitutes code encouraged consumer groups and developing countries to argue 
for a WHO pharmaceuticals marketing code (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). In 1981 
the WHO’s Regional Office for Europe proposed the creation o f an international 
U.N.-sponsored drug regulatory agency which would determine the safety, efficacy 
and quality of pharmaceuticals moving in international commerce, while WHO’s 
1982-83 budget included a suggestion about the introduction of international 
regulations concerning the labelling and advertising of pharmaceutical products 
moving in international commerce (Cone 1983; Phelps 1982).
Predictably, these proposals provoked the industry’s reaction. The Chairman 
of the IFPMA set the tone in a speech to the federation’s assembly in 1981: “for this 
year and next, 70 percent of WHO’s budget will be paid by 13 industrialised 
countries...certainly this entitles the industrialised world to stand up to WHO. We 
must have the will to do so” (Dee in Chetley 1990, p.70). Nonetheless, in 1984 the
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World Health Assembly called an examination of the industry’s marketing practices, 
a call which resulted in the Ethical Criteria for Medicinal Drug Promotion in 1988. 
Unsurprisingly, the confrontation with the US reached a climax. In 1986 the US did 
not pay its financial contribution to the organization. In 1987 it paid off a small 
fraction of its previous debt for 1986 and 1985. By January 1988 the situation had 
reached a crisis: according to an editorial of Science the US was at that time in arrears 
of $118 million which represented about 25% of WHO’s annual budget (Chetley
1990). Although the situation was eventually alleviated, by 1988 the WHO was 
effectively abandoned by the US and therefore its power and legitimacy in creating 
international pharmaceutical regulation were severely undermined. Indeed, according 
to a former FDA official which played a significant role in the establishment of the 
ICH, the WHO was not considered an appropriate forum for dealing with developed 
countries’ problems, such as the harmonization of technical requirements for the 
research-based industry187. In 1989 the regulators of the US, Europe and Japan 
decided to launch the ICH initiative.
The ICH initiative represented a joint govemment-industry effort to reduce 
unnecessary regulatory burden, diminishing development time and costs. Contrary to 
the ICH, the WHO initiatives aimed at increasing international regulation and giving 
more control to national governments. It is obvious therefore, that achieving an ICH- 
type agreement in the WHO was not possible. Even if developing countries agreed to 
reduce duplicate tests for the approval of new drugs, this would only be accepted in 
the context of an inter-governmental agency where developing countries would have 
significant influence. However, allowing developing countries to have a say in drug 
approval reviews could have significant political and economic implications for the 
incumbent governments in developed states. It would result in the loss of public 
confidence in a drug approval process where officials from countries without 
adequate expertise could play a potentially decisive role. Such an arrangement could 
not be accepted by developed states. Also, there is no doubt that in such a forum, 
developing countries would attempt to promote other regulatory goals, concerning for 
example the marketing of pharmaceutical products or essential drugs’ procurement
187 Interview with author, 23/10/2007.
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procedures and pricing. Such initiatives would be fiercely resisted by the industry. 
Therefore, the compensatory costs of giving partial control o f an international drug 
approval procedure to developing countries (which lacked the necessary expertise) 
and of having to accept additional regulations for the industry were too high. These 
compensatory costs made the use of the WHO as the forum for international 
harmonization unlikely. The choice of a hybrid regulatory forum gave the “triad” the 
ability to exclude the developing countries from the harmonization talks altogether. 
Since having a significant pharmaceutical industry is a precondition for participating 
in a joint govemment-industry forum, the ICH has acted as a barrier to “regulatory 
entry” for developing countries.
However, the WHO’s association with high compensatory costs and the ICH’s 
function as a barrier to regulatory entry for developing countries, are still not enough 
to explain the regulators’ choice. As argued in chapter 3, when there is a harmony of 
interests among the dominant players and high compensatory costs associated with a 
particular international forum, the dominant players can exclude the parties that create 
the compensatory costs and benefit from the advantages o f an international agreement 
(vs. transnational regulatory authority) by using or establishing an alternative 
international forum. In this case, when the divide is between developing and 
developed countries, the triad could have resorted to the OECD, instead of setting up 
the ICH. This would have minimized the costs they had to incur for setting up an 
organization from scratch (it took about two years of discussions and negotiations 
before the ICH was up and running), while taking advantage o f already familiar and 
tested procedures, and limiting the harmonization process to almost the same set of 
countries that participated in the ICH. It is also worth mentioning that the OECD was 
already active, in a limited way, in the harmonization of some aspects of clinical 
testing. Why did the regulators of the three dominant players in the pharmaceutical 
industry choose the ICH over the OECD? The only answer, consistent with the 
evidence, is that the regulators chose to accommodate the requests of the industry.
7.4.2 ICH and domestic redistribution
As we have seen, according to the economic theory o f regulation in cases of 
redistribution, the winning constituencies tend to be small, well-organized and with a
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high per capita interest in the promoted regulation. This condition is more than 
satisfied by the pharmaceutical industry in all three jurisdictions, but also 
internationally. The ability of the industry to influence the regulators has been 
boosted by its oligopolistic structure. Traditionally, when looking at the industry as a 
whole, the pharmaceutical industry has not been considered a highly concentrated 
industry (Statman 1983; McIntyre 1999). In 2004, the top ten companies accounted 
for 46.1% of the world market (ABPI 2004). While this degree o f concentration 
clearly points to an oligopolistic market structure at an international level, there are 
other industries with higher concentration ratios (McIntyre 1999). This type of 
concentration ratio however, is not reflective of the true oligopolistic structure of the 
industry. The industry is separated in many distinct therapeutic categories, and 
products in these categories are poor substitutes for one another (Statman 1983; 
Schweitzer 1997; McIntyre 1999). Concentration ratios within these therapeutic 
categories therefore, are far more relevant for uncovering the true power of 
pharmaceutical companies188. Here concentration ratios are much higher, reaching in 
some instances, 80-90% of the world market for the top three or four companies, or 
even for just one company. Therefore, it is clear that specific companies dominate 
particular therapeutic classes and these companies have much more oligopolistic or 
even monopolistic power than the industry-wide ratios would lead us to believe. 
Moreover, this power is enhanced during the patent period when a company can 
literally enjoy a legally protected monopoly.
This level of concentration reveals the strong position of large multinational 
pharmaceutical companies. These companies, which are among the world’s most 
profitable189, are able to coordinate in powerful and “politically active” associations 
which influence domestic and international regulatory arrangements. The PhRMA for 
example is a very active and well-organized association and considered one of the 
most powerful lobbies in Washington (Wiktorowicz 2003). The PhRMA consistently 
lobbies for the industry and makes large donations to influence members o f Congress
188 See Appendix 5.
189 The pharmaceutical industry has traditionally earned profits above the industrial average 
(Schweitzer 1997; McIntyre 1999). In 2001 the industry topped the Fortune 500 index o f most 
profitable industries, while in 2006 it ranked fifth. For more details on the industry’s profitability 
rankings in recent years see http://monev.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/. accessed, 3/2/2007.
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and political parties. According to the non-partisan Center for Responsive Politics, in 
the 2002 Congressional elections, the pharmaceutical and health products industry 
spent about $20 million, with three-quarters of that money going to Republican 
candidates and party committees (Pear and Oppel 2002). This contribution, while 
already putting the industry among the top donors, understates the industry’s 
influence in Washington. According to Public Citizen, a consumer’s organization, the 
industry spent approximately $500 million on lobbying in the six years before the 
election, employing some 600 lobbyists including about two dozen former members 
of Congress (Pear and Oppel 2002). Canada’s Research-based Pharmaceutical 
Companies (Rx&D) represents 63-brand names, mostly foreign-owned companies, 
that account for about 90% of prescription drug sales; “Rx&D is involved in the 
development and implementation of policy through its extensive committee structure, 
its ability to act on behalf o f its members, and its capacity to bind member companies 
to its agreements (Wiktorowicz 2003, p.629). Similarly, the influence of the 
Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) on the UK’s regulatory system 
has been considerable. The ABPI is considered “the most successful national 
association in term of its influence” (Permanand and Altenstetter 2004, p.48). These 
powerful national associations have also been able to cooperate at a regional and 
international level. The EFPIA, set up in 1978, has lobbied successfully on many 
issues (e.g. patent period extension), and has been able to play a central role in 
shaping the EU’s regulatory framework (Permanand and Altenstetter 2004; 
Permanand 2006). In similar fashion, IFPMA has often played a significant role in 
representing the industry’s interests at international fora (particularly the WHO) and, 
as we saw, played a critical role in the establishment of the ICH. It has become an 
invaluable institutional feature of the process by acting as ICH’s Secretariat.
The influence of these associations is also reflected in the regulatory process 
of many developed countries. In most developed markets, the industry has a 
significant, and often, institutionally defined role in the regulatory process. This is 
particularly the case in Europe where the regulatory process has often been 
characterized by corporatist arrangements, which foster and encourage close 
cooperation between the industry and the regulators (Wiktorowitcz 2003). In Britain
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for example, the relationship between government and industry has been described as 
a case of “clientele pluralism” (Permanand and Altenstetter 2004, p.47)190. In France, 
the govemment-industry relationship is even closer, with the administration refraining 
from enforcing the detailed requirements of legislation; this is entrusted to 
professional or trade organizations with the government keeping a supervisory role 
over these associations (Hancher 1990). The close cooperation between regulators 
and industry in Europe is not limited to national markets alone. A striking feature of 
the EMEA is the fact that it is not based at the European Commission’s Public Health 
Directorate but rather at the General Directorate of Enterprises. As is the case with 
many national systems, the largest part of EMEA’s funding comes from fees charged 
to companies for the approval and authorization process. In 2002, 63.3% of EMEA’s 
budget came from industry fees (Garatinni and Bertele 2004, p.87). The result is that 
the EMEA effectively, has to compete with national agencies, since companies can 
follow either the centralized or a decentralized process (Garatinni and Bertele 2004). 
The latter procedure also forces national agencies to compete with each other for 
industry fees (Abraham and Lewis 1999). As is evident, this competition for fees 
among national and supranational regulators creates a dependence on the industry, 
with consequences on both the evaluation process itself and the regulatory measures 
that concern the authorization/registration process.
In Japan, the close relationship between companies and the government is not 
unique to the pharmaceutical industry. The regulatory process for most industries 
follows informal deliberations among government agencies, political parties and 
business, and legislation is pursued only after these parties have reached a consensus 
(Edelman 1988, p. 396). Industry committees draft the initial product standard and 
submit it to the appropriate ministry, although the reverse may also happen. In any 
case, “government and business insiders usually reach an agreement before a draft 
standard is presented for formal public comment” (Kanusky 1994, p.701).
Contrary to such corporatist practices, the US pharmaceutical regulatory 
system could be best characterized as pluralist (Wiktorowicz 2003). Industry, medical
190 Clientele pluralism refers to a situation where one narrow economic interest is involved in a process 
o f joint policy formation, and decisions are taken to preserve and protect the structural bases o f this 
interest (Wiktorowicz 2003, p.631).
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organizations, consumer groups and the Congress have all had a significant impact on 
the FDA’s regulatory work. Representation of the industry’s interests is external, 
mostly based on public notice-and-comment procedures and judicial review, courses 
of action also available to other interest groups. Moreover, the fragmentation of the 
institutional power of the FDA through the oversight and intervention of Congress 
and the courts, have prevented the FDA from engaging more heavily with the 
industry; as we have seen, this type of oversight tends to direct the FDA towards an 
adversarial stance vis a vis the industry (Grabowski 1976; Jordan 1992; Wictorowicz 
2003). However, the “drug-lag” issue and competitiveness concerns, particularly in 
the 1980s, started to erode this attitude. This change, as we have seen, was 
encouraged and indeed promoted by gradual modifications of the regulatory 
framework through the deregulatory policies of consecutive Conservative, but also 
Democrat administrations. In 1987, new IND regulations encouraged communication 
between the FDA and the applicants throughout the review process, while in 1992, 
Congress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA), which introduced 
fees on the industry for the processing of applications; in 2002 these fees represented 
approximately 15% of the agency’s budget (Garatinni and Bertele 2004). The Food 
and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) passed in 1997, enhanced 
cooperation between the FDA and the industry even further (Wiktorowicz 2003). The 
FDAMA renewed the PDUFA scheme, directed the FDA to use scientific advisory 
(external) committees for advice and recommendations on the clinical study and 
marketing approval of new drugs, and made the FDA-industry meetings during the 
review process mandatory (Merrill 1999). Under this new regime, the FDA is able to 
cooperate closer with the industry. However, this new relationship may have become 
a bit too close for comfort. In 2001, investigators of the House Government Reform 
Committee examined the work of the external committees because of claims of 
mismanagement and improper influence on their members (Gribbin 2001). The 
Committee found experts with ties to drug companies participating in meetings where 
they clearly had a conflict of interest (Wiktorowicz 2003). Moreover, it seems that the 
industry’s influence is not limited to external committees. In a 1998 survey of the 
Centre for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) of the FDA, many drug application
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reviewers revealed that they felt pressure to favour the desires of sponsors over 
science and public health, and that drug evaluation standards had fallen since the 
introduction of user fees in 1992 (Horton 2001).
From the above discussion, it is evident that the industry had the power to 
influence regulators in all three jurisdictions to pursue regulation favourable to its 
interests. However, previously we argued that harmonization seemed to address to 
some degree, both the public interest considerations of the regulators, and the private 
interests of the industry. Therefore, why would the industry need to exert its influence 
over regulation that the regulators seemed willing to pursue anyway? The answer lies 
with the objective of the pursued harmonization. Prioritizing one of these two 
different sets of interests, leads to a different kind of harmonization. Focusing on the 
protection of public interest, would imply an agreement to harmonize “upwards” the 
existing diverse regulations, in terms of drug safety and effectiveness, while reducing 
unnecessary, duplicate requirements. On the other hand, focusing on the industry’s 
interests would mean prioritizing the reduction of the regulatory burden on 
companies, even if that meant operating in the context o f a lowest-common- 
denominator agreement in terms of drug safety and/or effectiveness.
As we have seen, the duplicate testing required by the various jurisdictions 
entailed increasingly significant costs for the industry in terms of both time and 
money. Changes in the nature of the pharmaceutical industry only made things worse. 
The pharmaceutical industry is at the cutting edge of medical and scientific research, 
and the pharmaceutical R&D process is one of the most technically and scientifically 
complex subjects. It is worth noting that the pharmaceutical industry traditionally is 
one of the most innovative industries. Currently, it ranks second in Europe and the US 
and fourth in Japan in terms of its share to total industrial R&D expenditure (EFPIA 
2006). Findings during the R&D process are often published in top academic journals 
of medicine, genetics, biology and chemistry and the leading scientists in companies’ 
research departments are often prominent academic researchers. In addition, research- 
based companies are engaged in a variety of collaborative research projects with 
universities and research institutes (Gambardella 1995; Kanavos 1998). Not only is 
pharmaceutical research extremely complex, but it has been changing at a fast pace as
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the introduction o f  information technologies and new scientific knowledge, 
particularly in the field o f  biotechnology, have revolutionized the industry.
These developments have increased the knowledge requirements to such a 
degree, that not even large multinational pharmaceutical companies can satisfy them 
based solely on their own resources. Already since the 1980s, most companies have 
been forced to cooperate with a variety o f actors at a global level, giving rise to 
transnational knowledge-based networks (Mytelka and Delapierre 1999). As a result 
o f  these developments, the cost o f developing a new drug has increased from an 
average o f $2.5 million in the 1950s (Statman 1983) to $259 million in 1990 (OTA 
1993) to $897 million in the 2000s (Di Masi et al. 2003). In addition, the time it takes 
to bring a new drug to the market has risen from 2-3 years in the 1950s (Statman 
1983) to 12-13 years today (graph 7.5). Consequently, effective patent life today is 
about 8 years compared with the statutory protection period o f  20 years.
-ac
3ae
CJ
Graph 7.5 Phases of the R&D Process and Effective Patent Life
\p $  4>°SV1 \  A  ^
CP&
&
Tfcawi
Years 0 1 2 3 4 5
R&D
Administrative
Procedures
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Supplementary 
Patent Expiry Protection
Certificate
Source: EFPIA 2006
The continuous rise in R&D costs and the erosion o f  the effective patent 
period, meant that the industry’s priorities in a harmonization process were likely to
2 3 6
be dictated by a deregulatory outlook, aiming primarily to reduce the regulatory 
burden on companies: “companies hope for a system that could speed authorizations 
and allow quicker and easier access to the distribution of prescription drugs in 
multinational markets” (Orzack et al. 1992, p.852). Reducing drug evaluation and 
approval requirements would mean that part o f the costs o f health care provision 
would be transferred from the industry (extensive pre-marketing testing to ensure 
safety and effectiveness), to the public (increased monetary costs in both primary and 
secondary health provision due to the use of less effective and/or safe medicines).
Indeed, the industry’s view of what harmonization’s objective should be, was 
made clear early on. The comments of Dr. Griffin, Director of ABPI, at the first ICH 
conference, illustrate why harmonization was important for the industry:
where there are different regulatory requirements between national regulatory 
authorities,..., then valuable resources are being expended unnecessarily. Such 
resources expended by the innovative company are financial since new studies cost 
money. Resources are also consumed in the commitment of skilled personnel who 
could be better employed. Time is consumed and as time is consumed effective patent 
period is eroded. Erosion of patent time means lost revenue and lost revenue 
undermines the company’s ability to continue to invest in research.
(in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p. 560)
In view of this situation, William Steere Jr., CEO of Pfizer Inc., was very 
straightforward in spelling out what he thought harmonization through the ICH 
should be aiming for: “the ICH process should be a means of streamlining 
burdensome regulatory requirements and regulators’ work so as to speed up new drug 
review” (in D’Arcy and Harron 1994, p. 19).
Given the previous discussion on industry’s privileged position in national, 
regional and international, governance arrangements, in line with proposition (1) and 
condition (la), we would expect the research-based industry to press hard and be able 
to persuade regulators to pursue business-friendly harmonization. Indeed, industry 
representatives, who were often present at the bilateral harmonization negotiations 
that took place during the 1980s, were also present at the EC-Japan meeting in 1988, 
where the idea for the ICH first originated (Contrera 1995). In the 1989 WHO 
regulators’ conference, the regulators of the three states/region met with IFPMA and
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agreed the joint meeting of April 1990, which set the foundations o f the ICH. That 
meeting was sponsored by IFPMA (Contrera 1995). The industry thus, participated 
actively in every step of the way towards the establishment o f the ICH and as we saw 
in the chapter 6, has even assumed the operation of the ICH’s Secretariat, which is 
based at the IFPMA headquarters in Geneva. It is obvious that industry was very 
commited in its aim to create and maintain such a harmonization procedure, even if it 
meant that it had to cover a substantial part of the expenses191. Indeed, it seems that 
the thrust of the whole initiative lay with the industry. As Dr. Doi, Director of New 
Drugs Division in the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare admitted in his 
remarks in the First International Conference on Hamomization: “the pharmaceutical 
industry has strongly urged that regulatory authorities promote global harmonization 
of the technical requirements for drug registration and the acceptance o f foreign data” 
(in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p.20). Officials from the FDA, the EC and the EMEA 
have acknowledged in interviews with the author that the industry lobbied hard for 
the ICH and was very important for its establishment and operation. One former FDA 
official, who was heavily involved in the establishment of the ICH, has admitted that 
it was the industry that came up to the regulators and convinced them of the need to 
pursue harmonization in the first place192. The pressure from the industry finally paid 
off and as the Financial Times reported following the first ICH conference in 1991:
for three years, the world’s drugs industry has been trying to lighten the heavy 
financial burden of regulation by persuading national governments to standardise 
their rules...an ambitious initiative was announced this week after 18 months of 
tricky negotiations and sustained lobbying from pharmaceutical companies.
(Abrahams 1991)
As expected, the industry’s view of harmonization was echoed by regulators involved 
in the design and establishment of the ICH process. According to the vice-President 
of the Commission, Martin Bangemann:
191 IFPMA is responsible for the preparation and documentation o f the SC meetings as well as 
coordinating the preparations for EWG and Discussion Group meetings. It also provides administrative 
support for MedDRA and the Global Cooperation Group and is responsible for the technical 
documentation during Conferences (ICH website, http://www.ich.Org/cache/html/510-272-1 .html. 
accessed 17/01/2007).
192 Interview with author, 23/10/2007.
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The pharmaceutical industry is an innovatory one which spends a high proportion of its 
income on research. That is not to say that it should not be a profitable industry. Our 
joint effort here does not aim at maximizing profits but at reducing R&D costs in order 
to allow much better products to be introduced more rapidly on the world market.
(in D’Arcy and Harron 1992)
Similarly, Professor Strandberg, Director General of the Swedish Medical Products 
Agency, acting as representative of EFTA in the ICH, admitted that, “the need to 
increase cost-effectiveness is the driving force behind the harmonization and 
cooperation initiatives we have seen to date and which lie ahead” (in D ’Arcy and 
Harron 1992, p. 30), while Dr. Doi, Director of New Drugs Division in the Japanese 
MHW, acknowledged in his remarks in the first International Conference on 
Hamomization that, “global harmonization will be extremely beneficial to 
pharmaceutical companies, especially in relation to global marketing and efficient 
recovery of the costs of R&D” (in D ’Arcy and Harron 1992, p.20).
As a result, this approach has also informed the objectives of the ICH itself: 
“the Parties cosponsoring this Conference...re-affirmed their commitment to 
increased international harmonization, aimed at ensuring that good quality, safe and 
effective medicines are developed and registered in the most efficient and cost- 
effective manner”193. This harmony of purpose between the regulators and the 
industry has led critics to argue that the agenda of the ICH is to a large degree the 
regulatory agenda of the industry (Hodgkin 1996; Abraham and Reed 2001; WHO
2002). There has even been an admission to that effect by participants in the process. 
As the vice-president of international affairs at the IFPMA recounted:
The regulators’ attitude was “look, you’re the ones that have been telling us you’re 
wasting time and money because our requirements are all different and therefore you 
should be the ones who are identifying the problems, able to give us a concept paper 
which says, you know, this is the impact, this is the implication, this is the 
consequence” and certainly in the early days the main initiatives came from the 
industry.
(quote from interview, in Abraham and Reed 2001, p. 124)
193 “Statement by the ICH Steering Committee Tokyo”, October 1990, 1, in D ’Arcy and Harron, 
Annex 3, 1992.
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This mode of operation has also been confirmed to the author in an interview with a 
former FDA official, among the pioneers of the ICH initiative, who described how 
the regulators were depending on the industry both for the identification of the 
problems and for the proposed solutions194.
It is evident that, in line with our argument, the promoted harmonization was 
primarily designed to satisfy the industry’s requirements. Nonetheless, the question 
remains: why was harmonization pursued in the context o f the ICH and not in an 
international organization? According to propositions (2a) and (2b), we would expect 
regulators to shift the harmonization forum to a technically oriented, transnational 
non-state organization, in issue-areas with a high degree of technical and/or scientific 
complexity, when the issues being regulated, have a high potential to draw public 
attention. This can help regulators reduce the visibility of the whole harmonization 
process and exclude civil society organizations and other interested stakeholders from 
the discussion, hopefully reducing the risk of wide public awareness and reaction. 
The technical nature of the issue-area, particularly if expert representatives from civil 
society organizations are excluded from the negotiating process, meants that the 
public is unlikely to learn or understand the content and significance of this 
harmonization process.
Indeed, the kind of cooperation described above, would not have been 
possible in an international regulatory forum where other stakeholders were also 
present. It is certain that regulators would prefer to avoid extensive public exposure of 
the harmonization process, given the high political risk involved in reducing pre- 
marketing registration procedures for drugs for human use. Pursuing harmonization in 
the context of an organization like the OECD would draw public attention and would 
enable various stakeholders (e.g. medical associations, consumer and patient 
associations, and health-related NGOs) to follow the process closely and offer their 
input. In this context, deregulatory measures seemed unlikely, since they could find 
opposition from other interest constituencies and spark a negative public reaction 
with potentially significant political consequences. The potential for such a negative 
reaction was very high. As we saw in chapter 6, literally all regulatory interventions
194 Interview with author, 23/10/2007.
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in the 20th century were the result of public outcry in the wake of significant public 
health crises. Despite the technical nature of the issue-area, the political risk involved 
was significant, as the recent AIDS campaign in the US had made clear. The reforms 
demanded by the AIDS activists concerned the same kind of technical issues, 
pertaining to the drug evaluation and approval process. The significant publicity that 
the issue gained and the ability of the campaigners to reach the wide public through 
the media, showed that motivated and well-organized interest constituencies could 
deal significant political damage. The point was made eloquently by Dr. Poste of 
SmithKline Beecham:
the whole regulatory framework of not only the national research agenda, but certainly 
certain elements of regulatory strategy and posture in the United States, have been 
altered by the nature of the AIDS epidemic. A highly educated affluent, well-motivated 
community, unleashed to demand reform in regulatory process and I would argue 
dangerous precedents on occasion in terms of the nature of the review processes which 
have been adopted. The question we have to ask is, who is next?
(in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p. 37)
The ICH structure has been very useful in keeping other stakeholders out of the 
regulatory process and as would be expected both the industry and the regulators have 
supported it fervently. Industry executives have repeatedly argued that exclusion of 
other actors such as consumer groups is justified because such organizations would 
not understand the ICH proceedings since they lack the technical expertise, they are 
not “scientific” enough (Abraham and Reed 2001). Regulators have also justified the 
shift to the ICH and the exclusion of other stakeholders on the same basis. Officials 
from the FDA, EMEA and EC have stressed in interviews with the author, that the 
guidelines developed in the context of the ICH deal with extremely technical issues, 
and that the required expertise lies primarily with the industry. Indeed, one of them 
argued that interest groups other than the industry do not have the required 
expertise195. However, this line of argument has two problems. First, it runs contrary 
to how the pioneers of the ICH themselves have characterized the process. According 
to the comments made by Martin Bangemann, EC Vice-President, at the inaugural 
ICH meeting regarding the objectives of the ICH, “this first Conference on
195 Interview with author, 13/04/2007.
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Harmonization is no ordinary scientific conference, but combines the scientific and 
regulatory aspects against the background of increasing R&D costs” (D’Arcy and 
Harron 1992, p. 1). Secondly, such an argument cannot be easily supported given that 
some groups of outsiders, for example medical associations, obviously have the 
necessary expertise to participate meaningfully in the process, while others, such as 
consumer associations, often employ academic or other experts to represent their 
interests in a number o f international fora. Indeed, representatives from the medical 
profession and international NGOs active in the health sector have repeatedly 
criticized the closed and opaque character of the ICH process (Hodgkin 1996; 
Abraham and Reed 2001). The WHO has also expressed its concern over this issue: 
“there is a perceived lack of sufficient consultation with academic scientists, health 
professionals, and societal forces such as consumer and patient groups” (2002, p. 16). 
The implausibility of this argument is further illustrated by the inability o f regulators 
to provide a consistent and meaningful explanation for the structure of the ICH, 
which delegates regulatory authority to the pharmaceutical industry. The answer of 
Dr. Arlett, representative of the European Commission at the ICH Steering 
Committee is indicative o f this:
why not have industry as advisers rather than actually at the table directly? Well, that 
is a perfectly valid perspective and I agree that you could design alternative models 
with industry advising but not deciding...it is a model for developing technical 
guidelines and there are other models, and I am fully aware that there are opinions 
out there in some stakeholder groups that think that industry should not be involved 
or directly involved in the development of guidelines that govern its own work; that 
is not the view of this Commission. This Commission does believe that industry has a 
very active role196.
There is no explanation, no specific argument about why the European Commission 
decided on this particular model, especially since there is an admission that other 
types of models could be used; it was simply the Commission’s choice that the 
industry should be involved.
Similarly, regulators could not provide a convincing answer to the author 
when asked why they did not pursue harmonization in the context o f the OECD, 
which was already active in the harmonization o f several technical aspects of
196 Interview with author, 15/05/2007. We should note however that Dr. Arlett was not part o f the 
European team of regulators involved in the design and establishment o f the ICH in the late 1980s.
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pharmaceutical regulation at the time of the ICH establishment. An EMEA 
representative argued that the choice of the ICH was purely based on practical 
reasons, as the number of parties that participated should be limited in order to 
achieve progress197. This however does not explain why the industry should have 
voting rights in the process, or why the OECD, where approximately the same set of 
countries would participate, was not selected. His answer was that he did not know 
why the OECD was not chosen, while the answer of a former FDA official was that 
they simply did not think of it198. Surely, one would expect more detailed and clear 
explanations from public regulators, when justifying the choice of a regulatory 
structure as unique and consequential as the ICH, over an established international 
organization.
Finally, beyond excluding other stakeholders from participating in the 
regulatory work, reducing thus the visibility of the harmonization process, the 
structure of the ICH combined with the technical nature of the issues being regulated, 
have also served to reduce the visibility of the produced guidelines, as well as the 
ability of stakeholders to influence them even outside of the negotiating process. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, given the highly technical and quite advanced stage 
of development of the guidelines when they reach the public comment process, it is 
very difficult for other stakeholders to comment meaningfully on the guidelines 
(Goldman 1994; Booth 1997).
The weaknesses in regulators’ defense of the ICH structure, and the 
redistributive aspects of the promoted harmonization, can be seen in the regulatory 
outcome of the ICH. There is evidence that suggests that the negotiations in ICH are 
more than strictly technical discussions about the best scientific solution to a highly 
complex issue, and that other regulatory parameters, about which other stakeholder 
groups should have a say, are also considered. Thus, critics have questioned a number 
of ICH’s guidelines with regard to the claim that they are based on the best science 
available (Abraham and Reed 2001). For example, the ICH adopted a guideline for 
the duration of toxicity testing in animals (non-rodents) which recommends that
,97Interview with author, 13/04/2007. This official was also not involved in the design and 
establishment o f the ICH in the late 1980s.
198 Interviews with author, 13/04/2007 and 23/10/2007 respectively.
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testing should last 9 months. Previously, in the EU 6 months were traditionally 
required prior to marketing approval, while in the US testing was required for 12 
months. Despite the ICH’s recommendation, which seems to be a compromise based 
more on political considerations rather than scientific evidence, the EC continues to 
accept testing for only six months, for reasons entirely irrelevant to best safety 
practices. The admissions of representatives from both the industry and the EC are 
illustrative (Abraham and Reed 2001, pp. 121-122):
It isn’t pure science. There you are in the US where drugs have always been tested with 
a year’s toxicity and suddenly because of some negotiating with Europe, you’re now 
reducing the safety margin ondrugs being tested...I think the EU had to be very careful 
about the public reaction which says “hey wait a minute, all these years we’ve had 
drugs on the market which were only tested for 6 months” - you know- and that’s why 
the EU absolutely have not said that drugs have to be tested for 9 months - they will 
accept 6 months. They will continue to accept 6 months.
(Vice-President of international affairs at IFPMA)
Europe was between a rock and a hard place on this one. There was no way politically 
that we could go to 9 months because we could potentially have undermined all the 
existing products on the market by saying that they were incorrectly tested.
(EC Official)
Similarly, there are considerable doubts that the harmonized guidelines regarding 
quality issues are driven by the best available science. According to the WHO (2002), 
ICH quality guidelines require high levels of expertise and considerable technological 
capabilities in order to be properly applied. This kind of harmonization, is to a large 
degree determined by the most recent technological developments in production, a 
process which puts less developed countries as well as smaller and generic companies 
in developed countries in a particularly difficult position: “smaller pharmaceutical 
companies, generic companies and many larger companies responsible for essential 
drug production in developing countries may be effectively squeezed out of drug 
manufacturing if ICH guidelines start to be interpreted as the only global standard” 
(WHO 2002, p.21). As the WHO (2002) notes, the benefits o f incorporating these 
technological advances into new regulatory guidelines are only assumed and there are 
no tests which support their adoption. On the contrary, WHO argues that the quality 
assurances of pharmaceutical products established and maintained through its own
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Expert Committee on Specifications for Pharmaceutical Preparations, are based on 
robust tests and that there is no new scientific data that suggests that the existing 
methods need tightening (2002, p.21-24). One could argue therefore that what drives, 
at least to a degree, harmonization in quality issues, are the advances in 
pharmaceutical production methods employed by the large global research-based 
industries, and not unbiased scientific evidence.
From the discussion presented above, it is evident that the pharmaceutical 
industry in all three jurisdictions has had both the ability and the motivation to press 
the regulators into harmonizing their drug registration requirements in a way 
favourable to their interests. Indeed, the research industry lobbied hard to establish 
the ICH, and succeded in setting up a forum, which explicitly shares its view of 
harmonization, and affords it an institutionalized, privileged decision-making role, 
while excluding other stakeholders. As we would expect, in line with propositions 
(2a) and (2b), the technical nature o f the issue-area and the politically sensitive nature 
of the harmonized regulations, provided regulators with an incentive to use ICH for 
domestic redistribution. Despite criticisms that often guidelines aim at the lowest 
common denominator or even reduce the standard of safety previously in force, 
occasional objections from national and international NGOs199 about the lack of 
transparency and inclusiveness, and similar concerns raised by the WHO (2002), it 
has not been possible to raise significant public awareness about this issue and to 
unite the various stakeholders in an effort to address these issues. The highly 
technical nature of the guidelines has been used by both the regulators and the 
industry to defend the exclusion o f other stakeholder groups, and has contributed to 
the low visibility o f the ICH process, which has allowed the regulators to proceed 
rapidly with the agreement and adoption of over fifty guidelines.
7.4 Justifying ICH’s regulatory authority
We saw previously that regulators were pressed both by the industry and other 
domestic interest constituencies to increase the efficiency of regulation by reducing 
duplicate tests, facilitating exchange of information, and harmonizing requirements,
199 See Scrip Magazine, 1963, 4th October 1994, pp. 18-19 and Hodgkin 1996 respectively.
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so that foreign pre-clinical and clinical data could be accepted without the need to re­
examine them. While these efficiency gains have been linked to harmonization, as we 
saw above, the type of harmonization pursued through the ICH put the industry’s 
interests before that of the consumers and the patients. The question that is interesting 
for this thesis is, how did the regulators justify their decision to pursue harmonization 
in the context of the ICH? How did they justify their decision to give the industry the 
power to co-decide with them both the issues targeted for harmonization and the 
substantive content of harmonization, while excluding other stakeholders?
We have already seen that the pharmaceutical industry is characterized by a 
high degree of scientific and technological complexity. Also, we have seen that 
scientific breakthroughs and technological innovation have made R&D even more 
complex and expensive. Consequently, the way the industry operates has changed and 
joint research projects across borders are replacing traditional in-house research 
departments leading to the creation of transnational knowledge-based networks. 
These characteristics of the issue-area have already been used to justify delegation of 
regulatory authority to the pharmaceutical industry in domestic regulatory systems. 
For example, a consequence of the continuous change in pharmaceutical research is 
that legislation cannot always be very precise in its stipulations of what the drug 
approval process should be looking for. In Canada the vagueness of the Food and 
Drug Act has been cited as one of the main reasons for the delegation of increased 
authority to Rx&D by the Therapeutic Products Directorate (TPD), in the 
development of guidelines for the inspection of manufacturing practices and the self­
regulation of advertising claims (Wiktorowicz 2003). Moreover, lack of financial and 
therefore scientific resources has been identified as a major factor for the close 
relationship between the regulators and the industry, with the former often being 
dependent on the latter for expertise and information (Abraham 1995; Wiktorowicz
2003). As Wiktorowicz notes in his comparative study of pharmaceutical regulation:
while industrialized nations have established elaborate regulatory systems, they do 
not have complete independence in this policy area. Since they cannot conduct the 
clinical and preclinical trials necessary to determine the safety and efficacy of 
pharmaceuticals, governments must entrust the research and development of drugs, 
on which regulatory decisions are based, to private sector actors. Regulatory
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authorities therefore rely on the technical capabilities and goodwill of industry and 
the cooperation of scientists in the research community to assess new drug products.
(2003, p.627)
This argument about the inadequacy of the traditional state regulation to provide 
adequate regulatory governance, has been employed even in the case o f the FDA, 
which is the largest and best-resourced pharmaceutical regulatory agency in the 
world, the only one that reanalyzes clinical trial data on which product evaluations are 
based (Wiktorowicz 2003). It is worth noting that one of the reasons cited by the 
committee appointed by Health Secretary Sullivan for the FDA restructuring in the 
early 1990s, was that the FDA lacked qualified personnel and no longer had “the 
scientific ability to evaluate new drugs or to stay abreast o f the revolutionary 
advances occurring in the biological and medical sciences” (Jordan 1992, p.487).
These difficulties are bound to be even greater in the evaluation o f new 
biotechnological products, since the regulatory framework itself will need continuous 
updating. This has already been realised by the regulators: “many o f the guidelines in 
place for drug development do not encompass the new technologies, and thus new 
guidelines will have to be developed, an issue acknowledged by both the FDA and 
the EMEA” (Pirmohamed and Lewis 2004, p.288). Uncertainty over the new 
technologies will more likely lead to greater reliance on the industry for regulatory 
issues; already both the FDA and the EMEA, which support the introduction of new 
pharmacogenetics-based therapies, are meeting regularly with the industry to 
encourage “joint discussion of the meaning and interpretation of pharmacogenetics 
data” (Pirmohamed and Lewis 2004, p.288).
As anticipated by our framework, these types of arguments have also been 
employed by the regulators in the case of the ICH. First, in accordance with 
proposition (5), regulators participating in the ICH process have repeatedly stressed 
the increasing complexity of the R&D process due to scientific and technological 
developments. Thus, Professor Poggiolini, Chairman of the CPMP, noted in his 
opening remarks at the First International Conference on Harmonization the changes 
that started taking place in research strategies for the identification of new medicines:
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Over the last ten years an important evolution took place in concepts applied to the 
planning of new drugs, principally by virtue of the progress achieved in the field of 
molecular biology. Research strategies are currently guided by knowledged acquired 
on cellular biochemical processes rather by chemical concepts...an extremely 
important role in the discovery of non-conventional drugs is played by the 
extraordinary progress made in that sector of molecular biology addressed to the study 
of genetic molecular material, and to the appropriate technologies for its modification, 
aimed at producing therapeutically useful substances...finally consideration should be 
given to the evolution of genetic engineering...
(in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p.l 1) 
What is more, regulators have acknowledged that these developments have created 
significant costs for the research-based industry200, which in turn transform the way 
the industry conducts research:
To accommodate the exorbitant costs of modem research, industry could take certain 
initiatives, such as strategic alliances. In fact, increased costs coupled with the drop in 
productivity, has already resulted in a tendency for pharmaceutical companies to seek 
collaboration in the research field. The number of strategic pharmaceutical alliances 
among companies consistently increased between the years 1986 and 1990...alliances 
in the biotechnology field... also greatly increased during the same period.
(Poggiolini in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p.l 1) 
These developments had consequences for the ability o f regulators to provide 
governance:
We have, of course, to recognize the difficulty for regulatory authorities to depart from 
traditional ways in their national environment, in order to adapt to the new 
international dimension stemming from the global nature of pharmaceutical research.
(Sauer in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p.556)201
These themes have been echoed by regulators throughout the operation o f the ICH 
process. For example, many years later, in the context o f the Sixth International 
Conference in 2003 in Osaka, the regulatory and scientific challenges due to new and 
advanced technologies, and due to the globalization of drug development, were 
identified as the two most significant future challenges for the ICH202.
In order to deal with these challenges, regulators o f all jurisdictions have 
stressed the importance of pursuing harmonization on the basis of consensus founded
200 See for example the comments o f Professor Poggiolini and Dr. Doi in D ’Arcy and Harron 1992.
201 Femand Sauer was at the time Head of Pharmaceutical Unit at the EC.
202 Sixth International Conference on Harmonization, New Horizons and Future Challenges, Summary 
Report, 13-15 November 2003, Osaka, Japan.
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on the best available science and expertise203. Regulators from all three regions have 
repeatedly acknowledged the unique structure of the ICH204, but in accordance with 
proposition (4), have defended their choice on the grounds that the ICH has provided 
them with an ideal forum for this kind of technical/scientific harmonization:
The first international conference on harmonization provides a forum for the relaxed 
and open exchange of views, the cross-fertilization of positions and an eventual 
harmonised outcome...the advantage of a technically based conference such as this 
one, is that the real experts can express the true scientific needs and the regulators can 
can benefit from the clear unbiased views of these international experts.
(Bangemann in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p. 4-5).
The first ICH developed into a unique opportunity and forum beyond many 
expectations...experts at the highest levels, representing their institutions throughout 
the world, both industry and regulators, have come together to communicate on 
scientific issues of common interest.
(Dr. Esber in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p. 549)205
The role of the industry was particularly important in this process, as the expertise it 
possessed was necessary for the regulators trying address these challenges:
It would inappropriate not to acknowledge the valuable contribution of industry 
representatives in these activities. Not only has the industry provided a strong stimulus 
for these efforts and worked to identify the practical differences in requirements among 
the three regions, but has actively participated in the scientific deliberations and the 
collection of data to support the scientific discussions.
(Dr. Esber in D’Arcy and Harron 1992, p. 551)
This was particularly true for new areas of pharmaceutical research:
Biotechnology is, of course, a relatively new science whose technology is changing 
rapidly and whose innovative products are emerging from laboratories at a staggering 
pace. Because it is evolving so rapidly, biotechnology provides a forum where 
scientists from academia, industry and regulatory agencies can discuss issues based on 
scientific data without the constraints of ingrained policies or historic precedents.
(Dr. Kessler in D’Arcy and Harron 1994, p. 24)206
203 See the Proceedings o f the first two conferences in particular (D’Arcy and Harron 1992,1994).
204 See for example some o f the opening and closing remarks o f regulators o f all three regions in the 
International Conferences on Harmonization (D’Arcy and Harron 1992, 1994,1996).
205 Dr. Esber was at the time Associate Director for Research and Regulatory Coordination, CBER, 
FDA.
206 Dr. Kessler was at the time the FDA Commissioner.
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The ICH represented a complete break from traditional international cooperation 
mechanisms one ideally suited to the new regulatory environment. So much so, that it 
urged all regulatory authorities to reassess and change their own structures along the 
spirit of the ICH process:
The ICH process has prompted us to reassess FDA’s current procedures, especially 
within the context of international peer review and the structure of the ICH process. 
These gains, I am sure, are shared also by our European and Japanese colleagues: we 
all have been compelled by ICH to take a fresh look at our approaches and policies, 
and adjust them in light of the latest science.
(Dr. Kessler in D’Arcy and Harron 1994, p. 24)
To be sure, both European and Japanese regulators echoed Dr. Kessler’s 
comments207.
This public defence o f the ICH process has been confirmed to the author in 
interviews with regulatory representatives from the three jurisdictions of the ICH 
process. All regulatory agencies’ representatives interviewed by the author stressed 
the very specific and technical nature of the work conducted in the ICH208. According 
to Dr. Arlett o f the European Commission, the expertise needed to understand and 
conduct this kind of work lies with the industry, and therefore its participation is 
essential:
The innovative pharmaceutical industry associations are at the table directly, and the 
justification for that at the beginning and the justification for that now is that the 
representatives of the industry have the expertise, and very valuable expertise; they 
are also best placed to judge disharmony because they are trying to access the three 
markets and therefore they are ideally placed to tell us where disharmony occurs209.
As we saw previously, similar remarks have been made by industry representatives 
who have justified the participation of the industry and the exclusion of other 
stakeholders, on the grounds that the industry alone holds the required expertise for 
the technical harmonization being pursued in the ICH (Abraham and Reed 2001).
Still, the choice of the ICH as the forum for pharmaceutical harmonization is 
surprising, when justified on grounds of protecting the public interest. This as we 
have seen, is due to the politically sensitive nature of the issue-area in question. While
207 See comments by Keith Jones and Tatsuo Kurokawa in D’Arcy and Harron 1994, pp. 536-537.
208 Interviews with EMEA, EC and current and former FDA officials.
209 Interview with author, 15/05/2007.
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harmonization in the context of the ICH has targeted the “technicalities” of the 
approval process of commercial products, these products, medicines, are directly and 
inextricably related with the status of public health in any society, and its ability to 
treat disease. Indeed, it is for this reason that regulators have sought to justify their 
decision to participate in the ICH process, not only in terms of efficiency gains and 
technical expertise, but have stressed that these efficiency gains contribute 
siginficantly to the very purpose of their authority, that is, the protection of public 
health. At the opening session of the first ICH conference in 1991, the Vice-President 
of the European Commission argued that savings made by companies from 
harmonized regulations would further the delivery of innovative research, yielding 
therapeutic benefit to patients (Bangemann in D’Arcy and Harron 1992), while Vice- 
President Quayle argued that harmonization would save “millions o f lives”(Leary
1991). This connection between efficiency and public health has been necessary, 
since “by representing it [the ICH] as being in the interest o f public health, it became 
legitimate for governmental regulatory agencies, who are supposed to protect public 
health, to become its allies” (Abraham and Reed 2001, p. 117). This argument has 
been also promulgated by the industry, eager to justify the ICH process in terms of 
public interest: “failure to achieve harmonization results in the repetition of studies to 
meet divergent regulatory requirements. Such repetition takes time, and therefore 
delays new therapeutic advances reaching patients. Speeding access of patients to 
new treatments can for many be life-saving” (Griffin, ABPI Director, in D’Arcy and 
Harron 1992).
In addition, the presence of public health risk, in line with condition (lb), has 
forced regulators to set up a hybrid regulatory structure where they retain a decisive 
role. In the ICH structure, regulators have retained voting rights that give them the 
power to control all ICH decisions. Final approval at step 4 is only achieved once the 
three regulatory authorities sign off the proposed guideline. This allows the regulators 
to argue that they retain the ultimate decision-making power in the ICH: “ICH is a 
harmonization process where there is then the final sign off...[the final sign off] is 
only amongst the regulatory partners at the ICH Steering Committee, so the final sign
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off of the guidelines is only by the regulators”210. This is in contrast to the IASB, 
where the decision-making body is comprised solely by non-state actors. The 
structure of the ICH therefore, has a stronger intervention mechanism whereby the 
regulators participate in the development and approval of the actual regulatory work. 
This, I believe, reflects the heightened societal perception of risk related to medicines 
and therefore the correspondingly higher associated political costs.
7.5 Summary and conclusions
Diverse national regulations for the registration procedures of medicines for human 
use create significant financial and time costs for multinational pharmaceutical 
companies, but also for patients, regulators, and governments. Harmonization, by 
cancelling duplicate tests, promoting mutual recognition of certain pre-clinical and 
clinical results and harmonizing the information necessary to acquire marketing 
approval in all countries, can reduce significantly the time and costs needed to put a 
new drug in the market. These benefits became particularly important for the industry 
during the 1980s, when the cost and time for developing new drugs and satisfying all 
the necessary pre-marketing regulations increased to levels that even multinational 
companies had a difficult time meeting. The industry pressed for harmonization of 
drug registration procedures aiming primarily to a reduction of the regulatory 
requirements of the drug approval process and lobbied for a hybrid, transnational 
regulatory forum.
The timing helped their cause. In Europe, institutional developments in the 
context of the 1992 project and frustration with past failures produced a strong 
impetus in favour of harmonization. At the same time, the financial burden of 
European health care systems, made regulators more receptive to the idea of 
harmonization as it held the promise of lower drug prices and therefore reduced 
health care costs. In Japan, concern over health care costs was also important, but 
equally significant was a desire to develop the growing Japanese pharmaceutical 
industry into a significant global player. In the US, it was the public outcry against 
the FDA’s inefficiency and a conservative administration (and later Congress)
210 Interview with Dr. Arlett, 15/05/2007.
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promoting pharmaceutical market-friendly re-regulation that contributed to the FDA’s 
decision to embrace harmonization.
The coincidence o f industry pressures and domestic political circumstances 
favourable to harmonization gave added urgency to regulators’ move towards 
harmonization. Nonetheless, harmonization did not have to occur in a transnational 
regulatory forum like the ICH. The WHO had a clear and legitimate mandate to 
develop international pharmaceutical regulation. However, the triad regulators did not 
see positively the type of harmonization promoted in the WHO and could not afford 
the compensatory costs associated with it. So, they used the absence o f research- 
based pharmaceutical industry in developing countries to exclude them from a joint 
govemment-industry regulatory forum. Still, regulators could achieve the same result 
by using an alternative inter-state or inter-governmental forum comprising only 
developed states, like the OECD, particularly since a conflict o f interests among the 
three regulators cannot be substantiated. The only explanation consistent with the 
evidence is that, in accordance with proposition (1), the regulators o f the three 
states/region created the ICH as a means to effect domestic redistribution in favour of 
their research-based industries. The history, objectives, structure and regulatory 
output o f the ICH provide support for this claim.
The large multinational companies that dominate the world pharmaceutical 
industry have traditionally been able to organize and lobby their governments, but 
also international and regional organizations, successfully. As per condition (la), in 
the late 1980s they were able to lobby and persuade their respective regulators of the 
need to pursue technical harmonization, and to do so in the context o f a hybrid 
regulatory forum like the ICH. According to propositions (2a) and (2b), we would 
expect regulators to use transnational regulatory authority for domestic redistribution 
in issue-areas with a high degree of technological and/or scientific complexity, when 
the issues being regulated have a high potential to attract public attention. Indeed, 
reducing regulatory requirements for the evaluation and approval of new drugs, is a 
higly sensitive political issue, despite its technical complexity, as made evident by the 
history o f all significant regulatory interventions in the pharmaceutical industry and 
the recent AIDS’ patients campaign in the US. Shifting harmonization to a
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technically-oriented forum, which excluded “non-experts” could overcome these 
problems. As expected, the regulators agreed to the industry’s suggestion and decided 
to pursue harmonization in the ICH. The technically complex nature o f the issue-area 
and the exclusion of other stakeholders from the process have allowed the ICH to 
proceed in its work without attracting significant social visibility.
The redistribution pursued in this case does not mean that the regulators in the 
three jurisdictions sacrificed the interests of the public to the interests of the industry. 
Rather, pharmaceutical harmonization is a case where the private interests of the 
industry coincide to a significant degree with the public interest. The point is 
however, that the industry’s interests seem to have been given a higher priority. As 
long as the public interest was served to a satisfactory degree, the industry’s preferred 
direction and mode of regulation was chosen. Transnational regulatory governance 
was chosen primarily for the private goods it created.
Finally, according to proposition (4) and (5), the inability o f the state 
apparatus to provide adequate governance in this issue-area, in the context of 
significant scientific and technological developments that have transformed the way 
the R&D process take place, and the expertise of the private sector have been both 
cited by regulators as reasons for allowing the industry to participate as an equal 
partner in the context of the ICH. As we have seen, the industry was relied upon to 
identify the problems caused by the diversity of national registration requirements 
and also to propose the solutions for these problems. Moreover, given the politically 
sensitive nature of the issue-area in question, the regulators of the triad have also 
sought to justify their actions explicitly in terms of great benefits for public health, 
while also taking care to develop, as per condition (lb), an institutional mechanism 
for the approval and endorsement of the produced guidelines, that allows them to 
argue that they still retain the ultimate authority over the harmonization process.
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Chapter 8
Transnational Regulatory Authority and Global Economic
Governance
8.1 Introduction
Following the examination of the IASB and the ICH through the lens of transnational 
regulatory authority, it is now time to return to our theoretical framework in order to 
evaluate its propositions in light of the case studies’ findings. The summation and 
comparative evaluation of the evidence presented below will show that the 
propositions put forward in our theoretical framework have been given empirical 
support by our case studies. Of course, this verification does not translate in a final 
and conclusive validation of our framework. Nonetheless, I believe that it establishes 
a good starting point for a more thorough and analytically consistent investigation of 
transnational non-state governance. Following the overview o f the evidence, we shall 
turn our attention to a number of issues that emerged from our research, and examine 
them in the context of the current literature debates on the nature, consequences and 
future of global governance. In this context, we shall also attempt to outline potential 
avenues for future research.
8.2 Explaining the emergence of transnational regulatory authority
Transnational regulatory authority is a consequential new aspect of transnational non­
state governance, one not explicitly identified and analysed as such until now. Its 
features transcend the traditional gulf between binding state authority and voluntary 
non-state governance. Invested with transnational regulatory authority, a non-state 
organization can issue rules that enjoy binding legal force. While setting it apart from 
other types o f non-state governance, this distinctiveness of transnational regulatory 
authority also creates the puzzle of its emergence. In chapter 3, we posed three 
research questions in order to delineate this puzzle, and then offered a series of 
propositions and conditions to answer them. The principal argument of the thesis, as 
expressed in proposition (1), is that the use of transnational regulatory authority is the 
result o f explicit redistributive regulatory strategies aimed at satisfying specific
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domestic interest constituencies. In chapter 3, we put forward this argument after 
rejecting alternative hypotheses on theoretical grounds. Before proceeding to an 
evaluation of the propositions developed in our theoretical framework we shall begin 
the evaluation of our explanation of transnational regulatory authority by considering 
the alternative hypotheses examined earlier, based on the empirical findings of the 
two case studies.
The case studies’ analysis has shown that the alternative theoretical 
explanations considered in chapter 3, are not supported by the empirical findings. In 
the IASB case, the evaluation of other hypotheses is particularly interesting, as we 
have seen that Simmons and Martinez-Diaz have offered alternative explanations for 
the emergence of the same organization. Simmons’ analysis based on the power of 
the hegemonic financial centre, is not supported by the history of international 
accounting harmonization as presented in this thesis. Thus, Simmons’ argument about 
a dominant regulatory innovator makes no sense, since the SEC made no new 
domestic regulatory innovation intended for export to a global scale. On the contrary, 
the SEC pressured from the forces of financial globalization, reacted by trying to keep 
its regulatory framework as intact as possible, either by achieving a favourable 
international agreement on harmonization, or failing this, by bringing about a de facto 
globalization of US GAAP, while blocking the progress of harmonization. While 
Simmons is right to emphasize the influence of the US markets and the SEC in the 
harmonization process, she overestimates the ability of the SEC to act unilaterally and 
enforce its own standards. As we have seen, SEC’s tripartite proposal failed and the 
SEC was obliged to engage with the IASC in order to influence the future direction of 
harmonization, either by controlling IASC’s work or by stalling its progress. The 
IASC, a transnational, non-state organization became an essential part of the SEC’s 
strategy and indeed the only means to control international harmonization. Moreover, 
Simmons seriously underestimated the ability of the IASC/IASB to become a focal 
point for international accounting harmonization and thought that the G4+1 initiative 
would be a more probable forum for harmonization, and one, where Europeans would 
eventually be dragged on U.S.-U.K. terms. While it is true that the IASC/IASB’s 
standards have been heavily influenced by the SEC and the FASB, Europe has
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nonetheless, through its adoption of the IFRSs as national standards, changed the 
reversion point and acquired a voice of its own in the development o f the standards, 
which as we have seen, becomes increasingly stronger. Today the IASB is the 
unquestionable forum for global accounting standard setting, while the G4+1 was 
dispanded in 2001.
Martinez-Diaz’s account on the other hand, placed emphasis on the role of the 
IASC/IASB as an epistemic community. Nonetheless, as it became evident from the 
analysis in chapters 4 and 5, the IASC/IASB never really constituted a harmonious 
epistemic community, sharing a belief in common cause-and-effect relationships and 
common accounting principles. As we have seen, both internationally, and regionally 
in the context of the European harmonization programme, diversity o f accounting 
standards and principles was so deeply ingrained in the practices o f users and 
preparers of financial statements, that progress in accounting harmonization was 
extremely difficult, in both the UN and the EU, as well as in the context of the 
bilateral contacts between the EU and the US. Even in the early stages o f the IASC, 
when it comprised solely accountants, disagreements were so strong that the 
usefulness and therefore endorsement of its standards were limited, given the number 
of options they allowed. Moreover, we have seen that since the early 1980s, a number 
of different constituents were included in the Board, which makes the characterization 
of the IASC/IASB, as an epistemic community, arbitrary. The manoeuvres o f the 
SEC in order to influence the IASC’s work, particularly in the context o f the IOSCO, 
have demonstrated clearly the political nature of the standard-setting taking place in 
the IASC, while recent developments such as the adoption of the IASs/IFRSs by the 
EU, the establishment o f a European endorsement mechanism that introduced two 
carve-outs, and the controversy about some of the new proposed IFRSs, have 
compromised the image of the IASB as an epistemic community beyond any doubt.
Finally, it is clear that an efficiency hypothesis does not stand up to the 
evidence either. As was clear from the critique of the SEC by highly prominent 
American experts, efficiency gains for small investors and US issuers did not 
necessarily derive from SEC’s dismissal o f foreign GAAPs. Certainly, the NYSE’s 
proposal for a limited relaxation of the reconciliation requirement for a number of
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quality global issuers would only bring benefits to both US investors and stock 
exchanges, as well as to big foreign issuers. Moreover, were efficiency gains the 
overriding objective, the SEC would surely have tried to negotiate an international 
agreement with the Europeans, who were extremely eager to promote harmonization, 
and would not limit its only international effort to a trilateral agreement, which would 
not solve the problem either for the majority of foreign companies, the American 
investors, or the US stock exchanges. On the other hand, Europeans refuge to mutual 
recognition, which only transferred the costs of assessing accounting differences to 
investors and generally users of financial statements, was obviously far from 
efficiency driven, given the deep disagreements among them. Similarly, mutual 
recognition with US GAAP, would benefit the “global issuers”, the constituency 
pushing hard for harmonization, at the expense of small investors and other 
constituncies (e.g. trade unions) trying to evaluate these companies’ accounts. Finally, 
the conduct o f both the SEC and the EC in the context of their engangement with the 
IASC/IASB reveals that their decision was not based on efficiency grounds. This is 
well illustrated by the continuous interference and revisions introduced by the SEC 
during the core standards project, even for standards already judged as acceptable by 
the IOSCO and the unnecessary, from an efficiency point of view, diversion of 
resources away from IASC to the G4+1. Similarly, European efforts to gain influence 
in the IASC/IASB regulatory process, by allowing for example national 
interpretations consistent with IASs, at the expense of overall comparability of 
European statements, demonstrate that efficiency/effectiveness gains has not been the 
main driver of the European engagement with the IASC/IASB.
Similarly, in the ICH case alternative hypotheses do not stand up well against 
the evidence. Regarding the efficiency/effectiveness hypothesis, it is obvious that 
such an explanation cannot be easily reconciled with the nature and procedures of the 
ICH. As we have already argued, justifying the exclusionary set up of the ICH based 
on the argument that the necessary expertise can be found only in the private sector is 
a rather weak position to take. This is even more so for an efficiency/effectiveness 
argument, which is based on a premise of pursuit of the public interest. Reconciling 
the rather opaque structure of an organization where all interested stakeholders,
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except for the industry, are excluded, with principles underlying a public interest 
argument is a challenging task, particularly when there have been criticisms that the 
ICH has not always taken up the opportunity to raise the harmonized standards or that 
occasionally it has even reduced their quality. Finally, one would be hard pressed to 
find any reasons why regulators acting on the basis of an efficiency and/or 
effectiveness maximing rationale, would spend two years o f preparations incurring 
time delays and monetary costs, in order to set up a new hybrid organization, when 
they could use existing international regulatory structures, such as the OECD, where 
pharmaceutical harmonization was already taking place, where approximately the 
same set of countries with the same regulatory concerns would participate, and where 
the resulting regulations could have a higher degree o f legal obligation.
Concerning the epistemic communities argument, we have to admit that there 
seems to have developed a close working relationship between the regulators and the 
industry. Yet, this relationship developed over time and was not one o f the factors 
that affected the establishment o f the ICH. Indeed, as we have seen, in the case of the 
FDA, the relationship between regulators and the industry was characterized as 
adversarial before the establishment of the ICH and the deregulatory interventions of 
conservative US Administrations and Congressional majorities. Moreover, this 
relationship can hardly be said to possess the ambiance of an epistemic community. 
As we have seen, particularly in the early years, the regulators were depended on the 
industry to identify the problems, provide data for their analysis, and propose the 
solutions. This type of relationship can be more accurately described as a dependency 
relationship rather as an epistemic relationship based on equality and comradery. 
Finally, the very nature of the private sector participants, that is, manufacturers’ trade 
unions do not fit the description of scientists operating in the context of an epistemic 
community, as their expertise is exercised under the overriding limitations and 
directions imposed by the commercial interests of the companies their represent. This 
commercial bias in the exercise of science prevents the development o f a true 
epistemic community and as has been shown by empirical studies often runs contrary 
to well-established scientific practice and principles, particularly in the area of 
pharmaceutical research (Abraham 1995).
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Finally, an explanation based on power does not make much sense in the ICH 
case either. The regulatory dilemmas faced by the regulators did not pit them against 
each other. There was no significant distributional conflict that drove a dominant 
power to impose some kind of agreement on the others. The ICH was the result of a 
tripartite agreement among the three dominant powers in pharmaceuticals. The 
commercial dispute with Japan is not enough to explain the emergence o f the ICH or 
the type o f harmonization it promotes. Were these commercial concerns the 
overriding driver of harmonization, the US and the EC would continue their bilateral 
negotiations from a position of asymmetrical power, as they had done in the 1980s, or 
pursue an international commercial agreement that would bind Japan more tightly, 
and would address trade obstacles and not technical harmonization. Finally, as we 
have seen, the FDA, which was the biggest regulatory agency, endowed with the most 
resources, was the one that was the least enthusiastic about this harmonization 
initiative in the beginning. Traditionally, the FDA did not consider foreign testing 
requirements as equivalent to its own and throught that harmonization should mean 
other jurisdictions harmonizing towards the FDA standards. The fact that the FDA 
followed in an initiative led, at least in its initial stages, by the EC, runs clearly 
contrary to the argument of a dominant regulatory innovator.
Since the empirical findings, do not support alternative explanations, we shall 
now turn our attention to evaluating the propositions put forward in this thesis. 
During the discussion of the two case studies, we showed that the empirical findings 
support these propositions. Here we shall summarize this evaluation and try to 
reinforce it by comparing and contrasting the evidence both across and within the 
case studies. The main argument of the thesis is that transnational regulatory authority 
is the result o f an explicit redistributive strategy, employed by national 
regulators/politicians in order to satisfy specific domestic interest constituencies. This 
strategy can be used either to redistribute wealth among domestic constituencies or to 
transfer wealth from foreign to domestic constituencies. In any case, in accordance 
with the economic theory of regulation, and condition (la), we expect the winning 
constituencies to be small, well-organized, and with a high per capita interest in the 
produced regulation. Nonetheless, as per condition (lb), we do not expect
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regulators/politicians to delegate their regulatory authority away completely. We 
expect them to retain a role through an institutional mechanism, and thus the ability to 
control, to some degree at least, the regulatory outcome.
The analysis in chapter 7 has shown that the ICH case corresponds to a 
rationale of domestic redistribution. Duplicate and different testing and registration 
procedures created significant costs and time delays in the introduction of new 
medicines. The research-based industry, which was principally affected by the 
diversity o f national regulatory procedures, agreed in all three states/region about the 
necessity of harmonization and lobbied politicians and regulators in the three 
jurisdictions to begin a harmonization process. The industry was helped by the 
timing, since the escalating costs of health care programmes and the inefficiency of 
existing national and regional registration procedures (and in the case of Japan 
industrial policy considerations) made governments even more receptive to industry 
pressure as harmonization looked like a promising way out of their problems.
Regulators and the research-based industry came together in the context of the 
ICH, to promote the technical harmonization of drug approval guidelines. The 
available evidence suggests that the choice of the ICH was the result o f a commonly 
agreed domestic redistribution strategy in all three jurisdictions. In line with condition 
(la), the well-organized and well-funded national and international pharmaceutical 
manufacturers’ associations, put their weight behind the idea of technical 
harmonization. The research-based industry lobbied hard not only for harmonization 
but also for a forum like the ICH, and assumed the costs of its operation. It played a 
significant role in every step of the establishment of the ICH, and gained a privileged, 
regulatory role alongside national/regional regulators, while other legitimate 
stakeholders were excluded from the process. While, in accordance with condition 
(lb), the three regulators developed a framework that granted them the final sign off 
o f the tripartite guidelines, retaining thus an ultimate veto power, the objectives of the 
ICH have nonetheless followed closely the demands of the industry, which has often 
dictated both the issues in need for harmonization and the content o f the new 
harmonized tripartite guidelines. The produced guidelines have often been criticized 
for aiming towards the lowest-common-denominator, favouring agreement over
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“upwards” convergence, and for being decided on grounds other than the best 
available science. While public health undoubtedly stands to benefit from 
harmonization, the history, structure, procedures, and resulting guidelines of the ICH, 
clearly demonstrate that in chosing the ICH as the forum for pharmaceutical 
harmonization, regulators and politicians used the ICH as a means to reallocate some 
of the costs of health care from the industry to patients and consumers.
On the other hand, the analysis in chapter 5 has demonstrated that in the IASB 
case, the accounting harmonization debate developed into a dispute over the 
distribution of costs for issuers wanting to access international capital markets. The 
distribution of these costs was uneven, as European issuers have had to provide a 
quantified reconciliation to US GAAP for listing in the US capital markets, while 
their American counterparts could list their shares and bonds in European capital 
markets using their home accounting standards. This situation created a long-term, 
structural competitive disadvantage for European companies, since it often prevented 
them from accessing the US capital markets, the world’s most liquid and efficient 
capital markets. The EC therefore, faced a straightforward conflict o f interests 
between big, global issuers with a large per capita stake in the harmonization process, 
and American interest constituencies. On the other hand, this situation also created a 
problem for the competitiveness of US capital markets, which were clearly lagging 
behind in terms of attracting foreign listings, compared to other international stock 
exchanges. The US stock exchanges pressed the SEC to abolish the reconciliation 
requirement, even if only for a few selected global issuers. The US issuers, but also 
SEC’s own regulatory establishment, were against such a move, since it would 
undermine the former’s competitive advantage and the latter’s extensive regulatory 
infrastructure. The SEC therefore, was caught in the midst of a more complex 
regulatory problem, whereby well-organized, wealthy constituencies with a high per 
capita stake in harmonization (including the SEC), were pitted against each other.
To satisfy both constituencies the SEC could either delay the harmonization of 
accounting standards, or failing that, ensure that the harmonized standards would be 
as close to the US GAAP as possible. In the first case, in the absence of an 
internationally agreed set of accounting rules, the attraction o f the US capital markets,
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the existence of a comprehensive and highly developed set of US accounting rules, 
and the reconciliation requirement, could lead to a gradual de facto adoption of US 
accounting standards in international listings. Such a development, if realized, would 
resolve SEC’s domestic dilemma to the satisfaction of all sides, at the expense of 
foreign issuers, investors and regulators. Failing this, an international harmonization 
based on US GAAP, would at least transfer most of the adjustment costs to foreign 
constituencies. Indeed, the SEC sought to influence the development of the IASs so 
that they conformed closely to US GAAP. To achieve this objective and in line with 
condition (lb), it embedded its relationship with the IASC, in a working agreement 
between the IASC and IOSCO, over the work of which it exerted significant 
influence. Moreover, and in the context of a strategic manoeuvre not foressen by our 
framework, the SEC effectively turned its engagement with the IASC into a forum- 
blocking strategy, consistently trying, from within, to delay the rise of the IASC as a 
global forum for accounting harmonization.
On the other hand the EC, tried to resolve its dilemma and overcome the 
SEC’s resictance through mutual harmonization on an international set of accounting 
standards, particularly for the consolidated accounts o f listed companies. This 
solution would ensure that European issuers did not have to incur extra costs for 
accessing the US capital markets, while avoiding tax implications and leaving intact 
most of the European accounting regulatory infrastructure. The engagement with the 
IASC had the potential to help the EC meet these objectives. This engagement 
became gradually closer and eventually led to the landmark decision to replace 
national accounting standards with the IFRSs. The strategy has succeeded, since the 
SEC has come to acknowledge that the future set of global accounting standards will 
be based on the IFRSs, and has agreed to abolish the reconciliation requirement. In 
addition, as per condition (lb), the EC embedded its relationship with the IASB, with 
a European endorsement mechanism, which has allowed it to increase its influence 
over the IASC’s work. Still, the SEC’s and FASB’s influence, gained through their 
involvement with the IASC/IASB, have given them the ability to influence 
significantly the latters’s work, converging, at least to a degree, the IFRSs to the US 
GAAP.
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I believe that the discussion above has shown that both the IASB and ICH 
cases support proposition (1) and its accompanying conditions. This is all the more 
significant, because it is evident that several aspects of the regulatory dilemmas faced 
by the regulatory authorities, exhibit a significant degree of variation, not only 
between but also within the case studies. Thus, while the size, wealth and per capita 
interest of the winning constituencies in both cases conform to the economic theory’s 
predictions, and therefore provide support to condition (la), opposing constituencies, 
varied greatly, ranging from no opposition (IASB’s case in Europe)211, to large, 
poorly organized constituencies (ICH’s case), to significant and well-organized 
opposition (SEC’s case). Also, the regulatory dilemma in the ICH case pitted 
domestic constituencies against each other, while in the IASB case, we had an 
international conflict o f interests (EC’s case), as well as a regulatory dilemma which 
pitted both domestic constituencies against each other and against foreign 
constituencies (SEC’s case). The fact that, while the regulatory authorities in the two 
case studies faced different dilemmas, which created different types o f coordination 
problems between them, still employed transnational regulatory authority in order to 
transfer wealth to specific domestic interest constituencies, provides additional 
support to proposition (1). Indeed, as is evident the two cases represent the two 
different types of redistribution described in proposition (1). Finally, condition (lb) 
has also been given support by both cases. The regulators in both cases embedded 
their relationship with the transnational regulatory fora, with an institutional 
mechanism that allowed them to influence and if possible control the regulatory 
process. What is more, in the IASB’s case, both regulators employed such 
mechanisms, despite the significant differences in their institutional characteristics. 
Thus, the SEC engaged the IASC first throught IOSCO, where it exerted significant 
influence and held the chair of the working group responsible for the cooperation 
with the IASC, and later also through the G4+1, taking advantage o f the influence of 
the FASB as an accounting standard-setter. The EC on the other hand, tried first with
211 In the IASB case, European regulators and the EC did not have to deal with opposing 
constituencies. This is not surprising given that harmonization concerned only the consolidated 
accounts o f  listed companies and did not affect other constituencies significantly. More recent 
discussion about extending IFRSs requirements to other companies, e.g. SMEs, are not related to the 
initial decision to adopt IFRSs.
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the development of a Contact Committee that would coordinate and transmit the 
European views to the IASC, and then through the creation o f the endorsement 
mechanism, to influence the development of the IFRSs and prevent a wholesale 
adoption of US standards.
Propositions (2) and (3), sought to specify the conditions under which 
regulators and/or politicians have an incentive to use transnational regulatory 
authority as a redictributive strategy, compared to other international and/or 
transnational institutions. In the case o f domestic redistribution, we would expect 
transnational regulatory authority to be the choice-strategy when it allows 
regulators/politicians to effect redistribution among domestic constituencies with 
lower political costs than through other alternatives. According to propositions (2a) 
and (2b), this is more likely to happen when, in issue-areas with highly complex 
scientific, technical, and/or technological content, the issues being regulated have a 
high potential to mobilize wide public opposition. On the other hand, when the aim is 
international redistribution, regulators/politicians may employ transnational 
regulatory authority, when in line with propositions (3a) and (3b), in an oligopolistic 
global market structure, there is a distributional conflict among the dominant market 
players, which cannot be resolved through international institutions. In this case, 
transnational regulatory governance may be used as a forum-shifting strategy.
The ICH case seems to verify conditions (2a) and (2b). The pharmaceutical 
industry is one of the most heavily regulated industries. This is understandable, given 
that the regulation of medicines is inextricably linked with the protection of public 
health. As such, pharmaceutical regulation more generally, and the regulation of drug 
approval procedures in particular, can have tremendous political consequences. As we 
have seen, most of the regulation governing this issue-area, has been the result of 
significant public reaction in the wake of public health crises. As a result, until 
recently national regulators guarded their sovereignty in these issues very closely, and 
did not accept foreign pre-clinical and clinical data, on safety grounds. More recently, 
the AIDS campaign in the US, has demonstrated that despite the very technical nature 
of the issues involved, well-organized and motivated constituencies can attract 
significant public attention. In this context, a forum like the ICH provided the only
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mechanism where business-friendly harmonization aiming primarily at cost- 
effectiveness, could be sought without attracting significant public attention. Tthe 
technical nature o f the issue-area, has contributed to the low social visibility of the 
harmonization process. Despite the occasional reactions and criticism from national 
and international NGOs and indeed from the WHO itself, the ICH has remained for 
the most part invisible, opaque and exclusive, its character defended by both 
regulators and the industry as necessary for the conduct of purely technical and highly 
complex harmonization. In the course of a few years, the ICH has been able to adopt 
over fifty guidelines, without any significant public reaction.
Similarly, the IASB case also seems to lend support for propositions (3a) and 
(3b). We saw above, that the accounting harmonization debate turned into a conflict 
between the United States and the EU over the distribution of the listing costs on 
international capital markets. The US was clearly the dominant force in the world 
economy in terms of the significance and attraction of its financial markets. Also, as 
we saw above, it exerted significant influence on international harmonization due to 
SEC’s reconciliation requirement and FASB’s highly developed and detailed standard 
setting work. On the other hand, Europe’s financial markets had also started to grow 
during the 1980s, and as we have seen, by the 1990s European financial transactions 
and market capitalization had grown significantly. Moreover, European financial 
markets had become particularly attractive destinations for big, international issuers. 
Finally, Europe’s structural power in this issue-area was also boosted by the 
European accounting framework, which bound European jurisdictions and made it 
difficult for any single European regulator to make bilateral agreements with other 
states.
In these circumstances, the distributional conflict between the two major 
players was difficult to be resolved. The EC could not overcome SEC’s resistance, as 
it did not possess the structural power required to change the reversion point. The 
troubled history and status of European accounting harmonization which had failed to 
produce a unified European accounting model, and the fact that most European 
jurisdictions already accepted US accounting standards for listing in their markets 
without any reconciliation requirement, weakened its negotiating position
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significantly. Indeed, both the European Commission and European national 
regulators had tried to reach an international agreement on mutual recognition of 
accounting standards with the SEC, but the latter was not interested. On the other 
hand, while the SEC was clearly the dominant player, it could not unilaterally impose 
US standards. The SEC tried through a trilateral international agreement to force 
Europeans to harmonize towards the US GAAP. However, the European 
harmonization programme made the inclusion of the UK extremely difficult. Still, the 
SEC had enough structural power to resist any change in the status quo, which could 
gradually lead to the de facto prevalence of the US GAAP. As a result, there was a 
regulatory stalemate between these two major financial centres of the world economy.
As per condition (3b), it is exactly in cases like this that forum-shifting 
strategy may be employed to overcome the negotiating deadlock. Following the 
failure of the tripartite agreement, the SEC employed a transnational forum-shifting 
strategy, by engaging the IASC and promising transnational regulatory authority, that 
is the legal adoption o f IASC standards, albeit in effort not to create transnational 
regulatory governance, but rather to control and if possible prevent it. On the other 
hand, following its failure to obtain an international agreement based on mutual 
recognition, the EC opted for a forum-shifting strategy gradually transferring the 
debate to the IASC. As was argued above, the IASC was the obvious choice, due to 
its high expertise profile and of course the agreement with IOSCO. As per our 
argument, with this move the EC was finally able to change the reversion point. It 
overcame the problems of the European harmonization project and created, by 
adopting the IFRSs, a set of rigorously enforced, comprehensive, high quality 
accounting standards to rival the US GAAP.
The discussion above showed that while propositions (2) and (3) were given 
support by our case studies’ findings, in contrast to proposition (1) and its 
accompanying conditions, most of the propositions and/or variables included in these 
hypotheses cannot be compared across the two case studies. This is because the two 
cases represent two different types of redistributive strategies and therefore the 
propositions and/or variables involved in their articulation differ between them. Also, 
because these propositions set out the framework conditions for selecting
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transnational regulatory authority as a redictributive strategy, they often refer to 
characteristics o f the issue-area or industry where we would expect to see 
transnational regulatory authority. Obviously, this precludes, at least for such 
propositions and variables, variation within the cases. Thus, the degree o f technical 
complexity of the issue-area or industry, as per proposition (2a), cannot vary among 
the three jurisdictions in the ICH case, since in all three jurisdictions we are 
examining the same industry. Similarly, the oligopolistic global structure of the 
industry in the IASB case is the same for all regulators. To achieve the optimum test 
for these propositions’ validity, we should have at least two case studies for the same 
type of redistribution (domestic and international), where either additional cases of 
transnational authority could be compared for each type of redistribution, or test 
studies could be introduced to test the validity of the propositions. This however, 
would mean that we would have to have four case studies in total, something, which 
was not possible in the context of a resource-bound and time-limited doctoral thesis. 
It remains therefore for further research to validate further these propositions through 
comparative research with other cases. Still, for one proposition (3b), we can compare 
the regulators’ behaviour within the IASB case. As we saw above, both regulators 
tried to use first international institutions to resolve their dilemma and only when 
these efforts failed, did they turn to transnational regulatory authority as a forum- 
shifting strategy. Despite the different use and objectives of the forum-shifting 
strategies of the two regulators, the fact that they both used transnational regulatory 
authority as a forum-shifting strategy, in order to redistribute wealth to their preferred 
domestic constituencies, strengthens the validity o f proposition (3b).
While the arguments and empirical evidence presented above provide support 
for the propositions and conditions relating to the first two research questions, the 
third research question raised the normative dimension of transnational regulatory 
authority. According to propositions (4) and (5), we would expect national 
regulators/politicians that resort to transnational regulatory authority to justify their 
decision by arguing that it is necessary, because changes in scientific knowledge 
and/or technology have altered the nature of an issue-area or industry, thereby
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hindering the ability of traditional state or inter-state mechanisms to provide an 
adequate standard of governance, on their own.
Indeed, despite the significant differences in the subject-matter of the two 
issue-areas discussed in this thesis, in both the IASB and the ICH cases, justification 
for the delegation of regulatory authority to non-state actors was based on an 
argument of necessity. Traditional state mechanisms were presented as inadequate 
given the rapid pace o f technological change and the dramatic transformations that 
this change entailed for the structure and operation of industries and markets. In the 
case o f accounting, the EC argued that the rapidly changing, instantaneous, global 
financial markets’ environment created a new pressing need for increased 
comparability and flexibility o f financial information, which the traditional EU 
mechanisms had proven unable to provide. A new more flexible and international 
accounting setting infrastructure was needed and the IASB provided just that. In the 
case o f pharmaceutical harmonization, the expertise of the private sector was 
presented as necessary in order to identify regulatory differences burdening the 
operation of transnational enterprises in an increasingly global pharmaceutical 
market, and to address problems of extreme technical complexity in an environment 
of continuous technological and scientific change. In both cases recourse to the 
private sector was justified as necessary in order to achieve the regulatory authority’s 
ultimate objective: to serve the public interest. In both cases, as proposed in the 
theoretical framework, endorsement mechanisms were set up to give the regulators 
some degree o f leverage and control over the regulatory outcome. This allowed 
regulators to claim ultimate control over the regulatory process thus hoping to allay 
concerns over the legitimacy o f their actions.
I believe that this brief evaluation of the case studies’ empirical findings in 
relation to our hypotheses provides support for the theoretical framework put forward 
here. What is more, the discussion above, made clear that the comparative 
examination of these findings added to the credibility of this framework, and 
therefore justifies our decision to examine two case studies, one for each type of 
redistribution. While this research strategy limited to some degree the comparative 
examination of the framework conditions that could lead to the use o f transnational
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regulatory authority, it offered other advantages. First, it allowed us to examine both 
types of redistribution, thereby allowing us to test all framework conditions, even if 
only in the context of a single case study, something that would not be possible if we 
had selected two cases of the same type of redistribution. Moreover, the examination 
of our hypotheses for both types of redistribution provided a better test for the 
principal redistributive argument of the thesis, as well as for the justificatory 
hypothesis. Finally, this research design also allowed us to pursue a more holistic 
approach to case study analysis, an approach which was necessary, in order to address 
all the aspects, however different (e.g. interest-based vs. normative considerations), of 
a phenomenon as complex as transnational regulatory authority.
8.3 Transnational regulatory authority and the transformation of global 
economic governance
While providing support for our framework’s propositions, the synopsis presented 
above does not claim the final word on the issue of transnational regulatory authority 
and transnational non-state governance. On the contrary, the case studies’ analysis 
has pointed to new research avenues arising out of the propositions put forward in this 
thesis, and has raised some issues, which merit further discussion in the context of 
current global governance debates. In this section, we shall identify these issues and 
offer some suggestions for potential avenues of future research.
8.3.1 Privatizing and globalizing regulatory authority
A basic feature o f transnational regulatory authority, which was demonstrated clearly 
by our case studies, is the fact that it leads to the creation o f new, and the alteration of 
existing regulatory structures at both the domestic, and the international/transnational 
level. These changes are not random. Two basic elements characterize them: a 
strengthening of the role o f non-state actors and an increasing intertwining of 
domestic and transnational regulatory structures. Neither element is surprising. The 
strengthening and institutionalization of the role of non-state actors in the regulatory 
process is a constitutive feature o f transnational non-state authority. The close 
cooperation between national and transnational governance arrangements was also 
anticipated given our argument about the establishment o f an endorsement
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mechanism by the regulatory authorities intending to use transnational regulatory 
authority. Our analysis of the IASB and the ICH cases however, has revealed not only 
close cooperation but rather an increasing integration of the domestic and 
transnational regulatory structures to a degree that was not expected.
In the IASB’s case, following the decision to replace national standards with 
IFRSs, more than 7,000 European companies are obliged to use them for the 
preparation of their consolidated financial statements. This decision, implemented 
nationally, relocates to a transnational non-state organization a rule-making procedure 
that in most European countries was until recently under the auspices of the 
legislature. Instead of engaging in legislative work for the determination of the 
appropriate national financial reporting standards, national parliaments have now 
become integrated in a regulatory structure involving a series o f transnational (IASB 
and EFRAG), transgovemmental (ARC) and supranational (EC, EP) institutional 
mechanisms, where they perform, as a last act, a largely ceremonial national 
ratification process, while national regulators have undertaken the task of 
implementing the standards adopted through this multi-level process. Although less 
publicized, the ICH’s institutional impact is no less important. The tripartite 
guidelines agreed between industry and regulators have been incorporated in the 
official government medicinal rulebooks of the three jurisdictions participating in the 
scheme, complementing and often replacing other national pharmaceutical guidelines. 
The national regulatory procedure has been incorporated in the wider transnational 
regulatory procedure, with the draft guidelines being scrutinized under the normal, 
national regulatory consultation process in each of the three jurisdictions in step 3, 
before going back to the ICH for adoption in step 4, and finally becoming officially 
incorporated in each jurisdiction according to the national/regional procedures that 
apply to other regulatory guidelines in step 5.
It is obvious that the decision to delegate to non-state actors a regulatory role 
that produces legally binding results intended to be implemented nationally, has led, 
by necessity, to the partial incorporation of these transnational structures into 
domestic institutional regulatory frameworks. In this sense, transnational regulatory
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authority could be conceived as an example of the denationalization process 
identified by Sassen:
particular institutional components of the national state begin to function as the 
institutional home for the operation of powerful dynamics constitutive of what we 
could describe as ‘global capital’ and ‘global capital markets’...these types of 
dynamics unsettle the meaning of ‘national’ in institutional components o f states 
linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalization, and they do 
so within the law, not in violation of the law.
(2006, p. 412).
This conceptualization raises a number of issues that deserve to be examined further. 
A first set of questions has to do with the obvious political question: who gains by 
this transformation of the regulatory process? Are there particular 
constituencies/stakeholders that benefit from this rearrangement of the regulatory 
process? Do these constituencies/stakeholders share common characteristics across 
state borders? It is obvious from Sassen’s definition above, that she considers that 
denationalization favours economic actors with a global or transnational outlook. 
Indeed, according to Sassen (2006) one of the driving forces of denationalization is 
the emergence o f a number of specialized, globally-oriented assemblages which often 
re-organize institutional components of the state into new, globally-oriented 
organizing logics. This argument is similar to arguments made by scholars adopting a 
critical approach. Nolke, Overbeek and Van Apeldoom (2007) for example, argue 
that recent changes in corporate governance regulation, including changes in the 
mode of regulation, are mainly driven (directly or indirectly through the political 
system) by global capital market actors, certain international organizations, and 
professions heavily engaged in transnational activities. In a similar vein, other critical 
scholars talk of transnational elites (e.g. Cutler 2003) which promote new forms of 
transnational governance along the neoliberal lines of a “new constitutionalism” (Gill 
1995).
The framework developed in this thesis makes a redistributive argument based 
on the economic theory of regulation. There is nothing about redistribution that 
guarantees that constituencies more attuned to transnational preoccupations will 
dominate more domestically-oriented constituencies. Nonetheless, transnational 
regulatory authority, by its nature, is more likely to be used in order to satisfy
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globally-oriented constituencies, since they would be more likely to have adequate 
incentives and capacities to engage meaningfully in a transnational regulatory forum. 
Indeed, in both cases examined here, it was global players that pushed the envelope of 
transnational regulatory authority. As we saw, in the case of the IASB, it was mainly 
big European “global issuers” claiming access to global capital, which drove EC’s 
effort of international harmonization, while in the US it was the stock exchanges 
wanting to attract large transnational issuers that were primarily in favour of 
abolishing the reconciliation requirement. In a similar vein, in the ICH case it was the 
major, transnational research-based pharmaceutical companies that were in favour of 
harmonization, and convinced regulators to pursue harmonization in the context of 
the ICH.
Another interesting avenue for research, which can also help us identify the 
winners and losers of this process, refers to the changes that transnational regulatory 
authority entails for the domestic regulatory framework. In the IASB case, it is 
evident that significant changes were made with new transnational and 
transgovemmental bodies being added (EFRAG, ARC) and a new regulatory process 
being put in place. A particularly interesting characteristic o f this process, especially 
given the European tradition of Directives-based harmonization and the code-law 
approach to accounting standardization in many European jurisdictions, is the 
creation of the EFRAG, a private transnational body whose aim is to participate in the 
IASB process as a representative of European interests. The European accounting 
regulatory framework has been reconfigured to incorporate, as a crucial component, a 
private body along the lines of the Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition. This 
development represents a break with the previous accounting regulatory philosophy 
in a number o f European states, affecting thus the established channels of pre- 
regulatory deliberation and thus the opportunities of the various stakeholders to 
access the regulatory process, and their potential to influence the regulatory outcome. 
As Perry and Nolke (2005) have shown, the technical, expert-dominated transnational 
deliberation process between EFRAG and the IASB is dominated by the Big Four 
accountancy companies and the highly globalized and mobile financial sector, while
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there is a complete absence of labour unions or any other broad social interest groups, 
despite the fact that many of the issues addressed by IFRSs concern them directly.
In the ICH case, there were no significant new regulatory structures created, 
but rather the existing domestic and the new transnational regulatory procedures were 
incorporated in a new continuous process transcending national borders. One possible 
explanation for this difference in the two cases could be the different type of 
redistribution pursued in each case. Thus in the IASB case, the objective was to 
influence the standard-making process in favour of European positions. Therefore, a 
new transnational body was necessary to engage with the IASB process while the 
ARC was also necessary to address the legitimacy concerns stemming from this 
decision. On the contrary, in the ICH case the objective was domestic redistribution. 
As we have argued, the advantage of transnational regulatory authority is its de­
politicized character and low visibility. It would seem logical therefore that the three 
regulatory authorities incorporated the new transnational regulatory process in the 
existing domestic procedures in order to avoid significant changes in the regulatory 
landscape which could draw public attention and spark public deliberation about the 
desirability and purpose of these changes. Nonetheless, this difference does not seem 
to limit the adverse effects of transnational regulatory authority on inclusiveness212 
observed in the IASB case. As we have seen, the incorporation of the 
national/regional procedures for public deliberation in the ICH process has not 
resulted in a significant strengthening of the voice o f other stakeholders in the 
process. Even when an issue is of particular importance to certain interest groups (e.g. 
the generic industry), these are only invited occasionally to participate, and their 
presence is not formally institutionalized in the process.
Therefore, the institutional changes observed in the European accounting 
regulatory framework in the IASB case, but also the way that existing domestic 
regulatory mechanisms have been incorporated with transnational structures in the 
ICH case, seem to corroborate to some degree the proposition that large, transnational 
economic actors are likely to gain from a shift to transnational regulatory governance. 
Small-scale or domestically-oriented actors and interest groups are less likely to have
212 See Koenig-Archibugi (2006) for a discussion o f the concept of inclusiveness in global governance.
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the resources to participate meaningfully in the new transnational regulatory process. 
However, it should be made clear that this tentative suggestion, while in line with 
both Sassen’s and critical theorists’ positions, does not share their structural 
underpinnings. The fact that big, globally-oriented constituencies seem to be the 
winners of the redistributive strategies which employ transnational regulatory 
authority, does not mean that the latter is a phenomenon consistently promoted by 
certain globally-oriented assemblages or specific transnational classes of actors. The 
argument of this thesis is based on the economic theory of regulation. According to 
this approach, there is no general movement towards a predetermined direction, but in 
each issue-area or industry, depending on the configuration of interests and 
capabilities, one constituency or another, may or may not, be able to win the 
regulators’ favour and promote regulation favourable to its interests. As was evident 
by the case studies, redistribution does not refer only to regulatory dilemmas pitting 
large, globally-oriented constituents against small, domestically-oriented ones, but 
could also also refer to instances of big, globally-oriented constituencies pitted 
against well-resourced and well-organized primarily domestically-oriented 
constituencies (e.g. stock exchanges vs. domestic issuers and the SEC’s establishment 
in IASB’s case), or against other big, globally-oriented constituents (e.g. European 
global issuers against American global issuers in the IASB case). What is more, in 
these cases, big, global constituents were not always on the winning side.
Finally, a significant question, given the interlacing of domestic and 
transnational regulatory structures and the institutional changes, particularly in the 
IASB case noted above, is whether this process can be reversed or whether once these 
changes have taken place going back to purely national regulation is impossible. It is 
obvious that once engaged in a transnational regulatory forum, it is difficult for states 
to renege on their obligations. Although, as we have argued, backing out of the 
decision to participate in a transnational regulatory forum is probably not as costly as 
withdrawing from an international agreement, the element o f legal obligation 
associated with transnational regulatory authority and the creation of an endorsement 
mechanism create significant “sunk” costs which cannot be easily overlooked by 
regulators. Non-state actors conscious of the significance of these costs may claim a
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status of equality with state actors in the context of transnational regulatory 
governance.
The incident with the two European carve-outs in the IASB case illustrates the 
point. As made clear by the European Commission, these carve-outs were exceptional 
and always intended to be temporary pending changes in IAS 39213. They were 
supposed to be renegotiated in the deliberating process o f the IASB through the 
EFRAG. Having decided to replace national accounting standards with the IFRSs, the 
EC and national European regulators could not introduce separate changes into the 
IFRSs to suit their reporting needs, since that would defeat the whole purpose of 
adopting an internationally acknowledged and expert-developed set o f standards. 
Backing out of even a single standard became extremely difficult and working 
through the EFRAG and the IASB was the only option. The IASB knew this and 
seemed determined to press its advantage. This becomes obvious when we consider 
the reported statement o f Paul Volcker, chairman of the IASC Foundation, who in 
reply to the EC Commissioner’s warning that the EC would not be able to approve 
IAS 39 if differences were not resolved, commented that: "the IASB produces a 
standard-you take it or leave it” 214.
8.3.2 Redistributing structural power among states
The double movement observed above from the national to the transnational and from 
the public to the private not only shifts the balance among various stakeholders, but 
also has the potential to alter the balance of structural power among states themselves 
to the degree that it affects their abilities to engage with the global economy and the 
global governance system. In this context, a number of interesting questions emerge: 
are there particular domestic institutional characteristics which reduce the costs and 
risks and/or raise the probabilities of success of using transnational regulatory 
authority? Do these institutional characteristics vary systematically across states? If 
this is the case, does the use of transnational regulatory authority change the balance 
of structural power in favour of certain states?
2,3 IASC Insight, July 2005, p.4.
214 European Banker, April 30,2004 p.l.
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The IASB case study uncovered a complicated picture concerning the relation 
between domestic political and regulatory institutions and transnational regulatory 
governance. Undoubtedly, it was the EC’s decision to replace national accounting 
standards with the IFRSs that effectively turned the IASB into a transnational 
regulatory authority. Determining a clear pattern o f correlation between domestic 
institutions and the decision to delegate authority to the IASB however, is not an easy 
task. This is because the accounting regulatory framework in the EU has never been 
uniform. In countries following an Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition, the accounting 
profession has traditionally been accorded a significant role in the preparation of 
accounting standards. Indeed standard-setting itself is a feature associated with this 
particular tradition since in most Continental countries accounting regulation was part 
of the wider, corporate and commercial regulation and in many cases even legislation. 
Nonetheless, one pattern that was identified was that resistance to closer cooperation 
with the IASB and its predecessor, the IASC, came principally from Continental 
regulators which could not accept the wholesale delegation of regulatory authority to 
non-state actors. On the other hand, states with Anglo-Saxon accounting traditions 
argued in favour of closer cooperation with the IASC215. Although ultimately all 
states in the EU backed the decision to adopt the IFRSs, this decision, as we have 
seen, was a strategic move to overcome the SEC’s resistance without jeopardizing the 
European accounting framework, rather than a shift in the accounting philosophy of 
Continental professionals and regulators.
This pattern could be viewed as providing support for a Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) argument (Hall and Soskice 2001). This approach is based on a 
distinction between coordinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal market 
economies (LMEs), defined in terms of their systematic institutional variation. Based 
on this distinction, a VoC approach would argue that states participating in 
international negotiations would try to promote policies that sustain and take 
advantage of their own institutional make-up (Hall and Soskice 2001). Examining 
transnational regulatory authority through the prism of VoC extends the basic VoC 
argument beyond the content, to the mode of regulation. The particular characteristics
215 See footnote 113, p.162.
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of the institutional structure of a given state’s political economy may provide it with a 
comparative institutional advantage not only in terms o f economic activity and 
specialization as the VoC suggests, but also in terms of its ability to engage 
successfully in global economic governance structures. This is because the ability of a 
state to shift the mode of global economic governance in an issue-area to a mode of 
governance more compatible with the institutional characteristics o f its domestic 
governance structure can be an extremely powerful negotiating tool. The availability 
of the relevant institutional infrastructure, the expertise in, and the experience of 
using a particular mode of regulatory governance, can and do confer a significant 
comparative institutional advantage in the context of international and transnational 
negotiations to the state that possesses them. This point has been stressed by Mattli 
and Blithe (2003) who have argued, that the institutional complementarities between 
domestic and international regulatory organizations are very important for the ability 
of a state to influence the international regulatory process.
Our analysis of the IASB case seems to support such a view. We have seen 
that it has been the US, which has been able to influence most effectively the work of 
the IASB. The SEC engaged the IASC from early on in what was in effect a forum- 
blocking strategy, in order to control or disable it from within. This in turn was 
possible because the SEC was uniquely placed among regulators, due to the make-up 
of the US accounting regulatory framework, to influence the work o f a non-state 
organization like the IASC/IASB. According to Mattli and Biithe (2003) a state with 
well established, inclusive and hierarchical private sector standard-setting procedures 
will be in a better position to influence a non-state regulatory process at the 
transnational level and will thus have the advantage of the first mover. The existence 
of the FASB, which satisfies these criteria, allowed the American regulators to 
participate in significant preparatory work for the IASC from early on, and through 
the G4 +1 in the 1990s, and the convergence project in the 2000s, to take control of 
IASC’s and IASB’s agenda. On the other hand, it is obvious that the absence of a 
pan-European non-state standard-setting entity has hampered the ability o f Europe to 
engage in the work of the IASC.
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According to such a rationale then, it would be reasonable to expect states 
with Anglo-Saxon accounting traditions to push for a move towards an expert- 
dominated, non-state organization, mirroring their domestic regulatory frameworks. 
Indeed, as we have seen the SEC and the FASB pressed fervently during the 
restructuring of the IASC, and succeeded, in shaping the new transnational 
accounting standard-setting structure after the US accounting regulatory framework. 
A similar effort was launched by the EC, which however was unsuccessful. 
Following its failure to shape the IASB’s governance structure according to its own 
preferences, the EC sought to adjust its own regulatory framework by incorporating 
of a non-state body (EFRAG), able to participate in the IASB process.
In the case of the ICH, we have seen that the corporatist regulatory 
environment of many European jurisdictions has allowed the European industry to 
play a significant domestic and regional regulatory role (Hancher 1990; Wiktorowicz 
2003; Permanand and Altenstetter 2004; Permanand 2006). Similarly, pharmaceutical 
regulation in Japan is developed with the input of the industry, which also enjoys a 
privileged position in the regulatory process. On the other hand, the pluralist US 
system did not afford any privileged position to the US industry in the regulatory 
process, whereas the fragmented authority of the FDA, which was constantly under 
the supervision of the Congress, had created an often adversarial stance of the 
regulators towards the industry. Indeed as we have seen, o f the three founder- 
members of the ICH the FDA was initially the most reluctant participant. The FDA’s 
participation in the ICH was facilitated by the gradual change of the regulatory 
framework through the deregulatory policies of consecutive conservative 
administrations and congressional majorities. As we have seen, closer relations with 
the industry were encouraged through legislative measures and a major reform of the 
FDA included among other principal objectives, greater efforts towards 
harmonization.
From the above one could suggest that institutional characteristics associated 
with corporatist regulatory frameworks (e.g. business interest representation internal 
to the regulatory process, informal and accommodative stance vis a vis the industry,
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or closed regulatory processes)216 make the transition to transnational regulatory 
authority both a more likely policy option (due to industry’s significant influence) and 
its implementation potentially an easier task for the regulators (given the existing 
delegation of regulatory authority at the domestic level). Indeed, it should be 
reminded that the initial proposal for the creation of the ICH came up in a bilateral 
EC-Japan meeting, where representatives of the both the European and Japanese 
industries were present. Moreover, as we have seen, the EC was strongly in favour of 
a wider harmonization process and played a leading role in the establishment of the 
ICH. We could therefore argue that the ICH case also supports an extended VoC 
argument in the sense that the ICH structure reflects the close, cooperative and often 
secretive relationship between regulators and the industry found in Europe and Japan 
and not the formal, external and often adversarial relationship between the FDA and 
the US pharmaceutical industry.
This discussion would again seem to support the argument of scholars 
investigating from a critical perspective the recent changes in the mode of global 
economic regulation affecting various aspects of corporate governance (Overbeek, 
Van Apeldoom and Nolke 2007), that changes in the content and mode of 
international and transnational regulation are closely related. While, as we have 
shown above, this thesis also demonstrates that the mode and content of regulation 
are closely related, there is a significant difference in relation to critical theory’s 
view. Critical theorists, position the changes in the global governance structure within 
the context o f a greater transformation, taking place across issue-areas, which aims 
towards a marketization of the mode and content of regulation, along the lines of a 
neo-liberal project. As we argued above, the argument in this thesis is based on the 
economic theory of regulation, which suggests that regulation is a commodity for 
which there is a market with economic but also political characteristics, where 
winners and losers are determined by the configuration of interests and capabilities, in 
a given issue-area at a given time. Similarly, an extended VoC argument does not 
predict the direction o f the institutional changes; it only suggests that states which
216 See Wiktorowicz (2003) for a detailed discussion and a comparative examination o f these and other 
institutional characteristics and their application in pharmaceutical regulation.
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exhibit compamentarities between their national institutions and global governance 
structures will benefit from them in terms of negotiating power and influence. This 
becomes evident by examining our case studies.
According to Perry and Nolke (2006), the shift in global accounting standard- 
setting towards the IASB and the content of the standards promoted through the IASB 
could be seen as a wider structural shift of change and/or erosion o f the Rhenish 
model of capitalism in favour of LMEs’ model of capitalism. However, we have 
found no evidence of such a wide, politically driven, structural shift. On the contrary, 
the evidence we examined suggests that the adoption of the IASs was decided in the 
context of a forum-shifting strategy, and only following the failure of many years of 
effors on the part of both European regulators and the EC to persuade the SEC to 
accept an international agreement, which would respect European accounting 
traditions. Had its proposals for a mutual recognition policy been accepted by the 
SEC, it is extremely unlikely that the EC would be upseting this agreement by 
adopting the IFRSs. On the contrary, the attitude of the EC throughout the 1990s was 
quite adversarial towards both the SEC’s instistence on reconciliation, and the Anglo- 
Saxon, capital market-oriented approach to accounting standard-setting (EC 1990; 
Van Hulle 1993), and as we have seen during the IASC restructuring process, it 
argued strongly in favour of a geographically representative and politically 
accountable Board, in contrast to the market-based, expert-driven Board advocated by 
the SEC (Van Hulle 1999). What is more, the new financial reporting strategy 
targeted only consolidated accounts of listed companies and therefore addressed the 
regulatory concerns o f a specific interest constituency and did not represent a 
wholesale turn of accounting philosophy. Indeed, the European regulatory philosophy 
does not seem to have changed significantly, as is evident from the recent 
interventions and critique of the European Parliament, as well as ECOFIN’s concerns 
and proposals regarding the IASCF/IASB’s governance structure.
The distinction between our argument and critical theory’s proposition 
becomes even clearer when we compare the findings of our two cases. Thus, it 
appears that the parties that pioneered the ICH initiative proposed a mode of 
regulation resembling their own domestic regulatory structure. Nonetheless, contrary
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to the IASB case, this does not translate in a clear and identifiable shift in the mode of 
regulatory governance at the transnational level towards a traditional VoC category. 
The Anglo-Saxon/Continental categories are not so neatly defined in the case of 
pharmaceutical regulation. The pharmaceutical regulatory framework in countries 
such as the UK and Canada, usually identified as two of the most significant 
representatives of the Anglo-Saxon variety of capitalism, are clearly much closer to 
the corporatist arrangements found across Europe or in Japan than to the pluralist 
system of the United States. Both countries have been characterized as cases of 
“clientele pluralism”217. The picture may therefore be more complicated than a simple 
dichotomy along the VoC lines would have us believe and further research is needed 
before reaching safe conclusions on this issue.
The use of transnational regulatory authority changes the balance o f structural 
power not only among developed states but also between developed and developing 
states. In chapter 3, we argued that transnational regulatory authority can serve as a 
barrier to regulatory entry to developing countries. Even if this is not the primary 
objective of the use of transnational regulatory authority, since a similar result can be 
achieved in inter-state forums like the OECD, the exclusion of countries with no 
significant presence in a given industry, serves as a de facto barrier to regulatory 
governance for these countries. What is more, these countries, even if they have no 
say in their design, are very likely to adopt the rules of a transnational regulatory 
authority, since these are legally endorsed by the leaders of the industry.
These imbalances can be observed in both case studies. During its lifetime, the 
IASC was dominated by accounting representatives from the developed world. As we 
have seen, even when representatives from developing countries were invited, they 
often declined the offer because they did not have the required expertise and 
resources (Cairns 1997). Similarly, on the initial IASB’s Board only one member 
from a developing country was appointed218. Despite this situation, we have seen that 
developing countries were often the first to adopt IASs and IFRSs. What is more, this
217 See Permanand and Altenstetter (2004) for the UK and Wiktorowicz (2003) for Canada.
2,8 It is worth noting that the professional experience o f this member had been gained for the most part 
in multinational companies originating from the developed world. See the IASB website at 
www.iasb.org. for biographical details o f the Board members.
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has been the case even when it was obvious that many of the standards did not meet 
their accounting needs (Hove 1989; Wallace 1993; Abu-Ghazaleh 1999). Similarly, in 
the ICH case we have seen that developing countries have not been invited to the 
negotiating table. Despite the fact that increasingly consultation of external parties is 
encouraged, this occasional input has not been institutionalized. On the other hand, 
the Global Cooperation Group whose objective is to help developing countries to 
understand and implement the ICH guidelines, rather than to give them a voice in the 
regulatory process, has acquired distinct institutional identity and resources. Indeed, it 
is for this reason that the WHO (2002) has expressed fears that there is an effort on 
the part of the ICH establishment to turn the ICH guidelines into the de facto global 
marketing registration and approval guidelines.
8.3.3 Accountability, legitimacy and authority
In our theoretical framework, we argued that regulators and/or politicians do not 
operate in an institutional and normative vacuum. Their position as holders of in 
authority capable of issuing commands and directives expected to be enforced, places 
them under the scrutiny of the public eye and the political establishment and obliges 
them to respect several institutional and normative constraints when considering the 
delegation of part of their authority to a transnational non-state forum. In terms of the 
institutional constraints, we have argued that the delegation of authority needs to take 
place in a hierarchical fashion according to specific procedures, that the institutions 
receiving the grant of authority have to demonstrate some features reflective of the 
public character of their regulatory work (e.g. due process, increased transparency 
and inclusiveness), and that the state authorities have to retain some means of 
controlling the process. The two cases examined here have shown that the regulatory 
authorities engaged in transnational regulatory governance have followed these 
dictates. As we have seen, in the IASB case, the proposal to replace national 
accounting standards with IFRSs was forwarded, as required, to the European 
Council and the European Parliament where it was accepted without serious 
objections. Similarly, national parliaments, where necessary, have ratified the 
replacement o f national accounting standards with IFRSs, again with no serious 
objections or delays. Moreover, we have seen that there was a new regulatory
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mechanism put in place which included a political body, the ARC, which is placed 
above the private body, EFRAG, and retains the ultimate authority to decide on the 
adoption of the IFRSs. Also, the IASB has improved its due process and has 
increased the transparency and inclusiveness of its consultation procedures. Similarly 
in the ICH case, it was the competent regulatory authorities, which decided to set up 
and participate in the ICH. It should be reminded that these authorities are, in the case 
of Europe and Japan, supranational and governmental agencies with a clear authority 
to engage in such activities, while in the case of the FDA which is a Federal Agency 
operating under the auspices of the US Department of Health and Human Services, 
the Department and the higher echelons of the administration have clearly backed and 
encouraged the participation of the FDA in the ICH process. Moreover, these 
authorities participate directly in this forum retaining voting and veto powers and the 
ultimate authority to sign off the agreed guidelines. Finally, they have incorporated 
the national/regional procedures o f consultation and comment in the ICH process, and 
following their adoption the guidelines are incorporated in the body of public 
regulation subject to the same enforcement mechanisms as other public regulations.
It seems therefore that the regulators engaged in transnational regulatory 
governance have followed the institutional provisions dictated by their position as 
holders of authority. As far as the substantive-normative assessment goes, we have 
seen that in both cases regulators employed an argumentation based on reduced state 
abilities to regulate, brought about by global changes, and have invoked the expertise 
and resources of the private sector to assist them achieve the purpose behind their 
authority: the protection and promotion of the public interest. It is obvious that this 
justification has for the most part been accepted, since both these institutions have 
been operating successfully in an authoritative regulatory capacity for a number of 
years without serious problems and social or political resistance.
Therefore, it would seem that at first sight, the regulators have done enough to 
ensure the legitimacy o f the process of delegation and o f the new transnational 
regulatory process itself. A closer look however may disrupt this impression. As we 
saw above, by introducing new and altering existing regulatory and political 
structures, transnational regulatory authority has the potential to change the balance
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of power among various economic and social constituencies, among states, and 
between public and private actors. One of course could counter that since there are 
established institutional avenues of participating in and/or commenting on the 
regulatory process, any parties feeling disadvantaged by the proposed regulation 
could make use o f them and oppose it, as would be the case with domestic regulation. 
As we saw in the previous sections however, the institutional safeguards put in place 
have proven inadequate to guarantee a truly inclusive regulatory process. This 
situation obviously raises a significant problem of inclusiveness in the regulatory 
process, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of the produced regulation. In the 
case of transnational regulatory authority this problem is particularly pressing due to 
the element of legal obligation which renders such transnational governance 
structures more influential and intrusive in the everyday operation of domestic 
economies and societies.
As we have seen, many of these problems have been cited by a number of 
analysts in both cases examined here. The question then is why the stakeholders that 
stand in the losing side of the shift to transnational regulatory authority have not 
reacted more strongly. There are two possible explanations. First, there is the 
possibility that they are not aware of the changes under way. Secondly, it is likely that 
they have not understood the impact of these changes on their interests. The first 
explanation is likely to be valid when the issues migrating to the transnational level 
are characterized by low social visibility. Zum and Koenig-Archibugi (2006) have 
proposed that increased visibility through the movement o f issues from sectoral, 
functionally defined publics, to broader publics, and from publics nationally 
fragmented to publics integrated across borders, is more likely to increase the 
significance of legitimacy concerns and consequently lead to changes in the 
governance arrangements. However, the ability to broaden the interested publics in an 
issue-area, as well as the ability of these publics to understand the consequences of 
the promoted regulation on their interests, depends to a large degree on whether there 
are obvious distributive implications, and on whether it is possible to communicate 
these implications in simple and appealing terms in the context of a discourse in the 
public domain. Both of these features in turn, are highly depended on the degree of
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technical or scientific complexity of the underlying issues. Moreover, in order to 
integrate publics across borders a sense of transnational or global public interest 
needs to be identified that people from different cultures and socio-economic systems 
can relate to.
Neither is very likely in cases where we would expect to see transnational 
regulatory authority. In cases of domestic redistribution, according to propositions 
(2a) and (2b), the rationale behind the use of transnational regulatory governance is 
precisely to reduce visibility by transferring the issues under consideration to 
informal, expert-dominated and technically-oriented forums. Therefore, even though 
in this case nationally fragmented publics may indeed share a common interest, their 
ability to realize this is hampered by the technical nature o f the issues selected for 
migrating to the transnational level, and the informal and technical nature o f the 
transnational forum. This move contributes to a further de-politicization of these 
already complex issues making more remote the possibility of resistance and 
mobilization. In cases of international redistribution on the other hand, the interests of 
different publics often lie at opposite sides of the distribution equation or are simply 
indifferent. Thus, it is hard to imagine US or UK trade unions teaming up with 
German trade unions to stem the turn towards an Anglo-Saxon accounting model, 
associated with the work of the IASB.
These observations lend support for Ziirn and Koenig-Archibugi’s (2006, 
p.249) remark that higher levels of delegation do not always lead to politicization and 
demands for higher levels of inclusiveness and publicness in the governance 
arrangements, and that even if they do, institutional change is not guaranteed. The 
authors put forward Kerwer’s (2006) hypothesis that the latter may occur when rule- 
setting and enforcement are undertaken by different actors, particularly when 
enforcement becomes the responsibility of transnational social actors. While this
proposition may hold some explanatory power in the case of the IASB, where the EC
0 1 0enforces the standards developed by the IASB , in the ICH case this is obviously 
not applicable. It is obvious that more research is needed in order to reach safer
219 This also needs to be further examined since Kerwer’s hypothesis refers to voluntary standards 
primarily enforced by transnational societal actors and not public, mandatory enforcement of  
transnational standards as is the case o f the IASB.
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conclusions about the link between accountability, global governance and social 
resistance.
In any case, this situation raises significant concerns regarding the future of 
global governance, and ultimately through the process of denationalization, national 
government itself. As we have argued in chapter 3, technology permeates the 
operation of an increasing number of industries, often creating entirely new ones and 
fundamentally transforming others. This development has raised the level o f technical 
and technological complexity necessary in the operation o f many industries. 
Moreover, technological breakthroughs have made possible faster innovation rates, 
have limited significantly the obstacles of time and space in communication and 
transactions, and have contributed to an increasingly complex division of labour. All 
these changes are gradually turning the operation of the economy into a 
technologically and functionally complex transnational web of activities, whose 
governance necessitates a good understanding of the issues and technologies 
involved, awareness o f the transnational aspects of economic transactions, and 
heightened reflexes to respond to the dramatic changes of the underlying economic 
reality. This in turn makes it easier for politicians and regulators, when they want 
pursue a redistributive strategy, to justify shifting the governance and regulation in a 
number of issue-areas and economic activities to expert-dominated, technically- 
oriented fora. The end-result is an increasing reliance on a transnational bureaucracy 
of experts for the governance of an increasingly globalizing economy.
This perspective in turn threatens the principles of democratic rule. This is 
because we are in danger of turning global governance into an epistemocratic project. 
Epistemocratic authority is different to epistemic authority (Ball 1987). The latter 
refers to an authority as defined in chapter 2. The former refers to the claim of a class 
or a group of people to rule others precisely because they are an authorities. This 
transforms the logic of an authority which, while founded on the possession of 
specialized knowledge, does not claim mandatory obedience. In this sense 
epistemocratic authority is conceptually parasitic upon epistemic authority: 
“epistemocratic authority attempts to assimilate political authority to the non-political 
epistemic authority of the technician or expert” (Ball 1987, p. 48). What is more, the
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increasing reliance on experts and the increased levels of delegation of political 
authority to them is not the principle cause of concern. As Ball argues, the danger is 
not that we will come to concede too much authority to the experts but that we will 
come to conceptualize political authority exclusively in terms o f expertise. This 
assimilation assumes that politics and ethics are activities in which there are experts, a 
development, which could justify the removal of the public not only from the exercise 
of global governance but also from government itself.
The considerations presented in this section, are not meant to offer an 
alternative account to that of the main thesis. They simply point out some of the 
intended and unintended consequences that the use of transnational regulatory 
authority can have for global governance, and offer a preliminary examination of 
these consequences, and a few tentative suggestions, based on the empirical analysis 
of the two cases. We do not argue that transnational regulatory authority is part of a 
wide-ranging, structural transformation of global governance, intentionally and 
consistently engineered, by particular states, transnational classes, or ideological 
movements. Rather we have shown that transnational regulaotry authority is a tool in 
the economic diplomacy arsenal of national regulators and/or politicians, to be used 
for redistributive purposes, depending on the configuration of interests and 
capabilities in a given issue-area or industry at a given time.
8.4 Epilogue
While the case study analyses have provided support for the propositions we 
developed in the context of our theoretical framework, it is obvious that safe 
conclusions cannot be reached with the examination of only two case studies. As is 
evident from this concluding chapter, further research is needed in order to strengthen 
the empirical verification of these propositions (particularly the framework conditions 
relating to the second research question) and to provide answers to a number of new 
questions raised by this research exercise. In this sense, further research is needed to 
uncover other instances of transnational regulatory authority, but also to address cases 
of other types o f transnational in authority, concerning implementation and 
adjudication functions. An obvious place to look for cases of transnational regulatory 
authority would be industries and issue-areas characterized by a high rate of
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scientific, technical, and/or technological innovation and change, where as we have 
aegued, the justification for the use of transnational regulatory authority can be 
persuasively made.
An example of an organization that seems to satisfy the conditions of 
transnational regulatory authority is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), which is a transnational, non-state, non-profit organization 
responsible for managing the Internet Domain Name System (DNS), the technical 
blueprint that allows access and use of the Internet. Within its structure: 
“governments and international treaty organizations work in partnership with 
businesses, organizations, and skilled individuals involved in building and sustaining 
the global Internet... consistent with the principle of maximum self-regulation in the 
high-tech economy, ICANN is perhaps the foremost example o f collaboration by the 
various constituents of the Internet community” . This transnational non-state body 
has developed specific institutional structures performing not only rule-making 
functions such as developing guidelines for the deployment of Internationalized 
Domain Names (IDN), but also managing the DNS, resolving technical problems, 
holding hearings on user complaints though its own ombudsman, and even 
developing a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which has
t
been used to resolve more than 5000 disputes over the rights to domain names . A 
particularly interesting feature of this forum is that it exercises these functions on the 
basis of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the US Department of 
Commerce. Critics have argued that ICANN is effectively controlled by the US 
which has resisted calls to move the functions of the ICANN to an international 
forum (Bislev and Flyverbom 2008). Despite talks at various levels for a number of 
years, culminating in the Tunis World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) in 
2005, and the fact that the MoU between the US government and ICANN was set to 
expire in 2006, no progress was made as the US renewed the concession to ICANN, 
blocking thus the move to an international forum.
220 Available from ICANN’s website, http://www.icann.org/tr/english.html. accessed 12/12/2007.
221 Ibid.
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In the same issue-area, an interesting case to investigate could also be the 
hybrid governance framework developed by the EU for its own top-level domain -  
dot eu. This framework is based on two pillars: the delegation of the responsibility for 
the governance of dot eu to the European Commission, which however works in 
collaboration with Eurid, a private, non-profit company charged with a series of tasks 
for the governance of dot eu, including the accreditation o f registrar companies for 
the use of the dot eu domain, the development o f principles and procedures for their 
accreditation and the terms of competition among them, as well as the creation of an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism, whose function has been undertaken by the 
Czech Arbitration Court another non-profit organization (Christou and Simpson 
2008).
Another particularly interesting case of delegation o f regulatory authority to 
non-state actors is “Basel II”, the new capital adequacy accord developed under the 
auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This new framework, 
developed in close collaboration with the global financial and banking community, 
has transformed the credit-risk evaluation process by effectively delegating to banks 
and financial institutions the responsibility for assessing their own capital adequacy 
levels. Supervision of the process is again performed in a close cooperative 
relationship with the supervised institutions. All in all, some analysts have judged the 
new Basel Accord as “the perfect example of regulatory and supervisory capture” 
(Tsingou 2008, p.61). What is more, Basel II assigns a central role to the private 
credit rating agencies as it dictates that several risk measurements should be provided 
by them.
The examples above illustrate the variety of different governance functions 
performed by hybrid public-private, or purely non-state transnational organizations. 
As we saw above, some of these organizations have taken over not only rule-making 
tasks, but also adjudication procedures and implementation/administration duties. 
This in turn reminds us the limitations of this research exercise. The theoretical 
framework presented in this thesis, does not claim wide application to all types of 
non-state authority. Our framework operates within the context of certain scope 
conditions, which limit its applicability and clarify its purpose. Therefore, we cannot
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claim that the propositions developed here for the delegation of regulatory authority 
to transnational non-state actors, will be equally applicable for the delegation of 
adjudication or implementation functions. Thus, perhaps the delegation of both of 
these functions may be explained more consistently on the basis of an efficiency 
argument, rather than a redistributive argument that was the case for the delegation of 
regulatory authority. What is more, it is often the case that in the delegation of 
implementation functions in particular, the non-state actors receiving the grant of 
authority, are not private sector actors but national or international NGOs, which may 
be motivated not by economic interest, but by ideological and ethical criteria. This 
brings us in turn, to another condition, which refers to the fact that the argument we 
have developed here does not apply to all instances o f non-state authoritative 
governance. Our redistributive argument is based on the economic theory of 
regulation, an interest groups’ approach with regard to economic regulation. 
Obviously, there exist other types of regulation and legislation, which refer to the 
governance of issues without a significant or pre-dominant economic component (e.g. 
civic rights and duties, human rights, internal and/or external security, ethical and 
religious issues, several types of social regulation). In these cases, our framework 
may not apply, since the economic theory of regulation, on which it is based, may be 
irrelevant. This does not mean that interest group politics are necessarily absent from 
the regulation of such issues, but it means that both the interest groups involved and 
the regulators/politicians may be motivated by incentives other than strictly individual 
economic interests, which cannot be accounted for by an economic theory of 
regulation. In this context, it should also be made clear that, our framework aims to 
explain the delegation of in authority entrusted to state authorities, operating in the 
context of a democratic liberal society. It applies neither to totalitarian regimes nor to 
other non-state types of authority (e.g. religious authority).
Notwithstanding these scope conditions, we have to emphasize the political 
but also symbolic significance of transnational regulatory authority and the potential 
impact it may have on global governance, but also on national politics. To the degree 
that transnational regulatory authority and transnational in authority more generally, 
embed transnational non-state structures in domestic political economies through
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institutionalization and legalization, they make the reversal o f this impact less 
probable. For this reason, I believe that further research along the lines developed in 
this thesis is needed, in order to identify and address the economic, political and 
ultimately normative implications of transnational in authority.
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A ppendix 1
List of Interviewees
IASB Case Study
1. David Cairns, 11/05/2006 (IASC Secretary-General, 1985-1994).
2. Sir Bryan Carsberg, 15/03/2007 (IASC Secretary-General, 1995-2001).
3. Thomas E. Jones, 08/05/2007 (IASB Vice-President).
4. Tony Cope, 07/06/2007 (IASB Member, 2001-2007).
5. Karel Van Hulle, 08/06/2007 (Former Head of Unit for Accounting Standards, for 
Financial Reporting and Company Law, and for Accounting and Auditing, European 
Commission, Directorate-General “Internal Market and Services”, 1984-2004).
6 . Sue Bielstein, 14/06/2007 (Director of Major Projects and Technical Activities, 
FASB).
7. Mary Tokar, 08/05/2007 (Head of the KPMG International Financial Reporting 
Group. Former Senior Associate Chief Accountant, International, SEC’s Office of the 
Chief Accountant, 1997-2000. Chair of Working Party No. 1 on multinational 
Disclosures and Accounting, IOSCO, 1999-2000).
8. Saskia Slomp, 22/05/2007 (Technical Director, Federation des Experts 
Comptables Europeens).
ICH Case Study
1. Dr. Peter Arlett, 15/05/2007 (Member of the ICH Steering Committee, Principal 
Administrator Pharmaceuticals Unit, European Commission).
2. Dr. Spiros Vamvakas, 13/04/2007 (ICH Technical Coordinator for EU, (EMEA), 
Principal Scientific Administrator, Scientific Advice and Orphan Drugs Sector, 
EMEA).
3. Dr. Elaine Esber, 23/10/2007 (Executive Director, Medical Affairs International, 
Merck Vaccine Division, Chair of the IFPMA Biologies and Vaccines’ Committee. 
Former Associate Center Director for Medical and International Affairs, CBER, 
FDA. Former ICH Steering Committee Member (FDA representative) 1990-2001).
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4. Dr. Joseph F. Contrera, 13/08/2007 (written reply to list o f open-ended questions. 
Informatics and Computational Safety Analysis Director, Office of Pharmaceutical 
Science, CDER, FDA).
5. Dr. Christine-Lise Julou, 17/07/2 (Member of the ICH Steering Committee, 
Manager, Scientific Technical Regulatory Affairs, EFPIA).
6 . Dr. Lembit Rago, 27/04/2007 (WHO Observer on the ICH Steering Committee, 
Department of Medicines Policy and Standards, WHO).
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A ppendix 2
Trends in European Financial Markets’ Growth
Market Capitalization of European Stock Exchanges (USD millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Italy
Deutsche 
Borse 
Euronext 
Brussels 
Euronext 
Amsterdam 
Euronext 
Paris 
London 
Spanish 
Exchanges 
(BME)
Stockholm 
Swiss 
Exchange
Vienna_____________________________________________________________
Source: Haller (2002) and Standard and Poor’s Global Stock Market Factbook (2004)
149 159 124 145 186 210 257 345 566 728
355 392 347 461 499 577 665 825 1087 1432
65 71 64 78 84 102 119 139 244 184
120 136 135 183 225 287 375 469 600 695
312 373 350 455 452 500 587 676 985 1497
850 986 928 1151 1145 1347 1643 1996 2373 2855
111 127 99 119 124 151 241 290 400 432
92 97 78 107 131 173 240 265 279 373
158 174 189 271 285 398 400 575 702 693
26 26 22 28 31 33 34 37 36 33
Cross-border Transactions in Bonds and Equities in Major Continental
Economies (% of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 5 21 54 79 122 187 197 187 258 313
Italy 1 4 27 60 92 132 207 253 470 672
Germany 7 33 57 55 85 170 158 172 199 253
Source: Bank for International Settlements Annual Report (1998)
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A ppendix 3
Country breakdown of amounts raised by privatisation1 (USD millions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Austria2 32 48 49 142 700 1035 1302 2438 2537 70 2086
Belgium - - - 956 548 2745 1222 1848 2288 10 -
France - - - 12160 5479 4136 3096 10105 13596 9478 17438
Germany3 11 351 - 73 678 191 1421 3125 11357 2754 1750
Greece - - - 35 73 44 558 1395 3960 4880 1384
Italy4 - - 759 3039 9077 10131 11230 23945 15138 25594 2653
Netherlands 716 179 - 780 3766 3993 1239 842 335 1481 310
Portugal 1092 1002 2206 422 1123 2362 3001 4909 4299 1620 3256
Spain 172 - 830 3222 1458 2941 2680 12532 11618 1128 1079
United Kingdom5 4219 5346 7923 8114 4632 5648 2426 4500 - - -
Notes:
.. Not available.
-  Nil or insignificant.
1. The amounts shown are gross proceeds from direct privatizations. These do not necessarily correspond to the net amount available to the government. The 
figures are on a calendar year basis and they may not add up to published budget figures.
2. Statistics refer only to privatizations by the central government.
3. Up to 1997, information on trade sales is not available.
4. Including indirect privatizations since 1996-2000 raising million USD respectively 2,325; 2,018; 3,235; 5,791; 9,244.
5. Debt sales for years 1990-97 (fiscal years) amounting to GBP 5,347 million, GBP 7,924 million, GBP 8,189 million, GBP 5,453 million, GBP 6,429 million, 
GBP 2,439 million, GBP 4,500 million, respectively. All the figures are provided in fiscal years.
Source: OECD Financial Market Trends, No. 82, June 2002.______________________________________________________________________________________
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A ppendix 4
Differences in Shareholders’ Equity from Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP for
Foreign MNCs
Company Year Domestic U.S.-Adjusted Difference %Change
1995 Skr 34,263 m Skr 37, 878 m Skr 3,651 m +11
Ericsson
(Sweden) 1996 Skr 40,456 m Skr 44,921 m Skr 4,465 m +11
1997 Skr 52,624 m Skr 57, 364 m Skr 4,740 m +9
Benetton
(Italy)
1995 Lit 1,657 bn Lit 1,779 bn Lit 122 bn +7
1996 Lit 1,821 bn Lit 1,905 bn Lit 129 bn +7
1997 Lit 2,030 bn Lit 1,824 bn Lit (206 bn) -10
1993 DM 18,145 m DM 26,281 m DM 8,136 m +45
Daimler-Benz
(Germany) 1994 DM 20,251 m DM 29,435 m DM 9,184 m +45
1995 DM 13, 842 DM 22,860 m DM 9,018 m +65
1995 £91 m £ 8,168 m £ 8,077 m +8,876
Glaxn W ellenme _ . _ _ _ _ _
(UK) 1996 £ 1,225 m £8,153 m £ 6,928 m +556
1997 £ 1,843 m £ 7,882 m £ 6,039 m +328
British Airways 1997 £2,984 m £ 2,400 m £(584 m) -20
(UK) 1998 £3,321 m £ 3,044 m £ (277 m) -8
Source: Nobes and Parker 2000, p.3
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A ppendix 5
World Market for Ethical Pharmaceuticals by Therapeutic Class 
(1991/92 market shares in selected therapeutic sub-markets)
Therapeutic
Class/
Indication
Cardiovascular Gastro-intestinal Cancer
Treatment
ACE-
inhibitors
CA-
antagonists
H2-antagonists Proton-
pump
inhibitors
Immunomodulators
1991 1991 1992 1992 1992
Drug
(top company) 
% market share
Vasotec
(Merck)
41%
Cardizem
(MMD)
18%
Zantac
(Glaxo)
57%
Losec
(Astra)
85%
Intron-A
(Schering -Plough) 
31%
Drug
(2nd company) 
% market share
Capoten
(BMS)
38%
Procardia
(Pfizer)
17.3%
Tagamet
(SKB)
15.4%
Roferon-A
(Roche)
22%
Drug
(3rd company) 
% market share
Zestrill
(Zeneca)
9.4%
Adalat
(Bayer/
Takeda)
16.5%
Gaster
(Yamanouchi)
5.5%
Krestin
(Sankyo)
19%
Drug
(4th company) 
% market share
Calan
(Monsanto)
10%
Total 88.4% 61.8% 77.9% 85% 72%
Source: Kanavos (1998)
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Appendix 6
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation 
Criteria for IASB Members
(Annex to the IASC Foundation Constitution (July 2005).
The following would represent criteria for IASB membership:
1. Demonstrated Technical Competency and Knowledge of Financial Accounting and 
Reporting. All members of the IASB, regardless of whether they are from the 
accounting profession, preparers, users, or academics, should have demonstrated a 
high level of knowledge and technical competency in financial accounting and 
reporting. The credibility of the IASB and its individual members and the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation will be enhanced with members who 
have such knowledge and skills.
2. Ability to Analyse. IASB members should have demonstrated the ability to analyse 
issues and consider the implications of that analysis for the decision-making process.
3. Communication Skills. Effective oral and written communication skills are 
necessary. These skills include the ability to communicate effectively in private 
meetings with IASB members, in public meetings, and in written materials such as 
accounting standards, speeches, articles, memos and correspondence with 
constituents. Communication skills also include the ability to listen to and consider 
the views of others. While a working knowledge of English is necessary, there should 
not be discrimination in selection against those for whom English is not their first 
language.
4. Judicious Decision-making. IASB members should be capable o f considering varied 
viewpoints, weighing the evidence presented in an impartial fashion, and reaching 
well-reasoned and supportable decisions in a timely fashion.
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5. Awareness of the Financial Reporting Environment. High quality financial 
reporting will be affected by the financial, business and economic environment. IASB 
members should have an understanding of the global economic environment in which 
the IASB operates. This global awareness should include awareness of business and 
financial reporting issues that are relevant to, and affect the quality of, transparent 
financial reporting and disclosure in the various capital markets worldwide, including 
those using International Financial Reporting Standards.
6 . Ability to Work in a Collegial Atmosphere. Members should be able to show 
respect, tact and consideration for one another's and constituents' views. Members 
must be able to work with one another in reaching consensus views based on the 
IASB's objective of developing high quality and transparent financial reporting. 
Members must be able to put the objective of the IASB above individual philosophies 
and interests.
7. Integrity, Objectivity and Discipline. The credibility o f members should be 
demonstrated through their integrity and objectivity. This includes intellectual 
integrity as well as integrity in dealing with fellow IASB members and constituents. 
Members should demonstrate an ability to be objective in reaching decisions. 
Members also should demonstrate an ability to show rigorous discipline and carry a 
demanding workload.
8. Commitment to the IASC Foundation's Mission and Public Interest. Members 
should be committed to achieving the objective of the IASC Foundation of 
establishing international accounting and financial reporting standards that are of high 
quality, comparable, and transparent. A candidate for the IASB also should be 
committed to serving the public interest through a private standard-setting process.
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Appendix 7
Compendium of FSF Standards
Area Standard Issuing Body
Macroeconomic Policy 
and Data Transparency
Monetary and financial 
policy transparency
Code of Good Practices on Transparency in 
Monetary and Financial Policies IMF
Fiscal policy transparency Code of Good Practices in Fiscal Transparency IMF
Data dissemination Special Data Dissemination Standard/ General Data Dissemination System1 IMF
Institutional and Market
Infrastructure
Insolvency2 World Bank
Corporate governance Principles of Corporate Governance OECD
Accounting International Accounting Standards (IAS)3 IASB4
Auditing International Standards on Auditing (ISA) IFAC4
Payment and settlement
Core Principles for Systemically Important 
Payment Systems 
Recommendations for Securities Settlement 
Systems
CPSS/IOSCO
The Forty Recommendations of the Financial
Market integrity Action Task Force/8 Special Recommendations Against 
Terrorist Financing
FATF
Financial Regulation and 
Supervision
Banking supervision Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision BCBS
Securities regulation Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation IOSCO
Insurance supervision Insurance Core Principles IAIS
1. Economies with access to international capital markets are encouraged to subscribe to the more 
stringent SDDS and all other economies are encouraged to adopt the GDDS.
2. The World Bank is co-ordinating a broad-based effort to develop a set o f principles and guidelines 
on insolvency regimes. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), which adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency in 1997, will help 
facilitate implementation.
3. Relevant IAS are currently being reviewed by the IAIS and IOSCO.
4. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) are distinct from other standard-setting bodies in that they are private sector 
bodies.
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